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Abstract
Negation is a part of language that humans engage in pretty much from the onset of speech.
Negation appears at first glance to be harder to grasp than object or action labels, yet
this thesis explores how this family of ‘concepts’ could be acquired in a meaningful way by
a humanoid robot based solely on the unconstrained dialogue with a human conversation
partner. The earliest forms of negation appear to be linked to the affective or motivational
state of the speaker. Therefore we developed a behavioural architecture which contains
a motivational system. This motivational system feeds its state simultaneously to other
subsystems for the purpose of symbol-grounding but also leads to the expression of the
robot’s motivational state via a facial display of emotions and motivationally congruent
body behaviours.
In order to achieve the grounding of negative words we will examine two different
mechanisms which provide an alternative to the established grounding via ostension with
or without joint attention. Two large experiments were conducted to test these two mech-
anisms. One of these mechanisms is so called negative intent interpretation, the other one
is a combination of physical and linguistic prohibition. Both mechanisms have been de-
scribed in the literature on early child language development but have never been used in
human-robot-interaction for the purpose of symbol grounding.
As we will show, both mechanisms may operate simultaneously and we can exclude
none of them as potential ontogenetic origin of negation.
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In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God
—John 1:1
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about a particular subset of human speech that came to be labelled nega-
tion. More precisely, this thesis is about the acquisition of this particular part of human
language by a humanoid robot, and by means of having this robot interact with naïve par-
ticipants. With naïve participants we refer to humans that are not the constructors of the
robot nor of its software architecture, and that do not know anything about the internal
workings of the system. Additionally: these humans did not even know why we invited
them to talk to the robot. By means of linking and showing the link between negation
and emotion/motivations, the major topic of this thesis, this work connects to the more
comprehensive theme of human interaction and the mutual dependence of language and
emotion.
The basic idea which is elaborated upon in this thesis is roughly as follows:
1. When humans interact via communication this often consitutes a (social) action and
this action cannot be reduced to or sufficiently characterised as an (act of) reference to
entities outside of the interactant such as physical objects, events, other interactants,
or cultural artefacts.
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2. Language use, i.e. the production of words and strings of words with a certain
intonational contour and energy or the production of gestures, is one of several forms
of human communication.
3. Human action is motivated, i.e. humans do not (socially) act randomly but human
action can be explained by refering to the actors’ volition, motivation, emotion,
affect, or drives - we use motivation as an umbrella term to refer to all of these
‘things’. The relationship between action and motivation is not only explanatory
but also biological: we postulate some kind of neural correlates of these phenomena,
and connectivity between these correlates in terms of which it can be explained why
humans do what they do, including doings of the linguistic kind.
4. The production of words is part of language use and therefore part of human action.
This includes single negation words but also grammatically more complex negative
constructions.
5. Because action is motivated we postulate biological link(s) between motivation and
language including link(s) between motivation and negation.
6. (From a developmental perspective emotion as opposed to “pure cognition” is partic-
ularily prevalent and important in mother-child communication. For this reason we
postulate a particularily strong link between a toddler’s motivation and his or her
early forms of language use, this link is mirrored in the affective valence of the first
words.)
Regarding assertion 1 : Social is bracketed because the reader may associate this word with
developmentally late conventional uses of language such as speech acts to establish conven-
tional social facts and relations (oaths, delarations of marriage, war declarations, judges’
2
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sentences, etc.). Our use of social is meant to include communicative actions that are
closer to biology and developmentally earlier such as a baby’s cry or early communicative
acts of rejection by emotional displays. We do take these acts, and human communication
in general, to be an inherently social phenomenon. It is just by virtue of for example
speech act theory having been developed ‘the other way around’, i.e. starting with and
emphasising highly conventional and ‘abstract’ uses of language, that the reader might
have a more narrow conception of social than the one we elude to here.
With ‘cultural artefacts’ we mean ‘culturally defined objects’ such as schools, coun-
tries, TV shows, stories, nationalities, the military, social roles such as judges, policemen,
protesters, dictators, the Queen, or other somewhat ‘abstract’ entities that we regularly
refer to in talk but which are not mainly ‘defined’1 in terms of physical properties or af-
fordances.
Regarding assertion 2 : This point is made as it is not uncommon in linguistic but also tech-
nical circles to reduce language to a linguistic code, i.e. word forms and the grammatical
relations between words. We strongly oppose this attempt and emphasize the non-codified,
physical, and biological characteristics of spoken language.
Regarding assertion 3 : The reason for giving this list of motivation-related terms, that
admittedly seems somewhat random, is the circumstance that there is not much consensus
in the scientific community, which of these notions are ‘biologically real’, which of them
are ‘psychological constructs’, and which are epiphenomena of our language that, on the
biological level, can be reduced to one or more of the other notions. Neither is there much
1Is is another misconception to think that one would have to know the definition of a word in order to
use it. We regularily use words without being able to give a definition of them. This author, for example,
has a lamentably small knowledge of different tree species and possibly could not tell apart a spruce from
a pine tree. Nevertheless the author has no problem with using (and understanding) these words in a
dialogue. The problems only start if the talk ventures towards the botanical. So it would be more correct
(but also bulky) to say “.. which, if one tried to define these entities one would define them ..”.
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agreement, if one accepts 2 or more of these notions as being ‘biologically real’, how these
relate to each other, causally or other. Thus, the obvious vagueness of the author is indeed,
at least partially, caused by the lack of agreement in psychology, neuroscience, discourse
analysis, and ethnopragmatics (cf. Lindquist et al. 2013).
Regarding assertion 4 : The reason why we include grammatical constructions here is our
belief that the interdependence of motivation and language does not ‘go away’ with the
progressing development of a child’s language use. The interdependence might become
slightly weaker with certain linguistic constructions as ‘pure cognition’ and grammatical
skills of the child develops. But we think it to be a fatal mistake to believe that humans
develop from being ‘purely emotional beings’ into being ‘purely rational beings’ and to
construe adult language use as a mainly rational and possibly logical endeavour. The au-
thor perceives this ‘logical stance’ to be a remote echo of positivism which was partially
rejuvenated with Chomsky’s version of linguistics. This stance can only be upheld under
ignorance of mounting empirical evidence to the contrary and goes to show that parts of
science, at least in the cases of (theoretical) linguistics, does not necessarily live up to its
own criteria, i.e. that theories have to be abandoned when faced with empirical evidence
that contradicts the theoretical assertions.
Regarding assertion 6 : This assertion is bracketed as it makes use of the dichotomy cogni-
tion vs. motivation or cognition vs. emotion. We regard this dichotomy as problematic,
as it might contribute to us thinking that there were a fundamental difference between
‘to think’ as opposed to ‘to feel’. By extending this dichotomy one might arrive at the
Chomskians’ believe that our mind was modular in the sense that the ‘language faculty’
would operate and could be studied in isolation of other ‘mental’ faculties. Other con-
coctions that can be construed based on this dichotomy are Chomsky’s postulated and
poorly defined divide between “I-” and “E-language”, which is in strong contradiction of
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empirical evidence that documents the impact of ‘pragmatic’ phenomena (“E-language”)
upon certain grammatical constructions (“I-language”). We nevertheless decided to make
use of this common dichotomy as it still in heavy use in the scientific community. But we
also want to emphasize the danger of its frequent use in that one might come to believe in
the biological reality of this division just by virtue of having alluded to it by ‘speaking it
out’ too often. This then would be a good example of our understanding of Wittgenstein’s
saying of what happens when “language celebrates”2.
A Warning: Beware of universals Before we go into any further elaboration of the
topic proper we would like to sensitise the reader to a fundamental issue that is much too
often not discussed, mentioned, or made explicit in the literature on language acquisition
(including robotics). This issue has to do with the clash of paradigms in current linguis-
tics, cognitive versus nativist linguistics, and the historical impact of the older of the two
paradigms, nativism, on other language-related fields such as pragmatics, developmental
psycholinguistics, or developmental psychology.
The single most dangerous and tempting tendency within the sciences of language3 is
the tendency to adopt a premature assumption about what is and what is not universal
across all languages. Assumptions of universality, albeit different from those in linguistics,
are also common in the literature on language acquisition. To make such an assumption is
2This is a reference to Wittgenstein’s dictum that “philosophical problems arise when language cel-
ebrates” which he attributes to the philosophers’ use of language, especially in the context of ostensive
definitions of words and the problems that arise if all words are ought to be given meaning via osten-
sion including ostensive words such as “this” themselves Wittgenstein (1984) (PI 38). Anscombe, the
English translator, translated the original “feiert” (celebrates) to “goes on holiday” in Wittgenstein (1958)
which is most probably a translation error. German has a particular word for holiday: “Ferien”, “goes on
holiday” would subsequently be “in die Ferien geht”. We suspect that Anscombe confused “Ferien” with
“Feiern/feiern” due to their strong lexical similarity.
3With use sciences of language as an umbrella term for the following language related scientific dis-
ciplines: philosophy of language, linguistics, pragmatics, developmental psychology, psycholinguistics,
antrophological linguistics, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, automatic speech processing (ASP),
natural language processing (NLP), language related developmental robotics.
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tempting in order to set a point of reference, a bedrock and starting point, against which
we can pitch our theories. It is the basis on which we formulate our research hypotheses
and how we frame the learning problem. For these reasons assumptions on universals
determine on what problem we focus our efforts, what questions we ask, which kind of
‘humanistic’ literature we read to form the theoretical backgound of our algorithms and
experimental designs, and whom we, as roboticists, potentially ask for advice in times of
(theoretical) doubt.
A philosopher of language might have the luxury to suspend such assumptions, indeed
we expect philosophers to be critical about any scientific assumptions, especially if they
stand on a fundament as weak as is typically the case in language-related disciplines.
Developmental roboticists on the other hand have to make up their mind, because these
universals, thought to be essential to the capacity of ‘languaging’ of any human being,
determine what we, as developmentalists, are allowed to design and hard-wire into our
robots as opposed to what the robot is supposed to learn. Analogously those innate
psychological capacities, but also a care-takers behavioural adaptations when interacting
with a toddler, count as universals that are supposed to be available to human babies
from birth and adhered to by there caregivers: biological and psychological givens, that
constitute the necessary and sufficient elemental driving forces that enable humans and,
potentially, at some point, robots to acquire this unique capacity amongst all species. In
this regard universals form the basis of our acquisition or learning algorithms.
The bad news is that far more authors than only the linguists which support the nativist
position make universal claims, yet many do not mark them as such. Most of the prominent
theories in pragmatics such as speech act theory, Gricean politeness theory, and relevance
theory have recently been identified as “universalist” (cf. Goddard 2006, Hatch 1999)
and Anglocentric (Goddard 2006). Yet these approaches have never presented sufficient
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empiriral support to back such grand claims.
The good news is that these premature claims for universality have been recently un-
covered as such by cross-language linguists and pragmaticists, that collected empirical
evidence to refute them. Furthermore these researchers, some of which now go under the
name of ethnopragmaticists indicate that we finally seem to get some ground under our feet
in terms of the question what is truly universal to ALL languages on our planet (Goddard
2006, Wierzbicka 1994). The author unfortunately discovered this new line of research
and new methodology only upon writing up this thesis and could therefore not attempt a
conversion of our negation ‘types’, which will be introduced later, and parts of our other
terminology into their new format called natural semantic metalanguage (NSM).
In order to avoid ill-formulated and ill-founded unversalist assumptions it is important
to realise that these assumptions are part, implictly or explicitly, of any language-related
publication that is not purely descriptive, that is, any publication that does not just report
chracteristics of a particular language or a practice of linguistic interaction, but that makes
any assertions beyond pure descriptions. Furthermore, via writing about language in a
particular language we also make a methodological choice in terms of the “tools of thought”
by recurring to, typically Anglocentric, scientific terminology or Anglocentric metaphors.
This author is a “gebranntes Kind”4 in the sense that he believed for a long time in
these false assumptions of universality of the pragmatic kind, in his particular case the
universality of speech act types as proposed by Searle. As we have realized now, only
cross-linguistic research is an approach that stands a chance to uncover what truly is
universal. Even philosophers, the majority of whom are predominantly of Anglo-European
descent, and supposedly the most general of thinkers, are prone to fall for, or make wrong
4This expression derives from the German proverb “Ein gebranntes Kind scheut das Feuer” which
roughly translates to “Once bitten, twice shy”. The literal translation would be “A burnt child dreads the
fire”.
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claims of universality by virtue of having been raised and cultivized in an Anglo-European
culture, and by virtue of using one particular language, typically their native language, as
their ‘tool of choice’. The fact that English is the de facto standard publication language
of modern science does not really help things in this regard. Facilitating misleading ideas
about universals in language-related research is the circumstance that we, as language
researchers, do not only think about language and language-related cultural practices, but
that the formulating of ideas is done in, and therefore influenced by a particular language.
This is for example not the case in mathematics where the language of the trade is a
formal, artificial language, a language nobody has been raised in, and which is not used
in ordinary life such as in ritualistic practices (marrying a couple, christening a child etc),
poetry, entertainment, or, just a for a chat in the pub - mathematics “does not celebrate”.
Thus any researcher or philosopher, that thinks, writes, and talks in his or her own na-
tive language about language-related phenomana is necessarily influenced by certain, not
necessarily conscious, cultural rules and what one may call concepts or metaphors in his or
her very language, many of which are culture-specific and therefore not directly applicable
to and available in other cultures. These rules, or cultural scripts, bias our thinking and
doing in many ways that we more often than not are oblivous to. As Underhill has aptly
put it: “It would seem that in language there are no ‘free-thinkers’. Thought is language-
bound” (Underhill 2011).
Ubiquity and importance of language for human societies Language permeates
our societies and cultures on all levels from the political to the emotional. Many cultures
give rise to institutions, by anchoring them in society via legally binding texts which adhere
to a particular jargon or group-internal discourse with lasting and very practical effects
8
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for the ordinary lives of the members of society. A recent historical example of such doing
with language is the establishment of what was termed “homeland security” in the United
States. The ‘political erection’ of the European Union, which essentially is based in a set
of legal texts that constitute legally binding contracts between its member countries, did
not just yield an abstract contract between societies, that is only truly acknowledged by
the ones in the upper echelons of the political establishments of societies, but has very
practical consequences for any member of this union. The fact, that we can just walk
across country borders without showing our passports and without being asked potentially
embarassing questions, the fact that we can just move to another member country and
work there without having to apply for visas, i.e. without scribbling certain things on a
certain kind of form, is a direct outcome of some people writing the ‘right’ kind of text in
the ‘right’ manner by using the ‘appropriate’ language, i.e. a language acknowledged as
being appropriate by a group of fellow conspecifics that we call “lawyers”5. The example
just given is an example of how certain kinds of language use affect us, our freedom and
potential actions in a top-to-bottom kind of way due to the fact that only a small group
of people are endowed by the citizens of their respective countries to discuss and decide
on the particular details of these foundational documents. In democratic societies the way
this ‘endowment’ is done is in a bottom-up approach called election that again involves
the heavy use of language, first in the form of political advertisement, propaganda, TV
adverts, posters etc., all with the purpose of influencing enough people to produce the right
kind of sign in the right kind of box on so-called election forms, such that ‘the right kind of
guy’ is endowed with the right kind of power. Effectively we see here a top-down (political
advertisement), bottom-up (filling out the election form), top-down use of language.
5Of course this is a very simplistic depiction of the actual process. The ideas that were rigidified in
these contractual texts for example had first ‘to be sold’ to the members the participating countries. Yet
this work was again accomplished by use of language. Try to subtract all linguistic doing from the political
practice and odds are that you will end up empty-handed.
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Yet this is only one rather abstract ‘level’ of language doings. Other ceremonial uses
of language that may seem ‘closer to home’ and therefore a few levels ‘below’ the just
described political doings by speaking or writing and which most members of western so-
cieties participate in are christenings, weddings, obituaries, and funerals, typically in this
order6. Much of our social order is established via the use of language by the ‘right’ kind
of people in the ‘right’ kind of position. These people are endowed with these positions
by means of language use of other conspecifics: we respect policemen as such and behave
accordingly7 in their presence because they have been made policemen via a ceremonial
practice executed via speaking, possibly rigidified via a written contract by other humans.
Teachers, professors, CEOs, and chimney sweepers, have these kind of professional roles
because some form of employment contract makes them so, which is formulated and written
in language sometimes in combination with some kind of ceremony that involves a par-
ticular kind of speech. Yet another level ‘down’, and typically considered less ceremonial,
are other language doings such as swearing, insulting, but also soothing, singing a lullaby,
waking somebody up, or declaring one’s love to another person which involve what we may
call emotions. Language doings of this kind then often result in or effect what one may call
emotional states such as feeling insulted, calming down or being calm, being awake or being
in love or feeling loved. These are only a few examples of what we do to and with each
other via ‘languaging’ and are meant to show that language and language-related practices
are not only part of most human societies but must be rather seen as constitutive of these
societies. Our societies are much less built on bricks and cement than they are built on
words and by the use of words.
It is a curious circumstance that we all to easily forget about the power of ‘languag-
6The ordering of christening and wedding may be inversed, depending if the ‘target’ of the practice is
oneself or if one is ‘only witness’ to the practice.
7Even if we do not behave accordingly, thereby risking arrest, we typically do so in full awareness, that
we are violating a cultural norm.
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ing’, possibly for the same reason that we typically don’t think about our heart beat. It
is an essential, probably the most essential ingredient involved in the construction and
maintenance of the social fabric that connects us as social beings.
Negation and logic This thesis is about negation and how it might be aquired by
toddlers or robots. For logicians as computer scientists negation is most often a matter
of logic, and one of the central notions of logic is truth. The notion of truth is central to
modern western sciences. This is also the case for computer science whose core concepts
and design principles were shaped mainly by physicists and mathematicians who, during
the inception of computer science, relied on and were already used to the formalism of
predicate logic. Predicate logic was developed between the late 19th and early 20th century
by the likes of Frege, Russell, Peano, Moore, Wittgenstein and many more, possibly lesser
known logicians (see also Ferreirós 2001). It was quickly accepted by mathematicians and
physicists as the common language of their trades - trades, particularly in the case of
physics, whose job it is to describe the fundamental laws of nature.
Another motivation, apart from developing a formal and sufficiently powerful ‘way of
writing’ for the natural sciences and mathematics, in the context of formal logic, seems to
have been the endeavour to find an alternative and more formally rigid way to ‘translate’
ordinary sentences of language, any human language, into something less ambiguous and
‘messy’. In the latter case the ‘content’ of the sentences to be pinned down is not con-
strained to the domain of natural sciences. In this case also ‘ordinary’ sentences, written
down utterances, such as “Yesterday I walked my dog” ought to be captured by the formal-
ism. It is important to emphasize the difference between these two motivations. In case
of the natural sciences the phenomenas captured and pinned down by the formalism, the
sentences that describe the target phenomena are, at least ideally, independent of the one
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who pins them down. So the fact that they are written down by a human is not captured
by the formalism of predicate logic, simply because the observer is thought to be irrelevant
to the truth or falsehood of the observed. This can only be hinted to in the meta-language,
which, by definition, is not part of the formal language itself. In the case of language in
general, this assumption does not hold. Utterances and sentences in everyday language
are phenomenas that only occasionally have to do with absolute truth. Many utterances
in ordinary language do not even have the tendency to establish truth, i.e. to describe
an observed phenomenon. The tendency of ordinary language, as opposed to the formal
language of natural science of not being ‘representational’, i.e., not being about establishing
truth- and falsehood will be described later in greater detail in chapter 2.1.
Nevertheless it is no big surpise that formal logic lies at the very heart of computer
science. This is possibly due to the fact that the field is based on mathematics and
engineering, both fields in which predicate logic is the standard notation for writing down
ideas or laws, or to describe systems in an unambiguous and formal way. On a technical
level, that is on the engineering side, the very core of the artifacts which computer science
is all about are, by design, nifty combinations of AND and OR gates, that, linked together
make up the core of the majority of all computational units. The influence of formal logic
does anything but end with its virtual materialization in terms of silicone chips. Theoretical
computer science is possibly closer to mathematics than any other subfield of computer
science and it does not surprise that most formal proofs utilize the logical notation in
order to keep proofs short and unambiguous. This is what the notation was created for.
In another subfield of computer science, artificial intelligence, the impact of the logical
formalisms was and is equally considerable. Thus, it would be hardly surprising, if one
would expect a treatise on the acquisition of negation involving robots to be mainly an
exercise in logic. Yet it is not.
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A very conscise, albeit somewhat cryptic, explanation why this is not so, can be given
in three sentences: “No” is not “not”. There is a reason why the logical operator is a
not-gate and not a no-gate. And finally: “No” comes first.
Words, sometimes in isolation, sometimes in company of other words and strung to-
gether to multi-word utterances are very powerful tools which humans use to act upon
each other as well as to act in communion. And as with most tools they can be used to
accomplish things that are beneficial for a majority of people but they can also be used
in a destructive way. A hammer can be used to build a house to give shelter, but it can
also be used to kill a person. A single utterance can cause two nations to go to war with
each other, but it can also be used to accomplish the maintenance of peace. Pub brawls
typically start with the exchange of utterances between parties which may or may not be
sympathetic towards each other at the start of the verbal exchange. Chains of events, or
rather chains of actions of this type have even become an idiom in German: ein Wort führte
zum anderen, one word leads to another. Often, in the case of a pub-related argument, the
exchange of words leads to an exchange of fists, but sometimes they don’t. The pivotal
activities, which decide if an argument becomes physical or not, are typically to be found
in one or more utterances being uttered: one or both parties either “pour oil on troubled
waters” or “fuel the fire”. And this is accomplished by uttering the right or wrong words
at the right or wrong time. In case of an argument becoming violent we then often say
that the situation escalated. This way of explaining events does not indicate a fundamen-
tal difference between the non-physical early stage of the argument and the physical one.
The transition from speaking or shouting to hitting seems to be fluent and, at least in
hindsight, hardly surprises the participant or observer. If participants of such an event are
asked, why they hit another person and possibly even killed him or her the justifciation is
often given in terms of provocations: “John provoked me by saying X”, or “John provoked
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me by calling me X”, or simply by “He was asking for it”. So at least in the mind of the
person who justifies his physical acts with such explanations, the verbal acts of the other
party seem to be causal in bringing about the physical acts of violence. In other words,
the utterances and words of the provoking party are seen as full-fleged actions which, by
virtue of being uttered by the provoking party, led, causally or not, to a physical action
on the part of the provoked.
1.1 Motivation and Goals
The major topic of this thesis it the acquisition of linguistic negation. Our goal is to shed
more light on the details of this acquisition process. We try to identify the prerequisites
and the particular ‘mechanics’ of the acquisition process in a manner far more detailed
than is typically the case in psycholinguistics or developmental psychology. The way in
which we are attempting to do this is akin to other constructive approaches such as artifi-
cial life. Constructive approaches (Nehaniv et al. 1999) typically transfer ideas and results
in both directions, from the natural to the constructed, and back. Thus also the goals
can be formulated from either perspective. Let us mentally put ‘the natural’ on the left,
and ‘the constructed’ on the right, with ‘the natural’ being research on language acquisi-
tion in humans, typically conducted within the fields psycholinguistics and developmental
psychology. ‘The constructed’ on the right are attempts to enable machines, in our case
robots, to acquire, learn, or understand human language. The work presented within this
thesis uses methods which are typically found in developmental and/or cognitive robotics
and human-robot-interaction.
Generally within this kind of research, in the left-to-right direction, in terms of the flow
of ideas, i.e. the right using ideas developed by the left, the goal is to construct machines
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that are capable of a conversation with human beings based on insights borrowed from the
left. In other words: The goal is to create robots that are able to speak and understand
what their locutor says.
In the right-to-left direction, i.e. the flow of ideas and results from the artificial to
the natural, the goal is to test hypotheses that have been proposed on the left by way
of implementing the necessary mechanisms in machines on the right, and feed the results
back to the left.
This constructive feedback loop can be beneficial to the ‘natural’ side because a great
amount of small detailed problems have to be solved if such ideas are to be implemented on
machines. These seemingly small details are easily overlooked when concentrating solely on
‘the big picture’ and when only considering organisms that acquire the skill in question fully
automatically. Many ‘small’ mechanisms that play a role within human communication
might be overlooked or considered of minor importance if they don’t fit neatly into the
linguistic theory of choice. It is only when we are forced to implement these grand ideas
in software and hardware, that some of these disregarded small mechanisms can come to
haunt us. And, as we will show within this thesis, some of these ‘small details’ have the
potential to turn the theoretical edifice upside-down and make us reconsider some claims
that otherwise could have lived on happily ever after in utter ignorance of reality.
As already mentioned, the particular phenomenon under investigation within this thesis
is the developmental origin of human linguistic negation. In simpler terms, we attempt to
answer the question: How do children learn (to use) negation appropriately, and what are
the required (cognitive/computational) mechanisms to achieve this feat?
We will in particular look at two not mutually-exclusive hypotheses which we encoun-
tered in Pea (1980). The first hypothesis, the first part of which is based on said publication,
but which, within Pea (1980) is not presented as such hypothesis, goes as follows:
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Hypothesis 1 Negation is acquired by children by way of parents interpreting the chil-
drens’ physical display of their negative motivational/emotional/volitional8 states in a
linguistic manner. We expect negative words to be highly prevalent within these “negative
intent interpretations”. Furthermore we expect these negative words to be prosodically
salient, such that the child may easily pick them up. Moreover, we expect these negative
intent interpretations to be produced simultaneously to the child’s display of those states,
at least in the majority of cases, such that the negative word may be associated with the
negative motivational state.9
Notice that the actual hypothesis is the assertion stated within the first sentence. The
subsequent three sentences contain details which are not elaborated on by the main asser-
tion. Main assertions like the above are frequently stated in the developmental literature.
The subsequent details are most often not made explicit within this literature and the
relevant experiments are often not executed or analysed with sufficient detail to make such
‘minor’ assertions. This also means, that the main assertion could still hold even if one of
the details should turn out to be false, though a refutation of any of the ‘sub’-assertions
would shed serious doubt on the validity of the main assertion. The second hypothesis is
based on Spitz (1957) and goes as follows.
Hypothesis 2 Negation is acquired by childen by way of parents prohibiting them from
doing something. Prohibitions that are performed by speaking typically contain or solely
consist of negative symbols. As early forms of prohibition typically go along with corporal
8We will later explain, why we cannot decide on any single element of this trinity.
9The original formulation in Pea (1980) is: “Parents also frequently interpret these behaviors (physical
means of rejection) as expressive of negation and expand them with lexical negative "no, no, don’t want
it." Ryan (1974) has emphasized the importance of such intent interpretations for the eventual linguistic
expression of intention.” (Remark in brackets added by the author)
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restraint, children may associate the negative symbol with the negative emotion that en-
sues from their limitation of agency brought about by the parental restraint.10
1.2 Overview of Thesis
This thesis should come with an appended DVD which contains more than 8 hours of
experimental video recordings. We strongly urge the reader to watch at least some of these
videos to sensitise him- or herself to the issue. Interaction is best observed, instead of
being read about. Some pointers to interesting positions within the videos are provided in
chapter D.
Main Section
In the present chapter we prepare the ground for this thesis: the two investigated hypothe-
ses on the origins of negation are introduced and motivated.
In chapter 2 we review ideas from various scientific fields that we consider important for the
understanding of negation. As this thesis is situated within robotics and computer science,
more time is spent on ‘humanistic’ ideas. In our view the problem of understanding early
forms of negation is one of taking the right perspective and getting the right footing rather
than finding some specific kind of algorithm.
In chapter 3 we will describe our robotic architecture that was designed and constructed
based on the insights gained from a cognitive ‘requirement analysis’ of early negation that
10Original formulation in (Pea 1980, p. 178 with reference to Spitz 1957: “Spitz (1957) sees the child’s
uncompleted act in conjunction with the parent’s negative word or gesture as a major source of the first
meaning of "no" for the child. His account assumes that the child’s frustrated id drives thereby endow
the negative word and gesture with a specific affective cathexis that ensures the child’s remembrance of
the negative symbols. The child’s first use of negation, on this view, is a result of identification with the
prohibiting parent, and refusal or rejection is the first meaning since the symbol is imbued with aggressive
cathexis in the unpleasurable experiences associated with its memory traces.”
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has been performed more than 30 years ago by Roy D. Pea. This architecture will then
subsequently be put to use in a set of experiments that attempt to either support or dis-
prove two hypotheses on the ontogenetic origins of negation.
In chapter 4 we will describe the experimental setup of both the so called rejection and
prohibition experiments. Both experiments have been designed to pitch the two research
hypothesis against each other.
Chapter 5 is the by far most extensive chapter of this thesis. There we perform an analysis
of the speech gathered during the experiments from both, the participants and the robot.
The main analysis is performed on three different levels: utterance, word, and pragmatic
level. Futhermore an additional analysis on temporal relationships between non-linguistic
events and participant’s speech acts is performed in order to answer some questions that
came up due to a rather surprising result.
In chapter 6 we discuss some new issues that were thrown up during the analysis. We also
quickly summarize the contributions of this thesis, discuss its potential impact, and the
future work, which we are planning to follow up with.
Appendix
Chapter B contains tables that are too long for the main part of the thesis and other
additional listings connected to the analysis as well as the coding scheme used within the
pragmatic analysis.
Chapter C contains a short overview of customary symbols employed in conversation ana-
lytical transcripts.
Chapter D gives a short overview of the contents of the DVD. Here we also provide some
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links to particular positions within the experimental video recordings that are of interest
for the purposes of this thesis. As there are alltogether 98 videos (2 videos were acciden-
tally overwritten during the execution of the experiments), the reader is well advised to
start a potential journey through the provided videos by starting at one of the positions
indicated there.
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The notion of a rule is logically connected to the
notion of following a rule, and the notion of
following a rule is connected to the notion of making
one’s behaviour conform to the content of a rule
because it is a rule.
—John R. Searle
Chapter 2
A Short Review of the Sciences of
Language
2.1 Doing Things by Speaking
2.1.1 Logical Limitations
As alluded to in the introduction, speaking can be a form of acting. This is not to say that
at some level some utterances are not amenable to a translation into a logical predicate.
Yet even for these utterances an important question is, if they are indeed sufficiently
characterised by the predicate. Moreover, there are many utterances that certainly are
insufficiently characterised by a logical description. Furthermore there are utterances where
it seems highly construed to posit the existence of a logically structured thought that
accompanies such utterances, a thought held by a speaker who engages in them. Think of
utterances such as “ouch!”, or even “ok”. For the latter kind of utterances the construction of
such a logical “representation” seems utterly unnecessary and a potential waste of cognitive
processing.
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Let us call the paradigm that posits that each and every utterance has a propositional
representation at its core propositional paradigm. Assume that this paradigm posits, that
every human, including small children, hold a logically structured thought in their mind
every time they produce an utterance. Sometimes the logical structure of this thought is
called the propositional content of an utterance. This is somewhat of a misnomer as the
content is not thought to be attached to the utterance but is rather thought to be held in
the mind of speaker at the time of speaking. The particular kind of logic to be employed
as “language of thought”, i.e. the particular logical flavour of this “internal language of
thought” is not overly important. But it might be worth saying that there are strong
indications from research on biases in human thinking that suggest that the type of logic
at play would most probably not be the standard predicate logic (Levinson 1995).
It seems that the propositional content at the core of an utterance is thought to rep-
resent whatever state of affairs in the world the utterance refers to or, in other words,
what the utterance is about. Saying that propositional contents are at the core of an ut-
terance hints towards the existence of a periphery, something secondary, which might not
be amenable to truth-functional logic. J. L. Austin developed a theory, speech act theory
(Austin 1975), that investigates parts of this so-called periphery which characterizes many
utterances as so-called speech acts. John Searle, his student, subsequently developed a cat-
egorization system for these speech acts (Searle 1969). Speech act theory will be sketched
a bit further below. First we will give some examples of speech in (inter-)action where
this so called periphery seems to become surprisingly dominant in terms of explaining the
character of a spoken utterance.
Utterances where people give reasons in order to justify their actions are one example where
predicate logic comes dangerously close to its descriptive limit. When a speaker gives a
reason why she did this or that, i.e. unveils her motivations behind a certain deed, this
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act is by its very nature subjective. A curious property of reasons is that a hearer has no
problem whatsoever in accepting a reason as a reason given by some other speaker, which
he himself would never give as a reason for the same deed. Assume somebody explains in
court that he killed his wife for cheating on him. In this case the accused states the fact
or at least his belief that she cheated on him, as the reason for his deed of killing her. We
might not accept this reason as sufficient to justify the deed (murder/manslaughter). But
this does not imply that we don’t take this to be a reason of the speaker. By saying “But
this is not a reason” (German: “Das ist doch kein Grund!”), we do not say that we don’t
think that it is not a reason for the speaker. What we say is that, if we were in the place of
the speaker, we would not consider this reason to be sufficient to justify the deed, possibly
implying our adherence to a higher moral standard compared to the speaker. We say that
the given reason is not a reason for us, but we don’t say anything about the reason being
or not being a reason for the speaker. We can at most speculate what would or would
not count as a reason for the speaker. Absolute truth about this ‘subjective truth’ of the
reason being a reason for the speaker cannot possibly be established in such a case by any
person other than the speaker due to the lack of access to the internal state of the speaker
and his ways of reasoning. Predicate logic is not designed to handle anything else than
absolute, that is speaker-independent truth.
In an attempt to rescue the descriptive power of the notion of truth for natural language,
this notion would have to be modified considerably. One could, for example, try to establish
a notion of subjective, or speaker-dependent truth in order to accomodate the fact that
different speakers often do not agree on what is and what is not the case. As in the
previous example, a reason might be a proper reason for one person, but does not even
come close being a reason for justifying the same action for another person. Certain forms
of modal logic, which are extensions of predicate logic, ought to capture ‘subjective truth’
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by introducing operators for believe, thereby introducing an agent-centric perspective into
the formalism. These kinds of logic have no problem with formalizing truth-functional
disagreements between various speakers by attributing different beliefs to different speakers.
Thus speaker-dependent truth can be handled by extensions of predicate logic. Yet, from
a logical perspective, two or more speakers sometimes do much worse things than just
uttering things that are logically incoherent when engaging in a conversation. These ‘speech
acts’ are worse in terms of the degree to which they could be considered truth-functional
or representational.
One example of such an ‘illogical’ deed was called performative by Austin. “Close the
window!” for example cannot be sufficiently characterised by ‘beliefs’ no matter how weak
of a truth they ought to be. The reason for this insufficiency is that performatives are not
‘about’ something else being or not being the case. Even worse for any truth-functional
account of language, they only marginally involve the speaker’s beliefs if we judge them
for their communicative success. Their degree of ‘being about something that is the case’,
is close to zero.
2.1.2 Speech Act Theory
In this subsection we quickly introduce speech act theory by examples. The particular
‘implementation’ of the theory is not of great importance to our purposes and we refer to
Levinson (1983) for a good introduction into the theory and an excellent formal proof of
some of its shortcomings. The purpose of this section is merely to further sensitise the
reader to the non-logical aspects of language use in preparation for our taxonomy which
will be introduced in chapter 5.3. We will generally adhere to Austin’s (1975) account of
speech acts as outlined by Levinson (1983) unless we say differently.
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Performatives vs. constatives Performatives were the first types of speech act that
caught Austin’s attention, who is commonly thought to be the father of speech act theory
(SAT ). At first he contrasted performatives with constatives, the latter of which basically
subsume statements and assertions, bearers of truth. Conversely, what performatives ‘are
really about’ is to bring about a future state of affairs, ‘fact creators’ so to say, or the manip-
ulation of the addressees’ state of mind. In other words, these utterances, or speech acts,
are full-fledged actions. As performatives, such as “Could you please close the window”,
a request, can generally not be evaluated in terms of truth, Austin introduced the notion
of felicity. The qualification of a speech act as (non-)felicitous, i.e. the (non-)successful
performance of a speech act, then may be seen as a more general qualification of (the act of
producing) an utterance and replacement for true and false. There have been attempts to
‘loosen up’ semantics in order to accommodate these ‘non-representational’ acts of speech
in order to circumvent the need for a separate (speech act) theory but none of them suc-
ceeded according to Levinson (1983). Later Austin evolved his taxonomy by giving up the
strict separation between performatives and constatives, to make the latter a specific case
amongst many other cases or types of speech acts. Due to space considerations we refer to
Austin (1975) and Levinson (1983) for further details of Austin’s taxonomic development.
Austin further noticed that the performance of certain speech acts appears to hinge
on the existence of conventional procedures. In order to christen a baby, for example, one
has to follow certain socially established rules, which involve a certain location (registrar’s
office or church), a certain role of the baptist (priest), and the use of certain (ceremonial)
utterances. Certain types of speech acts further require the addressee to acknowledge
or ratify their performance, as is the case when betting somebody as in “I bet you five
pounds that Arsenal will win tomorrow”. Without the addressee acknowledging the act
with something like “you’re on”, the bettor cannot be said to have actually betted. Yet other
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types of speech acts such as promises require the promising party to sincerely believe that
it will stick to the promise, and condolences require the speaker to feel actually sorry for
the addressee, if they ought to be felictous and not just empty formulae. Austin developed
a set of criteria that ought to capture the kind of conditions that have to be met in order
for a speech act to be considered as having been performed and, further, as having been
performed felicitously.
Felicity conditions Firstly (A), there has to be a conventional procedure with a con-
ventional effect, and the speaker, if this procedure requires, may have to hold a particular
role and may have to be in a particular situation1. Secondly (B), this conventional proce-
dure has to be executed correctly and completely. And thirdly (C ), the speaker may have
to have the required thoughts, feelings, or intentions, as specified by the procedure, and,
further, may have to follow-up with certain actions or a certain conduct, if the procedure
requires.
Non-acting vs. acting unsucessfully Clearly, any of these criteria may not be met.
The outcome of not meeting one or more of these criteria may have two different kinds
of failure as consequence. Austin distinguished between the non-performance or the non-
coming-off of a speech act, which is the case if any of the criteria listed under (A) or (B)
are not met, and a speech act beeing performed unfelicitiously, which would be caused by
a failure to meet any of the conditions listed under point (C ). An example for the first
case, the non-performance of a speech act, is if a random person on the street approaches
you and says “I hereby sentence you to 5 years in prison”. This is a non-sentence due to
1In the case of christening a child, it is not sufficient that there is a baptist and some random child. The
parents of the child actually must want the child to be baptized at that very point in time, must typically
be present, and they typically have to be members of or believers in the respective religion. This is what
is meant with “particular situation” here.
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the random person not being a judge. Even if this random person happens to be a judge,
it is not the right place (court), nor is it the right situation (trial) for a sentence to “take
off”. In these cases the speech act is thus not only not felicitous, the act was indeed not
carried out at all or misfired in Austin’s jargon. An example of the second case, a speech
act being performed unfelicitiously, would be if I promise you that I will do something, for
example attending your birthday party, without having the intention of doing so. In this
case, I did indeed promise, but the promise in not sincere and therefore unfelicitous.
So it is perfectly possible that a speech act was performed, but it may not be considered
felicitous, due to one or several criteria being violated. If somebody tells you to close the
window and you follow the request, it doesn’t matter if the speaker believed that you
would do it or not in order for the request to be a request. Neither does it matter if the
speaker actually believes that the window is indeed open or not. If you turn around to
close it and realise that the window is already closed, the request was successful in being
a request. It was not felicitous though if the person, asking you to close it, did not believe
that the window was open in the first place and just used this utterance to annoy you.
In this case the speaker would have acted insincerely, which is a violation of the criteria
listed under point (C ). If the speaker actually believed that the window is open, but it is
not, the speaker acted based on a false belief. The latter kind of failure is not covered by
Austin’s criteria.
As can be seen from this list of criteria, only required beliefs can be analysed in or
reduced to terms of truth- or falsehood. A request as the aforementioned may be caused
by my false belief of the window being open, but this being the case does not render the act
of requesting a non-act. Compare: Somebody throws a snowball at you, planning to hit
you, based on the belief that you were the culprit who threw the previous snowball which
hit him. In this case neither the thrower’s belief of you being the culprit (false belief), nor
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his belief, that he will indeed hit you bare any relevance on the decision as to whether he
threw the snowball. The act of throwing was performed even if the thrower does not hit
the target. Acting on a false belief, is acting nevertheless. And not achieving one’s goal
by an action does not render an action a non-action. The distinction between successfully
throwing a ball in terms of actually having thrown a ball, not having dropped it, on the
one hand, and successfully throwing a ball in terms of having hit the target, on the other
hand, was formalised in speech act theory.
Locutionary vs. perlocutionary acts This distinction is described by the notions
of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. More precisely, these two kind of acts, termi-
nologically somewhat misleading, don’t describe different actions, but rather characterize
different levels of the same action2. Formal success criteria were only defined for the illocu-
tionary level and are the criteria we grouped into the three categories A, B, and C above.
Generally, speech acts are identified with the illocutionary act.
The illocutionary act is the act performed by producing a (grammatically and seman-
tically correct) utterance and by virtue of the illocutionary force that comes with this type
of utterance. For example a request is only a request in a particular language if it has
a certain grammatical, or prosodical structure, and is issued in the right kind of circum-
stances. It is only a request instead of being a random utterance because there is a norm
(or conventional procedure) that is recognized by the the speakers of this language, and the
illocutionary force of “requesting” is bound up and reliant upon the conventional procedure
in order for the act to be successful. This norm then leads to there being the illocutionary
force “request” that ‘comes with’ the utterance. Other examples for illocutionary acts are
2There is a third, “underlying” level, the so called locutionary act, the act of having said something un-
ambiguously, which roughly maps the linguistic and semantic level. We only mention this for completeness
here.
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promising something, sentencing somebody, but also making a statement. The success of
the illocutionary act, as opposed to the success of the perlocutionary act, does not depend
on local circumstances other than the ones specified by the conventional procedure. Its
successful performance therefore depends mainly on the speaker. The only requirement for
an illocutionary act to be successful, that does not rest with the speaker, is the so-called
uptake of the act. This means that the speaker must ensure that both the content of the
utterance and the force of the utterance are understood by the addressee. Furthermore,
some speech acts require some form of ratification on part of the addressee, such as the
abovementioned ratification of a bet.
The perlocutionary act or effects of a speech act are the effect that the speaker tries
to achieve by uttering the utterance with the particular illocutionary force. As opposed
to the illocutionary act, the perlocutionary act very much depends on local circumstances
within which it is performed and “is therefore not conventionally achieved” just by the
production of the utterance according to the norm (Levinson 1983, p. 237). Apart from
the effect, that the speaker intended the utterance to have upon the addressee(s), all other
(side-)effects, planned or unplanned, that the utterance may have on the audience also
count to the perlocutionary effects. Examples of perlocutionary acts are forcing somebody
to do something, the potential outcome of the illocutionary act giving an order, or making
somebody believe that one is commited to do something, which may or may not be achieved
by promising to do something, an illocutionary act.
It should also be noticed that the border between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts
is not as neat as it may seem at this point (cf. Levinson 1983). Especially the circumstance
that a speaker has to secure the uptake of an utterance and ensure potentially necessary
ratifications are both deeds that are not totally under the speaker’s control and are clearly
not exclusively an issue of sticking to some conventions. This blurs the border between
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the illocutionary and the perlocutionary and Levinson (1983) concludes that “there seems
to be no clear reason why what is a perlocution in one culture may not be an illocution in
another” (p. 241).
After Austin, speech act theory was further developed by John R. Searle, one of his
students (cf. Searle 1969). At this point it shall suffice to say, that Searle put the theory
on a slightly different footing and introduced a pseudo-axiomatic categorisation of speech
acts, which, according to Levinson (1983), “is a disappointment in that it lacks a principled
basis” and “contrary to Searle’s claims, is not even built in any systematic way on felicity
conditions” (p. 240). Nevertheless Searle’s version of speech act theory may be the most
known and popular one. Yet, possibly due to Searle’s unsatisfying categorization, several
competing taxonomies exist now, and we refer to Levinson (1983) for further links.
With children that have not yet acquired either the necessary social knowledge or the
required skills in terms of motor control, it has been observed that they use different
kinds of “manual” gestures such as reaching and pointing gestures in order to signal their
communicative intention, which might be early forms of what later become speech acts
(Clark 2009, ch. 4). Yet within speech act theory itself developmental considerations
are at best rare. There, the invoked examples of acting by speaking typically assume
that the speaker is a human with full linguistic capabilities and equally full awareness of
the social norms or conventional procedures in place. Nevertheless speech act theory has
been adopted by some researchers of early child language development, but these accounts
typically diverge considerably from the original theory due to conversational properties of
actual talk which Austin and Searle have either overlooked or ignored when constructing
the theory. We will pick up developmental perspectives on speech act theory in section
2.2.2.
Here is another example to illustrate the power of acting via speaking: If a judge sen-
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tences somebody to 10 years in prison, it doesn’t matter, if he believes in the accused’s
guilt or not in order for the sentence to be at least temporarily in place, i.e. for the act to
be publicly recognised as an act of sentencing. Even in the very constructed case, where
the judge suffers from a sudden bout of some mental disease, and, at the time of sen-
tencing, forgets that he is a judge, forgets who the accused is, and possibly who anybody
else is, and just so happens to say the appropriate words “I hereby sentence you ...” at
the time slot in the court proceedings reserved for the sentence, this sentence would be
in place. It would be in place by virtue of him being a judge and by him uttering the
‘right’ words at the right place and time. In speech act theory and most probably also in
law, this sentence would be considered “insincere”, but it would be a sentence nevertheless.
The sentence could probably be easily reversed afterwards, if the judge, let’s say, jumps
out of the window after having sentenced the accused, and thereby makes the authorities
realise that he was ‘out of his mind’ when he said the fateful words. But at least for a
few minutes, until the appropriate measures are taken to remedy the juridical error, this
sentence would be in place, no matter what beliefs the judge or anybody else held at the
time of sentencing and no matter what else was the case in the world.
On speech acts and propositional content Based on the outline in the previous
paragraphs of speaking qua acting one might assert that for example performatives, chris-
tening somebody, sentencing somebody, or ordering somebody to do something, have more
similarities with the act of hammering a nail into the wall, than with the exchange of infor-
mation about something already being the case in the world. Nevertheless propositional
content is still an important notion in Searle’s version of SAT, and there, it seems, the
illocutionary force is seen as some kind of wrapper or add-on to the propositional content.
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This is also indicated by his formal notation for utterances, F (p), where F denotes the
force of an utterance, and p denotes its propositional content (Searle 1969). In Austin’s
account of speech acts the notion of propositional content features far less as compared
to Searle’s account. Indeed, when searching through his main publication “How To Do
Things With Words” (Austin 1975), we find propositions only mentioned at three differ-
ent places, one of which is a discussion of logical notions of entailment, implication, and
presupposition. At the other two places, Austin does not appear to be overly convinced
of their importance for the capacity of acting via speaking. There we find that sentences
(or propositions) appear to be logical constructions out of speech acts (p. 20), which we
may interpret as the act being the primary aspect of an utterance and the proposition
being secondary. Later on in the book Austin seems to become even more suspicious of
the very notion of propositions when he says “... in order to explain what can go wrong
with statements we cannot concentrate on the proposition involved (whatever that is) as
has been done traditionally” (Austin 1975, p. 52, emphasis added). And albeit Searle
seems to be rather commited to propositional content being an elementary ingredient of
speech acts, he also admits that “(o)f course not all illocutionary acts have a propositional
content, for example, an utterance of "Hurrah" does not, nor does "Ouch" ”(Searle 1969,
p. 30). He later adds “Hello” to his list of examples of proposition-less speech acts.
In the context of the importance of propositional content on the ability to act via
speaking, the analogy with an action that is not performed via speaking, might cast some
light on the issue as to whether such an act intrinsically requires any form of propositional
content.
What would the propositional content of the action of hammering a nail into a wall
be? The most likely candidate seems to be the proposition “I am hammering the nail into
the wall”, which one presumably ought to have in mind each time it is performed - similar
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to a speech act that ought to ‘carry’ propositional content each time it is performed. The
problem with the latter is, that the proposition would only be required to be in one’s mind
during the act of hammering, due to the claim that the propositional content is part of
the action. The outcome would be a vacuously true proposition in the best case, as the
proposition would always be true when performing the action. The proposition would only
be false, if the hammerer did not succeed to hammer by, for example, losing hold of the
hammer before hitting the nail. Yet in this case the proposition still does not serve any
function in terms of helping or being a requirement for the action to succeed. Other non-
propositional corrective aids, a teacher assisting the hand or the like, might be efficacious
in improving the success rate of the action. The hypothetical core proposition is quite
evidently of no use in guiding the action. Of course this comparison uses an extreme case
of ‘pure bodily intelligence’, but consider a simple “Hello”, which might be replaced with
a simple gesture, and the comparison is not that far off. As Searle admits on the rare
occasions mentioned above, there is no intrinsic need for propositional content in order to
act via speaking.
Possibly of not much concern to the philosopher, but perhaps important for ‘engineers
of a mind’, instantiating a proposition for such a simple act as hammering a nail into
the wall or greeting somebody, would be outrageously inefficient. There is no benefit in
instantiating a propositional representation, which is trivially true, taking up space in
the (attentional) memory and possibly starting a logical inference machinery that would
consequently idle most of the time. This is not the same as saying that the agent should not
be aware of the action being executed. In technical terms there are far more efficient, and
minimal ways of ‘consciously’3 keeping track of what one is doing than invoking the whole
logical and inferential machinery4, especially if the latter would subsequently idle along for
3‘consciously’ meaning here, that the representation is loaded into the working memory
4In computers, when using logical representations one has to start an inference machinery, that is
32
Literature Review Speech Act Theory
most of the time. Considering a logical representation (and the inference mechanism that
typically comes with it) only makes sense, if the agent wants to communicate what he is
doing or, possibly, in order to understand what another agent said, that he would be doing.
Where this is not the case it appears to be unnecessary to instantiate such representations
in order to “just do things in speaking”. This is the distinction that can be drawn in speech
act theory between speaking qua stating facts and speaking qua acting.
Acting with voice beyond speech acts There are other ways in which we act via
speaking which are not explicitly covered by speech act theory, possibly due to a low degree
of conventionality, or because these acts may be considered side-effects of an utterance
(perlocutionary and non-intentional effects). These may be efficacious more on a biological
level without the need to invoke societal conventions. These biological effects of humanly
produced acoustic waves are not limited to human speech though. Dogs employ sound
waves to deter a potential aggressor by barking, and human babies call for attention by
crying. The physical properties of these sound waves can have considerable effects on the
recipient5. And a baby’s cries may cause on a psychological level more distress than a jack-
hammer emitting sounds on the same decibel level, because the human auditory system
might be more sensitive to frequency bands typical to the human voice, than to those of a
jack-hammer.
We may not conveive of these activities as full-fleged, intentional actions, but they cer-
tainly have properties that are also important in conventional speech such as the intensity
able to ‘make sense of’ and process the representation, for example some implementation of Prolog. This
author is not aware of any technical implementation of logical representations independent of an inference
mechanism and it is not clear why one would want to have that. The whole point of having predicates is
to draw inferences from them.
5A baby’s cry can reach 110 decibels which is roughly equivalent to the sound intensity of a car horn
or a rock concert. Exposure to this level of ‘noise’ will cause damage to a person’s hearing capacity after
1.5 minutes according to Common Environmental Noise Levels (2013). Thus, babies are not that harmless
after all.
33
Literature Review Speech Act Theory
or intonational contour of the acoustic signal, which may become conventionalized in adult
speech as so called IFIDs (illocutionary force indicating devices). Intonation contour, to-
gether with other indicators such as word order, punctuation, or performative verbs, was
proposed as an IFID (Fotion 1975), i.e. as indicator as to which kind of illocutionary force
is present with a particular utterance.
Utterances can be abusive or soothing, they can have a direct impact on the well-being
of the person that is ‘hit’ by them. Non-lexical properties of speech such as prosodic
contour and energy of the sound wave seem to play an important role in this context. It
is for example questionable if one can verbally abuse a person in the long run, without
producing one’s abusive utterances with a high energy accoustic signal and without giving
the abuses the ‘appropriate’ intonation contour. It is not entirely clear if this may be
done by virtue of appealing to conventional procedures or if this may be so because of the
impact on a biological level. The circumstance that babies react to some of the acoustic
properties, hints towards the effect being non-conventional and biological.
Speech acts beyond philosophy and linguistics In order to demonstrate that the
existence of speech acts is acknowledged not only by philosophers and linguists, but that
this capacity of human speech is indeed part of our everyday life, this paragraph shall
briefly demonstrate their existence outside of the latter academic realms.
The power and efficacy of some forms of verbal conduct is nowadays acknowledged
by penal codes or legal acts in many countries. In the jargon of modern law malevolent
verbal conduct which has a detrimental effect on the addressee’s well-being has been given
the label of verbal abuse. Bullying or stalking are other acts or forms of conduct which
are typically at least partially accomplished by the malevolent use of words. Stalking
was only recently added to the penal codes or codified in legal acts of several countries
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and it is illuminating to analyse the precise wording of those texts. The Protection from
Harassment Act 1997 (1997) defines “actions of harassment” in section 8, the section for
Scotland6, as follows:
(2) An actual or apprehended breach of subsection (1) may be the subject of a claim in
civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct
in question; and any such claim shall be known as an action of harassment.
(3) For the purposes of this section –
“conduct” includes speech;
“harassment” of a person includes causing the person alarm or distress; and
a course of conduct must involve conduct on at least two occasions.
This legal act acknowledges that speech, as one of many possible forms of conduct, has the
capacity to victimize persons and that such forms of conduct are punishable within the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. In other words it acknowledges the capacity of speech
to cause “the person alarm or distress”, i.e. the capacity to manipulate the psychological
state of the recipient into an adverse psychological condition against his or her own will.
Thus, not only laymen, when trying to justify certain actions (or ‘conducts’ in legal
jargon) sometimes refer to speech as being causal in povoking distress. Even in formal
legal texts as the one cited above this capacity is explicitly acknowledged.
Limitations of speech act theory
Possibly the major limitation of SAT is its exclusive focus on single utterances qua speech
acts. Already Fotion (1975) noticed that the illocutionary force can be detached from the
6The wording of the equivalent section for the rest of the UK was more convoluted, leading to the
section for Scotland being cited.
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utterance that it is supposedly part of. The first example, that he gives, is not necessarily
damaging to the theory:
Speaker 1: “You had better get a move-on”
Speaker 2: “Are you threatening me?”
Speaker 1: “Yes”
Here, the “illocutionary force is tacked on later (3rd move) and is not literally part of
the original speech act (1st move).” (Fotion 1975, comments in brackets added by us).
Because the third move is only necessary because either speaker 1 spoke ambigously or
because speaker 2 failed to secure the uptake, one can count this as exception - the force
was supposed to be part of the first utterance but things went wrong.
More damaging to Searle’s SAT are cases which are clearly not repairs but absolutely
valid conversational moves. The IFID can, for example, be specified before the utterance,
‘the propositional content’, to which it supposedly belongs, as in “Here is what I promise”,
followed by what is promised, or as in “Here are your orders for the week”, followed by the
orders. Thus, Fotion draws the conclusion, that “language ... is not accurately analyzed in
terms of this or that isolated speech act. Instead, it is to be seen as a language which is
understood more completely only when the analyst take into account the flow of language
- use on the activity level - so that what was said a moment or two ago is viewed as having
direct logical bearing upon what is being said now and will be said later.” (Fotion 1975)
This direction of criticism, coming from within the philosophical community, is very similar
to the criticism, brought forward against SAT from a substantially different academic field:
conversation analysis.
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2.1.3 Conversation Analysis
Conversation analysis (CA) grew out of the studies of Harvey Sacks on the organisation of
ordinary talk. Methodologically CA is diametrically opposed to SAT in the sense that it
is entirely data-driven, based on recordings of talk-in-interaction as it actually occurs. As
indicated by the notion of talk-in-interaction, CA does not exclusively focus on language
per se, but rather on the particular ways that social activities are organized interactively
(Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999). Yet utterances, as part of conversations, are naturally an
important part of this interactional work. Contrastingly, speech act theory is based on,
possibly witty, informative, but nevertheless made-up, remembered, or imagined examples
instead of transcripts of actual “language at work” (cf. Wittgenstein 1984, PI 132)7.
Apart from this methodological difference, conversation analysis, as the name indicates,
extends the analytical scope to the level of the conversation. That means, that its main
focus is on the sequential organisation of talk, the way that speakers organise their turns
depending of their own and other speakers’ previous turns. This, naturally, is also in
opposition to the SAT approach of focusing on the atomic elements of a conversation in
isolation.
Two notions, that are central topics within conversation analysis are important within
this thesis. The first one is the notion of adjacency pairs, a central criterion in our taxonomy
of negation types, which will be introduced in section 5.3.2, and the second one is the notion
of turn-taking, which any treatment of human face-to-face communication cannot really do
without.
7Levinson (1983) very aptly expresses this point, while comparing CA to discourse analysis. He says
that in CA “the emphasis is on what can actually be found to occur, not on what one would guess would
be odd (or acceptable) if it were to do so.” (p. 287)
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On rules in conversation analysis
Before turning to the abovementioned notions, we will quickly discuss the nature of con-
versational rules, as they are investigated and extracted from talk-in-interaction by con-
versation analysts.
Rules, as for example the turn-taking rules, presented in the section on turn-taking
below, are normative rules. This means, that they are not seen as being causal for, con-
stitutive of, or external to the talk. Participants of the talk typically adhere to these rules
in order to accomplish the talk, not because of any hypothetical law-like nature of these
rules8. Thus, these rules do not describe, how participants accomplish the turn-allocation,
in terms of necessary and sufficient cognitive abilities. This also means, that these rules can-
not be directly implemented by an ‘engineer of a conversational mind’. Rather conversely,
such an engineer would have to find ways and means to enable a conversational mind to
orient towards these rules if any human-like conversational capability is to be achieved.
Conversation analyses showed that participants of talk orient towards these rules, but not
how participants achieve this orienting in terms of underlying mechanisms. These norma-
tive rules then constitute resources for participants to orient towards, and further allow
a description of talk-in-interaction as “abstract, structural phenomenon, without going
against the idea that participants are knowledgable agents who are not somehow ‘caused’
to act by that structure but actively use it to accomplish particular communicative actions”
(Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999, p. 141).
8Historically, there is a well-documented ‘clash of paradigms’ between John R. Searle, Emanuel A.
Schegloff and others on the nature of rules, whose textual artefacts were (at least partially) collected and
published under Searle et al. (1992)
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Turn-taking
A central notion within CA is the notion of turn-taking. This notion is based on the
observation that in mundane conversations9, i.e. formats of talk, in which turn form, turn
content, and turn length can be varied freely by the speakers, there is a tendency that one
speaker talks at any given time. Furthermore, it can be observed that there are usually
few gaps between turns (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999). A central topic of CA then is how
this turn-taking is organised and accomplished, but also, “what participants take it they
are actually doing in their talk” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999). Other important issues
that have been investigated within CA, are how overlapping talk is managed, and how
conversational repair is accomplished. For more information on the latter issues, we refer
to (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999, ten Have 2007).
The turn-taking model, as developed by Sacks et al. (1974), consists of two compo-
nents, the turn-construction component, and the turn-distribution component (Hutchby
and Wooffitt 1999).
Turns can be regarded as consisting of units, turn-construction units, that roughly
correspond to linguistic categories such as words, clauses, phrases, and sentences. An
important feature of these turn-construction units is that they are projectable. This means
that a participant of a given talk can during the production of a turn-construction unit
identify the kind of the unit. Moreover, he or she can estimate when this unit is likely to
end. These (projected) boundaries of turn-construction units are called transition-relevance
places, and afford participants of the talk the possibility of a transition to another speaker.
9 Non-mundane conversations are ceremonial or institutionalised kinds of talk, where talk underlies
more rigid contraints in terms of what, how much, and how things can be said. During baptism, for
example, the baptist follows a rule-set which contrains his or her possibilites of what can be said. In
western societies it would be considered inappropriate, if the latter would start the “core-process” with
something like “I hereby name you”, just to change the topic, after having said “Hereby”, to speak about
yesterday’s football game.
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Transition-relevance places then connect the turn-construction component of the model
to the turn-distribution component. The latter descibes how turns are allocated amongst
participants of the talk. The normative rule set as proposed by Sacks et al. (1974), that
regulates turn-allocation, looks exceedingly simple:
Rule 1 (a) If the current speaker has identified, or selected, a particular next
speaker, then that speaker should take a turn at that place.
(b) If no such selection has been made, then any next speaker may
(but need not) self-select at that point. If self-selection occurs, then
first speaker has the right to the turn.
(c) If no next speaker has been selected, then alternatively the cur-
rent speaker may, but need not, continue talking with another turn-
constructional unit, unless another speaker gains the right to the turn.
Rule 2 Whichever option has operated, then rules 1a-c come into play again
for the next transition-relevance place.
(Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999, pp. 49-50)
Notice that this rule set cannot be used to predict the serial allocation of turns such
as “participant A will produce 5 turns, followed by 3 turns by participant B”. This is
so, because different participants can orient towards different sub-rules of the set at any
transition-relevance place. Speaker A could for example attempt to take the next turn by
orienting towards rule 1b, while speaker B, the active speaker, may orient towards rule 1c,
which allows him to continue to speak. In such a case repair mechanisms are needed in
order to remedy the ensuing trouble (see Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999, p. 57 ff. for a short
summary of conversational repair mechanisms).
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Adjacency Pairs
An important notion, that was developed in CA, and which will become important later
for our taxonomy of negation types, is the notion of an adjacency pair. Adjacency pairs
are ordered pairs of utterances that consist of a first pair-part and a second pair-part that
are distributed across two different speakers (Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999). Furthermore,
certain first pair-parts require one particular or a range of certain second pair-parts. In
the parlance of CA the production of a first pair-part by a speaker A makes relevant
the production of a second pair-part by a speaker B, for which the latter is subsequently
accountable. Examples of adjacency pairs are invitation - response, greeting - greeting, or
question - answer. Adjacency pairs are an important mechanism with which participants
establish sequential order in talk-in-interaction. This does not necessarily mean though,
that the second pair-part must be immediately produced in the follow-up turn as the
following example of a so called insertion sequence shows:
A: May I have a bottle of Mitch? ((Q1))
B: Are you twenty one? ((Q2))
A: No ((A2))
B: No ((A1))
(Merritt 1976, p. 333: quoted in Levinson 1983, p. 304)
Here B, instead of answering A’s question immediately, produces another first pair-part
of a question-answer pair, which A answers on the next turn. Nevertheless B shows by
producing the answer A1, the relevant second pair-part to Q1, in the subsequent turn, that
he is still orienting to A’s question. Thus adjacency pairs do not only induce a certain
order, they are also used by participants to display their mutual understanding:
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What two utterances, produced by different speakers, can do that one utterance
cannot do is: by an adjacently positioned second, a speaker can show that he
understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that.
Also, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacently produced second, the doer of
a first can see that what he intended was indeed understood, and that it was or
was not accepted. Also, of course a second can assert his failure to understand,
or disagreement, and inspection of a second by a first can allow the first speaker
to see that while the second thought he understood, indeed he misunderstood.
(Schegloff and Sacks 1973, p. 296: quoted in
Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999, p. 41, emphasis added)
Pauses/Silences Pauses are generally important elements of conversations and have
been observed to be regarded by participants as “someone’s silences” (ten Have 2007, p.
19). As opposed to silences within a speaker’s turn, or silences between different speakers’
turns outside of adjacency pairs (“between-turn pauses”), sufficiently long pauses after the
production of a first pair-part of such pairs are noticeable and accountable. Together with
non-deliveries of a second pair-parts that are not preceded by pauses, they constitute so
called noticeable absences (Schegloff 1968). These noticeable absences can be meaningful in
themselves for one or all speakers, yet they are meaningful only by virtue of their position
within the conversation. Following is an example of a noticeable absence.
1 C: So I was wondering would you be in your office on Monday
(.) by any chance?
2 (2.0)
3 C: Probably not
4 R: Hmm yes=
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5 C: =You would?
6 R: Ya
7 C: So if we came by could you give us ten minutes of your time?
(Levinson 1983, p. 320)
The pause ‘produced’ by R at position 2 is evidently taken by C to be a response to
this question, and it is taken as a ‘no’. Thus, R’s non-reply was indeed taken to be a
conversational move by R, as he makes clear at position 3. This shows not only that
words or utterances are meaningful within a conversation, but also non-words and non-
utterances can be meaningful and even take the place of words. This means that meaning
in a conversation is certainly not bound to words and utterances but to some structure
that is only indirectly impacted by the words and utterances, which are said, but also
by words and utterances that are not said. Thus, as this short snippet of a conversation
shows, there is a strong sense of some form of inferential mechanism at work, that draws
on normative expectations. But, first of all, this mechanism may not be active with equal
strength at any point of a conversation. The example above is a particularly strong case
of one participant’s (R) follow-up action being monitored by his or her interlocutor (C),
due to the fact that C uttered a first pair-part of an adjacency pair. Adjacency pairs
carry above-average normative expectations with regards to R’s subsequent action, in this
case the production of an answer. Moreover this hypothetical inferential mechanism is
most probably far less concerned with state of affairs in the non-human world than it is
concerned with human action and therefore probably far less ‘logical’ as one might expect
from an inferential mechanism - at least from a computer science perspective. Sadly this
mechanism is not very well researched and probably part of what Levinson calls “the human
interaction engine” (Levinson 2006).
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On a technical side-note, we would like to mention that Jefferson (1989) indicates that
a pause length of one second appears to be a relevant threshold within conversations.
2.2 Language Acquisition in Humans
Most modern theories of language development appear to be largely “representationalist”
in the sense that the main task of the child is presented as mapping the words to categories
of physical objects or elements in the world, a labelling or naming task. Hirsh-Pasek and
Golinkoff (2012) summarise the toddler’s job as follows: “We have seen that language learn-
ing can be distilled into three main tasks: (1) finding the units of speech (segmentation)
that will become the sounds, words, phrases, and sentences; (2) finding the units in the
world (objects, actions, and events) that will be labeleled by language; and (3) forming
mappings between elements of the world and words.” An important constraint in this
context that aids children with their labelling task, is the so called whole-object-constraint
(Markman 1990). Under this constraint, children seem to assume that a novel word, all
other things being equal, refers to a whole object, and not to its colour, its texture, nor to
its spatial relationship to other objects.
But what about negation? A single no clearly cannot be mapped to any category of
objects. It should also be noted that in terms of experimental support, the whole-object-
constraint has been shown to apply to children of one-and-a-half years, yet most empirirical
evidence was accumulated for three and four year olds (Clark 2009). The simple no on the
other hand is typically produced before the first object words are. In the case of American
toddlers 50% of them produce no roughly after daddy, mommy, hi, bye, uh oh, and dog
(Fenson et al. 1994, p. 93). According to their caretakers their, i.e. the caretakers’, no is
perceived to be understood as early as at eight months of age (Fenson et al. 1994, p. 92).
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Ryan (1974) who provides us with an important hint about a potential developmental
source of negation (cf. hypothesis 1 in section 1.1), criticises accounts similar to the one of
Hirsh-Pasek and Golinkoff (2012) above for their tendency to postulate a transition from
a “predominantly expressive or emotional use of words to their factual or descriptive use”
and a frequently encountered disregard for communicative functions of early utterances.
The problem with latter transition, according to Ryan, is that it “does not make sense in
that there are no possible empirical criteria on which such a distinction could be based.”
Historically, while Vygotsky still speaks about emotion in the context of language de-
velopment, apparently supporting Meumann’s idea “ that the first words are also purely
affective, expressing feelings and emotions” and “are devoid of objective meaning, reflecting,
like an animal’s “language” (Vygotsky 1986, p. 93 refering to Meumann 1902), affect and
emotion are not even listed in the index of some modern accounts of language acquistion
such as Clark (2009) any more.
Thus, representationalist theories of language acquisition are not very helpful in terms
of explaining the emergence of early forms of negation due to their almost exclusive focus on
words that ought to refer to objects, object categories, or physical events and actions, and
the cognitive mechanisms that are involved in accomplishing the correct word-to-concept
mapping.
2.2.1 Early Words
“While infants vocabularies contain a variety of words, the early vocabulary of young
learners has often been characterized as biased towards nouns. Nouns form the majority
of children’s early receptive and productive vocabulary and are typically acquired earlier
than other word classes in many languages” (Poulin-Dubois and Graham 2007 referring
to Bloom 1998). While assertions as the just cited one might be true when looking at
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productive vocabularies of sizes larger than 10, this assertion does not hold for the earliest
productive and receptive words. Gopnik (1988) analysed the very first productive words of
toddlers and found that social words are the consistently first type of words that are uttered
at the onset of speech. She classified words from these early productive vocabularies as
belonging into one of three categories: social words, names, and cognitive-relational words.
Social words are those “words that were consistently used to fulfill the same social
function”, with social indicating that they were always directed at other people. Gopnik
furthermore noticed that these words are closely linked to illoctionary forces in the sense
“that each word was always used to accomplish the same speech act, usually a directive
speech act.” Examples for these social words are no, used for refusal, that or there to point
out objects, bye for leave-taking, hello or hi for greeting, up for requesting to be picked
up, or mama as “all-purpose call for help or assistance”.
Names are those words that occured in a variety of contexts and which could occur in
a variety of of speech acts (unlike social words). Gopnik notes that “informal observation
suggest that the affective context of these words was rather different from that of the
social words”, in that they often occured “when the child was not making eye-contact with
another person and children seemed relatively unperturbed by a lack of response to these
words.”
Cognitive-relational words are then those words that “encoded cognitively significant
concepts (other than objects or object categories), such as the concepts of success, failure,
recurrence, disappearance and location” (comment in bracket added by author). Examples
for these kind of words are gone to encode disappearance, there, no, and uh-oh to encode
the success or failure of the child’s plans.
For our purposes it might be worth emphasising that no which has two different func-
tions here, socially as refusal, and cognitively-relational as comment on failure, as well as
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gone, cognitively-relational as comment on disappearance, are all negation words.
2.2.2 Developmental Pragmatics
A field that certainly does not disregard the communicative functions of early child utter-
ances, and in which researchers typically focus on a slightly earlier developmental period
than the representationalists, is developmental pragmatics. According to Filipi (2009)
the historical reason for the field’s focus on the transition period between prelinguis-
tic and linguistic communication were “the opposing positions of Chomsky and Piaget
(Piatelli-Palmarini 1980)” on the relationship between communication and language and
as to whether “Piaget’s (1954) assertion that sensorimotor development provides the foun-
dation for later developments in the child, including language, can be accepted” (Filipi
2009).
According to Filipi (2009) amongst the researchers that argue for functional continuity
between the pre-linguistic and linguistic stage are Bates et al. (1977), Bates, Camaioni and
Volterra (1979), Bruner (1983), Bullowa (1979), Carter (1975), Lock (1978), Werner and
Kaplan (1963) and Zukow et al. (1982).
It is only against the background of this continuity assumption that terms such as proto-
conversation (Bateson 1979, Bruner 1983), protolanguage (Halliday 1975), proto-imperatives
(open-handed reaching), and proto-declaratives (attempts to elicit an adult’s attention)
(Bates et al. 1977, Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni and Volterra 1979) have to be
understood and make sense. These proto communicative acts are then seen as precursors
to their later emerging, full-fledged and ‘non-proto’ linguistic counterparts.
Ryan (1974) is another researcher that emphasises the continuity between the two
stages by arguing that the “(u)se and understanding of standard words develops at a time
where the ability to communicate non-verbally is well estabished, in the sense of being
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able to influence the behaviour of others, and of induldging in reciprocal interchanges of
various kind” (p. 186).
With her criticism of quantitative-descriptive approaches and her emphasis on the
interaction between mother and child Ryan might be one of the earliest adaptors of a
conversation analytic approach to early child language development.
Developmental Perspectives on Speech Act Theory
Pragmatically leaning researchers of early child language development picked up very
quickly the ideas of (word) meaning as use, that was developed by philosophers of lan-
guage such as Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, and Grice and asked the question, which the
latter typically did not ask: How do children acquire the skills to express communicative
intentions via conventional means, i.e. by the invocation of the appropriate illocutionary
force? Another more fundamental question, which to the knowledge of the author, remains
unanswered is then: How do communicative intentions come about in the first place and
how do they relate to extra- or pre-communicative intentions, emotions, motivation, etc.?
Bruner states this issue aptly:
Grammarians usually take intent for granted but one does so at one’s peril. ...
But intent in communication is difficult to deal with for a variety of reasons,
not the least demanding of which is the morass into which it leads when one
tries to establish whether something was really, or consciously intended. Does
a prelinguistic infant consciously intend to signal his displeasure or express
his delight? To obviate such difficlties, it has become customary to speak of
the functions that communication or language serve and to determine how
they do so. This has the virtue, at least, of postponing ultimate questions
about the ‘reality’ and ‘consciousness’ in the hope that they may become more
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manageable. (Bruner 1975a, p. 262)
Yet Bruner also asserts that the question when infants come to ‘intent consciously’ to com-
municate, i.e. when they move from “expressive utterances” (“early cries of discomfort and
pleasure”) to “stimulative” (producing reactions in others) and representational utterances,
was not very useful as the criteria how one would judge when “that trip had been made”
were not clear at all. The notions of consciousness and intention were opaque ones. Bruner
(1975a) therefore suggests to focus on “how communicative functions are shaped and how
they are fulfilled” in the mother-child interaction (p. 266).
Intentionality and early communicative intentions Dore (1975) supports the idea
of conceiving of communicative intentions as linguistically expressed intentions that per-
form universal functions such as asserting, denying, requesting, or ordering. Yet he also
contends that these “linguistically expressed intentions are not isomorphic with prelinguis-
tic intentions and the former need not be derived from the latter” (Dore 1975, p. 37). Other
proposed universals are referring and predicating acts, which are thought to emerge with
the child’s maturation and which are not deemed to be reducible to prior experience. This
means, they are considered to be innate and, importantly, not derivable from pre-linguistic
gestures for example (but cf. p. 62). He further contends that these non-grammatical en-
tities become grammaticalised but are “cognitive prerequisites for the grammaticalization
process” (Dore 1975, p. 38).
Filipi (2009), representing a more conversation analytical stance, sees communicative
intentions as something that the child acquires due to the manner in which its caretakers
interact with it: “Through a series of actions and counteractions, the infant learns that
her actions or gestures have an effect. The parent interprets these gestures and responds
to them as though they are words, as though the child has a social goal in mind. In
49
Literature Review Developmental Pragmatics
other words, through scaffolding and formatting, the parent is providing a conversational
structure to the routines - "a prelinguistic communicative framework" (Bruner 1982, 1998)
which is also referred to as scripts (Snow, Perlmann and Nathan 1987)” (pp. 8-9).
Intentional behaviour in its interpretation as goal-directed behaviour involving others
can then be witnessed in a child “focusing on an object, making eye contact with the adult
and/or gesturing while vocalising, trying an alternative behaviour if she fails in her goal
and stopping these behaviours once the goal has been achieved, Bruner (1975b), . . . ” (Filipi
2009, p. 16).
According to Filipi (2009), Dore (1983) proposed as “(m)otivating force behind the
intention to communicate ... the frustration of the child” while Garvey (1983) was taking
a more positive stance by suspecting “the immediate satisfaction of having the means for
producing an effect on others” as the source of motivation.
Intentionality Filipi (2009) identifies four issues in relation to the concept of inten-
tionality, the first of which concerns its definition. As indicators of intentionality are taken
to be:
1. the child’s ability to control her actions intentionally,
2. the understanding of communicative intentions of others or the attribution of comm-
nicative intentions to others. This has been termed the ability to take an intentional
stance (Carpenter et al. 1998).
According to Filipi supporters of this definition are amongst others Tomasello et al. (2007)
and Liszkowski (2006). An obvious question, if we are to accept this definition, is then
how we are to detect the presence of intentionality in the child. Filipi, summarising the
results of research “from the perspective of the social context” of the previous few decades,
lists the following four behaviours as indicative of the presence of intentionality (the given
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references are only partial, see Filipi (2001) for further pointers):
• reaching and grasping for an object (Bruner 1973),
• gestural communication, especially pointing (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni
and Volterra 1979, Filipi 2002, Tomasello et al. 2007),
• joint attention or reference (Bruner 1975b, Liszkowski 2006, Tomasello et al. 2007),
• attention getting practices, particular style of pointing or showing of object (Filipi
2001, 2002, Jones and Zimmerman 2003).
Intentional (or motivated) behaviour then might be equated with a theory of mind. This
is done by firstly claiming that toddlers which display such behaviour were attributing
beliefs and emotions to others (Carpenter et al. 1998, Golinkoff 1993: cited in Filipi 2009,
p. 16), and, secondly, by equating the ability to perform such attributions with a theory
of mind. (Golinkoff 1993: ibid.).
The other three issues surrounding intentionality as discussed by Filipi (2009) revolve
around (1) the age of onset of intentionality, (2) the issue if the onset of intentionality is
causal for the transition from pre-verbal communication to language, and (3) the question
whether the empirical evidence that is typically presented when arguing for the presence
of intentions “in” the child is actually sufficient to do so (Filipi 2009 referring to Francis
1979). We refer to the Filipi (2009, ch. 1) for a further discussion of these controversies.
In finishing our short discussion of intentionality we would like to highlight Filipi’s
(2009) distinction of the two different methodological approaches in laguage-related re-
search that emphasise this notion. Filipi contrasts the so called socio-cognitive or socio-
pragmatic approaches with the conversation analytical ones:
[1] The approach of Tomasello et al. (2007) and Liszkowski (2006) can be described as
experimental, hypothesis-driven paradigm which is sometimes refered to as social-cognitive
account of language development. Starting out with the assumption that a child recog-
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nises itself as well as conversation partners as intentional agents, experiments under this
approach are designed to show that this assumption holds. Problematic in this context is
that it is unclear if insights gathered from experimental setups transfer to real life con-
versations (Schegloff 1992). Filipi (2009) considers it ironical “that these studies go to
some length to show that pointing develops in the social context of shared understandings,
yet we are simply presented with the reports of how the infants reacted. In other words,
there is no relationship of the child or the adult’s action to the interactional reality of the
context in which the talk takes place” (p. 20). Thus, the actions under investigation in
these ‘usage-based theories of language’ “are abstracted and removed from interaction and
ultimately from a language in use paradigm” (ibid.).
[2] The approach of Filipi (2001, 2002), Jones and Zimmerman (2003), effectively an adap-
tation of Conversation Analysis to parent-child conversations, takes as its starting point
the interaction as it naturally occurs. “A key methodological approach . . . is to focus
on the pursuit of their co-participating adult’s attention both to themselves (the infants)
and to the object for which mutual attention is sought” (ibid.). Further focus, in the
spirit of the conversational analytic tenet that “it is in the next action” which is the “basic
structural position by which participants’ own interpretations and understandings of talk
are displayed”, “is on the pursuit of an appropriate, or at least adequate, response (Filipi
2007, Kidwell and Zimmerman 2007” (ibid.). The underlying assumption is that “cognitive
processes implicated in the action of pointing and showing, including intention . . . , are rep-
resented and emerge in interaction” (ibid.). In other words it is assumed that “constructs
of cognition are "relevant to, and involved in, interaction in terms of their hearability in
the interaction itself"” (ibid., p. 20: citing te Molder and Potter 2005, p. 24).
We would also like to highlight the slighty differing terminology between these two ap-
proaches. It appears that intentionality is the central notion of research conducted un-
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der approach [1], whereas intersubjectivity appears to be the largely equivalent notion
in research conducted under approach [2]. What is called “joint attentional frames” by
Tomasello (2003) and Tomasello et al. (2007) translates to “socially shared knowledge or
intersubjectivity Schegloff (1991)” within the conversation analytical terminology (Filipi
2009, p.19).
Operationalisation of communicative intentions Dore (1974a) contrasts com-
municative intentions (CIs) with non-communicative intentions, the goals of an utterance,
and the pragmatic purposes of an utterance. He defines communicative intention, drawing
on Grice’s (1957) notion of utterer’s meaning, as the “intention to induce in a listener the
recognition of how the speaker wants his utterance to be taken”. Communicative intention
is then contrasted with Piaget and Cook’s (1952) “sensorimotor intention”, such as the
intention to build a tower of blocks. In the latter case the child’s intention and goal are
basically identical, whereas communicative intentions involve other people.
This means that (communicative) intention, the inducement of the recognition of the
child’s plan in other people, is different from the goal of an utterance, which is the expected
effect that this recognition will produce in the listener. If we compare these notions with
those that are customary in speech act theory (cf. section 2.1.2), communicative intentions
appear to be largely identical with the illocutionary level of a speech act because “the CI
of an utterance is under the control of the speaker” (Dore 1974a, p. 6). The goal of an
utterance then appears to be largely congruent with the perlocutinary level (or effect) of a
speech act because “the goal of an utterance is under the control of the listener” (ibid.).
In this framework pragmatic purposes of an utterance are identified with rather indirect
intentions and purposes that are not part of the normative function of a speech act. Asking
somebody to do something in order to please a third person would be an example of such
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a pragmatic purpose. Pragmatic purposes are thus related to indirect speech acts, which
are as well beyond the scope of this literature review as they are beyond the scope of (Dore
1974a).
Typical names of communicative intentions of children are “questions, answers, la-
bels, calls and protests”. Dore goes on to report that he, based on a study with 3 year
old children, identified the four “core” CIs request, response, description, and statement.
Descriptions refer in this context to observable or verifiable aspects of the environment,
whereas statements refer to unobservable “facts” such as intents, emotions, but also reasons,
predictions, possession etc. Interesting for our purposes, none of the typical functions of
negation is part of these “core” CIs unless one counts refusals as a form of negative request.
Yet protests belong to the list of “non-core” CIs, a list which apparently expands as the
child’s development progresses, as opposed to the four types of “core” CIs, which according
to Dore is likely to be fixed in number.
He further asserts that the non-core CIs “appear to be primitive versions of "perfor-
matives" ”, whose felicity conditions are regularly violated by the children. An example of
such violations of felicity conditions are ‘broken’ promises, where the child either does not
follow up on what was promised, or already knows at the time of promising, that what it
promises will come to be without further ado.
Primitive Speech Acts More or less in parallel to his treatment of communicative
intentions, Dore also introduced in Dore (1974b) and Dore (1975) the notion of primitive
speech acts (PSAs). He gives as reason for modifying the philosophical account of adult
speech acts that “philosophers of language have not supplied an operational definition of
speech act”(Dore 1974b, p. 344). His notion of primitive speech acts is then meant to help
to answer the question how children acquire linguistic conventions. A second motivation
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for postulating PSAs as central notion within the theory of early language development is
Dore’s hypothesis that children already had “sytematic knowledge about the pragmatics of
their language before they acquire sentential structures” (ibid.) and that this knowledge
was best captured by the notion of primitive speech acts.
This endeavour has to be seen on the historical background of the much discussed issue
at that time as to whether or not children’s one-word utterances “imply propositions” or
“represent a sentence”. This is a question which implies a primarily grammatical view of
early language as opposed to a pragmatic one, as the sentence is given a pivotal role as
meaning-bearing entity. The position, that single words during a child’s one-word stage
were ‘really’ propositions, lead subsequently to the notion of holophrase (Dore 1975). Dore
argues against this predominantly grammatical perspective of early child language as “(t)he
notion of sentence is the linguist’s abstraction from adult utterances and may be totally
inappropriate for describing early child speech. Yet the most studied problem of recent
psycholinguistics has been the transition from the use of single words to syntax” (Dore
1975).
As a replacement for sentence or proposition, similar to the proposal of philosophers’
of language in the context of ‘adult language’, Dore proposes the primitive speech act as
central notion for the understanding of early child language. A PSA then is a combination
of rudimentary referring expression such as “doggie”, or “bye-bye”, and a primitive force
indicating device, typically an intonation pattern (Dore 1975). A PSA then consists of
a one-word utterance or a single prosodic pattern, a consistent prosodic feature, and it
communicates the child’s intention (Dore 1974b). As opposed to holophrases PSAs are
not elliptical adult speech in that they do “not contain a predicating expression” (Dore
1975, p. 32). “It expresses the child’s intention with respect to a concept without having
a propositional structure” (ibid.), and propositions are seen to emerge later with the de-
55
Literature Review Developmental Pragmatics
velopment of the child’s grammatical capabilities. Dore further characterises rudimentary
referring expressions as the child’s ability to “linguistically represent a single concept”.
The developmental trajectory from PSA to full-blown adult speech act is hypothe-
sised to progress as follows. In the two-word-stage the rudimentary referring expression
gets complemented by a predicating expression to form a rudimentary proposition. Ad-
ditionally, the force component develops towards a higher degree of conventionality by
being expressed “by elementary kinds of illocutionary force indicators” (Dore 1975, p. 34).
During this stage the word order is still relatively random. After the two-word-stage the
rudimentary proposition becomes grammaticalized towards a higher degree of conformity
with the sentential structure of the target-language. Furthermore, the child’s intentions are
organised and are expressed as ‘proper’ illocutionary force, presumably within the modal-
ity component of the sentence (with modality being interrogative, imperative, negation).
Intentions here then are “cognitive pragmatic structures, distinct from the grammatical
categories that serve to express it” (Dore 1975, p. 36) and more akin to Piaget and Cook’s
(1952) notion of intention as “the deliberate pursuit of a goal by means of instrumental
behaviours subordinated to that goal” (idid.).
In the study reported in (Dore 1974b) and which is based on 2 children in the one-word
stage, Dore isolates eight distinct PSAs based on the following observational criteria: the
child’s utterance, its nonlinguistic behaviour (e.g. gestures, facial expressions), the adult’s
verbal and nonverbal response, and the situational context (e.g. salient objects, location,
present people). The eight distinct PSAs that were distinguished in this manner are:
labelling, repeating, answering, requesting (action or answer), calling, greeting, protesting,
and practicing. Dore does not claim that this list is exhaustive. Practising, Dore’s catch-
all category for those utterances that could not be assigned to any other category, was
the only category that was exclusively expressed in non-conventional forms, that is, with
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linguistic features that are typically not used by adults. Also, adults typically do not
practice word forms out of context. Practicising is therefore a speech act category that
is typically not seen with adults. Requesting was done by both children conventionally
and non-conventionally. Protesting was done by one child exclusively non-conventionally
via extended screams with varying terminal contours, whereas the other child performed
its protests exclusively conventionally during the experimental observations. Acts that
were categorized as belonging to one of the remaining five categories were all performed
conventionally by both children during the observation.
Dore further noticed considerable differences between the two children under obser-
vation where the girl engaged mainly in “representational” uses of language (labeling, re-
peating, and practising words) whereas the boy acted mainly via recognizable prosodic
contours instead of using standardized words. The latter then used these idiosyncratic
prosodic “words” mainly instrumentally, that is, to manipulate and influence other people
by calling somebody, protesting, or requesting something. The mainly “representational”
functions of the girl’s early speech may be explained by the behaviour of her mother, who
regularly set up routines for her daughter where she would pick up objects, label them, and
encourage the child to imitate the label. This included animal-naming routines involving
toy animals or animal pictures, as well as the naming of utensils and people.
More recently, more elaborate speech act taxonomies for child language have been
proposed such as the Inventory of Communicative Acts (Abridged) (INCA and INCA-A)
(Ninio et al. 1994). One of the questions that is necessarily encountered when trying to put
speech act theory into practice, i.e. when trying to classify naturally occuring utterances
from a conversation according to their illocutionary force, is the status of answers or other
conversational turns whose meaning is dependent on a previous turn, essentially second
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pair-parts of adjacency pairs. Searle (1969) remains silent on this issue, possibly due to
his disregard for conversational phenomena (Searle et al. 1992). Ninio et al. (1994) solved
this problem pragmatically by evidently giving these entities the status of proper speech
acts: INCA also lists in all major categories of speech acts responses as members of the
respective type.
Generally INCA is a hybrid taxonomy to code for communicative intent in that it is
not only derived from speech act theory but also from Goffman’s studies of face-to-face
interaction (Goffman 1961, 1974) and from conversation analysis. Furthermore INCA codes
communicative intent at two different levels, the utterance level (speech acts) and on the
“level of the verbal interchange” which may consist of more than one rounds of talk “all
of which share a unitary interactive function” (Ninio et al. 1994). Moreover, the authors
of INCA tested the ‘ecological validity’ of the taxonomy by using mothers as informants
about, and interpreters of, the social reality created in the dyadic interaction.
In terms of negation we find “refuse to carry out act requested” as separate speech act
type in the category of directives in INCA-A.
Developmental Perspectives on Conversation
Conversation analytical approaches are generally very critical about theory-driven research
methods, and thus do not only critisise what may be called “positivist approaches”, i.e. ap-
proaches that focus by and large on truth-functional propositions, but they may even
critisise pragmatic approaches for similar reasons: “Positivist approaches that rely exclu-
sively on count data can . . . be criticised (as) they do not tell us what those features are
doing and how they contribute to the overall organisation of talk” (Filipi 2009). Yet, ac-
cording to Filipi, these, together with speech act theoretical approaches, have dominated
the studies of infant talk . The problem even with pragmatic approaches for conversation
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analysts is that also with the latter it is “linguistics that provides the starting point . . .
rather than the talk per se viewed as sequentially organized social actions” (Filipi 2009,
p. 53: refering to Sharrock and Anderson 1987). In other words these approaches are
theory-driven and thus use “preconveived notions of talk and premature categorising based
on intuitive judgement” (ibid.).
Conversely conversation analysis is data-driven and “there is no research question or
hypothesis at the outset” such that “nothing can be dismissed a priori” (Filipi 2009). This
stance has been described by Levinson (1983) as “a strict and parsimonious structuralism
and a theoretical asceticism” (p. 295).
Intent Interpretations Joanna Ryan, who appears to be one of the early adopters of
a conversation-analytical position within child-language research, emphasises the adults’
role in and impact on language acquisition by asserting that “(e)arly language development
thus appears to take place in a context that provides a child with frequent interpretations
of his utterances” (Ryan 1974). She observed that mothers frequently repeated or ex-
tended the child’s utterances and also manipulate the non-linguistic context in order to
understand what they conceive of as attempts at speech. Several features of the child’s
behaviour are observed to contribute to adults crediting the child with ‘trying to say some-
thing’, which they also use to make sense of the utterances. The behavioural features
presented by Ryan are intonation patterns, which within Dore’s account featured as prim-
itive IFIDS, and which are “variously interpreted as insistence, protest, pleasure, request,
etc.” (idid.) based on adult intonation patterns, accompaniments of utterances such as
pointing, searching, refusing but also other features of the situational context such as the
presence of objects or people that have or had some relevance to the child. Important
for our purposes is the observation that these linguistic interpretations do not only oc-
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cur as extensions of single words or some non-conventional but stable phonetic pattern,
but also as interpretations of bodily behaviour. According to Pea (1980) “(p)arents also
frequently interpret these behaviors (physical means of rejection, our comment) as expres-
sive of negation and expand them with lexical negatives: "no, no, don’t want it."” More
recently, Filipi (2009) provided another, potentially complementary explanation for these
behaviours which play a central role in our hypothesis 1 (cf. section 1.1): parent(s) “ad-
dress the infant as a conversational partner from birth and continue(s) to do so through
early infancy. As noted, the parent treats the infant’s gestures, eye contact and vocal-
isations as meaningful and she will respond to them verbally. When the child does not
produce the required conversational behaviour, the parent supplies it” (Filipi 2009, p. 23,
emphasis added). If this is the case, and we will see clear evidence of such behaviour in our
human-robot dyads within the experiments, the caretaker’s activity might go well beyond
the mere interpretation and completion of the child’s incomplete utterances. Caretakers
and, in our case, participants, may provide the entire conversationally required turn, if the
child (or robot) does not appear to fulfill its obligation.
Ryan cautions us against the practice to “conflate the means by which an adult inter-
prets a child’s utterance with the devices it is assumed a child uses to express herself”,
that is “to assume a child uses the same devices to convey her meaning as an adult uses in
interpreting the utterance” (Ryan 1974). This problem is fundamental to the application
of pragmatic theories, speech act or other theories, to mother-child conversations. This
fundamental limitation also touches upon the basic assumption of ethnomethodology and
conversation analysis that “unique adequacy can usually be assumed” for “the subject of
research is something that most persons participate in regularly, like ordinary talk” (Rawls
2003). In other words we, as researchers, may not be able to access the member’s methods
of the child by means of “naturalistic observation grounded in a deep familiarity with and,
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preferably, bona fide competence in the discipline under scrutiny” as our familiarity with
ordinary talk gives us access to the mothers’ member methods but not necessarily to those
of the child (Ryan 1974). Yet researchers such as Trevarthen evidently trust our capacity as
conversing human beings to be able to interpret a toddler’s behaviour in a meaningful way,
in his case by means of a (conversational) micro-description of mother-child interactions
(cf. Trevarthen and Aitken 2001). Conversely it may be argued that the interpretation
of other reseachers of a toddler’s single-word utterances as being just words or as being
proto-utterances was theoretically motivated and cannot be backed up experimentally nei-
ther. We will later follow Trevarthen’s lead by using a ethnomethodological approach in
our analyses of the pragmatic level (cf. section 5.3).
In the following we will give a rough sketch of pre-linguistic adult-child communication
based on (Filipi 2009).
Early Communication - Gaze As first step into a social world as conversation partners,
neonates have been observed to orient towards a talking adult within the first week.
Gaze is generally the first means of infants to signal to an adult that he shall attend to an
object which is accomplished via gaze fixation. In this function it is thought to be the first
developmental step for communicating attention and as such a precursor to, first, gestural
requests and subsequently verbal requests (p. 2). This ability subsequently changes the
mother’s behaviour in that she starts to communicate with her child. She “fits in” with
the infant’s behaviour and responds to her, while ceasing to respond when the baby looks
away (Stern 1974, Brazelton et al. 1974, Fogel 1977, Kaye 1979: ibid., p. 3). The roles
of the ‘gazers’ are initially asymmetric: parents were observed to watch the child much
more than vice versa. Parents have been described as acting as if the child was behaving
intentionally (Bruner 1975b, Collis 1977, Harding 1983, Trevarthen 1979: ibid., p. 3).
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Apart from gaze, a sharing of rhythm both in talk and body movement between parent
and infant have been observed (Holmlund 1995: ibid., p. 3) and have been described as the
“groundwork for the future development of turn-taking” (Bateson 1979: quoted in Filipi
2009, p. 3). Thus gaze may be seen as the “infant’s way of starting to do "interaction" or
of setting the stage for talk ... The parent’s role in this is of course crucial. It is largely
through her behaviour that the parent systematically "teaches" the child the importance of
gaze in turn-taking, and that the basic sequential organisation of talk involving adjacency
pairs ... is beginning to set” (Filipi 2009, p. 3, emphasis added). Filipi contends that the
child beyond acquiring rules for turn-taking actually learns that gaze is a form of social
action. Yet, even at this very early stage, universality may not be given: “sustained gazing
and the importance of maintaining eye contact is very much a feature of parent and child
interaction in middle class Western families” (p. 3). Amongst the Kaluli, a community
that lives in the Southern Highlands province of Papua New Guinea, gaze appears to play
a far less pivotal role in mother-child interaction than in Western families (Schieffelin and
Ochs 1983).
Interestingly face-to-face interactions occur significantly less after the first six months
as the child learns to follow the direction of the parent’s attention. The latter is thought
to be very important for the later lexical development, as joint attention and the ability
to establish a joint focus are claimed to be crucial in this context by authors such as
Tomasello (2003). By 10 to 11 months toddlers then acquire the skill to follow the adult’s
eye direction, before that stage they are following the adults’ head movements (p. 4).
Early Communication - Gestures Proponents of the continuity assumption, i.e. the
assumption that gestural and linguistic communication form a unified system, claim that
“what starts off as a spontaneous gestural action in the early stages of infancy, becomes
62
Literature Review Developmental CA
intentional communication at around nine to ten months” (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton,
Camaioni and Volterra 1979, Caselli 1990: ibid., p.8). According to these, infants are
unaware of the “conventional purpose” of their gestures up to that stage (Carpenter et al.
1998, Liszkowski 2006, Liszkowski et al. 2007, Tomasello et al. 2007: ibid., p. 8). De-
ictic gestures, mainly concrete pointing, occur first, with “intentional pointing” starting
at around 9 months, followed by conventional and iconic gestures such as head shakes or
waving (Filipi 2009, p. 10).
Recent studies indicate that children’s first utterances are crossmodal (Gullberg et al.
(2008): ibid., p. 11), thus, gestural communication does not stop with the onset of speech.
Some authors have linked the early comprehension of words to action gestures (Caselli et al.
1995, Fenson et al. 1994: ibid.). Pointing and reaching gestures in particular are thought
to be of great importance to early language development because of their communicative
function (Leavens and Hopkins 1999: ibid.). Some researchers even attribute to gestures
the same linguistic status as to the first words, and Bates et al. (1983) go on to equate
gestures with nouns (Filipi 2009, p. 12).
Open-handed reaching, which we will employ in our experiments, was described by
Bates et al. (1977) as a ‘proto-imperative’, through which the child is making her earliest
requests. The parents’ response to this gesture then may give it the appropriate information
on how to influence others which then might eventually lead to the development of the
imperative (Filipi 2009, Bruner 1983).
Development of Turn-taking Possibly the earliest precursor of turn-taking as observed
in talk-in-interaction has been described in the context of infant feeding: there an “alterna-
tion between sucking, pausing and looking at the mother who then engages in talk” (Filipi
2009, p. 24) has been oberved and authors such as Kaye (1977) consider this sequential
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organisation a conversational prototype (ibid.).
Yet, if one is willing to accept this position, the sequential organization is no “neat
alternation of speaker acts” at that stage. Overlaps of vocalizations occur frequently and
have been given the name “vocal clashing” (Ely and Gleason 1995: ibid., p. 25). Vocal
clashing peaks at 7 to 13 weeks (Locke 1993) whereupon turn-taking becomes more orderly
such that at the end of 12-18 weeks infants adapt in that they abstain more frequently from
vocalising during productions by their mother (Symons and Moran 1987): ibid., p.25). This
is then the time period when terms such as proto-conversations (Bateson 1979: ibid.) and
pseudo-dialogues (Schaffer 1979, 1984: ibid.) are used to refer to the interaction between
mother and child. Some authors claim that it is the mother’s conversational work, i.e. her
adaptations to the timing of the infant seeking to minimise overlap and her treatment of
the child as active conversational partner, that creates the impression of a real conversation
taking place (Filipi 2009 refering to Hayes 1984, Schaffer 1979, 1984). Other authors such
as Murray and Trevarthen (1986) criticise these accounts as withholding the active role
of the infant and therefore denying the reciprocity in this synchronization process (Filipi
2009).
Most responses in parent-child conversations are produced within one second (Beebe
and Stern 1977, Stella-Prorok 1983: ibid., p. 25) with gaps after maternal utterances
typically being longer (Snow 1977: ibid.). This is an interesting observation as the one-
second threshold appears to be an important threshold in adult conversations (cf. section
2.1.3).
In the context of this thesis possibly the most important observation is that the child’s
turn-taking skills are already well established when first words are uttered: “. . . when
the child reaches the stage where she can utter her first word, she is already capable of
sustaining long periods of well-timed turns at talk” (Filipi 2009 with reference to Kaye and
64
Literature Review Developmental CA
Charney 1980, 1981).
Adjacency Pairs In section 2.1.3 we have already emphasised the importance of
adjacency pairs for the sequential structure of adult talk. On this background it is an
important observation that question and answer sequences are pervasive in early turn-
taking in parent-child interaction (Ervin-Tripp 1977, Snow 1977: refered to in Filipi 2009,
p.26). In this context the main focus in the literature, most of which was published in the
1970s, is on parent’s questions. It was observed that “asking questions is more characteristic
of a parent’s talk to her child” than vice versa (Filipi 2009, p. 27: refering to Keenan and
Schieffelin 1976). Furthermore “(t)he high frequency of questions is maintained in the
parent’s interactions with the child throughout her early life, from the age of three months
to three years” (Filipi 2009, p. 27 with reference to Johnson 1982). The hypothesized reason
for the high frequency of questions in parent’s child-directed talk is to generate and sustain
a conversation as the production of first pair-parts create a slot for the child to respond
(ibid., p. 28: refering to Erwin-Tripp and Miller 1977, French and Pak 1991. Indeed
parental questions “have been found to be more successful than comments as elicitations
(Yoder et al. 1994)” in that “they are more likely to receive a response (Foster 1979)” (ibid.,
p. 27).
What can be thought of as cognitive complexity of question-answer pairs changes during
the child’s development from cognitively easier tag questions to questions that demand spe-
cific responses, requests for action and test questions. Furthermore the length of parental
repetition sequences of questions decreases and children “are increasingly able to terminate
them with a relevant response (Snow 1978, Filipi 2001)” (ibid., p.28). An interesting ob-
servation in this context is that “answering questions is thought to be the first discourse
bound obligation to which the child is sensitive (Erwin-Tripp and Miller 1977)” (ibid., p.
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29). This is not to say that children always fulfill this obligation satisfactorily, “. . . they
might simply imitate the adult by repeating the prior utterance (Baker and Nelson 1984)
or randomly choose between yes or no despite the fact that the answer may be incorrect
(Tanz 1987)” (ibid.).
2.3 Developmental Robotics
Developmental robotics is a relatively new research field within robotic research that is
inspired and guided by insights from cognitive and developmental sciences, where the two
developmental sciences under consideration are developmental psychology and develop-
mental neuroscience. Lungarella et al. (2003) describe its methodology as two-pronged in
that it instantiates models that originate from the developmental sciences on one hand,
and develops better robotic systems by exploiting insights from these sciences on the other
hand. Robots are thought to be valid tools to investigate embodied models of development
in the expectation that psychologist “may gain considerable insights from trying to embed
a particular model in robots” (ibid.). Moreover, the field is seen not only as very similar
to but rather as an extension of epigenetic robotics, in that it endorses an biomimetic
approach by addressing biological questions via the construction of physical models of the
animal in question (ibid.). One may add to this view, that ‘the animal’ might be human,
and that in such cases ‘biology’ extends to include psychology. The ‘add-on’ of develop-
mental robotics as compared to epigenetic robotics is then the additional consideration of
research questions pertaining to the acquisition of motor or other skills, i.e. an extension
of scope to include ontogenesis.
Robots that are employed within this methodology are “ ‘cognitive’ or ‘synthetic’ re-
search tools ... to study and model the emergence and development of cognition and
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action” (ibid.). As extension of epigenetic robotics the field then inherits its emphasis on
the importance of embodiment. Thus, most researchers of this field appear to reject the
mind-as-computer metaphor of traditional cognitive science, which demotes the body to a
mere ‘slave’ of a disembodied mind, and where the body serves either solely as channel for
sensorial inputs or as a mere output device or ‘executor’ of what the independent mind had
‘decided’ (cf. Varela et al. 1991). This means that epigenetic and developmental roboticists
generally oppose the view that all cognitively interesting things happen detached from all
bodily matters, but, conversely, see the body as a prerequisite and active element in the
generation of intelligent behaviour. The traditionally strong separation in robotics between
cognitive structures (symbols, representations), software (attention, decision making, rea-
soning), and hardware is viewed as rather unfortunate (ibid.). Lungarella et al. (2003)
further attest the cognitive approach a denial of the importance of ontogentic development
and the (linguistic) nativist position is seen as one outbirth of the cognitivist stance.
The behavioural system that constitutes a central element within this thesis (cf. section
3), thus may be viewed as a developmental robotic system, as the hypotheses which are
tested are developmental ones, pertaining to the acquisition of negation, but also because
we followed a particular tenet when designing the system, that Lungarella et al. (2003)
consider as basic within the developmental synthetic methodology: “the designer should
not engineer ‘intelligence’ into the artificial system ...; instead, he or she should try to
endow the system with an approriate set of basic mechanisms for the system to develop,
learn and behave in a way that appears intelligent to an external observer” (p. 179).
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2.4 Robots and (Human) Language
Possibly the central idea within the community of ‘robotic language learners’, by which
most if not all embodied approaches distinguish themselves from non-embodied, computa-
tional approaches to language understanding and learning, is that they attempt to solve the
so called “symbol grounding problem” (Harnad 1990), depicted in figure 2.1. If one accepts
Figure 2.1: Symbol grounding problem: One cannot learn the meaning of words from a
dictionary alone due to the depicted “dictionary go-round” (aka circular definition of lexical items).
Without symbols being grounded in something outside of the dictionary, the learner will necessarily
end up in such a go-round. The depiction is a (non-faithful) replication from a depiction given in
Roy (2005), which is based on Webster’s Dictionary.
this problem as central to the acquisition and understanding of language by an artificial
agent, all existing approaches to language acquisition, learning, understanding, or recog-
nition fall into one of two categories: those who try to tackle the problem, and those who
don’t. The vast majority of modern computational approaches to speech and language
processing such as natural language processing (NLP) or automatic speech recognition
(ASR) (Jurafsky and Martin 2000) fall into the latter category. An alternative approach
to avoid the grounding of symbols in perceptual or ‘bodily’ data are so called amodal symbol
systems, with a popular exponent being latent semantic analysis (Landauer and Dumais
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1997). Due to the lack of space, we cannot discuss this approach any further, but refer the
reader to (Barsalou 1999) for a critical discussion.
It has to be emphasised that most of the latter approaches do not attempt to make
‘their’ machines understand human language in more than the most superficial ways. A
search engine, for example, does not necessarily need to ‘make sense’ out of the data that
it is processing. There, it might be sufficient to generate a list of results based on a few
catchwords entered by the user and based on the behaviour of other users that ‘asked the
same question’, i.e. entered the same query. Similarly, a speech interface for cars, if the
car is sufficiently modern, would theoretically have access to more ‘external world’ sensors
than most modern robots. Yet it does not necessarly need to understand the user input in
any ‘deep’ way, in order to do its job. What this interface needs to do is to call the correct
function, based on the user input, and where the correct speech-to-command mapping
is predefined by the designer. There is no real need for the car to have ‘acquired’ these
mappings, it is sufficient if the designers of the interface had enough foresight to hard-wire
the vast majority of utterances that a human would possibly utter when ‘speaking to’
the car. The latter could presumably be lifted from an extensive user study. Only a few
people would presumably try to converse with their Mercedes about the latest football
game, yet those who tried would be utterly disappointed by the outcome of the attempt.
Furthermore, users will most probably be more than happy to adapt their way of speaking
to a certain degree, in order to ‘be understood’ by their vehicle, i.e. they will stop their
attempts to converse about football. The same holds true for modern speech interfaces for
mobile phones. With enough data of human speech behaviour available, and this data is
growing by the minute, there is no real practical need for command interfaces to ‘really
understand’ a single word of what the user says.
Yet, this is precisely what, at least in the author’s opinion, symbol grounding is all
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about: for a machine to make sense of, first words, and then, hopefully, longer utterances,
by virtue of linking these words with its own embodiment. It is important to emphasise the
active construction in the previous sentence: “linking” instead of “being linked”. Because
one could easily argue that a speech interface for automobiles that does map words or
utterances to control functions does indeed have some form of symbol-to-percept or symbol-
to-action grounding. One could easily imagine a function that evaluates the status of the
rain sensor on the car window in order give a meaningful answer to the question “Is it
raining outside?”10. This utterance then would be grounded in the best sense of the word.
Yet, the link between the sensory-function and the word or utterance was in this case
established by the designer, not by the car itself.
We should therefore be more precise with regards to what those roboticists that attempt
to “ground symbols” are actually attempting to do. The issue that is being tackled is how
to enable the machine to learn or acquire the symbol-to-percept or symbol-to-function
mappings by itself. To use the car example: How can the Mercedes figure out all by itself
that “rain” somehow relates to its water sensors as opposed to the sensor that measures the
engine temperature. The major challenge, thus, is not the grounding in the sense of the
resulting link itself, but rather how to have the machine establish this link in an automatic
fashion.
This then is the challenge that is tackled by most researchers in the field of ‘robotic
language acquisition’. Yet, another much less recognised and tackled problem is the circum-
stance that utterances are not just strings of words. As alluded to in previous sections,
utterances also have a communicative function. This means that questions are not the
same as assertions. “Do you know what time it is?” can be a proper question, yet it also
can be a request to be left alone. And this function evidently does not hinge on words or
10It is another question if this actually makes any practical sense, as looking out of the windows would
probably answer this question more quickly than asking the car.
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strings of words. Do then communicative functions have to be grounded as well? And if
yes, how? What are these communicative functions then mapped or linked to? And how
many communicative functions are there anyway? To the knowledge of the author, there
have been hardly any attempts in the robotic community to tackle this issue. Yet this is
precisely the problem, which we face, when trying to ‘ground’ negation.
2.4.1 Previous approaches to symbol grounding
In this subsection we will quickly summarize the previous attempts to symbol grounding
via conversation or dialogue and work out important differences between those approaches.
This subsection is not meant to be a comprehensive overview due to time and space con-
straints. It should be noted, that not all symbol grounding is done via conversational
systems. Evolutionary linguistics is a neighbouring and methodologically somewhat over-
lapping field, where this notion is equally central, yet the perspective there is an evolu-
tionary one, phylogenetic as opposed to ontogenetic, and typically involves multi-agent
models, often simulated (cf. Cangelosi 1999, 2001, Lyon et al. 2007, Steels 2003, 2005).
We further sub-divide this subsection in terms of the nature of the conversation part-
ners, i.e. in terms of who is conversing with whom, as this has important implications
on the complexity of the grounding problem. Notice that the section on “Designer-Robot-
Interaction” comprises experiments in which the human interlocutor has to restrict his or
her speech in pre-defined ways in order to render the symbol-grounding successful. Thus
the section title is somewhat of a misnomer and was chosen for reasons of brevity.
Robot-Robot Interaction
Some of the embodied frameworks such as those described by Steels (2003) enable artificial
agents to invent their own vocabulary and simple forms of grammar like word order for the
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purpose of communicating with each other in a language constructed by and understand-
able to the robotic participants of the dialogue (Steels 1998). The latter approach came
to be known as evolutionary linguistics and mainly focuses on the development of vocabu-
laries over time by groups of agents, and potentially, simple grammatical constructions by
the agents (Steels 2005). As the research effort in the involved approaches appear to be
mainly directed towards the understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of the language
games of the agents, the symbol-grounding problem is often simplified by limiting the num-
ber of potentially meaningful sensory channels, often the visual channel (e.g. Baillie and
Ganascia 2000). Most often these systems are limited in their scope of acquisition to object
labels and descriptions of physical actions or events such as move, push, pull etc. (Steels
and Baillie 2003). Often the underlying conceptual layer, i.e. the semantic equivalents to
which event ‘labels’ such as push, pull, etc. are linked is hand-crafted by the designer and,
in turn, linked to some event logic (e.g. Steels 2003). This means that what is typically
learned, is the word-to-concept mapping, whereas the concepts are already existent, static,
and can typically not be influenced by the linguistic level.
A popular ‘template’ for these logical type of grounding systems appears to be the one
developed by Siskind (2001), variants of which were for example adopted and/or developed
by Dominey and Boucher (2005) and Steels and Baillie (2003).
Siskind’s (2001) grounding mechanism consists of several levels:
(1) A segmentation-and-tracking component that isolates and tracks coloured objects on
the camera images.
(2) A model-reconstruction component that produces a so called force-dynamic model for
the objects as identified by the segmentation-and-tracking component. The latter deter-
mines which of a number of visual primitives apply to the isolated objects. Visual primitives
in Siskind’s system are grounded, i.e. physically supported by an unseen mechanism other
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than the known objects, or attached, which indicates that the object is attached to another
object in some way.
(3) An event-classification component that determines over which time intervals certain
primitive events hold based on the force-dynamic model. Primitive event types are then
events such as SUPPORTED(x), SUPPORTS(x,y), CONTACTS(x,y), and ATTACHED(x,y)
which form the basis for an inference mechanism which can subsequently determine higher-
level events such as PICKUP(x,y,z), or MOVE(w,x,y,z).
The high-level events can then subsequently serve as semantic basis against which object
and event labels may be linked.
Obviously, grounding systems of this kind are limited to the grounding of those physical
and visible actions and events which are decomposable into the respective visual primitives
on one hand, and for which inference rules have been designed by the human construc-
tor to ‘perform’ this decomposition on the other. The grounded utterances are typically
utterances such as “the red block pushed the blue ball” and the like.
Designer-Robot Interaction
(Steels and Kaplan 2002) present a so-called ‘social learning’ mechanism where the Sony
robot AIBO engages with a mediator in a classification game, effectively a game that aims
to establish an object-word association - a game not dissimilar to the one that participants
and robot engage in within this thesis (cf. section 4). The ‘social’ component of the
game, i.e. the feedback of the mediator consists of encouraging and correcting words such
as “good”, “yes”, or “no”, which are pre-determined and not learned. Furthermore the
mediator obviously has to be trained in order to only utter trigger words and utterances
which activate scripts that, in turn, drive the interaction. On the plus-side the learning
evidently happens in real-time, which is made possible by the pre-arranged scripts, an
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automatic speech recognition which is trained for the small corpus of words and utterances,
that the mediator is allowed to utter, and a mediator that sticks to these limitations.
(Dominey and Boucher 2005) focus on the acquisition of more complex sentence-to-
meaning mappings by using a camera-setup coupled with a speech recognition system.
Content words and their order are extracted from (complete) sentences via the identifica-
tion of pre-defined function words. The extracted words and their order is subsequently
mapped to a predicate-argument structure that is derived from a physical scene via an
event analysis based on perceptual primitives akin to the one developed by Siskind (2001).
These mappings are then stored in an associative memory with the configuration of func-
tion words as index to access the stored mapping. The authors subsequently tested the
ability of the system to generalize across participants, i.e. to identify correct noun-agent,
noun-object, verb-action mappings etc. based on unseen sentences. This system is thus
very much motivated by construction grammar approaches such as (Tomasello 2003), yet it
also assumes that the sentences are complete and that they exclusively refer to the physical
scene at hand. Systems of this kind are, despite being ‘constructionist’, in the grammatical
sense of the word (Tomasello 2003), prime examples of representationalist approaches to
language acquistion, i.e. they assume that every utterance is a complete sentence and that
the sentence ‘represents’ or corresponds to a physical scene. Albeit the authors tested their
system with so-called naïve participants, these participants were constrained to one type
of speech act: describe a given physical scene. Any other kind of linguistic behaviour has
to be either captured by the foresight of the designer, or the human has to be forced to
speak in certain system-compliant ways. We therefore do not count this system amongst
those that involve unconstrained human-robot interaction but rather amongst those where
the speech is somewhat designed to fit the learning problem.
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Unconstrained Human-Robot-Interaction
The experimental approach presented in this section forms the basis of the work described
within this thesis and will therefore be discussed in greater detail than the other robotic
approaches sketched above. The major difference between this and the other presented
robotic approaches for language-centered human-robot interaction is the circumstance that
here naïve participants are the ones interacting with the robot, and that these participants
can speak with the robot in whatever way they deem appropriate. Furthermore no post-
experimental filtering of the collected speech is undertaken to remove ‘unfitting’ utterances
or the like to improve the learning algorithm. This ‘lack of tampering’ with the data
and the lack of scripted dialogues, which appear to be common amongst the systems
in our designer-robot interaction category, renders approaches of this kind most similar
to the learning problem that a small child faces and more informative in terms of the
characterisation of the actual problem that children face. Naturally this large degree of
‘interactive freedom’ also renders the learning problem comparatively hard, as there is no
guarantee that the utterances really fit the experimental scenario.
Saunders’ system Saunders et al. (2009) describe a two-pronged approach to robotic
language acquisition with the first ‘prong’ focussing on pre-word simulated babbling and
the second ‘prong’ focussing on the developmentally later acquisition of first words in an
“interactional environment with shared ‘intentional’ referencing” (ibid.). We will focus here
on the latter avenue of research and refer the reader to (Lyon et al. 2012) for a discussion
of the simulated babbling approach. The latter approach was in terms of the employed
learning method set out as one of establishing a statistical association between speech and
the robot’s actions, its visual, proprioceptive, and auditory perceptions. As the authors
outline, a ‘brute force’ statistical mapping that operates indifferently on all available speech
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and perception data is most likely to fail, as observations of mother-child conversations do
not support the view that the language teacher always utters the ‘right’ words at ‘right’
time to establish the correct link between the extralinguistic object and the intralinguistic
word. For this reason the learning method is biased via the establishment of a shared
context and shared intentional ‘intent’ between robot and human teacher.
Experiment 1: Acquisition of noun-like object labels For the first experiment
the social learning architecture ROSSUM (Saunders et al. 2006, 2007) and the humanoid
Kaspar2 (Blow et al. 2006, Dautenhahn et al. 2009) are employed. The robot’s behaviour
is driven by novelty, i.e. it searches for, fixates on, and tracks novel objects, and smiles
as soon as one is found. Yet the robot also becomes bored with a given object if it is
presented long enough (approx. 20 sec.) and subsequently moves its head semi-randomly
until a new object or the human’s face enters its visual field. This behaviour was designed
in order to provoke participants to present new objects to the robot. The robot is further
driven by the ‘urge’ to share the same attention space as the human participant and its
visual focus thus is made to correspond roughly with the target of the human gaze.
In Saunders et al. (2010) the authors report about the outcome of an experiment
based on said architecture and robot. The experiment was initially set up to make use of
an automatic speech recognition (ASR). Yet the accuracy of the word recognition of these
systems was found to be insufficient for the purpose of lexical grounding, and an alternative
semi-automatic method for speech processing was developed (see next paragraph). The
experiment consisted of 8 participants, each of which completed four training sessions for
the ASR, followed by five interaction sessions with the robot of approximately 2 minutes
each. Participants were told to teach the robot the names of the given objects and to
to treat the robot as a 1-2 year old child. For the purposes of symbol grounding an 8-
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dimensional sensorimotor (sm) vector was used, consisting of the object id, a binary value
for face detection, head pan, tilt, and roll and 3 dimensions pertaining to the location of
the object.
Speech processing, word extraction, grounding - Method 1 The speech pro-
cessing method developed by and employed in Saunders et al. (2009) was adopted by us and
we therefore refer to section 3.6 of the architecture for a description. However, as opposed
to the word extraction method employed within the work of this thesis, Saunders et al.
(2009) employed a different heuristic to determine the most salient word of an utterance.
Under the latter heuristic a word is considered the most salient word of an utterance if (a)
the duration of its pronunciation is above the average word duration within the utterance,
and (b) if the word is at the utterance-final position. For each utterance at most one salient
word is extracted. The grounding of salient words, i.e. the ‘attachment’ of sensorimotor
data to the extracted salient words was, again, adopted by us, and is described in section
3.7. Naturally Saunders et al. (2009) system differs from ours in terms of the kind and
dimensionality of the sensorimotor data, yet the grounding process is identical.
Run-time ‘languaging’ The method by which words are selected from the robot’s
lexicon, i.e. the set of grounded salient words, was largely adopted by us and is therefore
described in section 3.4. However the two systems differ in the following four aspects:
(1) Saunders et al.’s (2009) system uses information gain to ‘weigh’ the sensorimotor di-
mensions for distance calculation within the kNN algorithm, (2) Saunders et al. use the
1-norm Manhattan distance as similarity metric, (3) the ‘speaking threshold’ is not adapted
to the robot’s motivational state as their system has none, and (4) no differential lexicon
is employed (cf. section 3.4).
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Experiment 1: Research questions and answers Four questions were sought to
be answered by Saunders et al. from the experiment. The first two questions, pertaining to
potential adaptations of the participants speech, were [1 ] if participants in the experiment
would adapt their speech when interacting with the robot in a similar way to adaptations
observed in CDS, and [2 ] whether participants would change their speech style with the
progression of the experiment during which typically a change of the robot’s speech occurs
as its learning progresses. The last two questions pertain to the robot’s learning progress
and were [3 ] whether the robot’s ‘linguistic classification’ would improve as the experiment
progresses, and [4 ] whether the robot would ‘hone in’ on those dimensions of its sensori-
motor data which we, as knowledgable observers, know to be relevant for the classification
of the present objects.
With regards to question [1 ], Saunders et. al. found, that female participants lowered
their speech rate across sessions, whereas male participants did not. Moreover it was found
that participants placed the relevant words, that is the object-related nouns, at the end
of the utterances, and pronounced them with higher-than-average duration in, on average,
80% of times.
The authors were seeking to answer question [2 ] with an analysis of the number of
added and dropped words between sessions. This analysis indicated a considerable amount
of repetition. Furthermore, the largest drop in the number of words was witnessed between
the second and third session, i.e. after participants had heard the robot speak for the first
time. The interpretation of the authors with regards to this finding was that participants
were adapting to what was most probably perceived as a limited understanding of the
robot.
With regards to the improvement of the robot’s ‘linguistic classification’, the authors
found that such an improvement did indeed happen between the first and the fourth
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session, such that the percentage of ‘correct matches’ were ranging between 53 and 76%
after this fourth session. Yet this correct match rate dropped from the forth to the fifth
session uniformly across participants. This was explained by the following adaptation:
upon the mainly correct production of object labels on part of the robot by the 4th session
participants often stopped to teach it the names or object labels and proceeded to give it
encouraging feedback such as “well done”. This positive feedback then, eventually, leads to
the entering of ‘object-foreign’ words into the robot’s lexica, a process which subsequently
dilutes the association between the object-id dimension of the sm data and the object
labels.
In order to answer question [4 ], an analysis of information gains associated with the
various sm dimensions was performed. This analysis showed that for all but 2 participants
the information gain associated with the sm-dimension that contained the object id was
indeed higher than the ones associated with any of the other dimensions. This then indi-
cates that this dimension is the most meaningful dimension with respect to the words in
the lexica.
Experiment 2: Moving towards the two-word stage Saunders et al. (2012)
describe the attempt to move the robot’s language production from the one- to the two-
word stage. This target necessitated a slight change of the experimental scenario such that
the previously black-and-white and equally large boxes were replaced by coloured boxes
with different sized signs on them. This change was made in order to enable participants to
talk not only about the objects as wholes but also about their attributes, here colour and
size. The participants were further told to do precisely that: teach the robot about colours
and sizes on top of the ‘kind’ of the object. Another, technical, change in the experimental
setup is the exchange of the robot. Kaspar2 was replaced by the humanoid iCub, the same
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humanoid that was also employed in the experiments reported about in this thesis. The
robot’s behaviour was slightly modified as well: deictic gestures (pointing) and non-deictic
arm movements towards the objects were introduced. Furthermore happy and sad facial
expressions were employed and small random head movements to engage the participants.
The sensorimotor data employed was reduced to three dimensions, corresponding to object
id, colour id, and shape id.
Speech processing, word extraction, grounding - Method 2 While the speech
processing in this ‘advanced’ system still is done in the same manner as has been described
for the first experiment above, the saliency detection was modified in order to extract
more than one salient word from each utterance. This new method employs prosodic
features and preliminary experiments on this method are reported in (Saunders, Lehmann,
Sato and Nehaniv 2011). In order to obtain a yardstick to determine which words can
be considered prosodically salient, the product of the normalised values for maximum
fundamental frequency (f0 ), duration, and maximum energy was calculated for each word.
A word was subsequently considered salient if this value was larger than the average value
of this product within the utterance to which this word belonged. Thus, as opposed to
the ‘old’ method, the ‘end of utterance’ criterion was dropped and replaced by the two
mentioned prosodic measures, while the word duration was kept as determining factor for
salience.
The grounding is performed in the same manner as before. Yet, there is now potentially
more than one salient word per utterance. If this is the case, the salient and grounded
words are split into two sets or memory tables. The first table then contains all but the
last of the salient words of any utterance, whereas the second set contains the last salient
word of each utterance.
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Run-time ‘languaging’ - Method 2 The method by which words are retrieved
from the memory tables is essentially the same as before, yet there are now two tables
against which the incoming sm data is matched simultaneously. Thus, there is now the
possibility that two words, one from each table, might reach the ‘expression threshold’ at
approximately the same time. In this case both words are produced by the robot in the
order <word from table 1>, <word from table 2>.
Experiment 2: Research questions and answers Saunders et al. (2012) at-
tempted to answer three research question by conducting experiments with the described
architecture. They asked [1 ] how effective the novel prosody-based word extraction was,
where effectiveness is measured as the percentage of meaningful words relative to the num-
ber of all words that were marked as salient. Meaningful words in this context are words
that can be related to any dimension of the robot’s sensorimotor data, in this case words
that either label the object, or that relate to colour or size. Examples for meaningful words
in this sense are thus “star”, “red”, or “large”. Examples for meaningless words in this sense
are “that”, “good”, but also “Deechee” because there is no sm dimension to which these
words could be directly related to. [2 ] They further asked which sm dimensions would be
associated with the salient words, and [3 ] whether word order could be derived from these
associations, i.e. whether the received temporal order of salient words would be indicative
of the standard word order in English - here adjective - object word rather than vice versa.
With regards to question [1 ] the analysis showed that a very high number of meaning-
ful words were extracted, approximately 70-80% with each participant, and thus showed
that participants did prosodically emphasise these words. Yet, notice that not all of the
extracted words were meaningful.
With regards to questions [2 ] and [3 ] Saunders et. al. analysed both the difference in
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information gain between the colour id and the object id dimensions of the sm data as well
as the same difference between the size id and the object id dimensions. These differences
were calculated for both tables. If participants primarily used the standard word order
in English for ‘modifications’, e.g. “this is a red star”, as opposed to the word order for
‘predication’, e.g. “this star is red”, one would expect adjectives, if produced with at least
average prosodic saliency, to be mainly located in the first tables. Object labels, on the
other hand, under the same assumptions, would be primarily located in the second tables.
This, in turn, would lead to an increase of the information index (or other correlation
measures for that matter) of the size and colour dimensions of the sm data of the first
tables and to a decrease of the information index of the object id dimension within the
same tables. Conversely, one would expect to see in this case the opposite development in
terms of changes of the information index in the second table if both ‘modification’ word
order as well as the prosody criteria were met by the participants’ productions.
The calculated differences then indeed indicated that these assumptions held in the
case for the colour dimension but less so for the size dimension. The authors explain this
difference with the circumstance that indeed not the ARToolkit shapes or tags attached to
the boxes varied in size but that just the physical objects (boxes) did. This then had led
to their participants not saying things like “this is a big red star”, but to them producing
descriptions such as “this is a red star on a big box”.
Theoretical Approaches
A (so far) theoretical approach that fits in neither of the above categories but one which
constitutes the only operationalisable framework for robots that, to the knowledge of the
author, incorporates the notion of speech acts are the so called semiotic schemas of Roy
(2005). Roy considers the grounding of language as a special form of the grounding of
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an agent’s belief, and further conceives of primitive speech acts as intentional signs. Yet
he makes the somewhat irritating assertion that in their implemention “speech acts are
assembled from lexical units (..) using a grammar”(Roy 2005, p.195). On the background
that their semiotic schema framework supports precisely two types of speech acts, direc-
tives and descriptives, we take this to mean, that their grammatical parser recognizes the
grammatical imperative in an utterance and subsequently flags the presence of a directive.
If this is so, a single-word loud “No!” would go unnoticed. The learning and acquisition of
these schemas is not part of (Roy 2005), which is a paper on representational issues.
2.5 Acquisition of Negation
Despite the majority of the first words of English-speaking toddlers being nouns, there
are many other words in these toddlers’ expressive vocabularies that do not refer to “any-
thing visualisable” (Ryan 1974). No is one of these words. Due to the at least partially
non-referential nature of these words their meaning or use can generally not be acquired
exclusively by a process of association with an entity or event in the physical, non-social
world. It is hard to imagine how they could possibly be taught via ostension, and often
there is no indication that they would be used to name or label anything. The at least
partially non-referential nature of these words in combination with the above mentioned
focus of modern child language research on nouns and, to a lesser degree verbs, appears to
effectively put these non-referential words and the process of their acquisition outside of
the scope of most research on child language development.
This narrow focus may explain why there are comparatively few publications dedicated
to the acquisition of negation most of which date back to the 1970’s and 1980’s. Another
curious observation is the circumstance that many of the authors that did research on ‘non-
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referential’ words and other ‘non-referential’ aspects of mother-infant conversations are in
one way or another connected to Jerome Bruner, an early critic of the field’s predominant
focus on grammar of Chomsky’s formalist programme and one of the most prominent
figures in the first wave of the so-called sociopragmatic approaches to language acquisition
(cf. Baldwin and Meyer 2007).
It is important to emphasise that the early emergence of “no” is not the only phe-
nomenon that is outside of the scope of research that has its focus firmly on words that
can potentially be explained by ostension or the co-occurrence of ‘words and things’. Other
early emerging words such as words to negotiate or answer questions (“yes”) or words used
within social practices such as greeting somebody (“hi”), saying good night (“night night”)
or saying good bye (“bye”) which all belong to the very first words of an infant’s expressive
vocabulary cannot be explained by ostension or physical co-occurence of ‘word and thing’
(cf. Fenson et al. 1994, p. 93 for a list of the earliest words produced).
2.5.1 Taxonomies of early meanings of negation
A few taxonomies of early meanings of negation exist, yet we conceive of the differences
between them as rather minor. Pea’s (1980) taxonomy is the one that we chose as template
for our taxonomies (cf. section 5.3.2). Pea gives an analysis of cognitive requirements of the
various negation types, which is thought to explain the particular developmental order in
which these various types emerge. These postulated cognitive requirements, affect, memory
constraints, or the ability to perform logical judgements, then appeared to lend itself for
computational implementation, which had been the initial reason to choose this taxonomy
over the others. A second reason for the choice of Pea’s taxonomy was the circumstance that
it covers precisely the developmental period of our interest: the very beginning of toddlers’
speech. The four children upon which Pea’s observations and therefore his taxonomy are
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based are between eight months and one year eight months old. The other two taxonomies
of early forms of negation, which we considered, were the ones presented by Bloom (1970)
and Choi (1988). Bloom’s categorization is comparatively minimal as it only contains the
three types nonexistence, rejection, and denial.
Choi’s taxonomy is one of few negation taxonomies that we are aware of which is based
on cross-linguistic data. Choi based her analysis on the observation of eleven children:
two US-American, four Korean-speaking and five French-speaking children the latter of
which contained one French-Canadian. She identifies nine different semantic/pragmatic
types which are thought to emerge roughly in three subsequent developmental phases. It
is important to note that the children under observation in Choi’s study were slightly older
than the ones observed by Pea. ‘Choi’s’ children were between one year seven months
and three years four months of age. According to Choi (1988) during the first phase
the negation types prohibition, rejection, (failure), and (nonexistence) emerge, where the
bracketed types have been observed to emerge one phase later with some children. In the
second phase denial, (inability), and (epistemic negation) emerge, followed by normative
negation and inferential negation in phase 3. We refer to (Förster et al. 2011) where we
attempted to map Choi’s types to the ones developed by Pea.
2.5.2 Pea’s Taxonomy of Early Meanings of Negation
Pea’s “taxonomy of negative meanings” (Pea 1980, p. 157) is depicted in figure 2.2. In
his own words this taxonomy is “not a typology of early meanings for negation, for there
is no reason to assume that these "types" .. are in any sense distinct in the children’s
conception of their own use of the negative words in these situations” (Pea 1980, p. 163).
We take this, at least to us, slightly confusing emphasis on the taxonomy’s elements being
“meanings” but not “types of meanings” to mean the following:
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Pea’s taxonomy is very much motivated by the Wittgensteinian idea of family resem-
blance: “Like many words, "negation" does not have any one central or defining essence,
but a number of meanings that partake of family resemblances to one another” (Pea 1980,
p. 160: in reference to Wittgenstein 1958). This means that he does conceive of the various
forms of negation not as ‘concepts’ that all share one or more essential features, but rather
that some of these forms share certain common properties and might be used in similar
situations for similar purposes. What appears to be equally Wittgensteinian’ in spirit is
the circumstance that the features which distinguish one type from another are pragmatic,
or, in Pea’s own words, “contexts for the use of negation”.
At the topmost level the taxonomy has adjacency as criterion. Despite Pea’s reason
of this just being so “for the purpose of exposition”, it emphasises the importance of the
conversational context. Especially from a conversation analytical perspective the location
of an utterance within a conversation is of utter import for its very function within that
conversation. Yet the notion of adjacency that is used within the taxonomy is somewhat
weaker than the notion of adjacency within the conversation analytical concept of adjacency
pairs (cf. section 2.1.3).
On Adjacency In conversations the production of the first pair-part of an adjacency
pair necessitates the production of a second-pair part by the addressee (cf. section 2.1.3).
If for example Peter asks Susanne for the time, Susanne will feel urged to give Peter an
adequate answer if possible. If she is unable to do so for Susanne might not have a watch,
she will feel the need to explain why she is unable answer the question. Simple non-action
on the part of Susanne would amount to a breach of conversational convention and would
be considered odd or rude - in conversation analytical terms Susanne is accountable for
her non-production. This is the strong version of adjacency, adjacency between parts of
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adjacency pairs (cf. section 2.1.3). In Pea’s taxonomy adjacency refers to the weaker, ‘sim-
ple’ conversational adjacency of a child’s utterance to an adult utterance which naturally
includes but is not restricted to second-pair parts of adjacency pairs.
For example the subscript of truth-dependent denial on the left hand side of the
taxonomy-tree in figure 2.2 refers to “yes/no questions and declaratives”. In the case
of the child answering “no” in response to a truth-functional question such as “Is it raining
outside?”, the child is producing a second pair-part of the adjacency-pair question-answer.
If, however, the “no” is adjacent to the declarative “It is raining outside”, “no” is not a
second pair-part, because assertion-denial is not an adjacency-pair. In the latter case the
child could have just as well said nothing and would have not been accountable for its
non-production.
Nonadjacency in this taxonomy simply means that it is the child that initiated the
utterance. We take this to mean that also negative questions on the part of the child, if
they would exist in the taxonomy, would be listed on the right-hand, non-adjacent side of
the tree.
Study setup Before delving into the details of the different meanings of negation it is
important to briefly explain some characteristics of the setup or situational context within
which Pea’s data was gathered. Pea’s study is based on speech of toddlers gathered during
monthly visits of 7 mother-child dyads during a single year. 5 of the children were aged
0:8 to 1:8 and the remaining two were aged 1:0 to 2:0, i.e. all children were in the so called
one-word stage. During each visit the mother-child interaction during home activities such
as playing, feeding, or bathing was observed for 90 minutes of which 30 minutes were video-
taped for transcription purposes. Pea mentions additional audio recordings that were used
for the transcription but he does not specify how much of the non-videotaped interaction
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was (audio-) recorded, and based on which criteria the to-be-videotaped 30 minutes of
the 90 minutes were selected . Importantly Pea, when counting ‘acts of negation’, also
included gestural forms of negation such as head-shakes. These typically emerge ontoge-
netically before their linguistic counterparts. We would also like to emphasise the following
shortcomings, possibly due to the absence of modern experimental standards 30 years ago,
but which are important if we are to compare our data with the one presented by Pea.
First, Pea does not specify the percentual proportion of audio- to video-recordings. Tod-
dlers communicate frequently via gestures and via gesture-word combinations once they
start to speak. Thus video-recordings should be preferred over audio-recordings. For this
reason one would tend to be more suspicious about any categorization that is based on
mere audio-recordings as gestures might have been used by the toddler that could substan-
tially change the meaning of a word. Also, as we will see later on, facial expressions are of
utmost importance if one seeks to determine the type of a negative utterance but also if
one seeks to determine if such an utterance was meant seriously or not. The second major
shortcoming is the lack of use of two or more coders such that we have to rely on Pea’s
judgement alone. Subsequently we don’t know how reliable Pea’s taxonomy is, nor do we
know how reliable his frequency counts for the various ‘types’ are. Some of them could be
based on very ambiguous decisions, and further one or more categories may have served
as ‘catch-all’ categories similar to Dore’s practicing category (cf. section 2.2.2, page 54).
The Frequent Five In this paragraph we will quickly summarize the five ‘types’, se-
mantic categories, or meaning families which Pea observed to be the ones most frequently
produced by his subjects. Also notice that some types occur on both sides of the ‘adjacency-
divide’ such as rejection or disappearance. We list them roughly in their order of ontogenetic
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Figure 2.2: Pea’s taxonomy of “contexts for the use of negation”, replicated from Pea (1980)
emergence11.
Rejection Pea defines Rejection negatives as those “action-based”12 negations which
are used by the child to reject events, persons, objects, or activities that are either in
the immediate context of the child, i.e. the here and now, or which are “imminent in
the mother’s behaviour or utterance”. Futhermore their “truth-value” is contingent on
the child’s motivation. Pea’s definition of rejection seems to exhibit a certain overlap
11We say “roughly” because Pea reports some variation in the developmental order of self-prohibition
and unfulfilled expectation. The remaining three ‘types’ emerged invariably in the given order.
12All citations in this and the following list items are taken from Pea (1980), including the conversational
examples, unless marked otherwise.
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with motivation-dependent denials as he also counts negative responses to desire questions
such as “Do you want a cookie?” in this category. Pea invokes the response “no, now
I do it” of one of his children to her mother’s question “now can I do it?” as example
for motivation-dependent denial. We don’t see a fundamental difference between this
response and a negative response to the foregoing cookie question13. Yet as rejection
is also listed as nonadjacent “type” there are certainly rejections which are clearly not
motivation-dependent denials. For example negative responses to non-linguistic behaviour
such as mother’s bodily indications of a looming nappy-change is a form of rejection that
is not a (motivation-dependent) denial. The sole cognitive requirement for an agent to
engage in this type is “the inner attitude of rejection” or “aversion”.
This ‘definition’ of rejection appears to be largely identical to Bloom’s version of rejec-
tion.
Self-prohibition Self-prohibition is “a form of egocentric symbol use in which the
child approaches a previously forbidden object or begins to do something which has been
prohibited in the past and then expresses a negative.” It is somewhat of a misnomer in
that self-prohibition does not mean that the child effectively ends up not doing what it is
not supposed to do. The examples that Pea gives paint the picture of a child that shows
signs of an internal struggle between ego and self, to use psychoanalytic terminology. So
the child may approach a forbidden object, stop itself, possibly saying “no” while stopping,
start a further approach, stop again, and so on. In the end the child might well end up
having the forbidden object in its hand (or mouth) in case of the self winning the struggle.
But what counts as self-prohibition are the expressed signs of prohibitive measures having
13For this reason we employed a clearer distinction between rejection and motivation-dependent denial
in our own taxonomy which effectively renders our version of rejection a more narrowly defined ‘type’ than
Pea’s version of rejection
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been internalized and being at work, the observation of a struggle that is not a struggle
between mother and child but rather a struggle between the child and itself. In (Förster
et al. 2011) we asserted that engagement in this type of negation had to be cognitively
more complex as compared to rejection as the agent needed an internal representation to
represent the preceeding paternal prohibition.
After having executed the experiment, we are far less certain, if this indeed must be
the case. Our robot appeared to engage in self-prohibition within the prohibition scenario
(cf. section 4.6) by producing words which were initially uttered in a prohibitive context
by the respective participant. Sometimes, for example, the robot produced “can’t”, which
clearly originated from the respective participant’s use of “you can’t touch that” or the
like in previous sessions. We also observed some participants interpreting the robot’s
utterance as self-prohibitions, which was indicated by reactions such as “No, no, you can
have that” with a prosodic emphasis on “can”. As the robot’s internal ‘representations’ are
rather minimal and constant over the course of the experiment, the cognitive requirements
needed in order to display something that appears to the observer to be some form of
bodily and linguistic self-prohibition might not be so complex after all.
Disappearance Disappearance negation in Pea’s taxonomy is a negative comment
produced by the child such as “gone” or “no more” uttered upon the disappearance of
objects or persons, the disappearance of something “which had been present just prior to
the child’s utterance” and denotes “the vanished object or event of disappearance”. The
engagement in this type of negation appears to require slighty more complex cognitive
skills in the sense that the utterance refers to something that is not any more present in
the immediate physical environment. Thus a child, according to Pea, needs at least some
form of memory in order to notice the change between something just having been there
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to something not being there any more. The disappearance may be self- or other-caused.
In (Förster et al. 2011) we re-asserted Pea’s claim that a temporally somewhat extended
memory would be needed in order to detect a disappearance event: one needs to ‘know’
that something was there in order to realize that it is gone. Based on observations made
during the experiments we are now more critical about such stern claims. It is well possible
that an agent might produce a negative word that appears to be a disappearance negative
to an external observer without the aforementioned cognitive requirement being in place.
Albeit the robot never produced disappearance negatives according to the coders, some
of its words, which we termed ‘pragmatic negatives’ such as “go” (cf. section 5.3.3), at
times appeared to have the potential to be interpreted as disappearance negatives. This
is particularly so if such words are produced in the ‘right kind’ of situation, for example
immediately after the child or robot had dropped something.
Unfulfilled Expectation Unfulfilled Expectations are somewhat similar to disap-
pearances as they denote those uses of negation which refer to the “absence other than
immediately prior disappearance or cessation”, that is, the disappearance of objects on
a longer time-scale than the immediate temporal context. Moreover negative utterances
which refer to cessation events or, more generally, to “some aspects of the child’s contin-
uing line of activity (..) which does not occur” such as malfunctioning toys, or blocked
movements of a bycicle, fall into this category of negative meaning. Through the inclusion
of latter kinds of negative utterances this category differs from disappearance in ways other
than a merely extended time-scale.
Bloom’s category of non-existence seems to fall into this category of unfulfilled expec-
tations.
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Truth-functional denial Truth-functional denial is the last of the frequently pro-
duced negation types to emerge amongst ‘Pea’s’ children and he deems this type to be “of
a different logical order” ... “ requiring abstract cognitive representations of yet greater
complexity” than the earlier emerging types (Pea 1980, p. 166). As opposed to rejections
or motivation-dependent denials this type refers to negative responses, typically a simple
“no”, to questions or declaratives which do not involve the child’s motivation or affect in
any form. For example a “no” that is uttered to answer the question “Did you crash my
car?” is a form of truth-functional denial.
As the coders in our experiments deemed a great many utterances to be truth-functional
denials, and granted that our robot does not engage in any form of logical judgement, this
strong cognitive criteria might be slightly too strong. We will pick up this issue in our
discussion in section 6.
Bloom’s category of denial appears to be largely coextensive with Pea’s truth-functional
denial.
2.5.3 Affect as required ‘skill’ to engage in and acquire negation
Both Choi and Pea list rejection as earliest type of negation, although Choi also counts
prohibition fully and nonexistence partially to the types emerging in phase 1. In Bloom’s
division, nonexistence precedes rejection, but Bloom seems to be the exception. This
clearly indicates that, if we are to synthetically capacitate a robot to engage in negation,
which it is ought to acquire in a developmentally sound fashion similar to the human
acquisition process, the robot will need some form of affect or volition in order to “express
inner attitudes of rejection” (Pea 1980, p. 165). This insight then forms the founding block
for the symbol grounding system that is employed in this thesis.
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However, granted that these affective requirements are given, the question as to how
the linguistic skill to express negation comes about is still open. To this purpose two more
ideas of how an agent, that ‘has’ some form of affect and is able to express it, could acquire
this skill can both be found in (Pea 1980) and consitute the core of our two hypotheses
(cf. section 1.1). Both ideas pertain to the interaction between a linguistically more skilled
caretaker or teacher that holds more power within the interaction and a less skilled toddler
or child.
Hypothesis 1 assumes that the conversationally dominant conversation partner will
interpret emotional and volitional displays and gestures of the ‘weaker’ participant in a
linguistic manner. This idea is based on the observation that caretakers of toddlers, typ-
ically mothers or fathers, have been observed to do precisely that: linguistically interpret
their children’s emotional and/or volitional states (Pea 1980, p. 179). In other words, the
caretakers (or conversationally strong partners) produce words that fit the motivational or
volitional state of their weaker partner. If this state is negative or rejective, the likelihood
is very high that these words will be, at least partially, lexical negatives as in “No, no,
don’t like it”.
We should emphasise that this potential “source of meaning” appears to be fundamen-
tally different from ostensive sources of meaning: no joint attention, gaze following or
mutual honing in on a referent is needed. What is needed, if an association mechanism is
assumed, in order to establish the link between affect and word, is simultaneity : the word
needs to be produced while the agent is in whatever state the interpretation ‘refers to’.
However, simultaneity is also required in ostensive theories of meaning, sociopragmatic or
else, if simple association as learing mechanism is assumed: the relevant words have to
be uttered while joint attention is established, or while the joint action is executed. They
must not be produced before or after the time windows during which this is the case.
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It is surprising that the phenomenon of intent interpretation is hardly ever mentioned
in standard textbooks on language acquisition and word learning, and that we had to ‘dig
deep’ to find it documented in the literature. This is even more surprising once one has
observed this social mechanism in vivo: it appears to be the most natural kind of behaviour
between a caretaker and a child.
Hypothesis 2 assumes that caretakers employ negative words, when physically prohibit-
ing a child (Pea 1980, p. 181: referring to Spitz 1957). Again simultaneity is required if
the, often implicit, assumption is made that the learning process works via association:
The negative word of the caretaker has to co-occur with the negative motivational state,
that is brought about by the caretakers intervention. We will see in our analysis that this
assumption might be problematic.
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I envy you the certitude of your grasp of the causal well-springs of human behavior.
It is apparently quite clear to you that you drive on the left in England because
there is a rule which tells you to; you apparently have been able to reject quite
firmly some not unrelated possibilities, such as that you are oriented to the
possibility that other drivers will be oriented to the rule, and that if they (and you)
do otherwise you are likely to collide head on, it being the avoidance of this
prospect which motivates your compliance, rather than “because it is a rule”.
—Emanuel A. Schegloff (in response to John R. Searle)
Chapter 3
A Robotic Architecture for the
Acquisition of Negation
Conceptually the architecture that is presented in this chapter, and which was employed
in the experiments described in chapter 4, is based on the system outlined in (Saunders,
Nehaniv and Lyon 2011)1 which has been used successfully to acquire object labels and
adjectives from dialogues with naïve participants. In terms of the actual software all
modules but one were re-developed in order to integrate new capacities of the iCub that
had been developed within the RobotCub and ITALK projects since then (RobotCub
project 2013, ITALK project 2013).
Figure 3.1 gives a functional overview of the system architecture. Note that the func-
tional modules, depicted with boxes, do not necessarily coincide with software modules
in the repository. The only truly new module, as compared to Saunders’ system, is the
motivation system. Furthermore the body behaviour system differs greatly from the equiv-
alent system employed by Saunders. This circumstance is owed to the mentioned new
1We will refer to this system in the following as Saunders’ system for ease of reference. No denial of
the other authors’ merits is intended.
96
Architecture Perception System
capabilities of the iCub platform such as force control. Apart from these, the need for new
behaviours such as reaching or rejecting, and the way behaviours are triggered necessitated
a complete reimplementation of the way the humanoid behaves in any particular situation.
All modules are subsequently described in more detail.
3.1 Perception System
The perception system processes camera images from one or two cameras and provides the
other modules with high-level information about salient objects or actions. Furthermore
low-level percepts from the motor encoders, external pressure excerted upon the arms, and
the detection of pickup and put-down events of salient objects can be propagated into the
system if needed (see below, this section). The detection of external resistance is only
available when the arms are operated in force control mode and is currently only used in
the prohibitive scenario described in section 4.6.
The core element of the perception system is a modified version of a salience module
originally developed by (Rüsch et al. 2008). Amongst other changes additional salience
filters for a commercial face tracking software (faceAPI 2013) as well as for ARToolKit
tags (ARToolKit 2012) were integrated into the module. The ARToolKit software package
provides for comparatively easy object recognition by means of the attachment of easy to
recognize, adaptable, black-and-white symbol tags to target objects. It was used in order to
avoid common computer-vision problems that typically emerge in the context of a reliable
object detection. In the future this system should be replaced by a “tag-less” system.
Despite the availability of many salience filters, such as skin colour or movement detection,
that were inherited from the original salience module, only the two abovementioned ones
were used for our experiments (cf. chapter 4).
97
Figure 3.1: Functional overview of robotic architecture for language acquisition. Solid
lines indicate components that are active during experimental sessions (“online”), dotted lines in-
dicate components that work oﬄine.
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As, within these experiments, typically more than one object is located within the visual
field of the robot, an algorithm was implemented that detects when an object is picked up
by the participant and when the object is put back onto the table. We will call these events
pickup and put-down in the following. This algorithm makes use of an estimation of the z
coordinate (‘vertical axis’) of all objects in the Cartesian space of the iCub’s root reference
frame (cf. iCub Forward Kinematics 2012). Pickup and put-down events are crucial as
they trigger different behaviours (cf. section 3.3), which in turn trigger speech actions in
the languaging system (cf. section 3.4). Thus, via picking up objects and presenting them
to the robot, participants drive the interaction via said trigger events without necessarily
being aware of it.
3.2 Motivation System
The motivation system provides the system with an additional dimension for the senso-
rimotor data vectors and is treated in exactly the same way as the other dimensions of
said vector. The motivation model is deliberately kept as minimal as possible in order
to investigate the dynamics between language acquisition process and motivation. The
motivational state is a numerical value between -1 and 1 and is currently discretised within
the lexical grounding system. This means that from within the latter system only three
motivational states are distinguished: -1 (negative), 0 (neutral), and 1 (positive).
In the experiments described in the following chapter, the motivational state of the
robot is neutral unless the participant picks up an objects that has a negative or positive
valence. The object : valence mapping can be either generated randomly or can be specified
in a configuration file. In the prohibition scenario the motivation is furthermore modulated
by external resistance on the right arm. Through the manner in which said scenario is set
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up, detecting external resistance implies that the participant is physically restraining the
robots arm movement. If such an event is registered the motivation value is set to negative
for a certain specifiable time frame.
3.3 Body Behaviour System
The body behaviour system generates the humanoid’s bodily behaviour including its facial
expressions. It receives input from both the perception and the motivation system. The
central design tenet was to make the robot act as believable as possible, as opposed to
making its movements as accurate as possible. A consequence of this tenet is that the
system should always produce some kind of behaviour. Toddlers don’t freeze and neither
should the robot. This means for example that the robot continues to behave even if the
majority of its perceptual capabilities fail and the available object coordinates are out-
of-date. Naturally there is a limit to this design target: if all perceptual capabilities fail
long enough, the robot will stop behaving as all of its behaviour is target-directed with the
target being either an object or a human face.
(a) Happy facial expression (b) Neutral facial expression (c) Grumpy facial expression
Figure 3.2: Facial expression as used within the experiments. (Images are clippings of
photos taken by Pete Stevens)
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The author put a considerable effort into the fine-tuning of the system until it roughly
generated the kind of behaviour which he felt would be believable enough for it to be
used within the experiments. We feel incapable of describing this process in an adequate
textual form, a process not dissimilar to the “black art” of designing a neural network which
involves, amongst other things, choosing a particular input and output coding, choosing
the number of network layers, and choosing a particular learning algorithm, which, in
turn, typically necessitates the choice of some learning parameters. The kind of fine-
tuning necessary for our behavioural system was mainly related to the adjustment of time
constants that impact on the duration and synchronization of the described behaviours as
well as the coordination of sub-actions that are constitutive for some of the behaviours.
An important example for time constants involved in the temporal coordination of sub-
actions is the duration of the robot’s gaze at the human face in relation to the duration of its
gaze at objects, both of which are constitutive components of the Watching behaviour. In
human face-to-face interaction the difference between a stare and a casual glance is mainly
constituted by the duration of the gaze. It is therefore hard to over-emphasise the impor-
tance of the various time constants that ensued from this process. We refer the technically
oriented reader to the software itself, its documentation, and the configuration file where
these constants are specified. (cf. <DVD>/software/italk/src/negationBehaviour/
and <DVD>/software/italk/app/negation/conf/negationBehaviour.ini).
Five different behaviours have been implemented:
• Idle
• Looking around
• Reaching for object
• Rejecting
• Watching
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Each behaviour has an associated unique behaviour id which is broadcasted to the other
subsystems whenever a change of behaviour occurs. A sketch of the ‘behavioural loop’ of
the body behavior, which outlines when which behaviour is executed, is given in algorithm
1, followed by a description of each behaviour.
3.3.1 Behaviours
Idle
As the name indicates the robot does not behave in a meaningful way while being in this
state. This behaviour is currently only activated during an initial calibration phase upon
startup of the system while connections to controllers and other modules are established.
The facial expression during this behaviour is neutral.
Algorithm 1 Outline of the ‘behavioural loop’ for the robot’s body behaviour.
Notice that ‘offer_detected()’ is based on information broadcasted by the perception sys-
tem, and ‘valence()’ is based on information pertaining to the motivation system.
1: while negation behaviour module is running do
2: if ! headController→connected() then
3: behaviour = IDLE
4: else
5: if ! offer_detected() then
6: behaviour = LOOK_AROUND
7: else
8: getObjectID(oid)
9: if valence(oid) > neutralThreshold then
10: behaviour = REACH_FOR_OBJECT(oid)
11: else if valence(oid) < -neutralThreshold then
12: REJECT(oid)
13: else
14: WATCH(oid)
15: end if
16: end if
17: end if
18: end while
102
Architecture Body Behaviour System
Looking around
This behaviour is the default behaviour after the initial calibration phase. The iCub
switches its focus between the different available objects in its visual field and the human’s
face, if the face tracker can detect one. If the face tracker fails to detect a face, a default
face location is assumed based on the spatial position of the sitting participant relative to
the robot. The facial expression is neutral. The amount of time that if focuses on each
object as well as the time it focuses on the human’s face are adjustable via configuration
file. The particular trajectories of the head-eye movements are calculated and executed by
a kinematic gaze controller, developed by Pattacini (2010). This controller was designed
to generate biologically plausible, human-like combined head and eye movements.
This behaviour can be observed in any of the experiment-related video recordings con-
tained on the appended DVD. It is easiest to spot at the very start of the interactions
before participants pick up the first object.
Reaching for object
This behaviour is executed when a participant picks up an object with positive valence,
thereby triggering positive motivation. The facial expression is happy. After a short
(adjustable) time of looking at the object, the iCub reaches out for the object. The palm
of the hand is facing upwards in order to signal to the participant that he or she can put
the object into its hand.
We initially considered having the robot grasp directly for the objects. Due to the lack
of a reliable grasping module at the time of implementation but also due to the size of the
objects, we decided against this behaviour. Moreover, upon starting the first experiment, it
quickly became clear that the open-hand gesture is immediately picked up by participants
and possibly even favourable over the more ‘aggressive’ direct grasp. We conjecture that it
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might be preferable to the direct grasp as it has a gestural (and therefore communicative)
quality that the direct grasp may have not. It would be of no surprise to us if the open-hand
gesture might have contributed to a higher degree of involvement of participants with the
robot. Our impression is, that, possibly caused through conventions of politeness, and the
imperative nature of the gesture, it appears to urge participants to physically interact with
the robot. It further may have contributed to an increased ascription of intentionality to the
robot on the part of the participants. We did not formally test the suspected contribution
of this behaviour to participants’ involvement nor did we test for the degree of ascribed
intentionality2. Nevertheless we wanted to bring its potential importance to the reader’s
attention.
Figure 3.3: Reaching with open-hand gesture. (Photo by Pete Stevens)
2We only became aware of the existence of psychological tests for ascribed intentionality long after the
experiments had ended.
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While reaching out, the iCub’s focus of gaze switches between the selected object and
the participant’s face. The duration of both gaze actions is adjustable and was fine-
tuned. The reaching movement is executed via the cartesian controllers of the arms (cf.
Pattacini et al. 2010). Due to a certain amount of noise in the distance estimation of
the object, potential occlusion of the frontal side of the objects when in the robot’s hand,
and unpredictable detection-switches between various sides of an objects3, this in theory
uniform behaviour manifests itself as a variety of similar but non-repetitive observable
behaviours (cf. figure 3.3 for one example). These behaviours include the dropping of an
object, the movement of an object closer to the body, the giving-back of an object to the
participant, the holding of an object above the head. None of the latter behaviours are
part of the control design, they ‘emerge’ mostly due to the mentioned forms of noise, and,
to a lesser degree, due to the particular way a participant interacts with the humanoid,
i.e. the way he or she places an object into its hand, the way he or she holds the object,
potentially causing the occlusion of tag markers, etc. Observations during the experiments,
comments made by participants, and even comments of participants that were directed
towards the humanoid, indicate that this particular behaviour often invokes the impression
of intentionality on part of the robot - intentionality by noise, so to speak.
Prohibition Scenario Within the prohibition scenario, which will be introduced in
section 4, participants were asked to and taught how to restrain the robot’s arm movement
as soon as it tries to approach a forbidden object. Within this scenario the arm controllers
are operated in a novel way termed force control, a different control mode as compared to
the one in operation within the rejection scenario. This control mode makes it possible
3All presented objects were cubes with identical ARToolKit tags attached to every side of the cube.
For this reason often more than one tag was visible to the robot’s camera and the object detection was
observed to switch its ‘focus’ at times between the visible tags.
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that the robot can actively move its arms while, simultaneously, external pressure might be
applied such that the arm moves in a compliant manner. If external pressure is detected,
which in our scenario equates to physical restraint of the robot’s arm movement, the robot’s
motivational state is switched immediately to negative and a grumpy face is displayed.
The design rationale behind this ‘motivation switch’ is the idea that agents don’t like
their agency to be diminished (cf. hypothesis 2 in section 1.1). The reaching behaviour
is in this case not aborted. The decision not to abort the reaching, despite participants’
attempts to counteract the robot’s movement (which they were told to do), was made in
order to simulate a behaviour akin to a toddler’s insistence to engage in a forbidden act.
Furthermore, the reaching behaviour was aborted frequently due to the object recognition
losing track of the object. Unplanned abortions of this behaviour were indeed the norm
rather than the exception without any further additions or checks added to the control
loop - they are, in some way, emergent features of the interaction caused by the kind of
aforementioned noise. It is only in the prohibition scenario and only in the just described
situation, that the reaching behaviour may co-occur with a negative motivational state (cf.
figure 3.4).
The reaching behaviour can be observed in any experiment-related videos of any session
on the appended DVD. The prohibition task, i.e. participants physically restraining the
robot’s arm movement, was in place during the first three sessions of the prohibition
experiment (participants P13 - P22). Not all participants followed our instructions and
restrained the robot’s arm in the respective situations. Good examples of the ensuing
interaction of those who did, can be seen with participants P15 and P16.
Rejecting
The Rejecting behaviour is executed when a participant picks up an object with negative
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Figure 3.4: Physical restraint of the arm: participants were taught, how to restrain the iCub’s
arm movement if it approaches a forbidden object. (Photo by Pete Stevens)
valence, which triggers negative motivation. After a short (adjustable) time of looking at
the object the iCub starts to frown, facial expression grumpy, and turns its head away.
The particular way in which the head is turned depends on the particular position of the
object relative to the right camera/eye position. Depending on the centre coordinates of
the object, in 2D camera image coordinates, an avoidance vector is calculated that roughly
points in the opposite direction of the vector <image_centre>→<object_centre>. We say
roughly because the horizontal component of the vector is emphasized by multiplying it
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with a scaling factor in order to pronounce the yaw movement (looking sideways) over the
pitch movement (looking down). Figure 3.5 depicts the relevant vectors, and algorithm 2
specifies the calculation in more detail.
Within the experiments xSkew was set to 3, which was determined experimentally
by trial and error. Due to slight movements of the object in the participant’s hand in
combination with previous head movements of the robot, the results are typically dynamic,
Figure 3.5: Calculation of avoidance vector. The object, represented by the square as de-
termined by the perceptual system, is located in the upper right, but with its centre still within the
inner region of the robot’s visual field. The avoidance vector (av) is calculated as indicated, pointing
roughly in the opposite direction of the object and is subsequently sent to the head controller. v:
centre of object, resX: image width in pixels, resY: image height in pixels, thres: radius of centre
region within which the avoidance is active, α · ov: scaled “opposite vector”, av: avoidance vector,
xSkew: “skew” factor to emphasise the x-component of av. Notice: this equation is mathematically
incorrect and is meant to indicate that xSkew only operates on the x-component of the ov-vector.
See algorithm 2 for the correct formulation.
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Algorithm 2 Object-gaze-avoidance: Determination of target coordinate for head-eye
movement in order to avoid looking at object; ta is adjustable via configuration file
1: Fixate on presented object o =
(
cX
cY
)
for ta seconds
2: if valence(o) < 0 then
3: if |(cXcY )− (resX/2resY/2)| < thres then
4: ov = −v = (resX/2−cX
resY/2−cY
)
{Calc. “opposite vector” ov}
5: av = α · (xSkew·ov[0]
ov[1]
)
{Calc. avoidance vector}
6: Send
(resX/2
resY/2
)
+ av to head controller
7: end if
8: end if
believable, and somewhat unpredictable head movements such that the iCub looks away
from the presented object. Sometimes this results in what some participants referred to as
head shaking, which one of the participants, P04, described at some point as creepy. The
arms are not moved during this behaviour.
The rejection behaviour can be observed in all videos of the experiment. For visual
examples for the occasionally emerging ‘head shakes’, and participants’ interpretation of
them as such see section D.4.1.
Watching
The Watching behaviour is executed when a human participant picks up an object with
neutral valence, which triggers neutral motivation. The iCub switches focus between the
selected object and the participant’s face. The duration of both object- and face-directed
gaze is adjustable, typically not identical, and was determined experimentally. The facial
expression is neutral. The arms are not moved.
The watching behaviour can be observed in any of the experimental videos on the
appended DVD.
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3.4 Languaging System
The general purpose of the languaging system is to produce utterances, based on what
participants said in previous sessions, and which are meaningful in the particular situational
context. To this purpose it uses the embodied lexicon which is generated oﬄine by the lexical
grounding system (cf. section 3.7) and takes into account the sensorimotor-motivational
data provided by the following other subsystems:
• The body behaviour system provides information about the currently executed be-
haviours in the form of behaviour ids.
• The perception system provides information about the current perceptions in the
format of a vector of sensorimotor data from the motor encoders, higher-level vision
percepts on recognized objects, a binary value from the face-tracker (face recognized
or not), and potentially a binary value indicating the experience of external resistance.
• The motivation system provides information about the current motivational state in
the form of a single motivation value.
The information of these three subsystems is consequently combined into one vector which
will henceforth be called the sensorimotor-motivational (smm) vector (cf. figure 3.6).
In short, this vector contains all the information about the humanoid’s own bodily and
motivational state, the behaviour that it currently executes and all perceptions related to
its environment that it has access to (currently only ARToolKit objects, and human faces).
Note that for the experiments described in chapter 4 the decision was made to remove
those dimensions from the smm vector that originate from the motor encoders in order not
to fall victim to the curse of dimensionality (cf. Hastie et al. 2013, section 2.5).
One may criticise that we thereby render the learning problem unduly easy by throwing
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Figure 3.6: Sensorimotor-motivational ( smm) vector. Solid line indicates dimensions that
were used within experiments; bid: behaviour id, oid: object id, faceDet: face detected, moti:
motivation value, resist: resistance detected, encX: encoder #X,
out a majority of bothersome data. By only keeping potentially meaningful dimensions,
we indeed incorporate external (designer) knowledge, which a child may not have. Yet,
consider the whole-object constraint mentioned in section 2.2, which may be cited in defense
of this decision. Based on this and other constraints one could argue that the child may
have said ‘designer’ knowledge, brought about by some evolutionary process and encoded
in its genes. Nevertheless we do agree that, in principle, one should keep such incorporation
of knowledge as minimal as possible. Yet the critic has to consider that our and Saunders,
Nehaniv and Lyon’s (2011) approach are the first of its kind in that it combines lexical
entities extracted from a linguistically unconstrained human-robot conversation with a
learning system. We could not possibly have performed any algorithmic tests, to choose
and adjust algorithms to the given learning problem due to the lack of a realistic data set.
We neither knew from the outset how the word distribution in the embodied lexicon would
look like, nor did we have an estimate of the ratio between ‘true positives’, i.e. negative
words associated with smm data with a negative entry in the motivation dimension, and
‘false positives’, i.e negative words with an ‘attached’ positive motivation. In other words,
we were faced with an unknown level of what might be conceived of as noise in our data set.
If the noise surpassed a certain level, this would deteriorate the performance of any learning
algorithm, associative or other. The knowledge required to generate such a synthetic
data set, i.e. how often, with what prosodic characteristics, and at what time within the
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conversation, participants would utter which words, is only, tendentially, available now after
we actually executed the experiment. Even more important, the human effort necessary
to conduct these experiments was by several magnitudes larger than the one required
to solve standard machine learning problems such as image recognition, classification of
medical data, email spam etc., and was caused by the semi-automatic speech processing
(cf. chapter 4). Thus, our reply to criticism, that we did cut corners, by pre-selecting
certain dimensions from our robot’s embodiment, is, that we simply could not take the
risk of choosing a potentially non-efficacious algorithmic setup due to the fact that we
could run this experiment with one such setup exactly once.
The central element of the languaging system is a memory-based learner. In particular,
the system makes use of an efficient implementation of the k-nearest-neighbour (knn) algo-
rithm, the open source Tilburg Memory-Based Learner (TiMBL 2012, also cf. Daelemans
and van den Bosch 2005). This choice was made, simply because (Saunders, Nehaniv and
Lyon 2011) used this algorithm successfully before in the context of noun acquisition, and
because memory-based learners do not require a training phase as many other machine
learning algorithms. In other words, they are a very easy to use family of algorithms
with a very ‘low maintenance’ due to the non-explicit learning phase. The author has no
strong conviction that this type of learning algorithm is superior to other machine learning
techniques on this particular kind of data.
For the experiments described in chapter 4 the parameter k, the number of neighbours,
is set to 3. As opposed to (Saunders, Nehaniv and Lyon 2011) we used as distance metric
the modified value difference metric (MVDM ) after initial experimentation with different
parameters and upon recommendation by one of the authors of TiMBL (personal commu-
nication). For a description of the k-nearest-neighbour algorithm in combination with the
MVDM metric see Cost and Salzberg (1993). For the experiments described in chapter 4
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we employ something that we call a differential lexicon (see following subsection).
This lexicon is simply a multitude of embodied lexica, each of which has one word
removed as compared to the base lexicon from which the set is constructed. The reason for
having a multitude of lexica instead of having just one, is the lacking support of TiMBL
to temporarily suppress single items once the data base, in our case the embodied lexicon,
is loaded.
During test runs we observed that the use of a single embodied lexicon often resulted
in the repetitive sequential production of the same word, presumably due to a lack of
change within the smm vector. We therefore decided to prevent repetition by temporarily
suppressing the previously produced word. Thereby the variety of the linguistic behaviour
increases without the need on part of the designer to make any biased decision as to what
kind of lexical items would be eligible for production after a particular (type of) item was
uttered.
The kind of biased decision that we have in mind, is external linguistic knowledge in-
volving things such as grammatical word order, grammatical scope of a negative operator,
or lexical/semantic type. A tempting incorporation of such knowledge for example, falling
into the category of aforementioned word-order constraints, would be the temporary deac-
tivation of adjectival4 items once they were uttered, in order to increase the likelihood of a
noun being produced next. An increase of adjective-noun constructions could the outcome
of such incorporation of designer knowledge.
4How we would determine, what is adjectival, is a separate question. In our system this could be achieved
by adding a pre-processing step, in which a hand-constructed set of ‘semantic adjectival prototypes’ could
be test-fired against the embodied lexicon, in order to extract and mark potential adjectives. Of course
the same could be done for nouns, emotion words, verbs, etc.
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3.4.1 Differential Lexicon
The differential lexicon consists of the k-nearest-neighbour implementation and a set of
embodied lexica, i.e. lexica containing grounded words. It is created each time anew
upon startup of the system based on the (single) embodied lexicon created by the lexical
grounding system (cf. section 3.7). The lexicon determines which lexical item best matches
the current embodied and situational context, by comparing the current smm vector of
the robot with the smm-parts of the grounded words of the active lexicon. On startup a
separate memory base mlexi for each distinct lexical item lexi of the embodied lexicon is
created that contains all entries of said lexicon except of those whose word-part matches
the one of lexi. Furthermore one full memory base m is constructed that contains all the
words from the embodied lexicon and which is therefore identical to this lexicon. Hence
the system constructs n+ 1 memory bases for an embodied lexicon with n distinct words.
Eachmlexi as well asm serves as a data base for the knn algorithm. As TiMBL does not
allow switching the underlying data base during run-time, n+1 instances of the knn-learner
are created, one for each memory base. We will henceforth abbreviate that instance of knn,
which operates on the full embodied lexicon, knnfull, and those instances that operate on
derived lexica, missing a particular lexical item lexi, knnlexi . For each instance of knn
the gain ratio (cf. Quinlan 1992) between the lexical items and each other dimension of
the particular memory base is calculated. This effectively constitutes a measure of mutual
information between each smm dimension and the dimension that holds the lexical items5.
The resulting gain ratios are subsequently used by the knn algorithm as weights, associated
with each smm dimension, that are used in order to calculate the distance between a new,
yet-to-be-classified data point and the data points in the particular memory base.
5Cf. Daelemans and van den Bosch (2005) for a more detailed discussion about different measures to
calculate the relevance of dimensions in memory-based reasoning.
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The best match or winner is determined in terms of the smallest distance between the
current, to-be-matched smm vector and the smm parts of all entries in the active memory
base (see next section on the activation of memory bases).
3.4.2 Operational Description
An important question, that has not been touched so far, is as to when the humanoid
actually speaks. Within a dialogue, humans follow various cues such as prosodic marking of
questions, pauses, and non-linguistic cues such as particular properties of the interlocutor’s
gaze in order to regulate turn-taking behaviour (cf. section 2.1.3). More generally, if spoken
language is regarded as a form of social action it becomes one of several goal-driven actions
of an agent. Taking this perspective leads to the question of when an agent would speak in
the first place as opposed to choosing a non-linguistic action. A follow-up problem, in case
that the decision was made in favour of speaking, is the issue when precisely the robot is
supposed to speak, when does it “think” that it is its turn.
In our experimental scenarios the first problem, i.e. when does the robot speak at all,
is ‘solved by design’ as the particular situation in which the humanoid performs linguistic
actions is invariably a teaching scenario: the humanoid reacts to the participant’s action
rather than proactively initiating a dialogue. Furthermore, it always reacts this way, that
is, it never runs away6.
The solution on how to operationalise turn taking, i.e. the solution to the second
problem, is solved rather trivially, and, more importantly, unsocially. This means that a
proper solution to this problem has yet to be found. We will see the outcome of this lack
of a proper solution later in the analysis of the experiments (cf. chapter 5) and we will
discuss this issue in chapter 6. As, to the knowledge of the author, no operational models
6If a speech act is considered to be one of a variety of possible (re-)actions in a given situation, the
action of ‘running away’ could be amongst the set of possible reactions when being asked a question.
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of turn-taking for robots exist, the decision was made to use a mechanism akin to the one
employed by Saunders, Nehaniv and Lyon (2011). This means that the differential lexicon
is activated whenever the system receives the notification from the body behaviour system
that a trigger behaviour is being executed. The experimenter can define which behaviours
are trigger behaviours via a configuration file. In our experiments Watching, Rejecting,
and Reaching for object are trigger behaviours.
Upon activation knnfull is executed and returns the best matching lexical item. knnfull
is executed as often as the system receives inputs from the perception system. The fre-
quency of the perception system sending out new percepts is limited through the time
needed to compute high-level percepts from the vision system, some of which are com-
puted in parallel. This results in a frequency of approximately 30 Hertz7. In other words,
the robot queries its lexicon constantly as to which of its entries fits best to the robot’s
current situation in terms of high-level percepts, motivation, etc.
As it is neither sensible nor feasible to have the robot speak with approximately 30
Hertz, i.e. every 33 milliseconds, and in order to stabilize the system with regard to
potentially erroneous detections of the vision system, the following thresholding mechanism
similar to the one used by Saunders, Nehaniv and Lyon (2011) was introduced.
Three different thresholds were chosen for the three motivational states of the robot:
positive motivation has assigned the lowest threshold (highest probability of speaking),
neutral motivation has assigned the highest threshold (more reluctant to speak), and the
assigned threshold for negative motivation was chosen to be in between the two former
thresholds.
The design rationale behind these choices follows the intuition that we speak about
things that we like (positive motivation) rather than things we don’t care about (neutral
7The perception system could certainly be optimized in terms of the computational complexity of the
vision part, but test experiments showed that said frequency is sufficient for the experimental scenarios.
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motivation), and that we speak in order to stop actions that we dislike (negative motiva-
tion) rather than if we don’t care.
For each lexical item a counter is held that is increased by some increment in case of
this item being a best match. Said counter is decreased by some different increment if this
item is not the best match with 0 being the lower bound. A further increment is added to
a winning item’s counter in case this item has also been the winner of the previous match.
All three different increments were chosen experimentally during test-runs of the system
such that the robot’s production frequency roughly matched our intuition.
As soon as a lexical item lexi reaches the motivation-dependent threshold the word-
part of the lexi is sent to the speech synthesizer and the iCub subsequently utters this
word. Upon speaking, all counters are reset to 0, knnfull is deactivated, knnlexi becomes
active, and the matching cycle is repeated. As soon as the value of any dimension in the
smm vector changes knnfull is activated again. The only dimension that is not considered
in terms of detecting changes of the smm vector is the dimension that represents the signal
from the face tracker. The latter proved to be volatile to the degree that its inclusion
would have jeopardized the intended operation of the differential lexicon as a whole.
3.4.3 Non-technical summary of the languaging system
In non-technical terminology, the questions as to when the robot speaks, how often the
robot speaks, and what it says, may be summarized as follows: The robot speaks whenever
a participant picks up a box and presents it to the robot, granted that this participant
has spoken to it before, which means that the robot remembers some of the words, that
the participant used previously as well as the situations in which he or she used them. As
soon as the robot is certain enough, that a word that it remembers, matches the particular
situation in terms of its own motivation, in terms of its own behaviour, in terms of the
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presented object, and, in case of the prohibition scenario, in terms of whether its arm is
restrained by the participant or not, it says the word. The reason for the robot being
uncertain about a particular word is the presence of other words in its memory that were
said in exactly the same situation. If this is the case, the robot might be undecided, which
of these words it should say, and therefore hesitates. After having said a word, and if the
situation does not change, it will look for another word in its memory that also matches
the given situation. If the situation does change, it may say the same word again, that
it said just before, or others, depending on whichever word fits best to the corresponding
situation. The robot stops speaking as soon as the box falls down or if participants put it
back on the table.
As we will later see in the analysis in section 5, the three biggest shortcomings of this
system is the circumstance, that the robot does not know, when it is being addressed by
the participant, that it does not know what is being said at the time of the interaction,
and that it neither knows how, what is said, is being said, in terms of pitch, energy etc. In
terms of the importance of these shortcomings, we consider the first one (not knowing that
it is being spoken to) as the most fundamental one, followed by the last one (not knowing
how it is being spoken to).
3.5 Body Memory
The body memory saves all high- and low-level perceptions as well as behaviour ids and mo-
tivation values as they occur in a file and timestamps them. Only auditory perceptions are
excluded from this module and processed separately by the auditory system. The resulting
sensorimotor-motivational file is subsequently used by the lexical grounding system.
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3.6 Auditory System
The auditory system comprises all processes related to the extraction of lexical units,
which are words in the experiments reported upon within this thesis. The auditory system
currently works oﬄine in between experimental session. The following processes may be
distinguished:
• speech recognition and word alignment
• prosodic labeling
• word extraction
3.6.1 Speech recognition and word alignment
In previous experiments on the acquisition of object words described in (Saunders et al.
2010) it was found that regular off-the-shelf speech recognition software did not yield a
sufficient accuracy when applied to the speech used by their participants within the human-
robot interaction. As the experimental scenarios described in chapter 4 are very similar
to the scenarios described in (Saunders et al. 2010) we utilized the speech recognition and
alignment procedure outlined there. This means that instead of using a fully-automated
but not very accurate standard speech recognizer, a combination of two half-automated
systems was employed which rely on manual transcription of the speech recording and a
subsequent manual re-alignment of word timings and audio stream. We will just give a
short sketch of the system and refer to (Saunders, Lehmann, Sato and Nehaniv 2011) for
details.
The first part of the system, basically a specialised speech recognition system, takes
a cleaned audio-file, that contains the recorded speech, and a separate transcript of this
very speech recording as input and outputs a timed phonetic transcription. This file is
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further processed and subsequently, together with the original audio recording, loaded into
the second sub-system, which performs a prosodic analysis. Before this analysis can be
performed, the phonetic transcription has to be manually re-aligned in order to improve
the precise timing of the words relative to the audio recording.
The time effort of the two manual steps is considerable and possibly only surpassed by a
full-fledged conversation analytical transcription. On average 5 minutes of audio recording,
the length of one experimental session, required 4 hours of post-processing.
3.6.2 Prosodic Labeling
In order to be able to compare the effect of introducing affect into the language acquisition
architecture as opposed to not having any affective values, the same prosodic labeling
system was employed as in (Saunders, Lehmann, Sato and Nehaniv 2011). This system
takes as input the correctly-timed transcription file, i.e. the output from speech recognition
and word alignment, and produces for each utterance a set of prosodically salient words
which is subsequently used by the word extraction mechanism.
3.6.3 Word Extraction
In initial experiments a set of heuristics was tested, which was developed by (Saunders
et al. 2010) and which is not related to prosody: there, a word is considered salient if it is
firstly utterance-final, with the end of an utterance being defined as a pause longer than
average word duration, and if, secondly, its duration is longer than average.
In the case of participant P04, who was the first real participant of our experiments,
the just described word extraction mechanism was employed. For all other participants
the following one is used: from each utterance that word is extracted which has the highest
prosodic salience as calculated by the prosodic labeling system. Upon the execution of a full
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set of test-sessions with participant P04, we decided to use the latter mechanism as none
of the two mechanisms appeared to be superior. The said mechanism has the additional
advantage of being the word extraction mechanism employed within the experiments with
the “affect-less” architecture of (Saunders, Lehmann, Sato and Nehaniv 2011). This means
that choosing the same word extraction mechanism as (Saunders, Lehmann, Sato and
Nehaniv 2011) renders their and our results comparable.
The application of the three mechanisms above to a speech recording from an experi-
mental session results in a file that contains only salient words and the time at which they
were uttered relative to a start time stamp (cf. figure 3.7, top-left *.emph_words file).
Furthermore, the start and end time of a particular word are extended to the start and
end time of the entire utterance. One could say that the most salient word of an utterance
gets to represent the whole of the utterance (see also Saunders et al. 2010).
3.7 Lexical Grounding System
The lexical grounding system performs, as the name indicates, the grounding of the lex-
ical items produced by the auditory system. This process is performed oﬄine, after the
execution of an experimental session. It takes as input both the sensorimotor-motivational
file as recorded the body memory during that session, and the salient word file which is
generated by the auditory system after the session. Both files are subsequently merged
into one file in which each salient word is associated with the smm data that was recorded
at the time during which the corresponding utterance was produced. In the current im-
plementation we made the decision to eliminate duplicate entries, that originate from the
same utterance, in order to keep the lexicon at a manageable size. The grounding process
is depicted in figure 3.7.
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The resulting file, in figure 3.7 P05-011211-british.laction, is merged with the
embodied lexicon from previous sessions, if any, to form an updated embodied lexicon
which is subsequently used in the followup session by the languaging system.
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Figure 3.7: Grounding of (salient) words. The grounding process associates lexical entries,
in our case salient words, with the concurrently occurring sensorimotor-motivational data. In our
system the salient word is propagated across the entire duration of the utterance, such that the
time stamps, visible in the salient-words-file (top-left) do mark the start and end of the respective
utterance within which the word was produced. Time stamps for utterance boundaries are symbolized
by ‘...’. Also notice that we remove duplicates of grounded words that would ensue from the same
utterance. In the given example this means that due to the lack of change within the smm data
while the utterance was produced the potentially ensuing 23 identical grounded words are collapsed
into one (bottom).
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Die Grammatik des Wortes “wissen” ist offenbar eng
verwandt der Grammatik der Worte “können”,
“imstande sein”. Aber auch eng verwandt der des
Wortes “verstehen”. (Eine Technik ‘beherrschen’.)
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, PU 150
Chapter 4
Experiments on the Acquisition of
Negation
4.1 Introduction
In order to test the two hypotheses outlined in section 1.1, we devised two experimental
scenarios, a so-called rejective scenario and a so-called prohibitive scenario1, and embedded
them in two experiments, which were subsequently called the rejection and the prohibition
experiment. Both scenarios target the acquisition of the earliest types of negation such
as the rejective “no”, and both scenarios were grafted on top of the experimental scenario
developed by (Saunders et al. 2010) and (Saunders, Nehaniv and Lyon 2011)2.
Differing from Saunders’ experiment both the rejection as well as the prohibition exper-
iment are what psychologists refer to as blind experiments. Within Saunders’ experiment,
participants were told to teach the humanoid “Deechee” about particular objects, i.e. the
1We will alternatively refer to these scenarios as rejection and prohibition scenario.
2We will in the following for reasons of readabilty refer to these scenarios and experiments as Saunders’
scenario and Saunders’ experiment respectively. By doing so we do not intend to deny the contribution of
the other authors.
124
Experiments Introduction
objects’ names, their colour, and their size, and this was indeed what Saunders’ experiment
was about. By contrast, we largely assumed those teaching instructions, yet, in our case,
they served as a cover story. This means that our participants did not know about the
true purpose of the experiments. At no time did we tell them that, what we refer to in
here as negation experiments, were about the acquisition of negation.
This choice was made, as it was unclear to the author, how one could potentially go
about to teach negation. No and words with similar functions in other languages, seem to
be so embedded within the fabric of language, that we had no intuition, what one could
and would possibly do, to teach ‘the meaning’ of no. Thus, as we could not imagine what
participants would do, if we told them to teach the robot ‘negation’, in combination with
potentially willful artificial modifications of participants’ speech during such unimaginable
doings, we decided not to tell them at all. Instead, we decided to elicit negative words
naturally by putting participants in situations similar to those in which, according to the
developmental literature, negative words naturally occur and from which they are thought
to originate (cf. section 2.5).
Yet, despite the tendency of caregivers to interpret a toddler’s emotional state linguis-
tically via so called intent interpretations, we could not be sure, if participant’s would do
the same for our robot. A side-effect of the circumstance that they did, as we will show in
chapter 5, is that this result strengthens hypothesis 1.
4.2 Instructions to participants
Thus, in both the rejection as the prohibition experiment the naïve participants were given
very similar instructions as in Saunders’ experiment, namely that their task was to teach
Deechee about the available objects. The objects consisted of boxes with different shapes
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printed on them such as star shapes, heart shapes, circle shapes etc, which constitute tags
from the ARToolKit package as described in chapter 3. Moreover, participants were told
to imagine Deechee to be a small child of approximately 2 years and, further, that Deechee
had preferences for particular objects, that it may like, dislike, or would feel neutral about.
The first additional instruction, to imagine Deechee to be a 2-year-old child, was given in
order to increase the likelihood of participants assuming a simplyfied speech register akin
to CDS. The second additional instruction about Deechee having preferences, was given
in order to prepare participants for Deechee’s emotional displays. As opposed to a child,
humans may not expect a robot to display emotions or intentional behaviour. Thus, in
order to render the experimental situation more similar to that of a mother-child dyad, we
prepared them for emotional displays.
All objects were situated on a table between the participant and Deechee. The partici-
pants were further instructed that they should try to teach Deechee about all of the boxes
even though Deechee might not like particular ones, and that Deechee would communicate
its preferences to them. No further explanations were given as to how the humanoid com-
municates its preferences. Participants were told that they could put the boxes into the
humanoids hand if they wanted to. It was also mentioned to the participants that Deechee
would not know a single word at the start of their set of sessions, and that it might start to
speak from session 2 onwards. If participants asked for more instructions as to how exactly
to speak to Deechee, it was only emphasized that they should speak to it as if it was a
small child and that they should say whatever they would deem appropriate in the given
situation. It was further emphasized that we could not give them more precise instructions
in terms of their language use.
The written instructions and consent forms are available on the appended DVD (cf.
section D).
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4.3 Recruiting and distribution of participants
We recruited 10 participants per experiment, all but one of which were native English
speakers, the majority British, with one Asian (the only non-native), one US-American,
one Nigerian, and one South-African speaker, the latter of which had lived for several
decades in the UK. The participants were balanced by gender. Further balancing was
not possible, due to the difficulty in recruiting participants for an experiment for which
they had to return to the lab five times. Most of the participants were recruited from the
campus and were either students or employees, only three of them had no affiliation with
the university. Participants were remunerated with £20 each after completion of all five
sessions.
4.4 General experimental setup
Each participant completed five sessions of approximately five minutes each with at least
one day in between sessions, which was needed for the post-processing of the speech record-
ings (cf. chapter 3). All participants were wearing headsets during the interaction in order
to record their speech and we further videotaped each session. Apart from the participant,
one to two more people were in the room: an operator, who started up the system and
monitored it during the session, and a helper which placed the boxes back on the table, as
Deechee was prone to drop them. In a few sessions, the helper was absent and the operator
took on both roles. Participants were seated opposite the robot with a table separating the
two. The five objects, which were to be taught, were cardboard boxes of approximately
10cm side length, with black-and-white symbols printed on each side of each box. For any
particular box, the symbols were identical on every side. The symbols were a star, a heart,
a square, a crescent moon, and a triangle. After having read and signed the instructions
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and the consent form, participants were seated in room and asked to count down in the
following way: “three, two, one, start”. They were told in advance, that “start” would
constitute the start time of the experiment and that the operator would signal when the
five minutes were over. Upon “start”, the operator pressed a button, which subsequently
produced a time stamp within the body memory.
After completion of the fifth session the experimenter carried out a short interview with
the participants, in which they were asked to evaluate the learning progress of Deechee,
and about particular aspects of its linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour including ques-
tions relating to negation. During this interview they could give general comments on the
experiment if they wanted to. The entire interview was recorded and transcribed. More-
over, each participant was asked to fill out a Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI) form
(Gosling et al. 2003) in order to detect potential correlations between personality traits
and linguistic behaviour. Neither interview nor TIPI form have been evaluated at the time
of writing due to time constraints associated with the PhD programme.
4.5 Rejective Scenario
This scenario was devised in order to test if intent interpretations might be sufficient for the
acquisition of early types of negation such as rejective utterances or motivation-dependent
denial. An example for rejection would be a simple “no” as in “no, I don’t want potato
mash” when being handed some. An example for motivation-dependent denial would
be another simple “no”, but as an answer to a motivation-related question such as “Do
you want some potato mash?” (see coding scheme in section B.8). Caretakers of young
children were observed to engage in intent interpretations, and these are hypothesised to
play an important role in the acquisition and eventual linguistic expressions of intention
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(cf. hypothesis 1 in section 1.1).
Imagine a child that does not speak yet and which rejects a particular object or action
by “turning her head aside, pushing or throwing the aversive thing away” etc. Parents “fre-
quently interpret these behaviors as expressive of negation and expand them with lexical
negatives: ’no, no, don’t want it’ ” (Pea 1980).
The rejective scenario was designed to elicit intent interpretations of this type from par-
ticipants by having the humanoid express non-linguistic forms of rejection similar to the
aforementioned ones: Deechee, upon registering the presentation of a disliked object, will
briefly look at it, start to frown and turn its head away.
4.5.1 Parameter settings
Table 4.1 shows the object-bound motivation values as they were set for each session.
They are identical for each participant in order to make the various sessions comparable
across participants. Note that during the entire 5 sessions each object triggers negative
and positive motivation twice, and neutral motivation once.
Time constants, that are important to maintain the interaction, were chosen as depicted
in table 4.2. The particular choices were determined through fine-tuning during the design
phase with the author’s intuition as sole evaluation criterion.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
triangle 1 -1 1 -1 0
moon 0 1 -1 1 -1
square -1 0 1 -1 1
heart 1 -1 0 1 -1
circle -1 1 -1 0 1
Table 4.1: Object-bound motivation values per session for both scenarios.
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variable value description
face_time 0.8 duration of iCub looking at face when pickup detected
and motivation ≥ 0
object_time 3 duration of iCub looking at object when pickup detected
and motivation ≥ 0
dwell_time_face 1.2 duration of iCub looking at face when no pickup detected
dwell_time_object 2 duration of iCub looking at obj. when no pickup detected
maxIdleTime 3 perceptual timeout for high level percepts: if no objects
or faces are perceived for maxIdleTime, iCub looks back
at the table
Table 4.2: Important constants for human-robot interaction, all values in seconds
4.6 Prohibitive Scenario
The prohibitive scenario takes the rejective scenario as a basis but extends it to include
the elicitation of prohibitive utterances from the participants. In this scenario, two of
the boxes were declared to be forbidden, and were marked with coloured dots on the side
facing the participants. The latter were told, in addition to what they were told in the
rejective scenario, that the marked objects were forbidden objects, and that Deechee was
not allowed to touch them. In order to keep Deechee from touching these forbidden boxes,
participants were instructed to physically restrain the robot, in case it tried to approach
them. Thus, before the first session, participants were shown how to push the robot’s arm
back, firstly, in order to show them the ideal contact point, such that the robot’s hand
would not be damaged, and secondly, to take their potential fear from actually touching
the robot. The ideal contact point is the wrist and lower arm. In this scenario force control
was used as the control mode for both arms, which makes it possible for participants to
manipulate the arms while the robot executes a movement. The act of pushing the robot’s
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arm is detected as physical resistance and registered by the perception system as resistance
event. The system broadcasts this information to the other systems, such that the body
memory registers and saves this event together with the other percepts (cf. section 3
for more details on the technicalities). The occurance of such a resistance event further
leads to the motivation being set to negative: Deechee subsequently starts to frown. In
this case Deechee will also look slightly longer at the participant’s face (see parameters
below). We decided to elongate the gaze durations, when grumpy, in order to make sure
that participants would actually notice Deechee’s grumpy despair, and further, to give this
emotion a slightly higher intensity. The elongation of a gaze time by 0.8 seconds may not
seem much to the conversationally untrained reader, but the human conversational system
is highly sensitive to differences in pause durations which typically range within the 0.1 -
1 second range, with 1 second being hypothesized to be a significant threshold (cf. section
2.1.3). We did not retrieve exact information for standard gaze times, but due to the tight
integration of gaze with speech in human conversation, we were fairly confident, that a
difference of 0.8 seconds would not go unnoticed - if not consciously, then subconsciously.
This scenario was designed to test hypothesis 2, which relates to the origin of linguistic
negation (cf. section 1.1). Under this hypothesis one assumes that the very root of linguistic
rejection, typically the first negation type to emerge, originates from the prohibitive use
of “no” by caretakers, and that it is produced in conjunction with physical restraints. The
latter are typically applied in order to keep the child from doing whatever it intended to
do, for example putting its finger into an electric socket.
Physical restraint is not the only way in which a child can be prohibited from doing
something. For example, smaller dangerous or otherwise forbidden objects can be put out
of reach of a child. We would have preferred not to give the participants any particular
instructions as to how to prohibit Deechee from touching a forbidden object. But due to
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the limiations of the robot’s vision system, this was not a viable option. To our displeasure,
many participants did not follow our instructions, despite of the initial “contact exercise”
(cf. section 5.5), and did not physically restrain the arm movement. Yet the ensuing
interaction for those who did looked very promising and fulfilled our expectations.
4.6.1 Parameter Settings
In order to keep the results of prohibitive and rejective scenario as comparable as possible,
the object-bound motivation values were identical to those in the Rejective scenario (see
table 4.1). Also the time constants that largely determine the robots interactive behaviour
are the same as in the rejective scenario (see table 4.2). Additionally the following two
time constants were introduced to adapt the robot’s behaviour in case of physical restraint
(see table 4.3).
variable value description
grumpy_face_time 1.6 duration of iCub looking at face if physical restraint is
detected (this implies that iCub was reaching for an
object)
grumpy_object_time 2 duration of iCub looking at object if physical restraint
is detected
Table 4.3: Additional time constants for human-robot interaction in prohibitive scenario, all
values in seconds
4.7 Study Design: Comparison of Hypotheses
Both of the abovementioned scenarios were either embedded or singularly constitutive for
the two experiments and arranged such that the impact of the so called prohibition task
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could be directly compared between the two experiments. Upon the advice of a psychologist
within our research group, we decided to arrange the experiments as indicated in figure 4.1.
The rejection experiment consists solely of five sessions of the rejection scenario and was
Figure 4.1: Study Design: {..}: Permutations of the given values; L: Liked object, D: Disliked
object, N: Neutral object, A: Allowed Object, P: Prohibited/Forbidden object. The mapping of
positive/negative/neutral valences to objects was permutated between sessions, such that each
object was twice liked, twice disliked, and once neutral across the 5 sessions. The mappings were
identical for every participant. The allowed/ forbidden markers were permutated as well (see text).
executed first. From the very start we could see, that our participants did indeed engage
in the envisioned negative intent interpretations, that are at the core of hypothesis 1 (cf.
section 1.1). Subsequently this scenario was chosen to constitute the base line against which
the prohibition scenario, which is linked to hypothesis 2, could be compared. Upon said
psychological advice the prohibition experiment was designed as composite experiment,
where the first three sessions contain the treatment, here the presence of the prohibitive
task, which together with the base line task forms the prohibition scenario. The prohibitive
133
Experiments Prohibitive Scenario
task was then removed from the last two sessions of the prohibition experiment, in order
to determine the effect of the treatment upon the acquisition of negation by the robot.
The assessment of the two hypotheses is then based on the comparison of the robot’s
(negation) performance within the treated group with its performance within the baseline
group during the last 2 sessions.
The mapping of negative, positive, and neutral valence to the five available objects was
permutated in each session such that each object had twice a positive, twice a negative,
and twice a neutral valence asisgned to it. This was done for several reasons: Firstly, we
wanted to prevent participants from knowing from a previous session what Deechee would
like within the current session as they might have totally avoided or engaged less in talking
about the unliked objects. This naturally would have decreased the frequency of potential
negative intent interpretations as the latter mainly occur with negative emotional displays.
Secondly, we intended to prevent the robot learning the association between negative words
and certain objects. The latter could happen if these objects had constantly a negative
valence assigned to them for, as far as the learning algorithm goes, this would constitute
an attribute of the object rather than an attribute of the robot.
For the prohibition scenario the assignment of the forbidden and allowed attributes,
which only participants were aware of, was done in such way that every combination of
liked/disliked with allowed/forbidden would occur at least once within each session. This,
together with the change of the valence-to-object mapping between subsequent sessions
then lead automatically to a permutation of the allowed and disallowed attribute-to-object
mappings across sessions. In general there were either two or three forbidden objects per
session, and two or three allowed ones.
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A note on practicalities As a last remark within this chapter, we would like to give
some realistic estimation of the time effort involved in these experiments for those readers
which may consider untertaking a similar endeavor.
The rejection experiment was performed between October 2011 and May 2012. Over-
lapping the former, the prohibition experiment was performed between February and April
2012. It thus took us about 7 months to complete the 100 sessions of both experiments.
The most important reason for this long duration is the enormous effort that comes with
the semi-automatic speech processing (cf. section 3.6). The post-processing of one session
of 5 minutes required on average about 4 hours. This means that the number of man
hours, generated by post-processing alone, amounted to 400 hours or 2 - 3 man-months.
Luckily we received help from a lab assistant such that the time effort could be distributed.
The second important reason for time-delays is the circumstance that participants have to
return four times to the laboratory, which leads to delays, due to the lack of availability of
the latter during longer stretches of time. Other factors that contribute to delays in the
execution of the experiment have to do with failure or breakage of the robot, though the
latter is, surprisingly to the roboticist, a minor factor compared to the former two.
It is therefore our contention that an improvement to the semi-automatic speech pro-
cessing should be considered if more experiments of this kind should be performed in the
future. We will pick up this topic in the discussion section in chapter 6.
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P08 ((presents D with moon box, who looks at it and smiles))
P08 Do you like the moon? ((D approaches box, flinches back))
(2.0)
D No
P08 I think you do ((P holds box further out towards D))
(0.8)
D go
P08 ((chuckles)) .hh allright I’m not gonna force [you
D [no ] (2.1) go
P08 When a robot says no I should presumably just (.) relax
—Participant 08 and Deechee, session 2
Chapter 5
Making Sense of Negative Utterances
This chapter constitutes the core of this thesis and might have been simply titled “Analysis”.
As will be explained below, different variants of analysis will be employed which comple-
ment each other to a certain degree. Before going into detail some frequently occurring
words shall be clarified.
5.0.1 Negation words, negative utterances, and negation types
Negation words/Negative words
The expressions negation word and negative word are used in the following interchangeably.
The negation words listed in table 5.1 form the basis of the subsequent analyses and were
selected manually from a list of words which is derived from the entirety of transcripts
gathered during the experiments. All of these words are either lexically negative, such as
no, or they are part of grammatically negative constructions, such as not or don’t. Two
negation words have been excluded from the analysis due to each of them occurring exactly
once in the whole corpus: aren’t and nah. The latter might not be standard in written
English but was frequently found to substitute the more regular no in spoken English.
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The only non-standard negation word that was observed and which made it into the list is
nono. Nono was used by one participant in a noun-like manner such as in “this is a nono”.
The participant produced this utterance in order to indicate to Deechee that a box was
off-limits.
Some lexical negation words have more than one phonetic equivalent. This might be
due to the coders either choosing a different phonetic transcription of a word, but it also
might be caused by the participant speaking in a different accent. The lexical don’t for
example was found to have the two phonetic counterparts duhnt and downt. As our system
processes only phonetic words, these count as different words to the robot. We therefore
treat them as separate lexical units and add a ‘2’ in brackets to distinguish them in their
non-phonetic, standard English notation.
Table 5.1: List of negation words used for analyses. All negation words listed here were
selected from a complete list of words obtained by accumulating the words from the transcripts of
the experiments. A trailing ’(2)’ signifies a second phonetic variant of the same lexical word.
no don’t don’t (2) not didn’t didn’t (2)
isn’t won’t can’t can’t (2) wouldn’t doesn’t
doesn’t (2) couldn’t wasn’t weren’t haven’t hasn’t
mustn’t cannot shouldn’t nono neither
Negative utterances
In the following an utterance is considered a negative utterance if it contains at least one
negation word. The majority of negative utterances contain exactly one negation word,
but utterances with two negation words are not uncommon either. As the utterances of
our participants were extracted automatically, or, in other words, the utterance boundaries
were detected automatically, the ensuing utterances may not coincide exactly with what a
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human transcriber would conceive of as an utterance. But roughly speaking, and assuming
an optimal utterance isolation mechanism the notion of utterance coincides with the intu-
itive notion: a singular move in speech that is either separated from a subsequent move
by a small gap or that is terminated by the move of another speaker. One may think of
utterances as atomic or smallest complete units in spoken language. Yet it is the author’s
conviction that some of these units are not so complete after all, especially if a less-than-
perfectly competent speaker is involved. Parents often “auto-complete” their children’s’
utterances, and the literature reports the construction of utterances across speaker turns
by mother-child dyads. Our intuitive notion of an utterance, i.e. the conversational move
of a single speaker, as being “complete” therefore might be overly simplistic. Yet for the
time being, the reader may stick to this notion and use it as a mental crutch. Numerically
speaking the relationship between negative utterances and negative words is a 1 : n rela-
tionship.
Examples:
[P05,s5] You don’t like the heart? (negative utterance with 1 negation word)
[P15, s2]No, you don’t like that one. (negative utterance with 2 negation words)
Negation types
The notion of negation types will be introduced more thoroughly in section 5.3. They
distinguish negative utterances on the pragmatic level. Roughly speaking they are a dis-
tinction of negative utterances into different types of speech acts, if the notion of speech
act is conceived in a liberal fashion. Producing a negative utterance implies that an agent
engages in at least one type of negation. On rare occasions the production of a negative
utterance during the experiments was classified as an agent engaging in more than one
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type of negation. Thus formally the relationship between negative utterances and nega-
tion types is a 1 : n relationship, yet in the overwhelming majority of cases the relationship
is 1 : 1.
Examples:
[P15, s2] You’re not allowed to play with this one, I told you you’re not allowed
to play with this one Deechee. (1 negative utterance with 2 negation
types: prohibition followed by apostrophised negation)
[P11, s3] You don’t like moon, do you? No. (1 negative utterance with 2 neg-
ation types: neg. mot. question followed by neg. intent interpretation)
5.0.2 Analytical Methods
We will in the following use three different methods to look at the participants’ as well as
the robot’s negative utterances. There are two essential reasons for employing more than
one method. Firstly, these three methods focus on different levels of negative utterances,
with a slightly different granularity on each level.
On the utterance level (section 5.1) we will look at negative utterances as a whole in
terms of rather conservative linguistic measures such as mean utterance length (MLU ), the
number of distinct words, and the number of utterances per minute. Some of these measures
can be used to infer cognitive expectations and ascriptions on part of the participants
towards the robot. Furthermore the MLU could, at least principally, be compared to
the MLU of child-directed speech to determine, if similar adaptations can be observed.
Moreover this analytical level allows us to conduct statistical comparisons between the two
negation experiments and Saunders’ experiment, in order to determine if one of our main
hypothesis holds: Does the display of emotions and motivationally congruent behaviour
139
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Analysis
indeed lead to a form of speech on part of participants that involves negation.
On the word level (section 5.2) we will aggregate the speech from all participants and
sessions into single, big corpora - one per experiment. There we will look at the absolute
and relative frequencies of word and word groups and compare the two corpora in between
each other as well as to other corpora in order to detect any impact of our experimental
setup on the word level.
On the pragmatic level (section 5.3) we will introduce and evaluate a pragmatically and
conversation analytically driven taxonomy of negation types and apply this taxonomy to
the participants’ negative utterances. On this level we will see most clearly the impact of
the two different settings upon the speech of our participants. It is our contention that this
analytical level is the explanatorily most valuable of the three levels as it is only here that
we see what participants were actually doing when producing their negative utterances.
Moreover, we will link the pragmatic with the word level in this section and have a closer
look at our notion of prosodic saliency.
In section 5.4 we will evaluate the robot’s negative utterances on a pragmatic level
and in terms of the adequacy of these utterances in context. It is also here where we will
pitch the two hypotheses on the origin of negation against each other as outlined in the
description of the experiments.
In section 5.5 we will take a closer look at the temporal coordination between and
correlation of prohibitions (one of our negation types), prohibitive corporal actions, and
the motivational state of the robot. This section was necessitated by a, to us, surprising
result in the preceding section.
The other reason for having several analytical levels, especially in language-related
research, is the circumstance that some academic groups may disregard the pragmatic
level, especially as it is based on the subjective assessment of a coder. As the reader
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will see, the impact of the robot’s motivated behaviour can be shown on each analytical
level. That is, even if one fosters absolute disregard for all things pragmatic, the ‘woolly’,
subjective results on the pragmatic level are mirrored on the ‘lower’ levels in terms of hard
word counts and frequencies and in the number of negative utterances.
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5.1 Human: Utterance Level
In this section an analysis of the speech of our participants on the utterance level is per-
formed using basic measures that can be calculated automatically once a transcription of
the participants’ speech, segmented into utterances, is available. These measures charac-
terize the participants’ linguistic behaviour on a rather coarse-grained level in terms of
verbosity, “how much do participants speak”, and utterance complexity (cf. Fischer et al.
2011). Said measures are calculated for the complete speech data of all participants, sepa-
rated by experiment, but also for negative utterances only. The tables 5.2 and 5.3 give an
overview of these measures for all utterances in the rejection and prohibition experiment
respectively.
5.1.1 Measures on the utterance level
mean length of utterance (MLU ) This is one of the most common measures in the
literature on child language development (cf. Owens 20121). It is used on the one hand
to estimate the linguistic capabilities of a child in terms of utterance complexity. On the
other hand it is also used to show how parents and caretakers simplify their speech in
terms of utterance length when speaking to children. We use the word-based MLU2 which
is obtained by dividing the number of phonetic words by the number of utterances per
speaker and session (cf. Fischer et al. 2011, Roy et al. 2009).
1Owens (2012) discusses in chapter 2 some of the limitations of this measure in terms of its explanatory
value and emphasizes that the child-based MLU might vary considerably across situational contexts. If this
should also hold true for the caregivers MLU, this could have important repercussions for the comparative
value of MLU across experiments in HRI. HRI experiments with a linguistic focus are to date extremely
limited and specific in their situational context.
2Alternatively the MLU can be calculated based on morphemes. This means that the MLU used with
this thesis is not necessarily comparable to the morpheme-based MLUs.
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Table 5.2: Utterance-level Measures for Rejection Experiment. All participants and all
sessions. Any given number refers to the participant with participant id noted on top the corre-
sponding column and the session number in the corresponding first column. Abbreviations: sX:
session nr. X, # w/# u: total number of words/utterances uttered by participant, # dw: number
of distinct words, MLU: mean length of utterance, w/min / u/min: average number of words /
utterances per minute
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12
s1
d (s) 272 168.4 308.6 178.3 380.9 290.4 301.9 275.5 298.3 300.5
# w 111 314 370 392 729 505 474 26 458 353
# u 50 67 133 104 225 157 126 16 114 92
# dw 21 101 96 100 140 145 133 6 103 114
MLU 2.2 4.7 2.8 3.8 3.2 3.2 3.8 1.6 4 3.8
w/min 24.5 111.9 71.9 131.9 114.8 104.3 94.2 5.7 92.1 70.5
u/min 11 23.9 25.9 35 35.4 32.4 25 3.5 22.9 18.4
s2
d (s) 285.4 196 305.2 293.2 303.4 259.8 306.6 287.6 298.8 312.7
# w 138 346 323 580 666 414 437 70 338 230
# u 66 83 110 156 183 112 122 36 106 82
# dw 26 77 71 86 107 89 138 27 90 76
MLU 2.1 4.2 2.9 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.6 1.9 3.2 2.8
w/min 29 105.9 63.5 118.7 131.7 95.6 85.5 14.6 67.9 44.1
u/min 13.9 25.4 21.6 31.9 36.2 25.9 23.9 7.5 21.3 15.7
s3
d (s) 307.9 297.1 249.9 318 307.8 296.8 299.2 290.8 306.6 302.5
# w 159 468 302 662 569 431 513 62 242 107
# u 66 111 102 168 180 128 139 31 98 38
# dw 29 107 73 97 100 96 155 27 56 22
MLU 2.4 4.2 3 3.9 3.1 3.4 3.7 2 2.5 2.8
w/min 31 94.5 72.5 124.9 110.3 87.1 102.9 12.8 47.4 21.2
u/min 12.9 22.4 24.5 31.7 35.1 25.9 27.9 6.4 19.2 7.5
s4
d (s) 319.2 265.5 213.2 329.9 307.8 301.5 300.4 289.4 300.2 303.5
# w 204 393 253 685 541 364 495 84 187 152
# u 80 93 89 187 184 105 143 33 70 67
# dw 30 104 67 95 108 88 152 23 58 27
MLU 2.5 4.2 2.8 3.7 2.9 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.7 2.3
w/min 38.3 88.8 71.2 124.6 105.5 72.4 99.1 17.4 37.4 30.1
u/min 15 21 25 34 35.9 20.9 28.6 6.8 14 13.2
s5
d (s) 305.9 220.4 269.1 307.1 314.5 324.5 301.3 290.2 319.5 299
# w 160 370 356 633 582 406 402 66 211 134
# u 61 92 135 157 188 128 132 36 74 54
# dw 23 104 81 89 105 127 116 20 74 36
MLU 2.6 4 2.6 4 3.1 3.2 3 1.8 2.9 2.5
w/min 31.4 100.7 79.4 123.7 111 75.1 80.1 13.6 39.6 26.9
u/min 12 25 30.1 30.7 35.9 23.7 26.3 7.4 13.9 10.8
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Table 5.3: Utterance-level Measures for prohibition experiment. All participants and
all sessions. Any given number refers to the participant with participant id noted on top the
corresponding column and the session number in the corresponding first column. Abbreviations:
sX: session nr. X, # w/# u: total number of words/utterances uttered by participant, # dw:
number of distinct words, MLU: mean length of utterance, w/min / u/min: words/utterances per
minute
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
s1
d (s) 301.8 317.8 311.8 332.3 303.8 301.1 318.9 300.4 359.3 319.3
# w 535 279 611 704 200 691 644 508 332 404
# u 134 92 165 194 66 185 179 138 119 124
# dw 110 76 134 195 63 170 178 114 74 99
MLU 4 3 3.7 3.6 3 3.7 3.6 3.7 2.8 3.3
w/min 106.4 52.7 117.6 127.1 39.5 137.7 121.2 101.5 55.4 75.9
u/min 26.6 17.4 31.8 35 13 36.9 33.7 27.6 19.9 23.3
s2
d (s) 324.2 305.7 301.4 307 310.7 296 308.4 308.3 317.6 312.1
# w 653 307 715 830 215 702 535 610 363 332
# u 178 93 187 204 78 188 147 138 133 110
# dw 100 73 126 187 53 188 117 110 75 77
MLU 3.7 3.3 3.8 4.1 2.8 3.7 3.6 4.4 2.7 3
w/min 120.9 60.3 142.3 162.2 41.5 142.3 104.1 118.7 68.6 63.8
u/min 32.9 18.3 37.2 39.9 15.1 38.1 28.6 26.9 25.1 21.1
s3
d (s) 297.4 332.5 294.6 326.8 302.3 309.1 316.2 302.6 306.1 315.8
# w 424 343 717 774 184 702 610 625 329 477
# u 133 95 180 221 71 195 170 137 141 162
# dw 70 70 152 205 52 178 130 87 82 100
MLU 3.2 3.6 4 3.5 2.6 3.6 3.6 4.6 2.3 2.9
w/min 85.5 61.9 146 142.1 36.5 136.3 115.8 123.9 64.5 90.6
u/min 26.8 17.1 36.7 40.6 14.1 37.9 32.3 27.2 27.6 30.8
s4
d (s) 307.6 319.9 308.5 316.1 314.7 314.8 301.7 298.6 301.1 316.2
# w 501 298 698 714 259 750 536 490 332 589
# u 154 89 181 192 83 198 160 131 119 204
# dw 69 55 132 195 40 194 117 93 59 127
MLU 3.3 3.3 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.8 3.4 3.7 2.8 2.9
w/min 97.7 55.9 135.7 135.5 49.4 143 106.6 98.5 66.2 111.7
u/min 30 16.7 35.2 36.4 15.8 37.7 31.8 26.3 23.7 38.7
s5
d (s) 306.7 380.3 312.4 320.1 293.4 302.1 311.2 303.2 306.6 317.4
# w 476 340 656 728 310 716 591 577 333 493
# u 160 100 186 188 102 199 178 157 127 170
# dw 64 52 131 198 42 176 109 105 69 106
MLU 3 3.4 3.5 3.9 3 3.6 3.3 3.7 2.6 2.9
w/min 93.1 53.6 126 136.5 63.4 142.2 113.9 114.2 65.2 93.2
u/min 31.3 15.8 35.7 35.2 20.9 39.5 34.3 31.1 24.9 32.1
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It is important to note that MLUs are not comparable across languages (Owens 2012).
Fischer et al. (2011) counts the MLU amongst the measures for linguistic complexity. Self-
evidently this measure is sensitive to differences in the segmentation of speech as the latter
impacts utterance length. As an automatic system for speech segmentation was used in
our experiments (cf. section 3.6), the MLUs reported here can currently not be compared
with MLUs from HRI studies that use different systems or MLUs obtained from speech
that was manually segmented.
number of utterances per minute (u/min) The number of utterances per minute
reveal how much participants spoke to the robot, if they were talkative or taciturn - a
measure of linguistic verbosity. To account for the variability of session length, this measure
will be used instead of the total number of utterances.
number of distinct words (#dw) This measure indicates if participants used a variety
of words when speaking to the robot or if they were repetitive instead. Fischer et al. (2011)
classes this measure, together with MLU, amongst the measures for linguistic verbosity.
5.1.2 Potential impact of measures upon the language acquisition sys-
tem
Mean length of utterances
Firstly, the length of an utterance (UL) is relevant to the language acquisition of the robot
in that precisely one word of each utterance, namely the most salient one, is extracted
and subsequently becomes part of the robot’s active vocabulary (see section 3.6). Thus,
the longer the MLU, the less words will be propagated into the lexicon and the bigger the
statistical impact of each word.
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Secondly, Saunders, Lehmann, Sato and Nehaniv (2011) report a 71% accuracy of the
prosodic labeling system with regards to the extraction of the most salient word. They
do not specify if there is a correlation between error rate and utterance length, but intu-
itively this seems likely. Consider for example the following two utterances (prosodically
emphasized words, i.e. words with high energy and higher pitch are capitalised): “It was
the CAT” (UL=4), “It was the CAT, NOT the dog”3 (UL=7). In longer utterances like
the second one, intuitively, it seems more likely that an error could occur in terms of the
extraction of the most salient word. The reason for this assumption is the circumstance
that there are firstly, two sufficiently salient words to choose from. Secondly, in presence
of a less-than perfect saliency detection system where the error is partially random, more
words to choose from afford the algorithm more opportunity to choose the incorrect word.
The particular likelihood of such an erroneous choice depends on the structure of the 71%
error as on the unknown error rate of the boundary detection. With structure of the er-
ror we mean here: Is the probability of picking a word other than the most salient one
dependent on utterance length or not, and, furthermore, is this probability dependent on
the number of salient words in one utterance.
Utterances per minute
Similarly to the MLU, the number of utterances per minute produced by a participant has
an impact on the acquisition system: A higher number of utterances leads to more words
being propagated into the robot’s active lexicon.
3Optimally this utterance, if pronounced normally, i.e. with a small gap where the comma is located,
should actually not occur as a whole in the utterance set based on which the most salient words are
extracted. Yet manual inspection has shown that such utterances, and longer ones, do occur in this set.
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Number of distinct words
It seems likely that the number of distinct words will have an impact on the acquisition
system, if a higher numbers of distinct words leads to a higher number of distinct salient
words. A higher number of salient words leads to a higher number of distinct entries in
the lexicon but also to a lower number of instances per distinct word. Further research
would be useful here to determine how the trade-off between a high number of instances
of few distinct words versus a low number of instances of many distinct words, impacts on
the performance of memory-based learners.
5.1.3 Overview of Analysis
The analysis on the utterances level is split into three parts. In subsection 5.1.4 we look at
any discernible trends within each experiment in terms of the three measures that were just
described, a so-called in-group analysis. Subsection 5.1.5 contains a cross-group analysis
between the participant groups of the two negation experiments. In subsection 5.1.6,
finally, a comparison on the utterance level is undertaken between the two utterance-level
measures of the two negation experiments on one hand and the same measures with regards
to the participants’ speech within Saunders’ experiments on the other.
5.1.4 In-Group Analysis
In this subsection the author focuses on the question whether any trends and statistically
significant differences with regard to the measures introduced above are discernible within
the speech corpus. We focus in particular on potential trends between subsequent sessions
that hint towards adaptations of the speakers to the perceived cognitive abilities of the
robot in terms of their linguistic behaviour.
This idea is based on the notion of recipient design (Sacks et al. 1974) which was
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introduced into linguistically focused HRI research by Fischer et al. (2012). Recipient
design denotes the observation that humans typically adapt their ways of speaking to the
perceived needs and capabilities of the communication partner. Child-directed speech is
possibly the most reported example for such adaptations, but it has also been shown to
happen when the communication partner is an artificial artifact such as a robot.
Fischer et al. (2012) compare the speech of participants addressing a robot. Their study
involved three different scenarios distinguished from each other by differing robotic embod-
iments. Their experiment was conducted based on only a single session per participant.
The authors subsequently compared the effects of embodiment horizontally across different
groups. Due to the single-session limitation they could not compare adaptations within
the same group across several sessions (‘vertical comparison’). The authors report that the
majority of observed changes in their study happened in terms of measures that pertain
to the interpersonal function of communication. These measure include, amongst others,
the frequency of certain sentence types (imperatives, interrogative, declarative), and the
frequency of use of the vocative. In order to perform latter types of measurements a more
advanced analysis of our data involving the use of a parser would be needed. As these
measurements are not the main focus of this thesis, we will focus on the easily obtainable
subset, i.e. the aforementioned three measures, MLU, u/min, and #dw.
Amongst these measures Fischer et al. (2012) only observed moderate changes of the
MLU across groups which were statistically significant. For multiple-session experiments
such as the ones reported here it seems reasonable to expect that participants do adapt
their speech with increasing familiarity with the robot. However, it is perfectly possible
for such changes to go undetected if the time scale for such adaptations to take place dif-
fers significantly from the time-scale that is measured here. If participants, for example,
happened to adapt their speech within the first 20 seconds of the conversation, the adap-
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tation might not be visible in our measurement that spans the entire 5 minutes of each
session. Two transition points of potential further adaptations are of particular interest:
Firstly the transition from session 1 to session 2 which is marked by the robot starting to
speak. Secondly, the transition from session 3 to 4 within the prohibition experiment, the
transition of there being prohibited objects to there not being any such objects.
Rejection Experiment
utterance length (MLU) Across all sessions no obvious trend of uniform changes in
Table 5.4: Comparison of mean length of
utterance between session 1 and 5 - Rejection
experiment; standard deviation in brackets;
* = p <.01, **= p < .05, †= p < .20
s1 s5 T
P01 2.22 (1.33) 2.62 (1.36) 1.57†
P04 4.69 (2.58) 4.02 (2.97) 1.47†
P05 2.78 (1.70) 2.64 (1.63) 0.71
P06 3.77 (2.29) 4.03 (2.23) 0.92
P07 3.24 (2.49) 3.10 (2.27) 0.61
P08 3.22 (2.20) 3.17 (2.07) 0.18
P09 3.76 (2.25) 3.05 (2.19) 2.59∗∗
P10 1.63 (1.02) 1.83 (1.18) 0.61
P11 4.02 (2.75) 2.85 (2.04) 3.33∗
P12 3.87 (2.34) 2.48 (1.26) 4.55∗
MLU is discernible (see table B.15). The mean
MLU based on the 50 MLUs of all sessions is
3.12 with a standard deviation of 0.72. Some
participants started with a relatively low MLU
in session 1, and increased it in session 2 (e.g.
P10 : 1.6 → 1.9), whereas others started with
comparatively high MLUs in the first session
and lowered them within the second (e.g. P12 :
3.8→ 2.8). In order to test for statistical signif-
icance of these changes, we compared the set of
utterance lengths of each session with the same
set in the subsequent session. Only few changes
between two subsequent sessions are statistically significant (see table B.15). Furthermore
it is not the case that the largest or most significant changes within sessions happen be-
tween sessions 1 and 2. For 4 participants it is the case that their largest change in MLU
happens between these two sessions, although only one of which is statistically significant
though. Yet for another 4 participants the largest change in this measure happens between
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the sessions 4 and 5.
When comparing the MLUs of each participant from the first session with the same
measure for their last session, 3 participants reduced the mean utterances length in a
statistically significant way and another 2 show a tendency (p < 0.8) to adapt their MLU.
All of these changes are changes towards the ‘global’ MLU of 3.12 (cf. table 5.4). That
is, those participants who start off with comparatively high MLUs and do adapt their
utterance length (P04, P09, P11, P12 ), decrease their MLUs towards the ‘global’ mean,
whereas those who start with comparatively low MLUs and who do adapt their MLUs
increase their MLU towards this mean (P01 ). Interestingly the MLUs of all but one ‘non-
adapters’ lie between those of the adapters.
Negative utterances There are no discernible trends for negative utterances only,
neither when comparing subsequent sessions with each other, nor when comparing the
sessions 1 and 5. See table B.15 for percentual changes and significance markers of these.
Number of distinct words (#dw) With regard to this measure we see a considerable
variance between different participants, spanning from only 6 distinct words in the 1st
session of participant P10 to 155 in the 3rd session of participant P09 (see table 5.2). Gen-
erally there seems to be a partial correlation between the number of produced utterances
per minute and the number of distinct words, i.e. participants who talk more tend to not
just repeat the same words over and over again but use different words over the course of
time. But the correlation is certainly far from being perfect, as we can see by comparing the
second session of participant P01 with the first session of participants P04. Though pro-
ducing nearly the same number of utterances, P04 uses close to four times as many distinct
words as compared to P01. In order to test for statistical significance of vertical changes
in this measure across the 5 sessions, we cannot perform a t-test for each participant as
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there is only one measure per participant and session (as opposed to the utterance length
discussed in the last paragraph). Therefore we pool the #dw measures of all participants
within each session and look for significant (vertical) trends for the group as a whole. As the
variance in #dw between participants is considerable, and extreme data points distort the
mean towards their respective values, extreme values have to be excluded. In the following
participants are considered extreme with regard to their #dw, whose #dw is either lower
than Q1−1.5∗IQR or higher than Q3+1.5∗IQR, with Q1, and Q3 being the first and third
quartile respectively, and IQR = Q3 − Q1 being the interquartile range4. Based on this
Table 5.5: Development of mean #dw - Rejection
experiment; TX : without P01 and P10; entry in the
T/TX column between session x and session x+1: t-
value resulting from comparison of #dw measures of
session x with those of session x+1; * = p <.05
meanX (sdX) TX mean (sd) T
s1 116.5 (19.85)
2.38∗
95.9 (46.96)
0.94
s2 91.75 (21.75)
0.22
78.7 (33.54)
0.15
s3 88.25 (39.18)
0.05
76.2 (42.89)
0.05
s4 87.38 (37.53)
-0.25
75.2 (41.92)
0.12
s5 91.50 (28.54) 77.5 (38.8)
method the participants P01 and P10
were excluded due to their respective
#dw values being below the Q1−1.5∗
IQR limit. No participant’s #dw was
above Q3 + 1.5 ∗ IQR.
Table 5.5 shows the development of
the means of this measure for the re-
maining 8 participants across the 5 ses-
sions. Only the transition from session
1 to session 2 is statistically significant.
There we see a significant drop in the
distinct number of words by on average 20% for the participants measured. This trend
seems to continue in a less significant manner in the subsequent sessions until there is a
marginal rise between sessions 4 and 5. For participants P01 and P10 which were excluded
4This is one method to mark the outer limits of the whiskers in a boxplot. Alternatively, one could
choose the mean of #dw across one session minus one standard deviation as lower limit, and the mean plus
standard deviation as upper limit, by which we would mark one participant more as outlier as compared to
the IQR method. For there are only 10 participants, the decision was made in favour of the IQR method
in order to lose as few data points as possible.
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as outliers and both of which start with very few distinct words the opposite seems to hold
true: when transitioning from session 1 to 2, they increase the number of distinct words
(cf. table 5.2). Most remarkably P10 more than triples the number of distinct words dur-
ing this transition from 6 to 27, just to subsequently level in on around 25 distinct words
in the sessions that follow. Due to there only being one value for #dw per participant
and session, it is impossible to say if these changes have statistical significance for single
participants that start with a rather restricted vocabulary.
Summarily we can say that all participants but one (P09 ) which start of with medium
to high numbers of distinct words in session 1, reduce this number in subsequent sessions.
Conceiving of these participants as a group, this reduction is statistically significant at the
transition point between session 1 and 2. P01 and P10, both of which start initially with
very few distinct words, increase this number between session 1 and 2 and in both cases
this change is the percentally largest of all changes in this measure between all sessions.
Negative utterances There are no significant trends when only considering the
distinct negative words. This is the case when both considering all participants and under
exclusion of participants P01 and P10.
Utterances per minute (u/min) Table B.17 gives an overview of the percentual
changes in u/min. With regard to this measure no obvious trend can be determined.
While the difference in communicativeness between some participants is remarkable, just
over a factor 10 between the least talkative (P10 ) and the most talkative participant
(P07 ), the IQR method used in the last paragraph to identify outliers does not mark
any participant as outlier. The percental changes in u/min are less marked than those
observed with the #dw measure. Despite a slight drop of the mean across the sessions,
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Table 5.6: Development of mean
u/min for all participants - Rejection
experiment; entry in the T column at
session X: t-value resulting from com-
parison u/min measures of session x-1
with same measures of session x
mean (sd) T
s1 23.34 (10.24)
0.24
s2 22.33 (8.47)
0.24
s3 21.35 (9.79)
-0.02
s4 21.44 (9.49)
-0.03
s5 21.58 (9.82)
there is no discernible pattern in terms of the di-
rection of change that would hold for any subgroup
of participants. Furthermore the biggest percentual
changes do not generally happen between session 1
and 2, they are fairly distributed across the sessions:
3 between session 1 and 2, another 3 between session
4 and 5, and 2 between session 2 and 3 and session
3 and 4 each.
Negative utterances When considering the
frequency of negative utterances only, no significant
trends are discernible (cf. table B.175).
Prohibition experiment
Utterance length (MLU) Similarly to the vertical comparison of MLUs within the
rejection experiment no clear pattern can be observed in terms of changes of MLU across
the sessions (cf. table B.18). Analoguous to the observations made for the rejection
experiment it is neither the case that the largest percentual changes in this measure hap-
pen from the first to the second sessions, nor is it the case that the statistically sig-
nificant changes would concentrate between these two sessions. The same observation
can be made when comparing the sessions 3 and 4, those sessions between which the
treatment stops. When comparing the first with the last sessions in this experiment,
we see less of a change in MLU compared to one we have seen in the rejection exper-
5The percentages of change are numerically very high at times. This is due to the fact that the
underlying base, i.e. the number of negative utterances per minute, is rather small, such that a single
additional negative utterance has a large impact upon the nu/min measure.
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iment: only P13 has a significantly lower MLU in session 5 as compared to session 1,
and two further participants, P14 and P22, show a tendency of such a change (cf. ta-
ble 5.7). P14 ends up with a higher MLU though than he or she has started with.
Table 5.7: Comparison of mean length of utter-
ance between session 1 and 5 - Prohibition experi-
ment; standard deviation in brackets; * = p <.01,
†= p < .20
s1 s5 T
P13 3.99 (2.59) 2.98 (1.76) 3.87∗
P14 3.03 (1.52) 3.4 (2.16) 1.37†
P15 3.7 (2.47) 3.53 (2.35) 0.68
P16 3.63 (2.55) 3.87 (2.65) 0.91
P17 3.03 (1.76) 3.04 (2.2) 0.03
P18 3.74 (2.22) 3.6 (2.42) 0.57
P19 3.6 (2.55) 3.32 (2.19) 1.1
P20 3.68 (2.72) 3.68 (2.34) 0.02
P21 2.79 (1.77) 2.62 (1.86) 0.72
P22 3.26 (2.11) 2.9 (2.16) 1.42†
Negative utterances Also when fo-
cusing on negative utterances only we can-
not discern any significant trends in MLU
change (cf. table B.18).
In summary it may be said that nothing
of interest can be asserted about trends of
the MLU for participants of the prohibition
experiment.
Number of distinct words (#dw)
Generally, i.e. when considering all distinct
words, no clear tendency is apparent (cf.
table B.19). Half of the percentally biggest
changes of this measure happen between the second and third session, yet none of the
changes in #dw between any two sessions is statistically significant nor could be said to
show a strong tendency in any direction.
Distinct negative words (#dnw) When focusing on the number of distinct neg-
ative words only, a tendency of one negation word being dropped between session 3 and
4 can be observed (cf. table 5.8). The word-level analysis in section 5.2 will show which
particular word was dropped.
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Table 5.8: Distinct negative words - Prohibition experiment; sid: session id; t-values in T column
between sessions x and x+1 pertain to #dnw measures of all participants between the two sessions;
*= p < .2
sid mean (sd) T sid mean (sd) T sid mean (sd) T sid mean (sd) T
s1 4.9 (2.33)
0.58
s2 4.4 (1.43)
-0.45
s3 4.7 (1.57)
1.36∗
s4 3.6 (2.01)
0.51
s2 4.4 (1.43) s3 4.7 (1.57) s4 3.6 (2.01) s5 3.2 (1.48)
Utterances per minute (u/min) The comparison of the utterance per minute mea-
surement across sessions yields no significant trends (cf. table B.20). Albeit 5 out of 10
of the biggest changes in this measure happen between session 1, u/min : 26.52 (sd 8.03),
and session 2, u/min : 28.32 (sd 8.62), this change is far from being statistically significant
(t = −0.48).
Table 5.9: Negative utterances
per minute - Prohibition ex-
periment: t-values in the T col-
umn between sessions x and x+1
pertain to comparison of #dnw
measures of all participants be-
tween the two sessions; *= p <
0.05
mean (sd) T
s1 4.08 (2.89)
-0.53
s2 4.66 (1.88)
0.14
s3 4.53 (2.24)
2.56∗
s4 2.29 (1.63)
-0.41
s5 2.61 (1.82)
Negative utterances per minute (nu/min)
This picture changes drastically when we focus on the
frequency of negative utterances only. There we can see
with virtually every participant a significant drop of the
negative utterances per minute between session 3 and 4
(cf. tables 5.11 and 5.9). This is the transition point, the
treatment ends with session 3, i.e. there are no forbidden
objects any more in session 4. This removes for partici-
pants the necessity to prohibit the robot. Evidently this
has had a direct impact on the production of negative
utterances.
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Table 5.10: Utterance-level measures for negative utterances in rejection experiment.
All numbers refer to the participant with the id noted in the top row and session number in the first
column. Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # nw/# nu: total number of negation words/negative
utterances uttered by participant, # ndw: number of unique negation words, MLU: mean length of
utterance , nw/min / nu/min: negation words / negative utterances per minute
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12
s1
d (s) 272 168.4 308.6 178.3 380.9 290.4 301.9 275.5 298.3 300.5
# nw 1 15 25 11 30 22 18 0 25 14
# nu 1 12 24 10 28 21 18 0 21 13
# dnw 1 5 4 3 4 3 5 0 5 3
MLU 2 4.4 1.8 3.7 3.2 3.5 4.5 0 5.6 3.8
nw/min 0.2 5.3 4.9 3.7 4.7 4.5 3.6 0 5 2.8
nu/min 0.2 4.3 4.7 3.4 4.4 4.3 3.6 0 4.2 2.6
s2
d (s) 285.4 196 305.2 293.2 303.4 259.8 306.6 287.6 298.8 312.7
# nw 3 23 21 13 35 18 21 2 41 17
# nu 3 19 20 12 34 17 18 2 29 14
# dnw 2 4 3 2 4 3 4 2 4 3
MLU 2.7 4.9 3 3.5 4.1 4.5 6.2 2.5 4.2 2.8
nw/min 0.6 7 4.1 2.7 6.9 4.2 4.1 0.4 8.2 3.3
nu/min 0.6 5.8 3.9 2.5 6.7 3.9 3.5 0.4 5.8 2.7
s3
d (s) 307.9 297.1 249.9 318 307.8 296.8 299.2 290.8 306.6 302.5
# nw 5 32 10 18 37 15 23 2 18 11
# nu 5 23 10 17 35 15 20 2 15 8
# dnw 2 4 3 4 5 4 6 2 3 1
MLU 3.4 5.3 1.2 4.6 3 2.3 6.2 3 4.4 4
nw/min 1 6.5 2.4 3.4 7.2 3.0 4.6 0.4 3.5 2.2
nu/min 1 4.6 2.4 3.2 6.8 3.0 4 0.4 2.9 1.6
s4
d (s) 319.2 265.5 213.2 329.9 307.8 301.5 300.4 289.4 300.2 303.5
# nw 8 26 12 17 25 21 14 3 21 18
# nu 8 20 12 17 24 20 14 3 20 14
# dnw 2 2 5 4 5 2 6 1 5 2
MLU 1.8 4.6 3.2 3.9 3.2 3.2 5.1 4.7 3.4 2.6
nw/min 1.5 5.9 3.4 3.1 4.9 4.2 2.8 0.6 4.2 3.6
nu/min 1.5 4.5 3.4 3.1 4.7 4 2.8 0.6 4 2.8
s5
d (s) 305.9 220.4 269.1 307.1 314.5 324.5 301.3 290.2 319.5 299
# nw 3 36 19 12 40 11 17 3 9 14
# nu 3 28 16 12 40 11 15 3 6 13
# dnw 2 5 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 2
MLU 3.7 4.7 2.9 4.4 2.7 3.9 3.4 2 3.7 3.3
nw/min 0.6 9.8 4.2 2.3 7.6 2 3.4 0.6 1.7 2.8
nu/min 0.6 7.6 3.6 2.3 7.6 2 3.0 0.6 1.1 2.6
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Table 5.11: Utterance-level measures for negative utterances in prohibition experi-
ment. Numbers refer to the participant with the id noted in the top row and session number
in the first column. Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # nw/# nu: total number of negation
words/negative utterances uttered by participant, # ndw: number of unique negation words, MLU:
mean length of utterance, nw/min / nu/min: negation words / negative utterances per minute
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
s1
d (s) 301.8 317.8 311.8 332.3 303.8 301.1 318.9 300.4 359.3 319.3
# nw 22 0 61 29 16 36 22 24 33 5
# nu 19 0 52 25 14 36 20 23 20 4
# dnw 7 0 8 5 4 7 5 6 3 4
MLU 4.8 0 4.5 5.6 2.7 4.4 3.8 3.9 3.6 4.8
nw/min 4.4 0 11.7 5.2 3.2 7.2 4.1 4.8 5.5 0.9
nu/min 3.8 0 10 4.5 2.8 7.2 3.8 4.6 3.3 0.8
s2
d (s) 324.2 305.7 301.4 307 310.7 296 308.4 308.3 317.6 312.1
# nw 43 12 45 34 18 19 29 34 36 15
# nu 36 8 37 32 16 18 24 30 24 15
# dnw 5 3 6 6 3 6 4 5 4 2
MLU 4.4 2.4 5.2 4.8 2.1 4.7 4.4 5.7 3.1 3.1
nw/min 8 2.4 9.0 6.6 3.5 3.9 5.6 6.6 6.8 2.9
nu/min 6.7 1.6 7.4 6.3 3.1 3.6 4.7 5.8 4.5 2.9
s3
d (s) 297.4 332.5 294.6 326.8 302.3 309.1 316.2 302.6 306.1 315.8
# nw 7 9 49 34 26 25 29 33 25 19
# nu 7 8 45 28 25 23 25 30 24 18
# dnw 3 3 7 6 5 7 4 5 4 3
MLU 4.4 3 5.0 5.0 1.9 4.9 4.7 5.3 2.4 2.7
nw/min 1.4 1.6 10 6.2 5.2 4.9 5.5 6.5 4.9 3.6
nu/min 1.4 1.4 9.2 5.1 5 4.5 4.7 5.9 4.7 3.4
s4
d (s) 307.6 319.9 308.5 316.1 314.7 314.8 301.7 298.6 301.1 316.2
# nw 5 1 30 28 8 15 6 21 9 7
# nu 5 1 24 25 8 14 6 20 8 7
# dnw 3 1 5 6 1 6 3 6 2 3
MLU 3.8 1 5.0 5.5 1.9 5.1 4.7 4.3 4 3.9
nw/min 1 0.2 5.8 5.3 1.5 2.9 1.2 4.2 1.8 1.3
nu/min 1 0.2 4.7 4.7 1.5 2.7 1.2 4.0 1.6 1.3
s5
d (s) 306.7 380.3 312.4 320.1 293.4 302.1 311.2 303.2 306.6 317.4
# nw 6 3 32 28 7 11 10 20 16 6
# nu 6 3 30 27 7 11 9 20 16 6
# dnw 3 2 3 6 1 4 3 5 2 3
MLU 5.3 1.3 2.8 5.3 1.3 4.6 4.3 4.5 2.5 2.8
nw/min 1.2 0.5 6.1 5.2 1.4 2.2 1.9 4 3.1 1.1
nu/min 1.2 0.5 5.8 5.1 1.4 2.2 1.7 4 3.1 1.1
157
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Utterance Level
Table 5.12: Accumulated utterance-level measures for rejection and prohibition exper-
iment. Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # w/# u: total number of words/utterances uttered
by participant, # dw: number of distinct words, MLU: mean length of utterance based on all
utterances, not on per-session MLUs, w/min / u/min: words / utterances per minute
(a) Rejection Experiment
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12
d (s) 1490.4 1147.4 1346.0 1426.5 1614.4 1473.0 1509.4 1433.5 1523.4 1518.2
# w 772 1891 1604 2952 3087 2120 2321 308 1436 976
# u 323 446 569 772 960 630 662 152 462 333
# dw 41 206 144 164 217 257 326 45 188 146
MLU 2.4 4.2 2.8 3.8 3.2 3.4 3.5 2 3.1 2.9
w/min 31.1 98.9 71.5 124.2 114.7 86.4 92.3 12.9 56.6 38.6
u/min 13 23.3 25.4 32.5 35.7 25.7 26.3 6.4 18.2 13.2
(b) Prohibition Experiment
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
d (s) 1537.7 1656.2 1528.7 1602.3 1524.9 1523.1 1556.4 1513.1 1590.7 1580.8
# w 2589 1567 3397 3750 1168 3561 2916 2809 1689 2295
# u 759 469 899 999 400 965 834 701 639 770
# dw 156 121 267 404 100 365 272 190 151 215
MLU 3.4 3.3 3.8 3.8 2.9 3.7 3.5 4 2.6 3
w/min 101 56.8 133.3 140.4 46 140.3 112.4 111.4 63.7 87.1
u/min 29.6 17 35.3 37.4 15.7 38 32.2 27.8 24.1 29.2
5.1.5 Cross-Group Analysis
In this section we compare the two negation experiments, rejection and prohibition exper-
iment, with each other. In order to compare the two experiments as a whole we will use
a so-called global measure which is based on the superset of the underlying entities from
each session, the values pertaining to our three measures, MLU, utterances per minute
(u/min), and distinct number of words (#dw). In other words, with regards to this global
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Table 5.13: Comparison of MLUs between Rejection and Prohibition experiment.
The two experiments are compared on a per session level as well as comparing the “global” MLU;
* = p <.2
(a) All Utterances
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean(sd) T
s1 3.31 (0.92) 3.44 (0.39) 0.41
s2 3.17 (0.74) 3.51 (0.55) 1.16
s3 3.10 (0.70) 3.39 (0.67) 0.94
s4 3.06 (0.63) 3.39 (0.38) 1.42∗
s5 2.97 (0.67) 3.29 (0.41) 1.29
global 3.13 (0.65) 3.4 (0.45) 1.08
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean(sd) T
s1 3.25 (1.61) 3.81 (1.56) 0.79
s2 3.84 (1.17) 3.99 (1.23) 0.28
s3 3.74 (1.47) 3.93 (1.28) 0.31
s4 3.57 (1.02) 3.92 (1.43) 0.63
s5 3.47 (0.8) 3.47 (1.52) 0
global 3.65 (0.91) 3.86 (1.1) 0.46
measure all entities are treated as if they were derived from a single, long session6. Thus,
for example, the global MLUs displayed in table 5.12 differ slightly from the means of the
single-session MLUs (means of means), as it is calculated not based on the latter but based
on the superset of the lengths of all utterances from all sessions.
Mean-length of utterances (MLU)
Generally the MLUs of the participants within the prohibition experiment are slightly
higher as compared to those of the participants within the rejection experiment, although
the difference between the global measures in MLU of both experiments is not statistically
significant (cf. table 5.13). The differences in means of MLU are neither statistically
significant when single sessions are compared. The only exception is the difference in MLU
when comparing the fourth sessions where, albeit not significant, participants within the
6Alternatively one could derive these global measures from the measures of the single sessions, a mean
of means in the case of MLU, or, more generally speaking, derivatives of derivatives. This may still seem
in order for non-derivatives such as the number of words, and may be acceptable for MLUs. Yet, with
the number of distinct words it becomes very implausible to use the mean of the single-session measures.
Using these means would largely overestimate the actual number of distinct words due to duplicate words
across sessions.
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prohibition experiment show a tendency to use slightly longer utterances.
For negative utterances only there is no significant difference between the MLUs of
participants of the respective experiments.
Utterances per minute (u/min)
In terms of utterances per minute a pattern between the two experiments becomes appar-
ent. The comparison of the two sets of means of this measure for each of the respective
experiments (cf. table 5.14) shows that on a global level there is a tendency of participants
to be more communicative within the prohibition experiment as compared to the rejection
experiment.
Probably more notable is the observation that the mean of this measure starts in both
experiments with approximately the same value, 23.34 vs. 22.66, the difference between
the two being insignificant. Yet from session 2 onwards the means develop in opposite
directions with increasing t-values such that we end up with significantly different means
in session 5. While within the rejection experiment the mean drops slightly first and then
levels at around 21.5, the communicativeness of the participants as measured in u/min
within the prohibition experiment increases steadily in each session to reach approximately
30 u/min in session 5, nearly 40% more than the average participant’s communicativeness
in the rejection experiment. This is not to say that every participant in the prohibition
experiment is more communicative in this last session as compared to any other participant
in the rejection experiment, the in-group variance is still considerable (cf. figure 5.1). Yet,
on average, participants in latter experiment talk significantly more in the last session
than they did when they started. The same cannot be said about participants within the
rejection experiment.
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Table 5.14: Comparison of utterances per minute between Rejection and Prohibition
experiment. The two experiments are compared on a per session level as well as accumulatively,
* = p < .05, † = p < .1, ‡ = p < .15
(a) All Utterances
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean (sd) T
s1 23.34 (10.24) 22.66 (11.71) 0.14
s2 22.33 (8.47) 28.32 (8.62) 1.58‡
s3 21.35 (9.79) 29.11 (8.57) 1.89†
s4 21.44 (9.49) 29.23 (8.38) 1.95†
s5 21.58 (9.81) 30.08 (7.35) 2.19∗
global 21.97 (9.19) 28.63 (7.8) 1.75†
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean(sd) T
s1 3.17 (1.73) 4.08 (2.89) 0.89
s2 3.58 (2.13) 4.66 (1.88) 1.2
s3 2.99 (1.86) 4.53 (2.24) 1.67‡
s4 3.14 (1.3) 2.29 (1.63) 1.29
s5 3.1 (2.57) 2.61 (1.82) 0.49
global 3.2 (1.73) 3.63 (1.86) 0.53
Negative Utterances If we look at the number of utterances per minute for negative
utterances only, the assertion that participants spoke more in the prohibitive experiment
can generally not be made. Only in session 3 there is a tendency (p < 0.15) of participants
within the prohibition experiment to speak more compared to those of the rejection exper-
iment. In the last two sessions, i.e. after the removal of the prohibition task, the opposite
seems to be the case. On average, albeit with a much weaker tendency, participants in the
rejection experiment uttered more negative utterances.
Number of distinct words (#dw)
Participants in the prohibition experiment used tendentially more distinct words as com-
pared to the participants of the rejection experiment. Although, when the distinct words
of all 5 sessions are accumulated (‘global level’), this difference is not statistically sig-
nificant (cf. table 5.15). If all participants are taken into account, there is a strong
tendency for this difference in session 2 and a weaker tendency in session 3. Yet if we
exclude the most extreme participants of both experiments, P01 and P10, as we did for
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Table 5.15: Comparison of number of distinct words between rejection and prohibition
experiment. The two experiments are compared on a per session level as well as accumulatively.
Furthermore t-numbers are given for the case when participants P01 and P10 are excluded from
the analysis (TX); † = p < .05, * = p < .1, ** = p < .15, ‡ = p < .2
(a) All Utterances
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean(sd) T TX
s1 95.9 (46.96) 121.3 (46.60) 1.21 0.29
s2 78.7 (33.54) 110.6 (46.36) 1.76∗ 1.14
s3 76.2 (42.89) 112.6 (51.34) 1.72∗∗ 1.11
s4 75.2 (41.92) 108.1 (55.34) 1.5‡ 0.9
s5 77.5 (38.8) 105.2 (51.79) 1.35‡ 0.71
global 173.4 (87.67) 224.1 (101.99) 1.19 0.46
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean(sd) T TX
s1 3.3 (1.7) 4.9 (2.33) 1.75∗ 1.12
s2 3.1 (0.88) 4.4 (1.43) 2.45† 1.96∗
s3 3.4 (1.51) 4.7 (1.57) 1.89∗ 1.31
s4 3.4 (1.78) 3.6 (2.01) 0.24 0.31
s5 2.7 (1.06) 3.2 (1.48) 0.87 0.33
global 6.2 (3.12) 7.2 (2.39) 0.8 0.16
the vertical comparison in section 5.1.4, the statistical tendencies disappear. This means
that the extremely low number of distinct utterances of participants P01 and P10 have a
non-negligible impact on the mean.
Number of distinct negative words Participants from the prohibition experiment
tend to produce one more negation word as compared to participants of the rejection exper-
iment during the first three sessions. This difference is statistically significant for session
2 and shows a strong tendency in sessions 1 and 3. If we exclude participants P01 and
P10 from the data set the statistical significance disappears, only session 2 shows a strong
tendency. Furthermore, and independent of the two outliers, this difference disappears in
sessions 4 and 5. Upon exclusion of said participants the mean of the rejection experiment
in session 4 rises to 3.88 (sd: 1.64) and to 3 (sd: 0.93) in session 5. For the global measure
no difference in number of distinct negative words can be shown.
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Table 5.16: Accumulated utterance-level measures for negative utterances and words
only. Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # w/# u: total number of words/utterances uttered by
participant, # dnw: number of distinct neg. words, MLU: mean length of utterance, w/min /
u/min: words / utterances per minute
(a) Rejection Experiment
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12
d (s) 1490.4 1147.4 1346.0 1426.5 1614.4 1473.0 1509.4 1433.5 1523.4 1518.2
# nw 20 132 87 71 167 87 93 10 114 74
# nu 20 102 82 68 161 84 85 10 91 62
# dnw 4 6 5 5 9 5 12 2 10 4
MLU 2.6 4.8 2.5 4.1 3.2 3.5 5.2 3.1 4.3 3.2
nw/min 0.8 6.9 3.9 3 6.2 3.5 3.7 0.4 4.5 2.9
nu/min 0.8 5.3 3.7 2.9 6.0 3.4 3.4 0.4 3.6 2.5
(b) Prohibition Experiment
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
d (s) 1537.7 1656.2 1528.7 1602.3 1524.9 1523.1 1556.4 1513.1 1590.7 1580.8
# nw 83 25 217 153 75 106 96 132 119 52
# nu 73 20 188 137 70 102 84 123 92 50
# dnw 7 4 10 11 6 9 6 9 5 5
MLU 4.5 2.4 4.5 5.2 2.1 4.7 4.3 4.8 3 3.1
nw/min 3.2 0.9 8.5 5.7 3 4.2 3.7 5.2 4.5 2
nu/min 2.8 0.7 7.4 5.1 2.8 4 3.2 4.9 3.5 1.9
5.1.6 Comparison with Saunders et al. (2012)
In this subsection a comparison is undertaken between participants’ speech recorded during
the two negation experiments and the speech of Saunders et al.’s (2012)7 participants. The
architecture used within Saunders’ experiments is very similar to the architecture employed
for the experiments reported about in this thesis. The major difference between the two
architectures is the addition of the motivation system described in section 3.2 and the newly
designed behavioural system (cf. section 3.3). As outlined there, the major design rationale
7For reasons of simplicity we will refer to the authors in the following just as “Saunders” without any
intention to deny recognition to any of the other authors.
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of this system is to be as convincing as possible in terms of expressing these motivational
states or, in other words, to maximise the congruence between the internal motivational
state and the outwardly expressed behaviour. Is is worth emphasizing that there is no
difference between the employed degrees of freedom by the robot or its physical appearance
compared to Saunders et al. (2012). We therefore do believe that the two systems as well as
the experimental setup are similar enough to make a linguistic comparison possible without
running the danger of these measures being confounded by factors other than the presence
of the motivation system, the independent variable so to speak. Yet there are three more
differences between the two experiments that have to be mentioned for the sake of a fair
comparison:
1. The duration of a session within the negation experiments is approximately twice as
long as the duration of one of Saunders’ sessions.
2. The objects in Saunders’ experiment were coloured and had varying sizes.
3. The instructions to the participants in the two negation experiments draw attention
to the fact that the robot has preferences towards the objects and that it will express
these.
In essence the generated behaviour of Saunders’ system is very similar to the hypothetical
behaviour of our behavioural system if we would remove the motivational system. This,
taken together with the fact that the experimental tasks of our rejection experiment and
Saunders’ experiment were identical, causes us to believe that speech from Saunders et al.’s
(2012) experiment is suitable for a comparison. Our motivation behind this comparison
is the evaluation of the impact of the motivational system, accompanied by congruent
behaviour, upon the speech of naïve participants. In the following we will use ANOVA
analyses as the speech of three groups will be compared with each other: participants from
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Table 5.17: Accumulated utterance-level measures for participants’ speech from Saun-
ders’ experiments (Saunders et al. 2012). The listed participant ids are compatible to the
ones used in latter publication. Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # (n)w/# (n)u: total number of
(negative) words/utterances uttered by participant, # d(n)w: number of distinct (negative) words,
MLU: mean length of utterance, nw/min / nu/min: (negative) words / utterances per minute
(a) All Utterances
M02 F05 M03 F01 F02 M01 F03 F06 F04
d (s) 726 671.5 646.1 568.6 603.6 663.1 501.4 706.8 621.3
# w 610 1044 540 627 1124 811 847 1420 1035
# u 204 272 188 159 244 237 262 386 323
# dw 40 121 76 52 96 70 106 168 112
MLU 3 3.8 2.9 3.9 4.6 3.4 3.2 3.7 3.2
w/min 50.4 93.3 50.1 66.2 111.7 73.4 101.4 120.5 100
u/min 16.9 24.3 17.5 16.8 24.3 21.4 31.4 32.8 31.2
(b) Negative Utterances Only
M02 F05 M03 F01 F02 M01 F03 F06 F04
d (s) 726 671.5 646.1 568.6 603.6 663.1 501.4 706.8 621.3
# nw 0 1 9 8 0 0 1 60 6
# nu 0 1 8 7 0 0 1 54 5
# dnw 0 1 3 2 0 0 1 8 3
MLU 0 8 5.2 5.3 0 0 5 5.4 6
nw/min 0 0.1 0.8 0.8 0 0 0.1 5.1 0.6
nu/min 0 0.1 0.7 0.7 0 0 0.1 4.6 0.5
the rejection experiment, participants from the prohibition experiment, and participants
from Saunders’ experiment. Table 5.17 gives an overview of our measurement in Saunders’
experiment, complete tables can be found in section B.2 of the appendix (tables B.3 and
B.4).
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Mean length of utterances (MLU)
The comparison of the mean length of utterances between the three experiments shows
no significant difference (cf. table 5.18).
Table 5.18: Comparison of MLU between negation ex-
periments and Saunders’ experiment; ?: due to only 2
data points no mean was calculated; * = p < 0.001, † =
p < 0.85, ‡ = p < 0.01
(a) All Utterances
Saunders Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 3.64 (0.61) 3.31 (0.92) 3.44 (0.39) 0.52
s2 3.62 (0.55) 3.17 (0.74) 3.51 (0.55) 1.38
s3 3.53 (0.54) 3.11 (0.71) 3.39 (0.67) 1.07
s4 3.49 (0.66) 3.06 (0.63) 3.39 (0.38) 1.53
s5 3.43 (0.75) 2.97 (0.67) 3.29 (0.41) 1.41
global 3.52 (0.54) 3.13 (0.65) 3.40 (0.45) 1.27
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Saunders Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 11.8 (6.49) 3.61 (1.2) 4.23 (0.84) 14.32∗
s2 5.1 (1.41) 3.84 (1.17) 3.99 (1.23) 1.58
s3 4.34 (2.32) 3.74 (1.47) 3.93 (1.28) 0.24
s4 n/a? 3.57 (1.02) 3.92 (1.43) 0.4
s5 4.88 (1.18) 3.47 (0.8) 3.47 (1.53) 2.23†
global 5.82 (1.12) 3.65 (0.91) 3.86 (1.1) 9.22‡
Negative Utterances Only When
only considering negative utterances
the ANOVA indicates a significant
difference in MLU in the first ses-
sion and in the global measure. But
this difference has to be considered
with caution. The underlying basis
of negative utterances within Saun-
ders’ experiment is extremely small.
The average of negative utterances
per session are 153 (sd 8.6), 187.8 (sd
57.1), and 15.2 (sd 4.82) for the rejec-
tive, prohibitive, and Saunders’ ex-
periment respectively. The on aver-
age 15 negative utterances are a very
small basis for the calculation of the
mean, such that one very long utter-
ance has the potential to skew the
mean considerably. Indeed the very
large MLU of 19 for M03 in Saun-
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ders’ first session (cf. table B.4) is based on one single utterance8. As the automatic
utterance segmentation has never been formally tested and could potentially produce un-
deservedly long utterances from time to time, the utterance length of any single utterance
has to be considered very critically. Therefore we regard the significance of this difference
in MLU skeptically, especially as it is not repeated in any other session.
Table 5.19: Comparison of #dw between negation experiments and Saunders’ exper-
iment. g.: global, * = p < 0.001, † = p < 0.01, ‡ = p < 0.05
(a) All Utterances
Saunders Rejection Prohib.
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 61.88 (25.8) 95.9 (47) 121.3 (46.6) 4.45‡
s2 51.56 (20) 78.7 (33.5) 110.6 (46.4) 6.61†
s3 49.33 (19.5) 76.2 (42.9) 112.6 (51.3) 5.77†
s4 43.56 (21.8) 75.2 (41.9) 108.1 (55.3) 5.45‡
s5 43.55 (18.8) 77.5 (38.8) 105.2 (51.8) 5.78†
g. 93.44 (39.1) 173.4 (87.7) 224.1 (102) 6.07†
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Saunders Rejection Prohib.
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 1 (1.77) 3.3 (1.7) 4.9 (2.33) 8.73†
s2 1.11 (1.96) 3.1 (0.88) 4.4 (1.43) 11.96∗
s3 1.11 (1.62) 3.4 (1.51) 4.7 (1.57) 12.73∗
s4 0.78 (1.99) 3.4 (1.78) 3.6 (2.01) 6.23†
s5 0.78 (1.3) 2.7 (1.06) 3.1 (1.52) 8.39†
g. 2 (2.58) 6.2 (3.12) 7.2 (2.39) 9.66∗
Number of distinct words (#dw)
With regards to the measure number of distinct words the statistics indicate a significant
difference between the three experiments. This is mainly due to the lesser number of
distinct words in Saunders’ experiment (cf. the much lower significance levels in table
5.15 where only rejection and prohibition experiments are compared). This significant
difference can be possibly explained to a large degree with the much shorter duration of
8It should be noted that an MLU of 19 is not impossible though. We doubtfully investigated a simi-
larly long utterance of one participant in the prohibition experiment, suspecting a fault of the automatic
boundary detection. It appeared that this participant spoke extremely fast in the given situation without
any audible pause. Thus the automatically established boundaries seemed adequate in that case.
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Saunders’ sessions. As participants do not constantly repeat themselves, i.e. they use at
least in part different words as they continue to talk, one would expect a higher number of
distinct words in experiments where participants talk for longer. The relationship between
duration and the number of distinct words is naturally not linear: some words, especially
function words such as articles, prepositions, or personal pronouns will be used repetitively,
but also object words typically recur when talking about the same object for a second or
third time. Subsequently one would not expect twice as many distinct words to occur in
a session that lasts twice as long, but one would nevertheless expect an increase in this
measure that is solely caused by the longer duration. Subsequently the approximately
85% increase of this measure between Saunders’ experiment and the rejection experiment
is not unexpected. It does not appear reasonable to make any further definite statements
with regards to the impact of the independent variable, i.e the presence of a motivational
system, on this measure.
Number of distinct negation words The yet more significant increase in the number
of distinct negation words between Saunders’ experiment and the rejection experiment, a
more than 300% increase, does indicate an influence of the independent variable. It seems
impossible though to tease apart the influence of the two factors, presence of a motivation
system and longer duration of the session, upon the statistical significance of the difference
in this measure. A look on a measure, that takes account of duration, such as utterances
per minute appears more suited to shed light on this issue.
Utterances per minute (u/min)
When comparing the u/min measure of all utterances of the three experiments we can
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Table 5.20: Comparison of u/min between negation ex-
periments and Saunders’ experiment; † = p < 0.01, * = p
< 0.05, ** = p < 0.1, ‡ = p < 0.2
(a) All Utterances
Saunders Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 24.86 (8.01) 23.34 (10.2) 26.52 (8.03) 0.32
s2 25.31 (5.04) 22.33 (8.47) 28.32 (8.62) 1.54
s3 24.4 (6.68) 21.35 (9.79) 29.11 (8.57) 2.11‡
s4 21.9 (6.99) 21.44 (9.49) 29.23 (8.38) 2.67∗∗
s5 23.12 (7.31) 21.58 (9.82) 30.08 (7.35) 2.97∗∗
global 24.06 (6.48) 21.97 (9.19) 28.63 (7.8) 1.83‡
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Saunders Rejection Prohibition
mean (sd) mean (sd) mean(sd) F
s1 0.6 (1.19) 3.17 (1.73) 4.08 (2.89) 6.31†
s2 0.96 (1.86) 3.58 (2.13) 4.66 (1.88) 8.83†
s3 1.1 (1.86) 2.99 (1.86) 4.53 (2.24) 6.98†
s4 0.73 (1.85) 3.14 (1.3) 2.29 (1.63) 5.45∗
s5 0.48 (0.9) 3.1 (2.57) 2.61 (1.82) 4.93∗
global 0.74 (1.48) 3.2 (1.73) 3.63 (1.86) 7.77†
see an increasing tendency of the
participants in the prohibition ex-
periment to speak more than in the
rejection experiment, with Saun-
ders’ participants being in between
(cf. significance levels in table
5.14). The tendency reaches near-
significance in session 5 (F=2.97, p
= 0.069).
Negative utterances only When
considering the u/min measure for
negative utterances only (cf. ta-
ble 5.20), the difference between
the two negation experiments and
Saunders’ experiment is yet more
striking. Participants in the rejec-
tion experiment produce on aver-
age more than four times as many
negative utterances as compared to
participants in Saunders’ experi-
ment (3.2 vs. 0.74). For the prohi-
bition experiment the ratio reaches nearly factor 5 (3.63 vs. 0.74) on average, with it being
even bigger in the first three sessions. Here is a very strong indication that the motiva-
tion system impacts the linguistic behaviour of participants: it provokes the production of
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negative utterances.
When considering the prohibition experiment in isolation, one might argue that the
fact that participants were asked to physically prohibit the robot caused them to engage
in linguistic means of prohibition. So this argument could attempt to explain the sud-
den surge of negative utterances by emphasising the prohibitive nature of their actions,
which were triggered by the experimenter telling them to act in this way. This argument
collapses, when the rejection experiment is taken into account: there was no mention of
prohibition, neither in the written nor in the oral instructions on part of the experimenter.
In terms of instructions, the only difference to the ones given in Saunders’ experiment is
that participants were told that the robot has preferences towards the objects, that the
robot would communicate these preferences to them in some way, and, furthermore, that
they should present all objects to the robot in order to teach it their names, not minding
too much about its potential rejection of some of them.
Within Saunders’ experiment on average only 3.08 % of all utterances produced are
negative utterances, whereas in the rejection and prohibition experiment this fraction rises
to 14.57% and 12.68% respectively. This also indicates that the difference in the number
of distinct negation words observed in the previous section were caused by many more
negative utterances being produced. Assuming that participants do vary the words they
use when speaking about similar topics or when performing similar linguistic deeds, an
increase in the distinct number of negative words appears a natural outcome of a strong
increase in the number of negative utterances being produced.
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Figure 5.1: Communicativeness of participants within each experiment. Displayed are
the means of utterances per minute by the symbol ‘×’ and connected through lines for each partic-
ipant and experiment as well as boxpots of the same coefficient (see also table 5.12). Participants
are ordered within each experiment in ascending order with regards to said coefficient, i.e. their
average degree of communicativeness across the sessions. Upper (blue) line with ‘×’s: means of
utterances per minute per participant within prohibition experiment. Lower (black) line with ‘×’s:
mean of utterances per minute per participants within rejection experiment. The boxplots visu-
alize the median, maximum, minimum, 1st and 3rd quartiles of utterances per minute for each
participant. The upper line of blue, dashed boxplots corresponds to participants within prohibition
experiment. The lower line of black, solid boxplots corresponds to participants within the rejection
experiment. Participant ids for the prohibition and rejection experiments are displayed on the top
and bottom horizontal axes respectively.
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5.2 Human: Word Level
There are at least two reasons why an analysis at the word level is of interest to the research
reported in this thesis. The first, probably less evident reason has to do with measures of
so called interpersonal function which deliver clues with regard to the impact of a robot’s
behaviour upon the involvement of its human interlocutor. The second reason for looking
at participants’ production frequencies of single words, is that salient words form the basis
of our acquisition algorithm and, as a whole and separately for each participant, constitute
the productive lexicon of the robot.
Interpersonal Function
In the previous section the analytical focus was on utterance level characteristics of the par-
ticipants’ speech such as the mean length of utterance (MLU), the utterances per minute,
and the number of distinct words. In the arsenal of linguistic measures put forward by
Fischer et al. (2012) the latter two measures pertain to measures of linguistic verbosity,
whereas the first measure, MLU, pertains to the measures of utterance complexity (cf. sec-
tion 5.0.2). Fischer et al.9 list a third class: measures of interpersonal function. The latter
ought to tell us something about “the degree with which speakers involve their communica-
tion partner” (Fischer et al. 2012). This is of interest to us because the motivation behind
our attempt to create an ‘emotionally convincing’ behaviour system is the hypothesis that
participants would be prompted to engage in intent interpretations similar, or possibly
even identical, to those that have been observed within CDS. Furthermore, in a second
move, negative intent interpretations are hypothesized to potentially serve as a basis for
the acquisition of certain negation types. We suspect that the production of intent in-
9We will at times for ease of reference refer to the authors just as Fischer, especially when using the
possessive ending ’s. No disrespect towards the other authors is intended.
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terpretations by a participant implies a considerable degree of him or her being involved
with the robot. If this is so, we would expect to be able to detect this involvement using
measures from Fischer’s interpersonal function category.
Many of the measures listed in Fischer et al. (2012) are not easy to obtain as they
involve the detection of sentence mood or the use of the infinitive. In order to detect and
count these one needs either a manual analysis of the entire speech corpus or the use of
an advanced parser that is able to detect said grammatical categories. Luckily the authors
list three other measures, two of which are at the word level and the forth, by pure chance,
coincides with one particular negation type, which will be introduced in the next section.
The three measures are:
• the frequency of the personal pronouns you, I, and we
• the frequency of the vocative, i.e. the robot’s name Deechee
• the use of understanding checks, in English typically tag questions: don’t you, isn’t
it, etc
High counts of these measures indicate, according to Fischer et al. (2012), a rather per-
sonal relationship between speaker and hearer. Impersonal relationships, according to this
reasoning, would be reflected in a less frequent use of personal pronouns, vocatives, and tag
questions, and would furthermore result in comparatively high frequencies of impersonal
constructions as reflected by the use of the German man (one).
As the impersonal one is used far less in conversational English as compared to conver-
sational German it is doubtful if this measure is of much use in experiments with native
English speakers. We will for this reason not consider one.
Furthermore we would like to argue that the usage of you/Du in English and German
are sufficiently different such that numbers reflecting the frequency of their use cannot be
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directly compared across the two languages. The reason for this is the following: The
use of the impersonal man (one) is a perfectly valid choice in colloquial German that
does not carry the heavy connotations of its British equivalent such as alleged or aspired
membership to the upper class or an ‘academic mode of conversation’. In contrast, the
use of one is not or to a much lesser degree used in colloquial British English, and has the
aforementioned connotations. These connotations render it much less of a choice compared
to a German speaker’s choice of man. Conversely, this means that the choice to use Du
(you) is a proper choice in German, the speaker could have chosen man (one) instead
without the fear of sounding presumptuous. Yet ‘choosing’ you is not much of a choice for
an English speaker, due to the lack of real alternatives, it rather amounts to the default. For
these reasons we think that in English you is not as indicative of a speaker’s involvement
with a hearer as Fischer claims this to be the case in German. We will include you in
our analysis nevertheless by way of stating its frequency and coverage, but will not make
implications with regards to its indicativeness with regard to speaker involvement. We
hope that attempts will be made in the future to work out measures for interpersonal
function that apply to English in a way that Fischer’s measures seem to apply to German.
Tag questions as further indicators of involvement, cannot be identified on a word level
as the involved negation words such as isn’t in isn’t it, or don’t in don’t you are not unique
to tag questions. Tag questions will therefore be covered in section 5.3, where they, by
pure coincidence, happen to be classed as a separate negation type.
Word learning - Negation Words
As this research focuses on the acquisition of negation we will in the following pay particular
attention to negation words in the frequency list. The selective frequency tables in this
chapter also contain the ‘usual suspects’ that one would expect to be frequent in a noun-
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learning scenario and as they were reported in Saunders et al. (2012): object words such
as star, moon, heart, or square that relate directly to the symbols attached to the boxes
whose names participants were supposed to teach the robot. We will consider negation
words in the context of these object words, especially when comparing the word frequencies
to those in Saunders’ experiment. Apart from using accumulated frequency tables of all
words, frequency tables of prosodically salient words will be employed. Only prosodically
salient words form the actual basis of the word acquisition algorithm and are in this regard
more important than general, “prosodically blind” word frequencies.
Overview of section
Subsection 5.2.1 presents a comparative analysis of the two negation experiments on a
word level based on accumulative word frequency tables which contain the words of all
participants and sessions. We will also use the British National Corpus on spoken English
as a measuring stick to put our measurements in the context of word frequencies as they are
found in ordinary conversations. Our use of accumulative frequency tables does not adjust
for the communicativeness of participants. As a result the frequency tables will be skewed
towards the word frequencies of the more talkative participants. In order to alleviate this
potential point of criticism we will give each participant equal influence on the accumulated
word rankings in adjusted ranking tables in subsection 5.2.2. There, a voting algorithm is
employed to determine the word ranks. This method ensures that the ranked word lists
of participants, no matter how talkative or taciturn, ‘get an equal vote’ in determining
the ranks of the accumulated list. This algorithm ignores the word frequencies alltogether
and only considers the rank of each word within a single participant’s word frequency
list. By doing so, we lose the frequency information, but ensure that each participant
has the same impact on the global result. In subsection 5.2.3 we will finally compare
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the accumulated word ranks and frequencies with those calculated from the transcripts
of Saunders’ experiment (Saunders et al. 2012). This comparison seeks to determine if
the presence of the motivational system produces a measurable impact in terms of word
frequencies and ranks.
Notation The following expressions will be used in the analyses:
• Top 10 and top 20 refer to the 10 and 20 most frequent words in the frequency tables
respectively.
• Coverage denotes the share of words (tokens) that a particular word form (type)
accounts for in the corpus. Example: The word form no has one entry in frequency
table 5.22 and its percentage is given as 2.39. In this case we will say that no has a
coverage of 2.39% or covers 2.39% of the entire corpus.
5.2.1 Accumulated Word Frequencies
In order to have a reference point with wich to compare the frequency lists derived from our
corpus we consider it helpful to look at general word frequencies in spoken British English.
Table 5.21 lists the top ranking 20 words of spoken English from the BNC (Leech et al.
2001), which was retrieved from Companion Website for: Word Frequencies in Written
and Spoken English by Geoffrey Leech et. al (2001). We will refer to this corpus as BNCS
from here on.
Notice that the frequency table on the basis of which table 5.21 was generated does
not have exactly the same structure as our frequency tables due to the fact that the tables
from Leech et al. (2001) use a part-of-speech tagging, such that the same word occurs
several times in the table if it has more than one grammatical function10. We checked the
10A quick search of entries starting with a, for example, yielded 6 entries: one for a in isolation when it
acts as determiner (freq.: 18637), another entry for A / a in isolation with a acting as letter (freq.: 405),
and four more entries where a is part of adverbial constructions such as a bit (freq.: 496). All frequencies
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10 top-ranking words for lower-rank entries containing these words and their impact on
their ranks. Some of the entries such as that which has two major grammatical functions,
Table 5.21: 20+1 most frequent
words of BNCS. Abs. frequencies
based on 1 million words.
rank word freq %
1 the 39605 3.96
2 I 29448 2.94
3 you 25957 2.60
4 and 25210 2.52
5 it 24508 2.45
6 a 18637 1.86
7 ’s 17677 1.77
8 to 14912 1.49
9 of 14550 1.46
10 that 14252 1.43
11 n’t 12212 1.22
12 in 11609 1.16
13 we 10448 1.04
14 is 10164 1.02
15 do 9594 0.96
16 they 9333 0.93
17 er 8542 0.85
18 was 8097 0.81
19 yeah 7890 0.79
20 have 7488 0.75
. . . . . . . . . . . .
41 no 4388 0.44
determiner (freq.11: 14252) and conjunction (freq.:
7246), would move up a few ranks, if it was merged into
one entry. Generally our analysis did not indicate that
merging of all entries for one particular word would result
in a fundamentally different frequency table with regard
to the top ranking words. Evidently the 20 most frequent
words in spoken British English are dominated by func-
tion or closed class words: personal pronouns I, you, it,
we, prepositions of, to, that, determiners a, the, and the
negation word n’t (not). Furthermore the auxiliary verbs
do, have, is, and ’s (is), but also the so called interjection
yeah can be found in these top ranks. No, also classified
as interjection in the BNC, ranks on place 41.
Rejection Experiment
Table 5.22 lists the frequencies of the 10 most frequent
and other selected words from the accumulated speech of
all participants in the rejection experiment (cf. table B.5
in the appendix for the complete listing). We will refer
to this set of words in the following as Rejection Corpus (RC). When comparing table 5.22
to the BNCS frequency table (5.21) we find the following differences:
per million.
11all total frequencies are counts per million
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Table 5.22: Word-frequencies of all words in rejection experiment. Listed are the ten most
frequent words within said experiment across all participants and sessions. Given are the rank, the
word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the experiment. Apart
from the highest-ranking words the same statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and
words linked to the motivational state of the robot. See table B.5 in the appendix for the complete
listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) you 1245 7.13 (35) Deechee 127 0.73 (93) didn’t 11 0.06
(2) the 983 5.63 (38) not 118 0.68 (94) didn’t (2) 10 0.06
(3) like 579 3.31 (41) box 110 0.63 (95 pyramid 9 0.05
(4) a 475 2.72 (42) Deechee (2) 103 0.59 (93) isn’t 11 0.06
(5) this 471 2.7 (44) triangles 99 0.57 (97) moons 7 0.04
(6) no 417 2.39 (54) don’t (2) 69 0.4 (100) rectangle 4 0.02
(7) one 396 2.27 (58) crescent 58 0.33 (101) won’t 3 0.02
(8) square 337 1.93 (65) sad 43 0.25 (100) smiling 4 0.02
(8) do 337 1.93 (68) shape 39 0.22 (101) can’t 3 0.02
(9) to 311 1.93 (69) happy 38 0.22 (101) pyramids 3 0.02
(11) moon 283 1.62 (69) nice 38 0.22 (103) wouldn’t 1 0.01
(12) heart 279 1.6 (70) favourite 37 0.21 (102) doesn’t 2 0.01
(14) triangle 254 1.45 (71) target 36 0.21 (102) doesn’t (2) 2 0.01
(15) circle 231 1.32 (75) hearts 30 0.17 (103) couldn’t 1 0.01
(17) don’t 200 1.15 (78) arteen 27 0.15 (103) wasn’t 1 0.01
(21) circles 190 1.09 (86) know 18 0.1 (103) weren’t 1 0.01
(23) squares 180 1.03 (91) smile 13 0.07 (103) can’t (2) 1 0.01
(24) yes 179 1.02 (92) rectangles 12 0.07 (100) haven’t 4 0.02
• you is the top-ranking word in the RC (coverage 7.13%) as opposed to the in the
BNCS. In the BNCS you covers 2.6%.
• like is part of the top 10 in the RC and covers 3.31% of all words in this corpus.
In the BNC it is distributed across 5 ranks 12. The combined coverage of all these
entries in the BNCS is 0.370%.
12format: [rank (PoS) freq.]: 96 (Prep) 1762, 138 (Verb) 1070, 163 (Adv) 784, 1200 (Conj) 61, and 2946
(Adj) 19
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• no is part of the top 10 and covers 2.39% in the RC. In the BNCS it is distributed
across 5 entries13. The combined coverage in the BNCS is 0.558%. In the RC it
ranks higher than any object-related word, i.e. object labels and terms that denote
properties of objects such as colour, size, etc.
• square, an object label, is part of the top 10 within the RC
• the ranks 10 to 20 in the RC contain many object labels
• don’t is amongst the top 20 in the RC. It has a second phonetic variant on rank 54
and the combined coverage of both variants is 1.55%. It has no entry in the BNCS
as it seems to split there into do and n’t. As n’t is a postfix for other auxiliary verbs
as well, we cannot calculate rank or coverage of don’t in the BNCS.
• If Deechee, the vocative, would have been transcribed into a single phonetic form, it
would rank amongst the top 20 in the RC (combined count: 230)
In summary we can say that the dominance of function words in the top 20 of frequency
tables for spoken English as indicated in the BNCS is weakened in the frequency table
of the speech collected during our word-learning experiment. There we find object labels
amongst the top 20, which might not be very surprising within a word-learning experiment.
Yet you occurs more frequently than on average in spoken English, possibly indicating an
increased involvement of our participants with the robot as compared to ‘the average
conversation’. Another surprisingly well above-average frequent word to be found in the
RC is like, stemming from utterances such as “do you like the heart”. In a similar vein the
vocative represented by Deechee is highly frequent and is another indicator for heightened
involvement. Furthermore no is more than 4 times more frequent in the RC than in the
132 entries with no in isolation and 3 where it is part of an expression. Format: [rank (PoS) freq.]: 41
(Int) 4388, 136 (Det) 1102, 1495 (Pron) 45, 2141 (Adv) 29, 3044 (Adv) 18
179
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Word Level
BNCS indicating that the hypothesised elicitation mechanism did indeed work. We will
see more detail about the source of no in the pragmatic analysis in section 5.3.
Nevertheless we still find non-personal function words such as the determiners the and
a as well as the preposition to amongst the most frequent words. The picture changes
dramatically when we look at the frequency of words, that are prosodically salient.
Prosodically Salient Words Before going into detail it is worth reflecting what a
change in rank between the two tables, the general frequency table 5.22 and the frequency
table of salient words 5.23 means. The ranks in the tables reflect the comparative percent-
age of the respective words proportional to the total number of words. If a word drops
in the ranks, it means that the number of times where it was prosodically emphasized by
the speakers is below average compared to other prosodically salient words. In terms of
notation we will use salient to mean prosodically salient in the remainder of this section.
Besides we will use the abbreviation RCS for the corpus of salient words derived from the
speech of all participants of the rejection experiment.
Table 5.23 lists the frequencies and ranks of the ten most frequent salient words as well as
the ranks and frequencies of the words which were already listed in the general frequency
table (table 5.22).
The differences to the RC frequency table is striking: function words other than no
and it disappeared from the top 10. The within RC highly frequent determiners a and
the moved down to the ranks 47 and 41 respectively with only 2.32% and 1.73% of their
occurrences being salient. The top ranks, which were filled with functions words in the RC,
are replaced by object labels in the RCS. No, which was on rank 6 in the general frequency
table and had a coverage of 2.39% in the RC words moved up to rank 2 in the RCS and
makes up for 4.64% of all salient words, only to be topped by square whose coverage is 0.33
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Table 5.23: Word-frequencies of salient words in rejection experiment. Listed are the
ten most frequent salient words within said experiment across all participants and sessions. Given
are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the
experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the same statistics are given for object labels,
negation words, and words linked to the motivational state of the robot. See table B.6 in the
appendix for the complete listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) square 259 4.97 (24) don’t 52 1 (46) do 12 0.23
(2) no 242 4.64 (27) box 45 0.86 (47) rectangles 11 0.21
(3) triangle 206 3.95 (29) crescent 39 0.75 (47) a 11 0.21
(4) heart 198 3.8 (31) are 36 0.69 (50) pyramid 8 0.15
(5) moon 184 3.53 (32) sad 35 0.67 (53) isn’t 5 0.1
(5) circle 184 3.53 (33) target 31 0.59 (54) rectangle 4 0.08
(6) like 167 3.2 (34) favourite 27 0.52 (55) pyramids 3 0.06
(7) circles 140 2.69 (35) arteen 25 0.48 (55) moons 3 0.06
(8) squares 126 2.42 (36) not 24 0.46 (55) smiling 3 0.06
(9) it 123 2.36 (37) hearts 22 0.42 (56) can’t 2 0.04
(10) yes 119 2.28 (38) to 20 0.38 (56) won’t 2 0.04
(11) one 111 2.13 (38) happy 20 0.38 (57) didn’t (2) 1 0.02
(13) this 95 1.82 (39) shape 19 0.36 (57) couldn’t 1 0.02
(18) Deechee 76 1.46 (39) nice 19 0.36 (57) doesn’t 1 0.02
(19) Deechee (2) 68 1.3 (41) the 17 0.33 (57) didn’t 1 0.02
(21) triangles 62 1.19 (46) smile 12 0.23 (57) haven’t 1 0.02
(23) you 53 1.02 (46) don’t (2) 12 0.23
higher than that of no. Moreover 58.03% of all occurrences of no’s are salient. Also notice
that like is still a member of the ten most frequent words despite its rank dropping by 4.
Furthermore the vocative Deechee moved up in the ranks. The sum of the frequencies of
both phonetic variants is 130, thus if Deechee would have been transcribed using the same
phonetic variant, the vocative would rank on 8th place, contributing to 2.76% of all salient
words with 62.6% of its occurrences being salient.
Table 5.24 lists the salience rates of highly frequent words and types of words in the
general frequency table. The salience rate for each word or word group is calculated by
simply dividing the frequency of the (set of) words in the RCS by the frequency of this (set
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of) words in the RC. As can be seen, the reason for the disappearance of articles from the
Table 5.24: Prosodic salience rates of se-
lected word groups and words - Rejection
Corpus. Obj. labels: square, triangle, heart,
moon, circle, crescent, target, arteen, rect-
angle, pyramid, plus plurals; emotion words:
sad, happy, smile; demonstratives: this,
that; pers. pronouns: you, we, I; articles:
a, the; vocative: Deechee, Deechee (2)
word (group) saliency rate (%)
object labels 73.81
emotion words 71.28
yes 66.48
vocative 62.6
no 58.03
it 39.55
like 28.89
one 28.03
don’t 23.79
demonstratives 20.31
to 6.43
pers. pronouns 14 4.15
do 3.56
articles 1.92
top ranks is that they hardly ever are salient.
The contrary is the case for object labels, which
are the most salient group of words. Also
noteworthy is the high salience rate of emotion
words as well as the high prosodic salience of
the vocative.
Negation Words In terms of negation
words it is noteworthy that the ‘major players’
for the rejection experiment turn out to be no,
don’t, and to a lesser degree not. All the other
negation words listed at the beginning of this
chapter (table 5.1), mainly auxiliary verbs with
the postfix n’t such as isn’t, were produced ex-
tremely rarely (coverage  0.1% ). No ranks
high in the RCS mainly because of its general
high frequency but also due to half of its produc-
tions being salient, whereas don’t drops slightly
in the ranks due to its lower, but still considerable salience rate of above 23%. The frequent
and salient occurrence of don’t within the rejection experiment took us a bit by surprise,
as we expected it to occur mainly as part of prohibitive utterances. As it transpired,
many participants used don’t when asking motivation-dependent questions such as “You
14If expressions containing these personal pronouns such as I’ve, we’ll etc., which are single phonetic
words, are included in the count, the salience rate changes to 4.26%. The expressions found in the corpus
are: I’ve, I’ll I’m, we’ve, we’ll, we’d, you’ve, you’re, you’d, and you’ll.
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don’t like that?”. In these questions participants evidently emphasize don’t very frequently,
thereby indicating one of two possibly related things: First, emphasis on don’t can indicate
real surprise on the part of the participant and the question is a way of requesting affirma-
tion that something is indeed not the case, with the something here being Deechee’s liking.
Second, emphasis on don’t may indicate doubt about the speakers current assumption that
Deechee indeed dislikes something. This is a somewhat weaker uncertainty than proper
surprise, but in both cases, doubt or surprise, the speaker pauses after posing the question
and awaits some kind of feedback15 from the recipient, in order to determine his or her next
move in the interaction game. Of course this does not necessarily mean that the speaker
subsequently acts in accordance with the preferences of the conversation partner, but it
seems to be important in conversations to make clear, in terms of preferences, where each
of the conversation partners stands.
Interpersonal Function As can be seen in the general frequency table 5.22 you
turns out to be the most frequent word uttered by participants, albeit not very salient.
It covers 7.13% in the RC as opposed to 2.96% in the BNCS. The percentage of you
and variants in the RC relative to the number of utterances in the experiment (5309) is
24.12%, Fischer et al. (2012) report 3%, 6%, and 2% for their three different HRI scenarios
respectively16. But remember, that their target language was German, such that a direct
cross-linguistic comparison is most probably untenable, as striking as this difference may
appear to be. The two phonetic variants of Deechee, the vocative, have a relatively high
combined salience rate (62.6%), and a combined coverage of 1.32% in the RC. Due to the
15Remember that feedback in conversation is not necessarily a positive move, but can also be given via
the absence of any action. Cf. the CA example in section 2.1.3.
16The scenario closest to the rejection scenario is scenario nr. 3 where the complete iCub is used, so the
3rd of the given numbers would be the reference for comparison, if they same target language would have
been used.
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high salience rate its coverage in the RCS rises to 2.76% which would correspond to the
7th rank if combined. The percentage of the vocative relative to the number of utterances
is 4.33%, Fischer et al. report 1%, 4%, and 16% respectively for their three scenarios. We
covers 1.18% within RC as compared to 1.04% in the BNCS, it’s percentage relative to the
number of utterances is 3.92%17 compared to 4%, 12%, and 4% respectively in Fischer’s
scenarios. I covers 0.86% in the RC compared to 2.96% in the BNCS18. Furthermore its
percentage relative to the number of utterances is 3.33%19 compared to 15%, 17%, and 12%
in Fischer’s scenario.
On the Word Distribution Figure 5.2 depicts graphically the word distributions
which very roughly resemble a Zipf distribution. Zipf’s Law states that the relationship
between the rank of a word and its frequency corresponds to rρf = c, with r being the rank,
f being the frequency, c being a constant, and ρ being a parameter (Wyllys 1981)20. ρ is
typically within the interval [0.9, 2]. Zipf’s law has been observed to hold for various word
distributions of many languages, but also other distributions related to social phenomena
such as city sizes (Wyllys 1981). So far the word distribution of our corpus is unsurprising
and comparable to other corpuses. This we consider a good thing in the sense that it
indicates that our participants did not engage in an extremely untypical way of speaking.
17combined percentage of we, we’ve, we’ll and we’d
182 PoS variants: pronoun (29448 occ.) and letter (193 occ)
19combined percentage of I, I’ll, I’ve, I’m
20Determining the value of c requires slightly heavier mathematical machinery (cf. Weisstein 2013)
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Figure 5.2: Word counts within the rejection experiment. Displayed are the words counts
for all sessions and participants of the rejection experiment on a log-log scale. The word index is
plotted on the x-axis, words are indexed by rank in ascending order, i.e. falling ranks from left
to right. For all words the total number of 17464 words is distributed over 613 distinct phonetic
words which were produced by the participants within this experiment. For salient words only,
5213 words are distributed over 423 distinct phonetic words. Both distributions of word frequencies
resemble roughly a Zipf distribution. Three Zipf probability mass functions (PMF) per distribution,
multiplied with the total number of words are plotted along the word counts for comparison. Within
the word distribution of all words 50% of these words are accounted for by the 24 highest ranking
distinct words. Within the word distribution of salient words only 50% of these words are accounted
for by the 19 highest ranking distinct salient words. For comparison, this is also the case with a
Zipf PMF with ρ = 0.96. See tables 5.22 and 5.23 for top ranking and other selected words.
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It might help to imagine how a fairly untypical way of speaking, which would not result in a
Zipf-like distribution, would look like. Imagine the majority of our participants would only
ever have uttered the object label when showing an object to the robot and nothing else.
In this case the word frequencies in such a corpus of less than 20 words, exclusively object
labels, would be distributed in a manner similar to a uniform distribution. Deviations from
a uniform distribution would in this case have only been caused by unequal numbers of
object presentations, leading to an unequal number of word labels being uttered, leading
to a slight slope in a regular, non-log-log-plot.
The fact that the fit to the Zipfian’ is far from being perfect might have to do with the
fact that our underlying word-basis, i.e. the number of distinct words, is comparatively
small in our corpus. When considering all words, the corpus derived from the speech
in the rejection experiment consists of only 613 words. When considering salient words
alone, this number diminishes to 423. These comparatively small numbers of distinct
words might explain why our word distributions show a considerable deviation from a
Zipfian distribution for the middle ranks, the “hump” towards the right in the middle
section. Furthermore the fact that the words are drawn from speech that is constrained to
a very particular situational context, our word-teaching experiment, might further lead to
a deviation from the Zipfian as compared to larger corpora that are derived from speech
from various situational contexts. The circumstance that the very highest and very lowest
ranks don’t show a good fit to the Zipfian’ is not unusual for word corpuses (Wyllys 1981).
Despite all imperfection of fit, our distribution is still rather Zipfian than, say, normal
or uniform, in the sense that a few highest-ranking word forms21 (types) contribute the
majority of words (tokens) in the corpus and that the rank-frequency relationship is roughly
inversely proportional. This leads to a exponentially rather than linearly falling slope of
21Our lexicon/corpus is made up of phonetic words/word forms. So in the context of our corpus, word
and word form should be read as abbreviation for phonetic word and phonetic word form.
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the rank-frequency plot. In the case of the “all words” corpus the highest-ranking 24 word
forms, only 3.92% of all word forms, cover over 50% of all words in the corpus (red ‘+’-plot
fig. 5.2). In the case of salient words only, already the first 19 word forms, 4.49% of all
salient word forms, yield a 50% coverage (yellow ‘×’-plot, same figure).
Prohibition Experiment
Table 5.25: Word-frequencies of all words in prohibition experiment. Listed are the
ten most frequent words within said experiment across all participants and sessions. Given are
the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the
experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the same statistics are given for object labels,
negation words, and words linked to the motivational state of the robot. See table B.7 in the
appendix for the complete listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) you 1591 6.18 (27) yes 227 0.88 (114) sad 8 0.03
(2) the 1416 5.5 (31) not 198 0.77 (116) smiling 6 0.02
(3) a 962 3.74 (32) crescent 184 0.72 (116) haven’t 6 0.02
(4) this 956 3.71 (33) circles 168 0.65 (117) mustn’t 5 0.02
(5) one 722 2.8 (43) Deechee (2) 132 0.51 (118) won’t 4 0.02
(6) is 632 2.45 (47) box 123 0.48 (119) target 3 0.01
(7) like 527 2.05 (56) Deechee 103 0.4 (119) hasn’t 3 0.01
(8) to 471 1.83 (58) can’t (2) 98 0.38 (120) crescents 2 0.01
(9) no 461 1.79 (63) squares 86 0.33 (120) cannot 2 0.01
(10) it’s 428 1.66 (66) hearts 79 0.31 (120) pyramids 2 0.01
(11) heart 411 1.6 (69) triangles 72 0.28 (121) shouldn’t 1 0
(12) square 389 1.51 (75) nice 59 0.23 (121) moons 1 0
(13) triangle 377 1.47 (81) know 51 0.20 (121) nono 1 0
(15) do 360 1.40 (88) favourite 34 0.13 (121) wouldn’t 1 0
(16) moon 356 1.38 (100) happy 22 0.09 (121) neither 1 0
(17) circle 332 1.29 (101) smile 21 0.08 (121) pyramid 1 0
(19) shape 310 1.2 (102) isn’t 20 0.08 (121) weren’t 1 0
(26) play 229 0.89 (103) didn’t 19 0.07
(26) don’t 229 0.89 (113) doesn’t 9 0.04
Table 5.25 lists the general word frequencies of the corpus stemming from the speech
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produced by participants within the prohibition experiment, called prohibition corpus (PC )
henceforth.
The ranking of word forms in this table is very similar to the word ranking of the
Rejection Corpus (table 5.22), yet there are small differences. We would like to highlight
the following word forms:
• you ranks first and covers 6.18%
• like is amongst the top 10 and covers 2.05%
• no is amongst the top 10 and covers 1.79%
• The ranks 10 to 20 are dominated by object labels
• don’t is not amongst the top 20 any more, it’s coverage is 0.89%
• Another negative, can’t, appeared above the 0.1% mark, it’s coverage is 0.38%
Prosodically Salient Words Table 5.26 gives an overview of ranks and frequencies of
selected prosodically salient words originating from the corpus of salient words extracted
from the speech linked to the prohibition experiment. We will henceforth refer to this
corpus as PCS.
We can observe similarly drastic changes in terms of word ranks and frequencies between
PCS and PC as between RCS and RC. Again, all but two function words disappeared from
the top 10. A moved down to rank 53, with only 2.18% of its tokens being salient. The
moved down to rank 35 with only 3.18% of its tokens being salient. No moved up to
rank 4, with 59% of its tokens being salient and is one of two function words that remain
in the top 10. The other one is this, salience rate: 24.06%. Interestingly, ok, that in a
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Table 5.26: Word-frequencies of salient words in prohibition experiment. Listed are
the ten most frequent salient words within said experiment across all participants and sessions.
Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words
in the experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the same statistics are given for object
labels, negation words, and words linked to the motivational state of the robot. See table B.8 in the
appendix for the complete listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) square 327 4.4 (25) Deechee 67 0.9 (65) know 9 0.12
(2) triangle 302 4.06 (27) squares 62 0.83 (69) smiling 5 0.07
(3) circle 285 3.83 (27) is 62 0.83 (71) target 3 0.04
(4) no 272 3.66 (32) triangles 50 0.67 (71) sad 3 0.04
(5) one 250 3.36 (35) the 45 0.61 (72) mustn’t 2 0.03
(6) heart 248 3.34 (35) don’t 45 0.61 (72) crescents 2 0.03
(7) this 230 3.09 (37) hearts 43 0.58 (72) cannot 2 0.03
(8) moon 208 2.8 (40) can’t (2) 39 0.53 (72) doesn’t 2 0.03
(9) ok 171 2.3 (45) not 31 0.42 (72) haven’t 2 0.03
(10) shape 159 2.14 (47) do 29 0.39 (73) nono 1 0.01
(11) yes 155 2.09 (49) favourite 27 0.36 (73) won’t 1 0.01
(12) crescent 149 2 (53) a 21 0.28 (73) hasn’t 1 0.01
(13) like 134 1.8 (54) to 20 0.27 (73) pyramids 1 0.01
(14) circles 129 1.74 (54) nice 20 0.27 (73) neither 1 0.01
(20) Deechee (2) 83 1.12 (57) it’s 17 0.23 (73) pyramid 1 0.01
(21) you 79 1.06 (59) smile 15 0.2 (73) weren’t 1 0.01
(23) play 75 1.01 (64) happy 10 0.13
(24) box 72 0.97 (65) isn’t 9 0.12
part of speech categorization might be classed as interjection22, and therefore a function
word, moved up into the top 10. The salience rate of ok is an astonishing 77.73%. The
remaining words in the top 10 are all object labels and one, which most probably stems
from expressions such as “What about this one”. Table 5.27 shows the salience rates for
various words and word groups based on the prohibition corpora PC and PCS. As is the
case in the rejection experiment object labels lead the table with a close to identical salience
22The grammarians don’t seem to agree very much on the categorization of these ‘interjections’: In the
BNCS yes is classed as interjection, whereas okay is classed as adverb. OED online, “the definitive record
of the English language”, classes ok as adjective, interjection, and noun (in this order), but yes is classed
there as adverb and other things, interjection not being one of them (OED online 2013).
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rates in both corpora, 73.81% and 73.49% in the RCS and PCS respectively. The group
of emotion words are less salient in the PCS, 54.90% as compared to the RCS, 71.28%.
Table 5.27: Prosodic salience rates of se-
lected word groups and words. Prohibition
Corpus - object labels: square, triangle,
heart, moon, circle, crescent, target, pyra-
mid, and their plurals; emotion words: sad,
happy, smile; demonstratives: this, that;
pers. pronouns: you, we, I; articles: a, a(2),
the; vocative: Deechee, Deechee (2)
word (group) saliency rate (%)
object labels 73.49
yes 68.28
vocative 63.83
no 59
emotion words 54.90
can’t 39.80
one 34.63
it 27.60
like 25.43
demonstratives 22.39
don’t 19.65
do 8.06
to 4.25
pers. pronouns23 5.25
articles 2.78
Yes (RCS: 66.48%, PCS: 68.28%), no (RCS:
58.03%, PCS: 59%), the vocative (RCS: 62.6,
PCS: 63.83), and like (RCS: 28.89%, PCS:
25.43%) have nearly identical salience rates in
both experiments. Equally the salience rates of
demonstratives (RCS: 20.31%, PCS: 22.39%),
articles (RCS: 1.92%, PCS: 2.78%), and per-
sonal pronouns (RCS: 4.15%, PCS: 5.25%) are
almost on a par. For reasons that we cannot ex-
plain the auxiliary verb do has within the PCS
a salience rate of more than twice that of the
RCS.
Negation Words: Prohibition vs. Re-
jection Experiment Similarly to what was
observed in the rejection experiment no is high-
ranking in the PCS due to a combination of high
overall frequency and high prosodic salience -
more than every second no is produced with
prosodic emphasis. The salience rate of don’t in the PC(S) dropped slightly compared to
the one in RC(S) as did its general frequency resulting in an overall lower rank in the PCS.
23If expressions containing these personal pronouns such as I’ve, we’ll etc., which are single phonetic
words, are included in the count, the salience rate changes to 5.15%. The expressions found in the corpus
are: I’ve, I’ll I’m, I’d, we’ve, we’ll, you’ve, you’re, and you’d.
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This observation surprised us, as we expected participants to use rather more than less
don’ts when producing prohibitive utterances such as “Don’t touch the square”. What we
observe instead, is that another negation word, can’t, emerged in the middle ranks. It was
produced 98 times by participants and roughly 40% of these productions were prosodically
emphasized to such degree that it was the most salient word of the utterance. It was
typically part of prohibitive utterances such as “You can’t have that one”, “You can’t play”,
“You can’t have the circle”, etc. Within the rejection experiment it played virtually no
role. Can’t was only produced there 4 times by any of the 10 participants and never in a
prohibitive context.
Not has a marginally higher frequency in PC compared to RC, but a lower salience
rate (RC(S): 20.34%, PC(S): 15.66%). For all other negation words the same observation
can be made as for their role within the rejection experiment: they hardly occur. Isn’t
is the only one that comes close the 0.1% margin, occurring 20 times and with 9 of its
productions having been salient.
Interpersonal Function: Prohibition vs. Rejection Experiment All percent-
ages given in the following are relative to the number of utterances in the prohibition
experiment unless stated otherwise. You is still the most frequent word in PC and the
combined percentage of you and variants24 is 21.60, a drop by −2.53% compared to RC.
The percentage of the vocative Deechee is 3.16, a drop by −1.17% compared to RC. For we
plus variants the combined percentage amounts to 4.49, a rise of 0.57%. The percentage
of I and variants within the PC is 3.13, which is a drop by −0.2% compared to RC.
If we exclude you as indicator of interpersonal function for the reasons given in subsec-
tion 5.2, and sum up the percentual differences of each indicator of interpersonal function
24With “variants of you” we mean grammatical compound expressions containing you, but which amount
to a single phonetic word. In the PC these are you’ve, you’d, and you’re.
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between PC and RC, the result is a drop by −0.8 in the use of personal pronouns and
vocatives in the prohibition experiment compared to the rejection experiment. This is a
drop of −6.91% relative to the sum of values of these indicators from the RC, 11.58% of
utterances within the RC include one of these personal pronouns or a vocative.
Without statistical analysis it is impossible to say if this is a significant value, but it
does not seem high enough to us to draw the definite conclusion that participants in within
the prohibition experiment were significantly less involved with the robot compared to the
rejection experiment.
On the Word Distributions Figure 5.3 depicts graphically the word distributions
of the PC and PCS, which roughly resemble a Zipf distribution. The distributions are
very similar to the distributions of the RC and RCS, hence we see no need for a separate
discussion and refer to section 5.2.1 where the distributions of RC and RCS are discussed.
5.2.2 Adjusted Accumulated Word Frequencies
The merger of corpora of single participants into one big corpus, which forms the basis of
the analysis in the previous section, has one major disadvantage: as every word has the
same weight in determining percentual changes of words and word groups, the resulting
tendencies are not necessarily tendencies of ‘the average participant’. Participant P07, the
most communicative participant of the rejection experiment for example contributes more
than 10 times as many words to the merged corpus as participant P10, the least commu-
nicative participant. Thus P07 has 10 times more influence on our ‘global’ measure than
P01, because all of these measures are based on word counts. In other words ‘the average
participant’ is in terms of any word-based measure not really an average participant, but
reflects to a much larger degree the linguistic characteristics of P07 than those of P10.
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Determining group-ranks by voting In order to ensure that the ranking in the rank-
frequency tables is indeed representative of all participants we employ the Ranked Pairs
(RP) algorithm (Tideman 1987), a voting algorithm which, based on a set of ballots
containing entries sorted by rank, calculates one ranked list. The comparison of this
list with our accumulative frequency tables should give us an indication if the rankings
given there represents the ranking of all participants. If the ranked words list produced by
RP is considerably different from the rankings in our frequency tables, we know that the
influence of the more communicative participants biased the group ranking considerably.
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Figure 5.3: Word counts within the prohibition experiment. Displayed are the words counts
for all sessions and participants of the prohibition experiment on a log-log scale. The word index
of the words is plotted on the x-axis - words are indexed by rank in ascending order, i.e. falling
rank from left to right. For all words the total number of 25745 words is distributed over 778
distinct phonetic words which were produced by the participants within this experiment. For salient
words only 7434 words are distributed over 567 distinct phonetic words. Both distributions of word
frequencies resemble roughly a Zipf distribution. Three Zipf probability mass functions (PMF) for
each distribution, multiplied with the total number of words are plotted along the word counts for
comparison. Within the word distribution of all words 50% of these words are accounted for by the
24 highest ranking distinct words. Within the word distribution of salient words only, 50% of these
words are accounted for by the 22 highest ranking distinct salient words. For comparison, this is
also the case with a Zipf PMF with 778 entities for ρ = 0.98 and with a Zipf PMF with 567 entities
for ρ = 0.97. See tables 5.25 and 5.26 for top ranking and other selected words.
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If the rankings produced by RP are to a large degree identical to those on the accumulated
rank-frequency lists we can be fairly sure that a statistical analysis based on the rank-
frequency lists of single participants would not give us a considerably different ranking of
words. The disadvantage of a ranking algorithm as compared to a statistical comparison is
the circumstance that ranking algorithms do not give us any quantification of the differences
in the measures within a cross-group analysis. Therefore the percentual differences given
in the last section will have to be considered with a certain scepticism despite any possible
affirmation of correctness in terms of rankings via the Ranked Pair voting.
The main idea behind the application of a voting algorithm to a frequency list of words
derived from a corpus is as follows: Conceive of each participant as a voter who produces a
ranked list of words ordered by their frequency. By interpreting this list as a ballot as used
within a voting procedure the problem of determining an accumulative list of word ranks
based on a set of subordinate lists of such word ranks can be transformed into a problem
of determining a list of winners in an election based on subordinated lists where preferred
winners are ordered by preference, most preferred candidate first. The chosen algorithm
assigns to every voter the same weight in determining the overall outcome of the vote and
virtually ignores all frequency information. This eliminates eventual bias through largely
differing frequencies between voters. The outcome of this voting procedure is a ranked list
of all available entries on the ballots, which in our case corresponds to a ranked word list
that is representative of the individual ranked word lists as a whole.
For reasons of computational complexity we did not run the RP algorithm on the complete
frequency lists turned ballots. Instead the decision was made to include the n highest-
ranking entries on each ballot, such that the combined coverage of these n entries reaches at
least 50% coverage for each participant’s corpus. As n was determined by the participant’s
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frequency list which required the most entries to reach the 50% coverage, the coverage for
most participants is considerably larger. For the RC, RCS, PC, and PCS n is 23, 23, 30,
and 31 respectively.
Outcome of the voting process The resulting ranked lists when applying the ranked
pairs voting procedure on the ballots from each of the four corpora are given in table
5.28. In the following four paragraphs the ranking in the rank-frequency tables of the four
corpora are compared to the word rankings as calculated by the Ranked Pair algorithm.
Rejection Corpus (RC): Ranks by vote vs. Ranks by frequency When com-
paring the voting-based ranking in table 5.22 (see also complete table B.5 in appendix)
with the frequency-based ranking (table 5.28) no major differences can be established. The
words in the top 10 are basically identical, only to moved down to rank 16 in the vote-
based table and moon moved up to rank 10. Furthermore there are some minor rank-swaps
within the top 10: no moved up by 1, square moved up by 2, and like moved down by 1.
When extending the scope to the top 20, we can see that the object labels are still there,
with heart having moved down by 3, and don’t having moved down by 5.
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Table 5.28: Adjusted accumulated word rankings in both negation experiments. Listed
are the 25 top-ranking words of all words and of salient words only within each experiment. The
ranking within each list results from conceiving of the frequency-ordered word lists for each partic-
ipant as voting ballots that are ordered descendingly with regard to word-frequency. The frequency
itself is not considered though. This approach eliminates the greater influence of very talkative
participants on the accumulated rankings as opposed to the lesser influence of rather taciturn par-
ticipants. The voting ballots were processed by the ranked-pair algorithm which determines the
ordered list of winners of this “voting process”. A quote (’"’) entry in the rank column indicates a
tie: the corresponding word has the same rank as the previous word in the column.
Rejection Experiment Prohibition Experiment
All Words Salient Words All Words Salient Words
Rank Word Rank Word Rank Word Rank Word
1 you 1 triangle 1 you 1 square
2 the 2 no 2 the 2 no
3 a " square 3 this 3 circle
4 like 3 heart 4 a 4 moon
" no 4 moon 5 is 5 triangle
5 this 5 circle 6 heart 6 heart
6 square 6 yes 7 one " one
7 one 7 like 8 to 7 this
8 that 8 it 9 no 8 yes
9 do 9 squares 10 like 9 like
10 moon 10 this 11 triangle " ok
11 it 11 one " square 10 again
12 triangle 12 ok 12 it 11 shape
13 circle " again 13 it’s 12 it
14 it’s 13 circles 14 that 13 crescent
15 heart 14 good " and 14 you
16 to 15 oh 15 circle 15 good
17 yes 16 right 16 very 16 very
18 is 17 triangles 17 do 17 ok(2)
19 ok 18 that 18 moon 18 right
20 oh 19 Deechee(2) 19 that’s 19 circles
21 want 20 you 20 shape 20 round
22 don’t 21 about 21 can 21 Deechee(2)
23 well 22 done 22 we 22 done
24 circles 23 ah 23 at 23 today
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Rejection Corpus Salient Words (RCS): Ranks by vote vs. Ranks by fre-
quency Again, when comparing the voting- with the frequency-based ranking no excep-
tional differences stand out. Circles moved from rank 7 to 13 and this moved up to rank 10.
Triangle and square swapped ranks, but all object labels in their singular word forms are
still part of the top 10 and so is no. Extending the scope to the top 20 the only remarkable
observation is that the first phonetic form of Deechee disappeared from the listed 23 ranks
- it has moved to rank 31. All other changes are minor rank swaps within the words that
have already been part of the group.
Prohibition Corpus (PC): Ranks by vote vs. Ranks by frequency Consid-
ering only the top 10 in the two rankings, the only mentionable difference is the fact that,
in the vote-based ranking heart moved from rank 11 up to rank 6 and, in exchange, it’s
moved out of the top 10 to rank 13. All other changes are minor rank-swaps amongst the
words that were already part of the top 10. Equally in the top 20, no remarkable changes
are discernible, the only additional word entering the top 20 being very - it’s on rank 24
on the frequency based list.
Prohibition Corpus Salient Words (PCS): Ranks by vote vs. Ranks by
frequency Apart from yes moving up by 3 to rank 8 and again moving from rank 15
to rank 10 and some minor rank swaps nothing notable can be said when comparing the
top 10 vote- versus the frequency-based ranking table. When extending the scope to the
ranks 11 to 20 the only mentionable observation might be the rank-increase of you by 7 to
rank 14. Two new words made it into the top 20, the first of which is round, on rank 20,
and which is in the frequency-based table on rank 27, and the second of which is right on
rank 18 which ranks on the frequency-based list on 26.
In summary we can say, that the differences between the frequency- and the vote-based
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rankings are rather miniscule. The top-ranking words, at least the top 20, seem to be
indeed representative of the frequency-based rankings of single participants as far as such
accumulative lists can be. There is no indication that the frequency-based rankings would
be biased to such a degree that words would be amongst the top 20, that do not “deserve”
to be there or that the rankings would be skewed through over-representation of the most
communicative participants’ frequencies.
5.2.3 Comparison with Saunders et al. (2012)
In this section we will compare the two corpora resulting from the negation experiments
with the one originating from Saunders’ experiment. Table 5.29 shows the ranks and fre-
quencies of selected words similar to those shown for the prohibition and rejection corpora.
It is important to note that the objects in Saunders’ experiment were coloured and the ob-
jects sketches printed on the boxes varied in size. For this reason we find colour words and
adjectives describing size in the corpus. Table 5.30 shows ranks and frequencies for salient
words only. We will henceforth refer to these two corpora as Saunders’ corpus (SC) and
Saunders’ salient words corpus (SCS). When comparing the RC and PC with Saunders’
corpus the following differences are salient:
• You slipped down in the ranks considerably: within the SC it ranks 10th and its
coverage decreased by nearly two thirds (2.41%)
• Like also dropped very considerably: from the ranks 3 and 7 in the RC and PC
respectively to rank 31 in the SC. Its coverage dropped from 3.2% (PC ) and 3.31%
(RC ) to 0.81% (SC ), a drop of nearly 75% relative to the other two coverages.
• No dropped from the ranks 6 (RC ) and 9 (PC ) to 65 within the SC. The coverage
dropped from from 2.39% (RC ) and 1.79% (PC ) to 0.35% (SC ). This is an even
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Table 5.29: Word-frequencies of all words in the experiment of (Saunders et al. 2012).
Listed are the ten most frequent words within said experiment across all participants and sessions.
Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words
uttered during the entire experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the same statistics are
given for object labels, object properties, negation words, and words linked to the motivational state
of the robot. See table B.9 in the appendix for the complete listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) a 702 8.71 (23) shape 88 1.09 (73) done 22 0.27
(2) this 367 4.55 (24) right 87 1.08 (75) don’t 21 0.26
(3) blue 347 4.31 (25) box 87 1.08 (80) crescent 17 0.21
(4) is 322 4 (28) small 76 0.94 (101) not 14 0.17
(5) and 314 3.9 (30) square 69 0.86 (107) colours 11 0.14
(6) red 302 3.75 (31) like 65 0.81 (109) isn’t 11 0.14
(7) green 286 3.55 (32) star 61 0.76 (137) nice 6 0.07
(8) the 265 3.29 (40) bigger 41 0.51 (150) can’t 4 0.05
(9) that’s 237 2.94 (41) white 41 0.51 (162) didn’t 3 0.04
(10) you 194 2.41 (42) large 40 0.5 (165) favourite 3 0.04
(11) it’s 161 2 (44) colour 37 0.46 (176) aren’t 3 0.04
(12) heart 160 1.99 (53) Deechee 33 0.41 (177) squares 3 0.04
(13) circle 149 1.85 (54) yes 33 0.41 (178) circles 3 0.04
(14) arrow 148 1.84 (64) smile 28 0.35 (229) triangle 1 0.01
(15) side 146 1.81 (65) no 28 0.35 (260) never 1 0.01
(16) cross 120 1.49 (68) shapes 25 0.31 (264) happy 1 0.01
(20) moon 95 1.18 (72) big 22 0.27 (273) excited 1 0.01
bigger decrease than the one observed with like, the decrease is more than 80%.
• Similarly to RC and PC, object labels in the grammatical singular are mainly on the
ranks 10 to 20. One is “pushed” beyond the 20, most probably because adjectives
referring to colours and sizes take up some of the top 20 ranks.
• Don’t similarly to no suffered a rather extreme decrease: in the SC it ranks 75th
and covers 0.26%. This is a 70% drop compared to its coverage within PC and even
more compared to RC.
• Deechee, the vocative, also suffers a considerable decrease down to rank 53. Its
200
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Word Level
coverage more than halves compared to the PC, the ratio is much worse for the RC.
• We see colour words entering the top 20 and even the top 10: 3 out of 10 words in
the top ten are colour words.
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Table 5.30: Word-frequencies of salient words in the experiment of (Saunders et al.
2012). Listed are the ten most salient words within said experiment across all participants and
sessions. Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number
of words uttered during the entire experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the same
statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and words linked to the motivational state of
the robot. See table B.10 in the appendix for the complete listing.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) blue 157 6.91 (19) right 35 1.54 (49) no 10 0.44
(2) red 126 5.54 (23) colour 24 1.06 (50) it’s 10 0.44
(3) circle 117 5.15 (24) good 22 0.97 (52) done 10 0.44
(4) heart 108 4.75 (25) bigger 22 0.97 (54) the 8 0.35
(5) green 99 4.36 (26) a 21 0.92 (67) don’t 6 0.26
(6) arrow 81 3.56 (27) that’s 20 0.88 (71) isn’t 6 0.26
(7) cross 79 3.48 (28) Deechee 19 0.84 (72) big 6 0.26
(8) side 79 3.48 (29) shapes 18 0.79 (78) colours 5 0.22
(9) box 64 2.82 (30) it 18 0.79 (91) didn’t 3 0.13
(10) shape 55 2.42 (32) you 18 0.79 (93) not 3 0.13
(11) and 48 2.11 (33) smile 17 0.75 (97) favourite 3 0.13
(12) moon 48 2.11 (36) white 17 0.75 (100) circles 3 0.13
(13) square 47 2.07 (38) large 16 0.7 (107) nice 3 0.13
(14) this 46 2.02 (41) yes 13 0.57 (119) squares 2 0.09
(15) star 42 1.85 (43) crescent 13 0.57 (146) can’t 1 0.04
(17) is 40 1.76 (46) like 11 0.48 (156) aren’t 1 0.04
(18) small 35 1.54 (47) yea 11 0.48
Prosodically Salient Words When comparing the ranks and frequencies of all words
(table 5.29) with the ranks and frequencies of only salient words (table 5.30) we can observe
that the trend for function words to disappear from the top ranks is even stronger in Saun-
ders’ corpus. The top 10 of the SCS does not contain a single function word and consists
entirely of object labels and other object-related words such as colours and more abstract
words referring to the objects or parts of them such as box or side. The function words
a and the moved down to the ranks 26 and 54 with salience rates slightly higher but still
comparable to those found in the RCS and PCS. A and the have salience rates of 2.99% and
3.02% respectively compared to combined salience rates of 1.92% and 2.78% in the RC(S)
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Table 5.31: Prosodic salience rates of se-
lected word groups and words. Saunders’
Corpus - object labels: heart, circle, arrow,
cross, moon, square, star, crescent, triangle,
and their plurals; emotion words: happy,
smile, excited; demonstratives: this, that;
pers. pronouns: you, we, I; articles: a, the;
vocative: Deechee
word (group) saliency rate (%)
object labels 65.20
emotion words 60
vocative 57.58
yes 39.39
no 35.71
don’t 28.57
one 28.72
can’t 25
it 24
like 16.92
demonstratives 13.82
to 11.43
pers. pronouns 5.69
articles 3.00
do 0
and PC(S) respectively (cf. table 5.31). When
comparing the salience rates of the RC(S) and
PC(S) corpora with the salience rate of the
SC(S) corpora most of these rates seem to be
generally lower in the SC(S) with few excep-
tions. The exceptions are articles and per-
sonal prononouns which have marginally higher
salience rates in the SC(S). Interestingly, also
emotion words have a higher salience rate in the
SC(S) than the PC(S) (60% vs. 54.90%) but
still a lower salience rate than emotion words in
the RC(S) (71.28%). Also don’t has a higher
salience rate in the SC(S) (28.57%) than in the
RC(S) (23.79%) and PC(S) (19.65%).
Negation Words - Comparison be-
tween RC(S), PC(S), and SC(S) When
we compare the “major players” amongst nega-
tion words in terms of frequency from the RC(S)
and PC(S) to Saunders’ corpora we find that
their general frequencies are much lower in the
latter corpora. No has the frequencies of 417 within the RC, 461 within the PC, but only
28 within the SC. Even if we account for the fact that the per session duration underlying
RC and PC it approximately twice as long compared to SC and there is one participant
less in Saunders’ experiment, the difference is still remarkable.
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If participants with Saunders’ experiment had produced approximately the same num-
ber of no’s as in the negation experiments we would expect the frequency to be somewhere
around 18025. Yet, as we can see, it is only about 15% of this ‘target value’. This obser-
vation does not come as a total surprise as the utterance-level analysis already indicated
that participants within Saunders’ experiment produced markedly less negative utterances
as compared to the negation experiments.
What was not already indicated by the utterance-level analysis is the circumstance that
the salience rate of no is markedly lower than the latter rate within the negation corpora.
This means that participants in Saunders’ experiment not only produced markedly less
no’s, but when they did so, they markedly less often prosodically emphasised the word.
The latter cannot be said about don’t. Don’t reaches for reasons which we cannot explain on
this analytical level the highest salience rates within Saunders’ corpora (28.57% compared
to 23.79% (RC(S)) and 19.65% PC(S))26 The overall frequency of don’t is markedly lower
in the SC (21) as compared to both the RC (26927) and PC (229). Again, the shorter
session duration, factor 0.5, cannot account for this large difference, as we would expect a
target value of around 100 if a similar production rate of don’t would pertain. Regarding
the production rates of not the findings are similar. Within the SC not was produced 14
times, whereas the frequencies within RC and PC are 118 and 198 respectively. Even if
we take the lower value, 118, as reference, we would expect a target value of around 50
within SC if the production rate was similar. This is clearly not the case. The salience
rates of not are 21.43%, 20.34%, and 15.66% within SC(S), RC(S), and PC(S) respectively
25We apply a scaling factor of 0.5*0.9 (50% duration time times 90% of number of participants).
26In order to explain why this is the case we would have to look at the pragmatic level and investigate the
video recordings in order to determine in which situational context don’t was produced and, furthermore,
what communicative function participants ‘had in mind’ when doing so. For the negation corpora this
is precisely what we did and the results of which will be reported on in the next section. Due to time
constraints, we are not able to do this for Saunders’ corpora within this thesis, which is admittedly
somewhat unsatisfying.
27Combined frequency of both phonetic variants
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and therefore seem to be roughly comparable.
Summarily we can conclude that within the SC(S), despite comparatively high salience
rates of two of the three most frequent negation words, the overall low frequencies of these
words cause them to play only minor roles within the SCS. As the corpora of salient words
form the basis of the robots active lexicon, negation words are very unlikely to be produced
by the robot in Saunders’ experiment. In strong contrast to this, negation words are very
frequent within the negation exerpiments and were produced with similar or, in the case
of no, markedly higher prosodic salience. Subsequently these words rank very high in the
salient word corpora of these experiments and are therefore likely to be produced by the
robot.
Interpersonal Function: Comparison between negation corpora and Saun-
ders’ corpus All percentages given here are percentages relative to the number of utter-
ances in each corpus28, not the coverage (which is a percentage relative to the number of
words in the corpus). You yields within SC a percentage of 8.53% as opposed to 24.13%
(RC ) and 21.60% (PC ), thus a considerable decrease. The percentage of use of the voca-
tive within SC amount to 1.45% compared to 4.33% (RC ) and 3.16% (PC ). 5.49% of all
utterances contain a we or a variant29 compared to 3.92% (RC ) and 4.49% (PC ), thus a
slight rise. Finally, I and variants30 occur in 1.8% of the utterances of SC, compared to
3.33% within RC and 3.13 % within PC.
The percentages of the above stated indicators of interpersonal function within SC ex-
28Assuming that each of the respective words occur at most once each in an utterance, allows us to make
statements such as “23% of all utterances contain a X.”. We know that this assumption does not hold for
every utterance and word. “You know that you can’t have that” is a counter-example. But based on our
experience when coding the language used by participants we believe that it is approximately true and it
allows us to speak about word-utterance relations in a more intuitive manner.
29We has only one variant within SC which is we’ve.
30Variants of I within SC : I’m, I’ll
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cluding you sum up to 8.74% compared to 11.58% (RC ) and 10.78% (PC ). The difference
of 2.04 constitutes a 18.92% decrease compared to the 10.78% level of PC. Without statis-
tical testing no decision can be made if this decrease is significant, thus we can only state
that the difference in terms of these indicators between the negation corpora and Saunders’
corpus is nearly three times the difference (factor 2.74) between the both negation corpora.
Furthermore the considerably lower rate in the use of you which decreased by more than
60% seems striking but due to the reasons given in section 5.2 we hesitate to take this as
an indicator for interpersonal function.
Emotion/Volition words: Comparison between negation corpora and Saun-
ders’ corpus This paragraph is intended to shed some light on the differences between
the corpora in terms of emotion words. By analogy with the analysis of interpersonal
function we compare in this section the percentage of the emotion words smile, sad, and
happy relative to the number of utterances of the corresponding corpus. Another word of
interest with a relatively high rank in the negation corpora in this context is like. It is
mainly used by participants to ask Deechee if it likes something, i.e. if it wants to talk
about a particular object. Thus it is often, probably in the majority of cases, used within
utterances which we will later call motivation-dependent questions. It is unclear to the
author if these questions really refer to the emotions of the recipient or if they refer to
the will of the recipient (emotion vs. volition). As the question “Do you like X” can be
replaced with “Do you want X” we are inclined to count it as a question involving volition
rather than emotion31.
31From a conversation-analytical standpoint one could even argue that it does not matter to what
precisely “like” refers and that the obsession with identifying the ‘correct’ referent is misleading. We do
know precisely what kind of conversational work a question such as “Do you want an ice cream” in an
appropriate context accomplishes. We also know that the precise referent does not matter to the agent
that performs it. The ‘work’ that is performed by the utterance is independent of the issue whether the
recipient really ‘wants’ (volition) an ice cream or if it ‘just feels like’ one (emotion). The forced quest to
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The percentage of smile within SC is 1.23% compared to 0.24% and 0.28% within RC and
PC respectively. Sad was never produced with SC at all whereas its percentages within
RC and PC are 0.81% and 0.11% respectively. Happy occurs in 0.04% of all utterances
of SC as compared to 0.72% in the case of RC and 0.30% in the case of PC. Like finally,
the word whose membership to the class of emotion words is dubious at least, shows the
biggest differences across corpora. It is used in 2.86% of all utterances of SC compared to
10.91% and 7.09% within RC and PC respectively.
If we sum up these percentages, excluding like, the picture is mixed at best: Within
Saunders’ corpus 1.27% of all utterances contain emotion words compared to 1.77% of
the Rejection Corpus and 0.69% of the Prohibition Corpus, putting Saunders’ Corpus in
between the two other corpora. If like is counted as an emotion word and included in
this sum the picture changes dramatically leading to 4.13% within the SC as compared
to 12.68% and 7.78% within the RC and PC respectively. As we are not readily willing
to count like in the class of emotion words we cannot assert that the negation corpora
would contain more emotion words per utterance than Saunders’ corpus. By the same
token the difference in the use of like between the negation corpora and Saunders corpus
is very marked. If we deny its membership to the class of emotion words, we can’t see
any other option than to count it in the class of volition/intention words such as want.
If we accept this classification the marked difference in the use of like indicates a marked
difference in the participant’s perception of the robots intentionality. If there is indeed a
marked difference in the perception of intentionality we would expect a similar discrepancy
with other volition words. And indeed, when looking at the production frequencies of want
plus variant32 we find such a marked difference: Within Saunders’ Corpus only 9 want ’s
identify a referent for each and every content word in an utterance might be just another example of what
happens when “language idles”(Wittgenstein 1984).
32There is only one variant of want within the three corpora: wanna.
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were produced which correspond to 0.4% of all utterances. Within the RC and PC 3.54%
and 3.24% of all utterances contain a want or a variant thereof. Thus the difference in the
production rates of want and variant is even more marked than is the case with like. The
negation corpora have more than 8 times as many want ’s and variant per utterance than
Saunders’ corpus.
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5.3 Human + Robot: Pragmatic Level
In the previous two sections we have established that in both rejection as prohibition
experiment a high number of negative utterances were produced by the participants of
the respective experiments, when compared to a very similar noun-learning experiment,
Saunders’ experiment. The reason for this increase in production was hypothesized to
be the presence of emotional displays via facial expressions and motivationally congruent
body behaviours.
The reason that we still can only hypothesize instead of prove that this is the case
is the presence of three potentially confounding variables between the experiments under
comparison. We named three potentially confounding variables: differing length of the
sessions, the fact that the objects in Saunders’ experiments were coloured and varied in
size, and slightly differing instructions to the participants which made them aware that
the robot would have preferences towards the objects. The author deems it highly unlikely
that the first two of these variables, session length and differing object colour and size
would trigger a difference in the linguistic behaviour manifested in an marked increase
of the use of negation. We only consider the third potentially confounding variable, the
hinting of participants towards the robot having likes and dislikes, a potential suspect
for influencing the participants behaviour. Intuitively the effect of this potential case of
priming would seem to be an increase of emotional and volitional words produced by the
participants. In point of fact the word-level analysis supports this intuition. We do observe
a large increase of volitional utterances containing words such as like and want. Yet it is
impossible to tell how much of this increase is caused by potential priming and how much
of it is caused by the robot actually exhibiting behaviour that indicates the presence of
volitional and motivational states. Nevertheless the assumption of this kind of priming
209
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
having taken place in conjunction with the observation of a similarly strong increase in
negative utterances turns out support an hypothesis that is very much akin to our major
hypothesis: Motivational and negative utterances are heavily interrelated.
The heightened number of negative utterances in the negation experiments were sub-
sequently shown to be mirrored by higher frequencies of negative words on the word level.
Moreover, the analysis of the word corpora revealed that the majority of negation words
that were either used within those negative utterances or that constitute single-word ut-
terances in their own right pertained to a very small set of word forms. By far the most
frequently used negation word turned out to be no, followed by don’t, and, with a consid-
erably lower frequency, can’t. In case of the prohibition experiment a fourth word, can’t,
was shown to have been produced frequently.
A question that both of these analyses cannot answer, due to their focus on sets of
words or sets of utterances, is the question to what purpose participants produced these
utterances. This question is closely related to the question for the communicative functions
of these utterances. Communicative functions pertain to the pragmatic level of linguistic
theory and cannot be reduced to word corpora or grammatical phenomena (cf. section
2.1.2).
In order to determine the kinds of communicative functions associated with the neg-
ative utterances produced by participants within the negation experiments we decided to
construct two taxonomies both of which are based on the taxonomy for negative utterances
developed by Roy D. Pea which was summarized in section 2.5.
5.3.1 Overview of section
Subsection 5.3.2 describes the process of how the negation taxonomies for human and robot
utterances were constructed.
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Subsection 5.3.4 then presents the taxonomy of negation types for human negation,
which our participants engaged in, whereas subsection 5.3.3 presents the taxonomy of
robot negation types, i.e. the kinds of negation which the robot engaged in during the
experiments. Both taxonomies are the outcome of said construction procedure.
Subsection 5.3.5 subsequently describes the evaluation of both taxonomies by means
of intercoder agreement. This evaluation was performed in order to ensure that the tax-
onomies and quantitative results based on these taxonomies can be replicated by coders
other than the author. A sufficient degree of intercoder agreement ensures a certain level
of reproducibility if the taxonomy is applied by other researchers to the given or similar
conversational data. We do not claim that the given taxonomies are general in the sense
that they would sufficiently cover negative utterances produced within scenarios or forms
of life that differ considerably from our experimental scenarios. We rather suspect that
many more negation types would have to be introduced into both taxonomies in order to
account for different situational contexts before any potential claim for generality could be
made.
As will be shown, the evaluation of the two taxonomies only yielded a good intercoder
agreement for the human negation taxonomy but a moderate agreement for the taxonomy
of robot negation. We therefore attempted to improve the robot taxonomy by two different
procedures.
In subsection 5.3.6 we present an automatic optimization approach based on Cohen’s κ,
a coefficient which numerically quantifies the amount of agreement, and report the results
of this automatic optimization.
In subsection 5.3.7 an account of a complementary qualitative optimization attempt
will be given which is based on a structured interview. During this interview we deter-
mined the reasons for the particular decisions of the two coders specifically for those codes
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in the,coding table where the two disagreed from each other. Interestingly the results
from this two methodologically very different methods yield comparable results which will
be reflected upon in this subsection. The results hint towards potential limitations with
regards to the application of conversation analysis, and derivative methods, to conversa-
tions between strongly asymmetrical conversation partners, i.e. conversation partners with
significant differences in their respective communicative competence.
5.3.2 Construction of Taxonomies from the Utterance Corpora
In order to assess the number and kinds of communicative functions associated with the
negative utterances encountered in our experiment we constructed two taxonomies: one
for the negative utterances produced by the participants and a second one for the negative
utterances eventually produced by the robot. As a starting point for the construction
served the taxonomy of negation in early child language proposed by Pea (1980). Our
intention behind adopting Pea’s taxonomy as template for our taxonomies is to ensure
that our results would be at least partially comparable to potential results obtained by
research of negation in early child language and to render our results as informative as
possible for research on human language development. The taxonomies were constructed
by the author who also acted as the first coder.
Construction of the Robot’s Negation Taxonomy The first taxonomy to be con-
structed was the taxonomy of negative robot utterances. To this purpose all of the robot’s
negative utterances were extracted from the corpus together with their respective session
ids and time stamps. For each utterance the author subsequently looked at the video-taped
conversation in the course of which the utterance occurred. Contingent on the observed
situational and conversational context we attempted to match each utterance to one of
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Pea’s negation types. If none of these was deemed appropriate, a new type was created.
After having processed all of the robot’s negative utterances in this way, we looked again
at those particular utterances which were classified as members of negation types that
had only few member utterances in order to determine if some of these types could be
eliminated by merging them with other types. This attempt to eliminate rarely occurring
negation types was performed in order to keep the taxonomy minimal. The taxonomy that
resulted from this procedure is depicted in figure 5.4.
Construction of the Participants’ Negation Taxonomy Pea’s taxonomy, originally
constructed to classify negative utterances of toddlers, incorporates the notion of adjacency
on the topmost level (cf. figure 2.2). Due to this property his taxonomy lends itself
as a starting point for constructing a partially symmetrical taxonomy for the negative
utterances of the parent, participant, or, more generally, the linguistically more competent
conversation partner. We observed, and so it seems did Pea, that many negative utterances
are not produced in isolation but rather occur as one part of an adjacency pair. This is not
specific to negative utterances but a well documented structural property of many human
face-to-face conversations (cf. section 2.1.3). As it will be shown later in this section
participants often produced negative first pair-parts, typically negative questions such as
“You don’t like it?” that make relevant another, potentially negative, second pair-part such
as a simple “No!”.
Thus, looking out for potential negative first pair-part negation types that fit the neg-
ative second pair-parts of the robot’s taxonomy (i.e. the left side of the classification tree
in figure 5.4), the construction of the participants’ negation taxonomy followed the same
procedure as the one in place when constructing the robot’s taxonomy. All negative ut-
terances of all participants and all sessions were automatically extracted from the corpus
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together with their respective session ids and time stamps. As with the robot’s utterances,
all utterances were evaluated based on the conversational and situational context in which
they were produced by watching the video recordings of the experimental sessions. Again,
we tried to keep the taxonomy as minimal as possible, yet the resulting number of nega-
tion types is considerably higher as compared to the number of robot negation types. This
circumstance is most probably due to the participant being the pro-active and dominant
conversation partner who essentially leads the conversation by selecting, describing, and
asking questions about particular objects. This asymmetrical conversational relationship
can be expected between conversation partners with largely differing degrees of commu-
nicative competence and has also been observed with mother-child dyads (cf. section 2.1.3).
The taxonomy resulting from this procedure is depicted in figure 5.5.
5.3.3 A Taxonomy for Robot Negation
Figure 5.4 visualizes the taxonomy of negation types the robot engaged in as judged by
the author and derived from both experimental corpora. For a detailed description of each
negation type with exemplary utterances we refer to paragraph B.8.4 of the coding scheme
in the appendix.
Pragmatic Negation Words The original negative utterance set included utterances
containing so called pragmatic negatives. These are still mentioned in the automatic opti-
mization of the robot’s negation types (subsection 5.3.6), and in the coding scheme in the
appendix, but were removed from the current taxonomy after the evaluation of the latter.
The author observed during the first round of coding that the robot’s production of
some words which are typically not mentioned in the literature on negation can in particular
situations have the same function or effect as words which would typically appear in lists of
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lexical negation words (“no”, “not”, “gone”, etc.) or which are uttered in the same situations
in which participants often produced lexical negation words. The pragmatic but not lexical
negation words on the robot’s part were go, oh, down, or done, which at times seemed
to have the same effect on participants as lexical negation words. On the participants’
part sad was used by one participant in the same situations where other participants used
negative intent interpretations such as “oh you don’t like the heart”. In the case of go and
oh, due to the suboptimal performance of the speech synthesis, there were clear indications
that they were sometimes misheard as no by some participants and could subsequently,
by pure accident, have the same effect as an acoustically proper no. In the cases of down,
or done there were no indications that they were ever misheard, yet these words have at
times been interpreted in certain situations as rejective utterances with regards to some
presented object. Initially we therefore selected not only proper lexical negation words for
the pragmatic classification as specified in the coding scheme but also added utterances
consisting of or containing these pragmatic negatives to the set of to be classified utterances.
This was done in order to see how these words would fare compared to the ‘proper’, i.e.
pragmatic and lexical negatives.
Upon completion of the classification it became evident that the intercoder agreement
for the robot’s negative utterances was particularly low due to a high degree of disagreement
between coders with regard to these pragmatic negatives. We therefore decided to remove
them from the final taxonomy. Yet they are still briefly mentioned in the coding scheme in
the appendix as well as in subsection 5.3.5 which covers the evaluation of the taxonomies.
Furthermore their presence during the classification procedure necessitated the presence
of the none-type, which had to be introduced in order to cater for those cases in which a
potential pragmatic negative did not “act” as a negative in particular utterances (cf. the
coding scheme in subsection B.8.4 of the appendix).
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Figure 5.4: Taxonomy of negation types used by robot within both experiments
Comparison to Pea’s taxonomy
Redefinition of particular negative meanings Importantly we extended or nar-
rowed the definitions for the types rejection, motivation-dependent denial, and perspective-
dependent denial compared to Pea’s definitions for the same types. As outlined in section
2.5.2 Pea’s definitions of and side remarks for rejection and motivation-dependent denial
seem to indicate a certain overlap. We therefore narrowed the definition of rejection to
include only negative responses to non-linguistic offers, that is we defined it to only re-
fer to linguistically non-adjacent negation types. Conversely motivation-dependent denial
was defined to denote all forms of negative robotic utterances that are linguistically ad-
jacent to participants’ utterances and which involve the motivational state of the robot.
Furthermore perspective-dependent denial is defined in our taxonomy to explicitly include
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negative responses that involve the physical perspective, the ability, or the knowledge of
the robot. For each of these different kinds of dependencies, perspectival, ability-related,
or epistemological, a separate negation type could have been created. Yet as there were
only few occurrences of utterances deemed to be of these kinds we decided to capture all
of these within a single category.
Lost negative meanings The following negation types or negative meanings, listed
in Pea’s taxonomy, are not present in our taxonomy: disappearance and make-believe on
the adjacent and non-adjacent side, and unfulfilled expectation on the non-adjacent side.
We did not consider any negative utterance from our corpus as falling into one of these
categories.
New negative meanings Our taxonomy contains some new types which do not
occur in Pea’s taxonomy: negative imperatives are in some way similar to rejections. As
we defined rejections rather narrowly to refer to rejections of non-linguistic offers, negative
imperatives refer to all other kinds of ‘rejective’ negatives on part of the robot which are
deemed by the coder to have been triggered by participants’ behaviours other than offers.
Motivation-dependent assertions are a residual category to capture all negative utter-
ances other than rejections of offers or negative imperatives which are non-adjacent and
deemed to involve the motivational state of the robot. For an utterance to fall into this
category the coder must judge it to be too weak either in terms of intonation or in terms
of the situational context in order to count as negative imperative.
Finally we introduced motivation-dependent exclamation to cover both adjacent and
non-adjacent negative utterances that are deemed to involve the motivational state of the
robot, but unlike negative imperatives are deemed to refer to some event rather than an
intentional action of the participant. An example would be a negative utterance that
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accompanies or is triggered by the accidental drop of a glass. For further definitions of and
examples for the various robot negation ‘types’ of the taxonomy we refer to section B.8.4
of the coding scheme in the appendix.
On the difference between the taxonomies An obvious question to ask when com-
paring Pea’s taxonomy for negative child utterances with our taxonomy for negative robot
utterances is why they differ from each other. The answer to this lies in the defining criteria
for the various ‘types’. Remember that all these ‘types’ or categories of negative meaning
are defined via the conversational and situational context in which they occur (cf. section
2.5.2).
The two experimental scenarios in the context of which the robot produced these ut-
terances, i.e. the situational context, differ in important ways from the context in which
Pea’s subjects produced their utterances. Probably the most important difference is that
Pea’s children were ambulatory, they could and did move around or were moved around
by their mothers. Deechee on the other hand can’t walk, can’t move its body to another
location. The robotic experiments were conducted in a single, small room. Participants
did not go with Deechee into the kitchen, bathroom or any other room because the robot
is attached to large, heavy, and immovable power supplies, and even it this was not the
case, its sheer weight would prevent anybody from doing so.
In terms of the capacity of movement a human equivalent to Deechee would be a child
that is paraplegic and has been so from birth, sits in a wheelchair, and yet worse, sits in
a wheelchair that is nailed to the ground. Furthermore Deechee’s capacity to manipulate
objects is far worse than that of a one-year old toddler, and Deechee has no history of
manipulating objects because of which neither participants nor coders have ever observed
the robot doing so.
218
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
Another important difference between the robotic and the children’s scenarios is the
fact that the robot has no common history with any of the participants in a shared living
environment, and for this very reason there are no entrenched habits that form part of the
common ground between the two conversation partners.
It is for all of these reasons that the coders as external observers as well as the par-
ticipants, both being perfectly aware of these circumstances, would never judge a negative
produced by Deechee to be an example of unfulfilled expectations. Participants as coders
know that the robot has no expectations of where to find the objects which are the topic
of conversation, because they have never seen the robot crawling around and looking for
them. The robot is physically unable to do so, therefore habitual locations are ‘none of his
business’.
Make-believe involves other, for robotic standards rather complicated bodily mecha-
nisms such as “chuckling” and cheeky smiles, which Deechee is not capable of. Yet in some
situations Deechee’s smile came close to being interpreted as cheeky.
Disappearance negation was not observed for the simple reason that objects rarely
disappeared, nor did participants make comments in this direction. Only when Deechee
dropped an object was there the possibility of temporary disappearance. In the few cases
where Deechee did produce utterances such as “oh”, “no”, or “done” immediately after
having dropped a box, these were deemed by the first coder to be motivation-dependent
exclamations, utterances expressing surprise or sorrow rather than comments on disap-
pearance. This interpretation was lent support by one participant’s reaction to such an
utterance and/or event with a “No worries”.
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5.3.4 A Taxonomy for Human Negation
When looking at the taxonomy of negative meanings produced by the participants (cf.
figure 5.5), it becomes immediately obvious that there are many more “types” or negative
meanings as compared to the ones produced by the robot or as reported by Pea. We
would like to argue that there are essentially two reasons why this is the case, which we
will explicate in the following paragraphs. A second, visually salient difference in the
participants’ taxonomy graph is the additional distinction of conversational adjacency into
first pair parts and second pair parts as well as the more explicit marking of types according
to non-conversational adjacency. By analogy with Pea’s use of adjacency our use of first
and second pair part does not exclusively refer to parts of adjacency pairs in the strong
conversation analytical sense but is used more liberally. It denotes the adjacency of two
or more sequentially linked conversational turns across speakers but without the stronger
requirement that the non-production of a second pair-part would lead to the second speaker
being accountable for this non-production (cf. section 2.5.2).
The first reason why there are more than twice as many meanings of negation listed
in the participants’ taxonomy as compared to the robots’ taxonomy is the lower degree of
communicative competence on the robots’ side. More precisely, the restrictions imposed
by it being constrained to one-word utterances automatically excludes the possibility of it
engaging in some negative meanings, which require more complex, grammatical utterances.
What we termed quoted negation for example, requires the to-be-quoted or reported
negative to be embedded in a main clause as in “I said "no" ”. If there is no embedding
main clause, there can not be any embedded quote. One could argue that this meaning
‘type’ is none, and that the communicative function captured by this form of negation
might be assimilated into other ‘types’.
Negative tag questions are possibly the most grammatically defined type here and are
220
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
for this very reason beyond the productive scope of a child (or robot) in the one-word
stage. An example of an utterances falling into the category of tag questions is “You do
like the square, don’t you?”, with the negative tag question being the terminal clause after
the comma. One might argue that these negative utterances are not ‘real’ or semantic
negatives at all and should be excluded from the taxonomy. Indeed negative tag questions
are at least a borderline case.
A second reason for the lesser number of categories of negative meanings, a reason which
applies to the robot’s situation but also to the toddlers in Pea’s study, is the asymmetrical
communicative relation between the two interlocutors, mother and child or participant
and robot, where the one with the higher communicative competence typically takes the
conversational lead, for example by proactively asking questions and thereby constructing
a conversational ‘scaffold’ and conversational slots for the conversationally weaker partner.
Our robot, and judging by Pea’s taxonomy, ‘his’ toddlers appear not to produce questions
containing negatives. More generally the robot does not produce questions at all. Similarly
there are indications from research on parent-child dialogues during the one-word stage
that questions are very prevalent within the parents’ productions but very scarce within
the toddlers’ productions (cf. section 2.2.2). The presence of ‘proper’ negative questions,
i.e. first part-pairs of question-answer adjacency pairs, in the participants’ speech accounts
for four types in the participants’ taxonomy which are absent in both the robot’s as in the
toddler’s taxonomies.
Apart from the communicative asymmetry, the lack of grammatical or lexical compe-
tence required to produce negative questions may account for a lack of these in the toddlers’
productions. As opposed to their positive counterparts questions containing negatives are
typically skewed in terms of neutrality. This is to say that the participants’ positive ques-
tions were typically neutral in terms of the the expected response. For example the question
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“Do you like Marmite?” does not indicate any bias in the speakers expectation towards
the answer, both “yes” and “no” appear to be expected with equal probability. In contrast
the speaker’s expectation in the negative variant “Don’t you like Marmite?” is biased to-
wards a negative response based on the speakers experience with the interlocutor such as
the observation of the addressee producing a negative facial expression upon biting into a
Marmite-laced sandwich or the like. In this regard negative questions convey more infor-
mation about the speaker’s expectation than their positive counterparts. This additional
information is then evidently expressed with an additional negative construction, here the
postfix “n’t” or additional negative words33. Hence if a communicatively ‘weak’ speaker
such as a toddler or our robot is not able to produce the three elements required by a
negative question, ‘negator’ + question particle/ interrogative intonation contour/ gesture
+ topic indicator, such questions can neither be produced nor identified as such by the
participant or an observer. For our robot we certainly know that it cannot produce the
required intonation contour commonly used with questions nor was it programmed to use
gestures indicating negation or question.
In this context we should note that the coders found it often difficult on the par-
ticipants’ side to distinguish between negative motivational questions and negative intent
interpretations. This difficulty arose because participants often did not leave sufficient
pauses after the supposed negative motivational questions. This subsequently raised the
coders’ doubt that these were indeed meant as ‘proper’ questions, i.e. questions where the
speaker expects and therefore waits for an answer. Yet the respective utterances often had
the intonation contour of a question as opposed to the ‘assertive contour’ of negative intent
interpretations.
This is one example that shows that the treatment of utterances in isolation may
33If we imagine pidgin variants of this question such as “like Marmite?” vs. “no like Marmite?” the
negative variant requires one word more and is therefore lexically more complex rather than grammatically.
222
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
evoke a false certainty in the observer that these could be unambiguously classified by
just paying enough attention to the details of production such as intonation, grammatical
indicators like word order, etc. Yet as soon as we take into account the conversational
context, with gap lengths between sequential turns being an important property of the
latter, the presumed, theory-driven ‘ease of classification’ shows severe incompatibilities
with the actual “language at work”.
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(a) Human Negation Types pt. 1
(b) Human Negation Types pt. 2
Figure 5.5: Taxonomy of negation types used by participants within both experimental scenarios.
Conv.: conversationally, 1st part-pair, 2nd part pair: parts of an adjacency pair such as question
(1st part-pair) - answer (2nd part-pair)
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Notice that we also introduced the 2nd part-pair question ‘type’ negative question into
the participants’ taxonomy. These are questions mainly by intonational contour and were
judged by us not to be questions for semantic information but rather questions regarding
the sincerity of the robot’s utterance. Thus, if lexically expanded, these questions would
amount to something like “Is that really what you mean?” or “Are you serious?”, but are in
the recorded conversations typically expressed by a simple “no?” (cf. section B.8.5 in the
coding scheme). Utterances of this kind show a certain smiliarity to negative agreements in
that the robot’s negative word is repeated by the participant. Yet the intonation contour
of negative agreements indicate certainty on the part of the participant with regards to the
communicative intent of the robot, whereas negative questions express the participants’
doubt.
Other additional negation ‘types’ which are typically not expressed with a simple one-
word utterance are negative promises and weaker forms of future commitments such as “I
won’t do X again” or “I promise not to do X”. Utterances of this kind typically involve
a word or construction which expresses future commitment such as “promise”, or “won’t”,
and one or more words that specify the referent of what the speaker commits herself to
such as “(not) doing X”. Theoretically such a promise could be performed in one word if
the referent of the promise is clear or salient to both conversation partners at the time of
production. For example a conversationally weak speaker B, could commit herself not to
do something in the future by a simple “won’t”, if a conversationally strong speaker had
specified the referent adjacently in a first pair-part such as “Promise me not to do X any
more”. Yet we never encountered utterances produced by the robot that seemed to fit this
pattern. The absence of an equivalent type in Pea’s taxonomy indicates that toddlers in
the one-word stage typically also do not commit to certain future behaviours in a linguistic
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manner.
For a description of the other ‘types’ of negative meaning and examples for each ‘type’
we refer to section B.8.5 of the coding scheme.
5.3.5 Evaluation of the Taxonomies
A potential problem of ‘hand-crafted’ taxonomies that rely on the subjective assessment of
their constructor is a certain degree of arbitrariness. On the pragmatic or functional level
of human communication one may even expect a certain degree of indeterminacy. This
is indicated by the well-documented presence of conversational repair mechanisms which
are employed whenever one conversational partners misinterprets one or more utterances
of the other. These repair mechanisms would not be needed if every conversational move
could be unambiguously ‘decoded’ and correctly understood by the interlocutor within a
given conversation. Both, the fact that conversational repair mechanism are one of the
best documented conversational phenomena, and the circumstance that participants of a
conversation display to each other how they understood each other’s utterances, are strong
indicators that single utterances are often inherently ambiguous. This is even the case
when these utterances are embedded in a particular conversational context.
The coders qua external observers of a conversation and members of the same language
community rely on the same conversational resources as the participants in order to deter-
mine the function or meaning of a particular utterance. We therefore cannot envision any
method to radically reduce this ambiguity. Rather a certain degree of ambiguity seems
to be part of the fabric of our language games. As language scientists and conversational
observers we are therefore effectively limited in our understanding of these utterances by
the same constraints as a conversationally fully competent participant. Subsequently all
functional or pragmatic taxonomies which are derived from actual conversations must be
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based on subjective evaluations and will therefore necessarily exhibit a certain degree of
arbitrariness. Therefore the best we can do is to strive to minimise the degree of arbitrari-
ness to an acceptable level, i.e. optimize the taxonomy by adding or removing types such
that an acceptable level of agreement is reached.
To this purpose, we have to evaluate, i.e. quantify, the degree of arbitrariness or,
inversely, the ‘goodness’ (Di Eugenio 2000) of our existing taxonomy. One method to do
so is the introduction of one or more additional coders that perform the same classification
task as the constructor, or first coder. The results can then subsequently be compared.
Thus, in absence of a gold standard or ‘god’s truth’ with regard to our pragmatic classes
or types, we choose intercoder agreement as an inverse measure of the subjectivity or
arbitrariness inherent within the taxonomy. High levels of agreement between the coders
is then taken to be an indicator for a low degree of subjectivity if one accepts the definitions
and examples of the taxonomy. The latter is described in a so called coding scheme which
the additional coders are given as a manual in order to perform the classification. Which
numeric levels of agreement are considered high or sufficient is a matter of discussion
and tradition within the particular scientific community and subject area within which the
coding task is performed. The actual numbers can differ quite considerably across different
communities (cf. Di Eugenio 2000). A common method to quantify intercoder agreement
is the calculation of Cohen’s κ coefficient (Cohen 1960). This coefficient discounts chance
agreement between coders which is not the case for simpler measurements such as the
relative agreement between coders, i.e. the percentage of cases in which the coders agree
in their decision relative to the total number of decisions (cf. Di Eugenio (2000) for a
discussion of the use of Cohen’s κ in language related coding tasks).
For our taxonomies the process of determining the intercoder agreement proceeded as
follows: Upon completion of the taxonomy, which was constructed in parallel to the ini-
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tial coding of all negative utterances, the author and first coder drafted a coding scheme
which explains the various types of the two taxonomies and several other features which
subsequently were to be coded by the second coder (cf. section B.8 in the appendix34).
As second coder a lab assistant was chosen who previously was involved with the man-
ual transcription and realignment of the audio recordings that were recorded during the
experiments. The coding scheme was handed over to the second coder, 20% of negative
utterances were randomly selected. Before coding the selected utterances for their type,
the second coder was asked to decide and code for each utterance if she would deem it
felicitous or adequate in the given situation. In a second stage the second coder then clas-
sified these utterances according to the coding scheme independently from her decisions
on felicity35. It is important to note at this point, that the second coder was not trained
on the data set prior to the coding proper36. Upon completion of the coding of the second
coder, Cohen’s κ was calculated as follows:
κ =
P (A)− P (E)
1− P (E)
Here P (A) denotes the observed agreement, and P (E) denotes the expected agreement. As
the number of decisions in our coding task is finite, the calculation of these probabilities
boils down to the calculation of ratios of frequencies. P (A) is calculated by adding up the
relative frequencies of each class or type where both coders agreed, i.e. by summing up
the normalized entries on the main diagonal of the confusion matrix (cf. table 5.32, yet
34Note that many of the additional features specified in the coding scheme such as the participants’
(non-)reaction to the robot’s utterances were not used in the subsequent analysis and are therefore not
included in this thesis
35For the details of how exactly the coding proceeded we refer to section B.8 of the appendix.
36An initial training of coders is sometimes performed, when several coders are used to code large data
sets. In these cases the investigators obviously assume that their taxonomy is sufficiently good, and the
purpose of stating the intercoder agreement is different from ours: there the purpose of the investigators
in citing the intercoder agreement seems to be to ensure that their coders internalized the coding scheme
sufficiently well and that the results are not skewed by a lax application of the scheme by the coders.
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the entries there are absolute, non-normalized frequencies), where normalized is meant to
mean percentages relative to the total frequency count. P (E) is calculated by adding up
the so called joint probabilities of the marginals (see Cohen 1960).
Gwet (2002) shows that Cohen’s κ statistic tends to overestimate the expected or
chance agreement depending on the marginal probabilities. This can lead to a distortion
of the intercoder-agreement and Gwet therefore developed the alternative AC1 statistic
which corrects for this overestimation. For this reason we calculated additionally to the
widespread κ statistic Gwet’s AC1 for both confusion matrices in order to ensure that our
κ values are not grossly distorted. Yet, as most numerical boundaries that determine what
can be regarded as an acceptable intercoder agreement are still expressed in terms of the
κ statistic, we had to use the latter for orientation despite its statistical shortcomings.
Intercoder Agreement
Across all sessions and participants the robot produced 505 negative utterances including
utterances containing or consisting of pragmatic negatives. 135 of these 505 utterances were
subsequently coded by both coders out of which 37 (27.4%) were utterances with pragmatic
negatives. Table 5.32 shows the confusion matrix for both coders’ classifications of these
negative utterances in terms of negation types. Also displayed are the corresponding κ and
AC1 values. Table 5.33 shows the same statistics for negative utterances produced by the
human participants.
Intercoder Agreement: Robot Negation Types The κ-value of 0.46 for the prag-
matic classification of the robot’s negative utterances is definitively on the very low end
of all “agreed upon boundaries” for intercoder agreement. According to Di Eugenio (2000)
this value is definitively too low on Krippendorff’s (1980) scale as it is < .67, which is the
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coder 2
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
co
de
r
1
[0] 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
[1] 1 8 0 1 5 1 5 0 0
[2] 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
[3] 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 5
[4] 6 0 0 0 14 1 3 0 1
[5] 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
[6] 0 0 1 2 6 3 30 3 1
[7] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[8] 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 6
Key:
[0] truth-func. denial
[1] none
[2] persp. dep. denial
[3] negative agreement
[4] rejection
[5] negative imperative
[6] mot. dep. denial
[7] mot. dep. exclam.
[8] self-prohibition
rel. obs. agreem. 0.563
Cohen’s κ 0.461
AC1 0.514
Table 5.32: Confusion matrix for robot negation types (left) and measures for intercoder reliability
(bottom right)
lower limit to draw tentative conclusions. On the scale of Rietveld and van Hout (1993)
(quoted in Di Eugenio 2000), in the following referred to as Rietveld’s scale, our κ value is
taken to be on the lower end of moderate agreement (.41 < κ < .6). Within the psychiatric
community a κ-value of 0.46 would be considered too low due to it being < 0.5 (Grove
et al. 1981: quoted in Di Eugenio 2000). The relative agreement for all coded utterances
amounts to 56.3%, whereas the relative agreement for all coded utterances containing
pragmatic negatives amounts to only 43.24%, which indicates that latter utterances are a
“source of trouble” in terms of intercoder agreement.
Intercoder Agreement: Felicity of Robot Negatives The intercoder agreement
in terms of κ for the felicity or adequacy of the robot’s negative utterances amounts to
0.41, which is the lowest κ-value of all judgments that the two coders made. The relative
agreement on felicity of all negative utterances amounts to 65.33%, yet for utterances
containing pragmatic negatives only it amounts to as few as 48.65%. This goes to show
that also in terms of felicity utterances with pragmatic negatives were less agreed upon
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compared to utterances containing lexical negatives. We will uncover some of the reasons
for the overall high level of disagreement in terms of felicity in subsection 5.3.7.
coder 2
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17]
co
de
r
1
[0] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[1] 0 84 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
[2] 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[3] 0 0 0 17 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[4] 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[5] 0 0 6 0 0 36 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
[6] 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[7] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 4 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
[8] 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[9] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[10] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[11] 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
[12] 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
[13] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[14] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0
[15] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
[16] 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0
[17] 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53
Key:
[0] neg. persp. quest. [6] neg. persp. assert. [12] neg. of self-prohib.
[1] truth-func. denial [7] neg. agreement [13] quoted negation
[2] neg. tag question [8] disallowance [14] rej. of request
[3] prohibition [9] neg. imperative [15] neg. promise
[4] mot. dep. assert. [10] neg. question [16] truth-func. neg.
[5] neg. mot. quest. [11] ? [17] neg. int. interpret.
rel. obs. agreem. 0.779
Cohen’s κ 0.739
AC1 0.768
Table 5.33: Confusion matrix for human negation types (top) and measures for intercoder relia-
bility (bottom right)
Intercoder Agreement: Participants’ Negation Types In terms of the aforemen-
tioned scales, the κ-value of 0.74 for the coders’ decisions regarding negation types of
participants’ utterances is sufficiently good. It is well within Krippendorff’s boundaries,
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within which tentative conclusions can be drawn, it is well above Rietveld’s and van Hout’s
0.61 mark, thereby indicating substantial agreement amongst the coders, and it is equally
well above the 0.6 mark established within the psychiatric community.
Upon examining table 5.33 we can identify differing judgments as to whether particular
negative utterances were negative motivational questions or negative intent interpretations
as the most common source of disagreement between coders. These two types essentially
differ from each other only in whether the producer of the utterance is deemed to expect
an answer or not, i.e. if the utterance is taken to be an assertion or a proper question. Here
the first coder and author has a strong tendency to classify as proper questions what the
second coder considers to be assertions. As has already been mentioned in section 5.3.4,
it can be very difficult to determine if an utterance that is produced with an interrogative
prosodic contour or, more precisely, an utterance which a coder perceives as having an
interrogative prosodic contour, is an actual question or not. This problem is especially
prevalent in the case of one-word utterances such as “no” which are abundant within the
given data. One-word utterances lack any grammatical features that could give a coder
further cues as to whether they are proper questions or not.
One could therefore argue to fuse these two types into one. For this reason we calcu-
lated both κ as AC1 values for a new hypothetical taxonomy in which negative motivational
questions and negative intent interpretations are fused into one type, with all other types
being equal to the current taxonomy. Subsequently a modified confusion matrix was calcu-
lated based on the given one (cf. table 5.33) by simply position-wise adding the respective
rows and columns, columns and rows 17 and 5 in table 5.33. In order for the resulting hy-
pothetical confusion matrix to be considered valid or meaningful, we have to assume that
the two coders would classify all those utterances, which they classified under the current
scheme as either one of these two types, as being of this new hypothetical, fused type.
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This assumption seems reasonable, but cannot be proven to hold, as a reduced taxonomy
with modified definitions in the coding scheme could have unforeseeable side effects on how
coders decide to classify any particular utterance. For example having simply one type
less to consider, or a particular name choice for the new hybrid type, could all influence
the decisions of the coders.
Nevertheless we undertook this synthetic exercise in order to estimate the numerical
impact that such a fusion of types may have upon the intercoder agreement. The κ-value
of the resulting confusion matrix amounts to 0.814, and the resulting AC1-value amounts
to 0.849. Thus, if our assumption holds, we could expect a close to impeccable agreement
between coders, as even the toughest of the abovementioned scales, Kripendorff’s scale,
sets 0.8 as the lower boundary for κ-values, starting from which definite conclusions can
be drawn from the underlying classification.
Yet, due to the postulated significance of intent interpretations for human language
acquisition, the abundance of this type in our experiments, and also due to the lack of
man-power necessary to re-code the human utterance set with the modified taxonomy,
we decided to keep our original taxonomy for participants’ negation types. Nevertheless
it is important to keep in mind, that negative variants of precisely these theoretically
important intent interpretations can, according to our 2-coder analysis, be easily confused
with negative motivational questions and vice versa.
The κ value of the 2-coder classification of the robot’s negation types was considered
too low and we therefore attempted to improve the taxonomy of the robot’s negation types.
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5.3.6 Automatic optimization attempt for the robot’s negation taxon-
omy
Our first attempt to improve the taxonomy of the robot’s negation types might be best
described as an automatic optimization approach that seeks to reduce the number of types
by merging one or more times two or more types into one resulting type. This approach is
motivated by the hypothesis that the insufficient intercoder agreement described in section
5.3.5 might be caused by too fine distinctions between the various types. If this was the
case, one would expect that a reduction of types by merging two or more types into one
would result in an improvement of the intercoder agreement and therefore the intercoder
reliability. In order to determine in a principled way those mergers which could be expected
to lead to a sufficient or even excellent intercoder agreement an optimization program was
implemented (cf. algorithm 3).
Taking our given confusion matrix as input the program performs an exhaustive search
over all possible sets of mergers with κ as the to be optimized value. Furthermore we
applied the constraint that the application of all mergers specified in any particular set
yields a taxonomy with no less than 3 types.
Due to our existing confusion matrix serving as the only input for the program, this
approach makes the following implicit assumption: Assume that our optimization program
suggests to merge some type A and some other type B into a fused type AB. If then, with
the original taxonomy, coder 1 decided that a particular utterance is of type A, and coder 2
decided that the same utterance is of type B, we assume that, given the modified taxonomy
with the fused type AB, both coders would decide that the same utterance is of type AB.
Again, this assumption seems to be straightforward but, as we already mentioned above,
cannot be proven to hold due to possible side-effects that a modified taxonomy might bring
along (cf. the short discussion of the last paragraph of the previous subsection 5.3.5).
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Algorithm 3 Optimization algorithm for taxonomies based on Cohen’s κ
1: c← |Corg|
2: Calculate P such that ∀Pi∀sj ∈ Pi : |Pi| < c ∧
∑m
j=1 |sj | − 1 < (C − 3) ∧ |sj | > 1
3: for all Pi ∈ P do {perform the mergers as specified by Pi}
4: C ← Corg {Each set of mergers starts from the original confusion matrix}
5: for all sj ∈ Pi with sj = {x0, . . . , xk} do
6: a← x0
7: for all b = x1, . . . , xk do
8: Ca: = Ca: + Cb:
9: end for
10: for all b = x1, . . . , xk do
11: C:a = C:a + C:b
12: end for
13: for all b = x1, . . . , xk do
14: remove C:b from C
15: remove Cb: from C
16: end for
17: end for
18: d = c−∑mj=1 |sj | − 1 {the remaining number of rows/types}
19: Calculate κ for C
20: Hd(C)← κ
21: end for
22: for all Hd with i = 3, . . . , c− 1 do
23: Sort Hd in ascending order
24: print Hd
25: end for
Notation Within algorithm 3 and the example below (cf. figure 5.6) the following nota-
tion is used. Let Corg denote the original confusion matrix which is given to the program
as input, C some confusion matrix, Ci: the ith row, and C:i the ith column of C. Let
|C| denote the number of rows or columns of a confusion matrix, i.e. for the confusion
matrix in figure 5.32 |C| = 9. Furthermore let P = {Pi} with i = 1, . . . , n be the set of
all partitions, and Pi = {sj} with j = 1, . . . ,m be a particular partition. Furthermore let
sj = {xk} with k = 0, . . . , l, xk ∈ N, l < |C| and xa 6= xb∀a, b be a set of indices. The
indices refer to the dimensions of the confusion matrix. Let |x| denote the size of either
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P , any Pi, or any sj , i.e. the number of partitions, index sets, or indices correspondingly.
Finally a set of hash-maps Hi is used to store mappings between confusion matrices C
with |C| = i and their corresponding κ-coefficients.
coder 2
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
co
de
r
1
[0] 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0
[1] 1 8 0 1 5 1 5 0 0
[2] 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
[3] 0 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 5
[4] 6 0 0 0 14 1 3 0 1
[5] 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
[6] 0 0 1 2 6 3 30 3 1
[7] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[8] 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 6
Key:
[0] truth-func. denial
[1] none
[2] persp. dep. denial
[3] negative agreement
[4] rejection
[5] negative imperative
[6] mot. dep. denial
[7] mot. dep. exclam.
[8] self-prohibition
{{0,4,5},{1,6,7},{3,8}}
coder 2
[0*] [1*] [2] [3*]
co
de
r
1 [0*] 37 3 0 1
[1*] 16 46 1 4
[2] 0 0 1 0
[3*] 3 1 0 22
Key:
[0*] {0, 4, 5}
[1*] {1, 6, 7}
[2] persp. dep. denial
[3*] {3, 8}
Figure 5.6: Example of applying a set of mergers to the confusion matrix of robot negation types.
Top left: The original confusion matrix Corg resulting from the two-coder coding of negative robot
utterances. Bottom left: The resulting matrix when the various mergers indicated next to the arrow
are applied to Corg. Dimension 0∗ of the resulting matrix corresponds to the dimensions 0,4, and
5 of Corg. In other words, the potential new "negation type" resulting from the merger would be a
hybrid type subsuming the "old" types truth-functional denial, rejection, and negative imperative.
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Example The partition p = {{0, 4, 5}, {1, 6, 7}, {3, 8}} contains 3 sets and specifies there-
fore 3 mergers. The first set specifies the merger of the dimensions 0,4, and 5, i.e. the 4.
and 5. row are added element-wise to the 1. row of the confusion matrix. Analogously the
4. and 5. column of said matrix are element-wise added to the 1. column. Subsequently
the 4. and 5. row, and the 4. and 5. column are deleted from the confusion matrix such
that the resulting matrix has 2 dimensions less in each rows and columns compared to
the original matrix. The application of this set of mergers to the 9x9 confusion matrix
obtained results in a matrix whose column and row vectors are reduced by 5 dimensions,
i.e. a 4x4 matrix. This merger is visualized in figure 5.6.
Results from the optimization attempt
Tables 5.34 and 5.35 show those mergers with the highest resulting κ-values as calculated
by our optimization program. The mergers are ordered by the highest resulting κ-values
from top to bottom, and the number of types removed/merged from left to right. Table
5.34 shows the results obtained from the full negative utterance set, including pragmatic
negation words (cf. subsection 5.3.3), table 5.35 shows the results from the negative utter-
ance set, where pragmatic negation words were removed. Additionally both tables consist
of two subtables each, one including and one excluding data from participant P12. The
reason for P12’s exclusion was his rather unnatural linguistic behaviour towards the robot,
which was caused by his attempt to ‘optimize the teaching game’ by consciously reduc-
ing his vocabulary to the absolute minimum. P12 assumed that this would improve the
robot’s word learning. This information was relayed to us by a colleague, who is tenant and
housemate of P12. This explained his rather ‘minimalist’ teaching style. Naturally such
a conscious artificial adaptation of a participant’s speech runs counter to our intention to
evoke negation naturally by establishing a ‘natural context’ for such productions to occur.
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We therefore decided to run our optimization program on the confusion matrices based
on the data set containing P12’s utterances and, additionally, on those confusion matrices
based on the same data set but under exclusion of P12’s utterances. This was done in or-
der to be able to detect and potentially exclude any distortion of the intercoder agreement
which could have possibly been brought about through P12’s consciously unnatural speech
style.
Indicated mergers for full data set (table 5.34, top subtable) With regards to
their κ-value all of the top three mergers of the third column of the table are at the lower
end of what is regarded as “substantial agreement” on Rietveld’s scale. Interestingly the
common denominator of all three mergers is the suggestion to fuse truth-functional denial
with rejection, an operation which we are strongly opposed to due to reasons which will be
discussed in subsection 5.3.8. Furthermore both the top- as the 3rd-ranking mergers suggest
a further fusion of truth-functional denials and rejection with negative imperatives. The
fusion of the latter two types is far less problematic as compared to the fusion of the first two
types because rejections and negative imperatives are only distinguished from each other
in terms of whether they are deemed to be in relation to a physical offer of the interlocutor
or not, both are motivation-dependent types. Finally the top- and second-ranking mergers
in the third column suggest a fusion of negative agreement with self-prohibition. Also this
fusion seems from a theoretical standpoint not overly problematic, as the two types differ
from each other mainly in terms of linguistic adjacency. If an utterance is judged to be
a negative agreement, the judge sees it as an affirmative reaction to a previous negative
utterance of the interlocutor. If an utterance is judged to be of the latter kind, the judge
sees it as a stand-alone utterance in which the speaker seems to linguistically prevent him-
or herself from doing something. In both cases the utterance is seen to express agreement
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with a negative ‘statement’, often of the prohibitive kind, because of which both types
are cognitively somewhat similar. A further interesting observation for this table is the
circumstance, that virtually every merger from column two upwards suggests a fusion of
truth-functional denial with rejection, and this same fusion is the one which yields the
highest improvement in κ if only two types are merged overall (1st column, top row).
Indicated mergers for data set without P12 (table 5.34, bottom subtable) As
was the case for the top subtable discussed in the previous paragraph, a reduction by
at least 3 types is indicated by the optimization program, in order to yield a κ-value
that would indicate substantial agreement on Rietveld’s scale. By and large the indicated
mergers are very similar to the ones that resulted from the optimization of the full data
set discussed in the last paragraph: the most frequently indicated fusions within these
mergers are the fusion of truth-functional denial and rejection on one hand, and the fusion
of negative agreement and self-prohibition on the other. Yet, in contrast to the result
from the top subtable, this optimization indicates an alternative merger, with which a
fusion of truth-functional denial and rejection could be avoided: the top merger in the
third column suggests that fusing negative agreement with self-prohibition on one hand
and rejections, negative imperatives, and motivation-dependent denials on the other, would
yield a sufficient κ-value. We discussed the former fusion already in the last paragraph.
One could argue that the latter fusion is from a cognitive-developmental standpoint far
less problematic than a fusion of rejection with truth-functional denial as these three types
are very similar to each other. All three are linked to the motivational state of the agent
that expresses them and do not seem to require the capacity for “logical abstraction” as
seems to be the case for truth-functional denial. The difference between these three types
is simply a matter of adjacency: motivation-dependent denials are adjacent to a linguistic
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offer and rejections are adjacent to a non-linguistic offer, yet both are adjacent to some
intentional move towards the speaker by another agent. Negative imperatives on the other
hand are ‘only’ adjacent to an event and therefore do not require the presence of some
intentional move. Yet utterances of all three types have in common that the speaker does
not want something to happen, be it either brought about by somebody else or be it just
an event that is not linked to any agent.
Indicated mergers for data set without pragmatic negatives (table 5.35, top
subtable Notice that the taxonomy without pragmatic negatives has one type less, none,
compared to the taxonomy based on the data set with pragmatic negatives because of
which its dimensionality (number of types) is 8 and not 9. We kept the indices of the
types within table 5.35 identical to the ones of table 5.34 in order to facilitate comparisons
between tables. The reason for most mergers to contain one type less, is the circumstance
that there is one type less in the taxonomy to start with.
Similar to the mergers indicated by both subtables in table 5.34 in the previous two
paragraphs, the core types to be fused are truth-functional denial and rejection on one
hand (all mergers of all columns from column 2 upwards), and negative agreement and
self-prohibition on the other hand (from column 2 top merger upwards). As mentioned
in the penultimate paragraph, a fusion of the latter two types into one hybrid seems not
overly problematic, yet the merger of truth-functional denial with rejection seems very
problematic and will be discussed in subsection 5.3.8. The indications which types ought
to be fused such that substantial agreement between coders could be expected are basically
identical to those regarding the two subtables discussed in the previous two paragraphs.
Indicated mergers for data set without pragmatic negatives and without P12’s
utterances (table 5.35, bottom subtable) The mergers for which there is an indica-
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tion that substantial agreement between coders can be expected (κ > 0.61) start in column
2 with the top merger. Here, based on the smallest data set of all four, the optimization
does not strongly indicate a fusion of truth-functional denial with rejection: only 3 out of 6
mergers (column 2 top merger plus all mergers from column 3) indicate such a fusion. Yet
the fusion of negative agreement with self-prohibition is still indicated by 5 out of 6 merg-
ers. Instead of fusing truth-functional denial with rejection the majority of mergers (5 out
of 6) indicate a fusion of rejection with motivation-dependent denial. This fusion is from
a cognitive standpoint one of the least problematic ones as the only difference between
the two types concerns adjacency to either an utterance as opposed to a non-linguistic
offer. As participants often physically offered an object to the robot whilst simultaneously
asking if it wanted that object, it is easy to see how the coders could confuse these two
types. One could even assert, that it might not be sensible to distinguish the two types
from each other in our case precisely because physical offers were very often co-produced
with linguistic ones, both of which fulfill arguably the same function37.
37One could further argue that to ask a coder to which of these two intentional moves a robotic utterances
is adjacent is to create an artificial problem which in the reality of the conversation does not occur: for
the participant it does not matter if the robot rejects the physical or the linguistic part of his or her offer.
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Summary of the results of the automatic optimization attempt We ran our
automatic optimization program as described in algorithm 3 on four variants of the dual-
coded dataset, which on its part consists of 20% of the utterances from the set of all
negative utterances. The four variants of this dataset differ from each other in whether
they include utterances that contain pragmatic negation words and in whether they include
the utterances of participant P12. P12 received this special treatment because he displayed
a very unnatural way of speaking and who is the only participant of whom we know that
he consciously modified his way of speaking to the robot in order to ‘win the game’. This
conscious modification of his speech style ran counter to our instructions to speak to the
robot as if it was a child of approximately 2 years. The outcome of running our optimization
program on these datasets yielded the following:
For 3 out of 4 of these datasets, the complete dataset, the dataset with pragmatic
negatives but without P12’s utterances, and the dataset without pragmatic negatives but
with the utterances of P12, the results were very similar: most of the mergers which would
arguably result in a taxonomy with a substantial intercoder agreement contain a fusion
of truth-functional denial with rejection and one or more additional types. Additionally
most of these mergers suggest a fusion of negative agreement with self-prohibition. The
latter fusion is from a theoretical cognitive standpoint little problematic, yet the former
fusion would run counter to everything that the literature on the development of linguistic
negation suggests. Out of the indicated mergers of these 3 datasets only the dataset with
pragmatic negatives but without P12’s utterances (table 5.34, bottom subtable) indicates
that the fusion of truth-functional denial and rejection could be avoided while still main-
taining the expectation of substantial intercoder agreement. This merger suggests a fusion
of all but one motivation-dependent negation types, rejection, negative imperative, and
motivation-dependent denial, into one hybrid type, on top of the already mentioned fusion
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of negative agreement with self-prohibition.
The results of the optimization performed on the fourth and smallest dataset, i.e.
the dataset which neither contains utterances with pragmatic negation words nor P12’s
utterances, finally supports the alternative fusion which avoids lumping together truth-
functional denial and rejection. There, the suggestion is to fuse rejection with motivation-
dependent denial in addition to the “standard fusion” of negative agreement with self-
prohibition which is also indicated by most other mergers of all other datasets.
In summary we can say, that we could reasonably expect that two coders would reach
substantial agreement if we modified our taxonomy in one of these ways, i.e. by conducting
one of the discussed mergers. Before making suggestions for any concrete merger, we
will discuss in the following subsection a more humanistic and non-automatic attempt to
uncover the source of the observed low intercoder agreement for the negative utterances
produced by the robot which complements this automatic approach.
5.3.7 Qualitative analysis of the taxonomy
Despite the current positioning of this subsection, i.e. after the subsection which covers
the automatic optimization of the taxonomy, the procedure described here was performed
before the program for the automatic optimization was written. The results of this proce-
dure are therefore independent of the automatic optimization attempt and not influenced
by its results.
In order to determine the reasons for the high level of disagreement between coders,
the 2nd coder was interviewed in the following way.
First, we wrote a script to automatically print all file names and precise time stamps
of those utterances where both coders disagreed either on the negation type or the felicity
of the utterance. The script did not print the categories on which both coders decided,
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such that the resulting list only indicated the utterances on whose category the coders
disagreed but not the particular kind of disagreement. Based on this list the first coder
thereafter wrote down his reasons for his particular decisions, separately for each indicated
utterance. Additionally the first coder noted all competing types if there were any, as there
were cases where he was torn when deciding for one of several types. Subsequently the
author and first coder interviewed the second coder where, for each indicated utterance, he
asked her for the reasons why she decided the way she did. Furthermore the second coder
was also asked if she could imagine to categorize the utterance differently and if yes, which
alternative category she would choose. She was also asked if the choice of an alternative
category would have an impact on her judgment on the felicity of the utterance.
The interview provided us with the general insight, that a coder’s judgments on the
felicity of an utterance often depends on his or her judgment with regard to the utterance
type, and that it did not matter whether the latter judgment is made explicit with the
help of a coding table or if it remains implicit. Remember that we separated for the
2nd coder the coding for the felicity/adequacy of an utterance in stage 1 from the coding
for the negation type in stage 2 (cf. subsection B.8.3 in the appendix). This separation
was motivated by the ethnomethodologically motivated idea that a fluent English speaker
should be able to decide if a particular utterance is felicitous or ‘makes sense’ in a particular
situation without any explicit knowledge of formal criteria such as SAT-like satisfaction
conditions but rather based on his or her capacity as being a competent member of the
speech community. Due to the first coder in his function as designer of the taxonomy being
acquainted with all negation types at the time of coding of both felicity and negation types,
the partial dependency of felicity and negation type mainly transpired during the interview
with the 2nd coder. There she clarified that she would have chosen for various utterances
different felicity values if she would have been aware of the various negation types from
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the very outset. In particular referring to self-prohibition, the 2nd coder made clear, that
she had totally forgotten about this kind of behaviour engaged in by small children, and
subsequently did not consider it when judging on the felicity of a particular utterance.
Upon reading about self-prohibition in the coding scheme she then, in retrospect, would
have often changed her decision on felicity in cases where self-prohibition was a likely
candidate for an utterance.
Reasons for Disagreement amongst Coders
The given reasons were subsequently analysed and put into the following categories. The
order in which these reasons are listed is roughly in terms of their generality, i.e. reasons
that only apply to particular types are listed first, and reasons which potentially apply to
a multitude of types are listed later. Coders 1 and 2 are in the following abbreviated with
C1 and C2, participants with P, and the robot Deechee with D.
[1 ] C2 interpreted motivation-dependent denial more narrowly as compared to C1: For
C2 the ‘triggering’ utterance had to be a motivation-dependent question or assertion
that directly referred to the motivational state of Deechee such as “Do you want X”
or “Do you want to hold X”. Assertions such as “I’m going to show you another box”
or “Let’s look at the box X” did not qualify for C2 as adequate first pair-parts for
motivation-dependent denials, whereas they did for C1.
Affected types:
- motivation-dependent denial
- negative imperative
[2 ] C2 interpreted negative imperatives more generally as compared to C1 such that they
included utterances that were deemed as being linguistically adjacent to an utterance
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of P. Replies to assertions which, for C2, did not qualify as adequate first pair-parts
under [1], were subsequently often classified as negative imperatives.
Affected types: see [1]
[3 ] C2 interpreted self-prohibition more generally as compared to C1 to include linguisti-
cally adjacent utterances.
Affected types:
- negative agreement
- self-prohibition
[4 ] C2 interpreted rejection more generally to include asocial triggers such as the mere
presence of an object.
Affected types:
- rejection
[5 ] Categorical overlap between motivation-dependent denial and negative agreement.
Affected types:
- motivation-dependent denial
- negative agreement
[6 ] Negation within the naming game versus not wanting to play the game - the ‘in game’
no versus the ‘meta’ no. This includes cases where C2 decided during coding stage 1
that D is not playing the game properly when saying no instead of the object label
expected by P. This then often resulted in C2 judging D’s utterance as not felicitous.
Yet, in coding stage 2, C2 thereupon often chose to categorize the utterance as
truth-functional denial, which implies that D is playing the game as it would have
to be categorized as rejection otherwise. Furthermore the coders sometimes decided
differently in terms of the particular utterance of P to which D’s utterance was judged
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to be adjacent to. If D’s utterance was deemed to be adjacent to an object label,
the categorical outcome would typically be truth-functional denial, whereas if it was
deemed to be adjacent to a motivation-dependent question, it was deemed to be a
case of rejection.
Affected types:
- rejection
- truth-functional denial
[7 ] Disagreement with regards to P’s perception of pragmatic negatives, including judg-
ments whether a particular utterance of D was actually heard by P or not.
Affected types:
- none
- negative agreement
- truth-functional denial
- motivation-dependent denial
- negative imperative
- rejection
[8 ] Disagreement as to whether an utterance is linguistically adjacent to an utterance
produced by P or not, other than [2] or [3]. This includes cases where both coders
agree that D’s utterance is linguistically adjacent to one of P’s utterances but disagree
about the particular utterance of P to which D’s utterance is supposedly adjacent
to.
Affected types:
- negative agreement
- rejection
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- motivation-dependent denial
- motivation-dependent exclamation
- negative imperative
- self-prohibition
- truth-functional denial
[9 ] Disagreement as to whether D’s utterance is adjacent to an offer by P or not. This
reason for disagreement often had to do with the timing of D’s utterance. If, for
example, P offered an object to D, and what may be interpreted as D’s linguistic
response was produced several seconds later, C1 had a tendency to not judge it as
a response to the offer as the time gap was deemed too long. C2 on the other hand
often still judged D’s production to be a response to P’s offer.
[10 ] Disagreement with regards to the intention of D, especially if the body behaviour is
not congruent with the linguistic behaviour as is the case when Deechee is smiling
and saying “no”, or when Deechee is smiling but not grasping due to a technical error.
Here C1 due to being the programmer of the system, knew that the non-grasping
was a technical error and assumed that Deechee ‘wanted’ the object. C2 on the other
hand often took the non-grasping to mean, that Deechee despite its smiles really did
not want a certain object. Furthermore differing judgments amongst the coders as to
whether the dropping of a box by D constituted an intentional action or not fall into
this category. This reason mainly applied to disagreements on felicity rather than to
differing judgments on the negation type.
Frequencies of reasons for type disagreement Upon extraction of the above list we
assigned to each case of disagreement one or more reasons of disagreement and counted
them. For example reasons [8], disagreement in terms of linguistic adjacency, and [9],
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disagreement in terms of ‘behavioural’ adjacency, often were judged to apply to the same
utterance. One coder may decide that D’s utterance was adjacent to a previous utterance
of P, whereas the other coder may decide that D’s utterance was adjacent to P’s corporal
offer, but not to what he or she said. Therefore, in terms of counting, the counter for each
of the given reasons was incremented if a disagreement case had more than one reason
associated with it. Table 5.36 depicts the results of this analysis.
Table 5.36: Counts of reasons for disagreement with regards to negation types between coders:
ctc (cX): count type change coder X: number of type changes for reason [x] as indicated by coders
reason count % ctc (c1) %ctc (c1) ctc (c2) %ctc (c2) ctc (c1+2) %ctc (c1+2)
[1] 2 2.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
[2] 5 7.1 1 4.3 0 0 1 2.6
[3] 5 7.1 0 0 4 25 4 10.3
[4] 1 1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
[5] 2 2.9 1 4.3 0 0 1 2.6
[6] 10 14.3 4 17.3 6 37.5 10 25.6
[7] 13 18.6 2 8.7 1 6.3 3 7.7
[8] 24 34.3 13 56.5 4 25 17 43.6
[9] 6 8.6 1 4.3 1 6.3 2 5.1
[10] 2 2.9 1 4.3 0 0 1 2.6
total 70 23 16 39
As can be seen from table 5.36 the majority of disagreements between coders are reason [6],
the “in game” no versus the “meta” no, reason [7], disagreement as to whether a pragmatic
negative is an actual negative in the particular situation, and reason [8], disagreement with
regards to adjacency, i.e. disagreement as to whether an utterance is linguistically adjacent
or not, and if both deem this to be the case, possible disagreement with regards to the first
pair-part. Reason [8] explains over a third of all observed disagreements.
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Notice that disagreements caused by reasons [1] to [5] are comparatively easy to remedy
by refining the definitions and descriptions of these types and possibly by training the 2nd
coder on a small test set of utterances. Yet the most frequent reasons for disagreement,
reasons [6] to [8] cannot be overcome by simply fusing, adding, or redefining types. Reason
[7] is exclusively linked to utterances containing pragmatic negatives, which we added to
the set of to be coded utterances only tentatively. Thus if we remove the latter from the
utterance set as is also indicated by the automatic optimization in section 5.3.6, reason [7]
will disappear. Yet reasons [6] and [8] will remain problematic factors for even a reduced
utterance set. Both of them have to do with the coders having problems in deciding
whether an utterance is adjacent to a previous utterance, and, if yes, to which one that
would be. The obvious solution to these problems is an improvement of the robot’s turn-
taking skills. This is easily said but equates to a fundamental overhaul of at least the
languaging system, as the robot has at least to know that it is being addressed and would
have to react in no later than approximately one second.
Frequencies of reasons for disagreement on felicity Similar to the analysis of rea-
sons for disagreements with regards to the pragmatic type, we tabulated the reasons for
disagreements with regards to the felicity or adequacy of utterances in table 5.37. As can
be seen there the most frequent reason for disagreements on felicity is reason [7], which
just applies to utterances containing pragmatic negatives. As already mentioned in the last
paragraph, this reason disappears as soon as we eliminate utterances containing pragmatic
negatives from the coding set. Interestingly the second-most frequent reason is one of the
most general reasons for disagreements between coders: disagreement with respect to the
intention of Deechee, i.e. disagreement as to whether Deechee really wants an object or
not or disagreement as to whether Deechee performed an action intentionally or not. This
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reason did not play much of a role for coders when trying to determine the negation type,
Table 5.37: Counts of
reasons for disagreement
with regards to felicity
between coders
reason count
[1] 2
[2] 2
[3] 1
[4] 3
[5] 0
[6] 8
[7] 16
[8] 9
[9] 2
[10] 10
as can be seen in the last paragraph. Yet this result indicates that
knowing what an agent is intending or not intending to do, may
be very important in order to judge if an utterance is adequate
in a particular situation, especially when it comes to negation.
Technical glitches in the arm controller of the robot sometimes
prevented it from reaching towards an object, when it actually
wanted to, indicated by Deechee’s smile. Coder 1, as developer
of the system, was perfectly aware of this technical shortcoming,
did not ‘get fooled’ by this and knew that Deechee, despite its
physical handicap, still wanted to reach for the object and there-
fore judged its intention as such: Deechee wants the object. The
2nd coder though, who had not been involved with the technical
development of the system, did not know about this and therefore
at times judged Deechee’s intention differently. This in itself is an
interesting result: even when judging an utterance on felicity in
an intuitive manner, i.e. without adhering to any formal criteria,
utterances are still judged in the light of the assumed intention of the speaker. This is
a prediction that speech act theorists would possibly have made, if they cared about any
real-world data: the speaker attitudes and intentions are in SAT formal criteria that de-
termine the felicity of an utterance. The remaining two most frequent reasons, [8] and [6],
were also frequent reasons for disagreement on the type of a negative utterance and were
briefly discussed in the previous paragraph.
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Table 5.38: Potential changes of negation types as indicated by coders during review of utterances
of disagreement. The order of the listing, type 1 ↔ type 2, does not the indicate the direction of
correction, old type → new alternative type. [x] + [y] denotes that two reasons for disagreement
were given for a particular utterance of disagreement, a x [Y]: reason Y applied a times for this
pair of types.
coder 1
type 1 type 2 freq. reasons for uncertainty
mot-dep. denial mot-dep. exclamation 4 3x[8],[8]+[9]
rejection truth-func. denial 4 3x[6],[8]
rejection mot. dep. denial 4 2x[8],[8]+[10],[2]
truth-func. denial mot. dep. denial 2 [6][8]
none neg. agreement 2 2x[7]
mot-dep. denial neg. agreement 1 [5]
rejection mot-dep. exclamation 1 [8]
self-prohibition rejection 1 [8]
self-prohibition mot-dep. denial 1 [8]
truth-func. denial neg. agreement 1 [8]
coder 2
type 1 type 2 freq. reasons for uncertainty
rejection truth-func. denial 6 6x[6]
self-prohibition neg. agreement 5 4x[3],[8]
rejection mot-dep. denial 2 [8],[9]
self-prohibition mot-dep. denial 1 [8]
rejection neg. agreement 1 [8]
mot-dep. denial neg. imperative 1 [7]
Frequencies for alternative types for cases of disagreement as indicated by
coders As briefly mentioned above, the coders also noted alternative type decisions upon
reviewing their categorical judgments for utterances of disagreement. The outcome of this
process is displayed in table 5.38, separately for each coder and with an additional listing of
the reasons associated to each type-pair. Note that the order of the pairs in this table does
not state, which of the respective two types in each row is the type which was effectively
chosen and which one is the alternative that was indicated as such during the review.
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Uncertainties of coder 1 Two of the three most frequent type-pairs for coder 1,
together accounting for more than 50% of uncertainties on part of this coder, are uncer-
tainties in terms of adjacency. The alternatives mot.-dep. denial ↔ mot.-dep. exclamation
indicates that the coder was uncertain in these cases as to whether the robot’s respective
utterance was adjacent to an utterance by the participant (→ mot.-dep. denial), or not
adjacent to any communicative move at all (→ mot.-dep. exclamation). The alternatives
rejection ↔ mot.-dep. denial indicate as well that the coder was uncertain in terms of
adjacency, yet in this case the coder decided that the robot’s respective utterance is ad-
jacent to some move, but uncertain as to whether it is adjacent to an utterance or to a
non-linguistic offer. The third-most frequent type-pair, rejection ↔ truth-functional denial
cannot be explained exclusively in terms of adjacency. This uncertainty appears to be of
a more fundamental kind: the coder is not sure if the negative utterance is a move within
the current ‘naming game’ such as “No, this is not a heart” (→ truth-func. denial) or if
the speaker is refusing to play the naming game with this particular object. The latter,
compared to the other utterance, is what one may call a meta-move in the sense that it
has the potential to stop the naming game itself as opposed to being a move within the
game. How caretakers manage to distinguish one from the other, and which communicative
resources toddlers use to express each of these two fundamentally different moves, is to our
knowledge not documented. We consider this a rather important issue. What the analysis
here suggests is that the robot is lacking the important capacity to act communicatively
such that the two communicative moves can be clearly distinguished from an external ob-
server’s viewpoint. We don’t think that any change within the taxonomy could overcome
this problem and would not be surprised to see similar problems amongst the participants,
which might be uncovered by a full-fledged conversation analysis of the complete corpus.
255
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
Uncertainties of coder 2 One of the two most frequent type-pairs for coder 2 in
terms of this coders uncertainty is self-prohibition ↔ neg. agreement. This uncertainty
could be easily overcome by defining these two types more intelligibly and by a potential
training of the coder. The most frequent type-pair in terms of uncertainty, rejection ↔
truth-functional denial, is the same one as has just been briefly discussed in the previous
paragraph and hints towards a much deeper problem than could be solved by a mere
‘cosmetic’ change of the taxonomy.
Effect of type changes as indicated by the two coders It could be argued that the
low agreement of the two coders as measured by κ may be lower than is actually the case
due to the coders making over-proportionally unfavourable choices when choosing, more or
less by chance, between one of typically two potential types as indicated by 5.38. In order to
see what outcome could be expected if one assumes that the coders would have happened to
choose the respective other types as indicated in the table, we performed this hypothetical
change, and calculated the ensuing confusion matrix as well as the κ-value associated with
this matrix. Table 5.39 depicts the outcome of this operation. As can be seen there the κ-
value would have been considerably higher had the coders chosen the respective other type
in those cases of disagreement in which they, within the review, indicated a competing type.
Yet the ensuing κ-value is most probably positively skewed by virtue of the coders only
having re-examined utterances where both coders had disagreed. If the whole utterance
set would have been re-examined including those utterances where both coders agreed in
their decisions, most probably some change from agreement to disagreement would have
occurred. Based on this reasoning the κ-value in table 5.39 is most probably too high, yet
it is still located at the lower end of acceptable agreement.
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coder 2
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
co
de
r
1
[0] 9 +3 0 0 0 1 -5 0 1 +1 0 0
[1] 1 8 0 0 -1 5 2 +1 3 -2 0 0
[2] 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
[3] 0 0 0 19 +8 1 0 1 +1 0 0 -5
[4] 3 -3 0 0 0 19 +5 0 -1 1 -2 0 0 -1
[5] 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
[6] 0 0 0 -1 1 -1 5 -1 4 +1 33 +3 0 -3 1
[7] 0 0 1 +1 0 0 0 1 +1 3 +3 0
[8] 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 1 0 6
Key:
[0] truth-func. denial [3] negative agreement [6] mot. dep. denial
[1] none [4] rejection [7] mot. dep. exclam.
[2] persp. dep. denial [5] negative imperative [8] self-prohibition
r. o. a. 0.726
κ 0.663
AC1 0.695
Table 5.39: Confusion matrix ensuing from hypothetical changes of type decision (top) and mea-
sures for intercoder reliability (bottom right). Top table: small numbers in italic refer to changes
in the confusion matrix based on the hypothetical type decisions, r.o.a.: relative observed agreement
5.3.8 Insights from Combining the Quantitative with the Qualitative
Results
In order to better understand the sources of the relatively high level of intercoder dis-
agreement when determining the negation type of a particular negative robot utterance
(cf. subsection 5.3.5), we combine in this subsection the results of the quantitative ap-
proach described in subsection 5.3.6 with the results from the qualitative analysis from the
previous subsection 5.3.7.
Whereas the quantitative results indicate which types ought to be merged such that
we could expect a sufficient intercoder agreement, the qualitative results focus on the rea-
sons why certain types were confused in the first place. In other words, the quantitative
approach yields precise recommendations while being explanatorily blind, the qualitative
approach gives us explanations without making precise suggestions as to which types to
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merge. Notice that the suggestions of the quantitative approach, i.e. the particular types
which ought to be merged, coincide with those types which show a high relative disagree-
ment in the confusion matrix (table 5.32), i.e columns and rows with relatively high entries
outside of the main diagonal of the matrix. Starting with the suggested main mergers from
subsection 5.3.6, we will have a look at the reasons for the ‘confusion’ of or disagreement
on the involved types amongst coders and discuss potential solutions.
Confusion of negative agreement with self-prohibition The majority of all mergers
which can be expected to yield a sufficient intercoder agreement in both tables 5.34 and
5.35 suggest a merger of both these types. According to confusion matrix 5.32 the coders
disagreed 5 times in total with regards to these two types. In these cases it was always
the 2nd coder that chose self-prohibition when the 1st coder chose negative agreement, and
it was always reason [3] that caused this disagreement. That means that the 2nd coder’s
interpretation of self-prohibition was that she judged robot utterances to be from this
type even though they were adjacent to a participant’s utterance. Thereby she effectively
ignored that the type is listed as a non-adjacent type in the coding scheme. Subsequently
one solution in order to make disagreement between coders in these cases less probable
would be to train the coders on a test set of utterances to ensure that they internalised
the taxonomy sufficiently. Another solution would be to merge these two types. Yet,
negative agreements can be far more than only self-prohibitive adjacent utterances, i.e.
utterances in which the robot/child uses a word when approaching a forbidden object which
was previously used by the participant or caretaker in a prohibitive manner. Negative
agreements can consist of any kind of negative word, independent of having been used
previously in a prohibitive manner or not. Merging the two would therefore water down
the distinction between two potentially important functions which are both part of Pea’s
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taxonomy.
Confusion of rejection with motivation-dependent denial (and negative imper-
ative) This merger is suggested by the results depicted in table 5.34, bottom subtable,
and table 5.35, bottom subtable, sometimes with and sometimes without negative impera-
tives. According to the confusion matrix in table 5.32, rejection and motivation-dependent
denial were confused 9 times, rejection and negative imperatives were confused 5 times, and
motivation-dependent denial and negative imperatives were confused 3 times. The reasons
for the confusion of rejection with motivation-dependent denial was mainly reason [8], i.e.
the coders disagreed as to whether the robot’s utterance was linguistically adjacent to a
human utterance or not. Reason [10] was twice analysed as being partially responsible for
the confusion, i.e. the coders judged the robot’s intention differently. The reasons for the
confusion of rejection and negative imperatives were mostly reasons [8] and [9], i.e. the
coders, again, disagreed as to whether the robot’s utterance was linguistically adjacent to
a human utterance or not, or, more generally, whether it was adjacent to a physical offer
or not. Albeit a fusion of these two or three types seems from a cognitive perspective the
least problematic of all suggested mergers38 because they are mainly distinguished in terms
of conversational adjacency, merging these types into one would cover up an important is-
sue linked to the robot’s capabilities. Due to the robot’s insensitivity to the participants’
speech and its timing in real time, it is not surprising that coders find it difficult to judge
many of its utterances with regards to adjacency: technically, and from the robot’s per-
spective, they are neither adjacent nor non-adjacent, because the robot is wholly unaware
that it is spoken to.
38This is, if we take cognitive to denote mainly the mental capacities of a single agent in isolation while
ignoring certain social skills which cannot be measured in isolating settings as is the case in intelligence
tests and the like.
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We do know that toddlers at the onset of speech are already somewhat skilled in terms of
turn-taking, which means in particular that they do answer questions and react to requests
with some regularity. Our robot on the other has no notion of turn-taking. Due to its
real-time deafness, its inability to recognise a human’s moving mouth, and its inability to
recognize if it is being looked at or not, Deechee stands no chance of deliberately taking
a turn at the right time. It is lacking virtually all high-level ‘sensory channels’ that could
give it a clue whether its interlocutor is executing a conversationally relevant move or not.
Thus, instead of glossing over this important difference in the skill set of toddlers com-
pared to our robot, we should take this uncertainty of the coder’s qua external judges as
an important hint that turn-taking or sensitivity to the communicative move of a conver-
sation partner is a non-negligible skill which a conversational robot cannot do without. If
‘it does without’ some of the consequences are the ones we see here: conversation partners
as well as external observers will have severe difficulties discerning particular communica-
tive functions from each other. We have shown that if the timing of the robot utterances,
relative to the humans’ utterances, is outside of a certain acceptable variance, this will
have a major impact on the intelligibility of the utterance. Thus, turn-taking skills are
not just something that are ‘nice to have’, but they are indispensable for the acquisition
of negation.
Confusion of rejection with truth-functional denial The confusion between these
two types is probably the most worrisome of all observed confusions. Whereas it seems at
least theoretically fairly obvious how to alleviate the confusions discussed in the previous
two paragraphs, the confusion between rejection and truth-functional denial occurs to be
more fundamental than the others. The capacity to engage in turn-taking properly, i.e.
to know that a questions requires an answer and how to properly produce an answer in
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terms of intonation, content etc., might help with some of the confusions of rejection and
truth-functional denial. Two reasons for this confusion transpired during the analysis:
Reason [6], the most frequent reason, pertains to the disagreement between coders as to
whether a negative utterance was an ‘in game’ move, or whether is was a ‘meta-move’.
Less frequently reason [8], i.e. uncertainty about linguistic adjacency was associated with
this type of confusion. This reason would hopefully disappear if we equipped the robot
with the necessary conversational skills. Yet we are uncertain if this would suffice to make
the uncertainty behind reason [6] disappear.
Developmentally the emergence of rejection and truth-functional denial in child lan-
guage are typically some months apart. One reason for the frequent confusion of these two
types in our experiments might be the somewhat unrealistic setup of our language game.
An important difference between the situational contexts and (language) games on which
Pea’s data is based and the language game played between the robot and our participants
is that the former are many and the latter is one or two. That is, Pea’s mother-child
dyads were observed and videotaped while “playing, feeding, bathing, and during other
home activities” (Pea 1980). Our human-robot dyads were observed within precisely two
settings which were, in principle, very similar to each other: both scenarios were word
learning scenarios. In such scenarios truth-functional denial is extremely likely to occur by
the very nature of the task at hand: naming may be conceived of as one example of saying
what is and what is not the case, that is, stating the name of an object while the object
is physically co-present and thereby expressing public knowledge on what this object is
called. Naturally, one may deny that a proposed label is the correct label for the object
at hand which amounts to truth-functional denial. On top of this rather truth-functional
scenario, we overlaid the motivational level, that is, we equipped the robot with the ca-
pacity to first physically, and then, eventually, linguistically reject a particular object. It
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is unclear if such a scenario is realistic in the sense that it may not occur very frequently
in mother-child interaction.
The approximate equivalent of this scenario in a setting with mother-child dyads is
most likely the following: The mother shows her son or daughter a picture book with
animals or the like, points to the various things displayed in the book, names them, and
says other things about them. Furthermore, she most probably will ask the child if it
knows the names of these things, either mainly for educational purposes or just for the
purpose of involving the child in the game. Rejection on the part of the child may not
occur very often in this setting, while the naming game is being played, so to say. Rejection
on the part of the toddler seems likely to either occur before the start of the game, and
may prevent the game from being played in the first place, or it may end the game. Pea
(1980) does not specify the situational context or the particular language game within
which he observed the particular types of negation. Thus we have to speculate within
which or during the onset of which particular language games rejection and truth-functional
denial were produced jointly within a small time frame, if at all. The temporally tightly
interleaved usage of rejection and truth-functional denial seems not very likely in the
aforementioned picture-book setting to us. Yet this is precisely the setting into which we
forced our participants and based on which the coders had to make their decisions. Where
it seems likely that a parent would end the game, if faced with recurring opposition, our
participants are somewhat forced to go on due to the simple fact that they were told that
each session lasted 5 minutes and that they should also present objects to the robot which
the latter does not like. The instruction was given in order to increase the probability of
negative intent interpretations being produced by participants. As we will see in the next
section, this led precisely to what we intended to happen, i.e. negative intent interpretations
and negative motivational questions were produced by participants in abundance. Yet we
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thereby evidently created a somewhat artificial scenario, which subsequently led to many
of the robot’s productions of negation to qualify as truth-functional denials due to our
setting.
Nevertheless we strongly believe that children even in the one-word stage do have
means, expressed via some form of rejection, to stop an ongoing intersubjective activity
such as the naming game, and that these forms must be discernible from the ‘in-game’ form
of negation simply because they would not be efficacious otherwise. Whatever behaviour
of the child is involved in making these two types of negation discernible from each other to
the interlocutor, it is these behavioural manifestations, linguistic or otherwise, that would
enable the interlocutor as the observer to distinguish rejection from truth-functional denial.
We do not think that merging these two types for the sake of a hypothetically sufficient
intercoder agreement is a good idea. We take the apparent confusion of these two types
in our experiments as an indication that the acquisition of negation on part of the robot
is incomplete.
We discussed in the previous three paragraphs the issues that would arise out of each of
the suggested changes in the taxonomy. The most frequently suggested change of merging
rejection with truth-functional denial in particular would alienate our taxonomy from those
taxonomies of negation that have been set up to depict the developmental trajectory of
negation in early child language. We therefore decided that a change of the taxonomy
to hypothetically increase the intercoder agreement would gloss over some fundamental
shortcomings of the robot’s conversational capabilities and would not be beneficial for our
understanding of the topic. Subsequently, due to the low intercoder agreement, we will
have to be careful with any counts that are based on the often confused types.
It should be noted at this point that intercoder agreements as low as ours which have
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been incurred during the pragmatic coding of human child utterances, have been reported
by some researchers. These will be discussed in chapter 6.
5.3.9 Pragmatic Analysis of Participants’ Negation
In this subsection we will use the taxonomy for human negation presented in the previ-
ous subsection in order to determine which types of negation were produced within the
rejection and prohibition experiments by our participants. We will then compare the two
experiments with each other to detect differences in terms of these types. Subsequently,
the pragmatic and word level will be linked in order to characterise the relationship be-
tween functional negation types and lexical negation words by looking at two different
aspects. First, we will determine the relative production frequencies of the most frequent
negation words within the most frequent negation types. Thereafter we will look at the
saliency rates of these words when being produced within instances of said negation types.
Lastly, after having determined said saliency rates, we will have a closer look at the two
factors which impact on prosodic saliency. By comparing the utterance length of negative
utterances of the most frequently occurring negation types with salient negative words on
the one hand with the general utterance length of utterances of these types on the other,
we will get a better understanding about the impact of this factor on saliency and thereby,
indirectly, on the role of prosodic emphasis.
All counts are based on the codes of single utterances as judged by the first coder which
contain one or more of the lexical negation words listed in table 5.1. As mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter, one utterance can constitute more than one negation type,
especially if the utterance consists of several clauses. In the majority of cases however one
utterance corresponds to one negation type (cf. subsection 5.0.1 for examples).
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Table 5.40: Frequency of participants’ negation types - Rejection experiment. Listed are
the counts for all negation types of all participants and all sessions within the rejection experiment.
The last column lists the total count for each type across all participants minus the counts of
participant P04. This participant has to be factored out for the subsequent consideration of salient
words as a different method for detecting salient words was used. ‘?’ is not a negation type but
indicates that the coder could not decide on a type for a given utterance due to the utterance being
incomplete.
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12 total total
w/o P04
neg. intent interpret. 2 23 36 49 49 18 25 1 19 9 231 208
neg. mot. question 0 24 30 11 72 43 20 9 8 4 221 197
truth-func. denial 18 35 2 1 3 0 9 0 45 39 152 148
neg. agreement 0 4 5 0 16 9 1 0 0 0 35 31
neg. tag question 0 2 5 7 8 0 7 0 2 0 31 29
neg. persp. assertion 0 4 0 1 1 8 6 0 3 3 26 22
mot. dep. assertion 0 3 0 0 5 0 12 0 4 0 24 21
truth-func. negation 0 1 0 0 0 2 4 0 7 0 14 13
neg. imperative 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 4 11 10
neg. question 0 3 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 4
apostr. negation 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 1 7 6
truth-func. question 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
neg. persp. question 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1
? 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 2
rejection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
mot. dep. exclamation 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
neg. promise 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
total 20 102 82 69 161 84 86 10 92 62 768 666
Rejection Experiment
Table 5.40 gives an overview of the frequencies of the negation types produced by the ten
participants within the rejection experiment.
Most frequently produced negation types If all frequencies are accumulated across
participants the most frequent types produced within the rejection experiment are negative
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intent interpretation, negative motivational questions, and truth-functional denial, in this
order. Moreover these three types are heading the table by a considerable lead: on average
82.63% of all negative utterances are of one of these three types, with 62.79% of participant
P09’s utterances at the lower end and even 100% of participants’ P01 and P10’s utterances
being of these types at the upper end of the distribution. If we abstract from the ac-
cumulated numbers, which represent the more talkative participants over-proportionally,
rank the types according to frequency, and just consider the ranks, the results are not
fundamentally different: Truth-functional denial ranks first amongst 4 participants, nega-
tive motivational questions and negative intent interpretations each rank first amongst 3
participants. With regards to the second-highest ranking types, negative intent interpre-
tations occupy this place amongst 6 participants, and negative motivational questions is
the second-highest ranking type amongst 4 participants. On the third rank the number of
types increases to include negative agreement, on this rank for 3 participants, negative tag
questions, on the 3rd rank amongst 2 participants, as are negative motivational questions.
Also negative imperatives and motivation-dependent assertions occupy the third rank of
one participant’s frequency list each together with the already high-ranking negative intent
interpretations.
Salience rates of the most frequent negation types Table 5.41 displays the salience
rates of negation words for each utterance type, i.e. the percentage of negative utterances
associated with each type whose negative words are the prosodically most salient ones. It
is important to remember that our word extraction algorithm described in section 3.6 only
extracts the prosodically most salient word from each utterance, and that these extracted
words in their entirety subsequently form the basis of the robot’s active vocabulary. In
order for the robot to acquire any negative words, it is not sufficient that participants
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produce utterances that contain negative words. The second requirement for negative
words to become part of the robot’s vocabulary is for them to be prosodically salient
within the participants’ speech.
As can be seen in table 5.41, the average salience rates of negative words within both
negative intent interpretations and negative motivational questions occur to be higher than
the same rate within truth-functional denials. The total rate across participants displayed
in the table is calculated such that each utterance is given the same weight as opposed to
giving each participant the same weight. This naturally skews the total towards the salience
rates of participants who produced more utterances of the respective type. Adjusting the
calculation such that each participant is given the same weight when calculating the total
does not change this observation: The total salience rates resulting from this calculation for
negative motivational questions, negative intent interpretations, and truth-functional denial
are 40.32%, 33.01%, and 28.88% respectively. If, additionally, those salience rates based
on very small frequencies are excluded, in our case frequencies smaller than 5, and each
participant is given the same weight, the resulting salience rates for negative motivational
questions, negative intent interpretations, and truth-functional denials are 44.33%, 36.2%,
and 33.0% respectively. If we further exclude P04 from the calculation, a participant where
a different word extraction method was used (cf. section 3.6), the resulting average salience
rates for the three types in the same order as previously are 43.51%, 46.54%, and 32.86% .
Thus all indications are that both motivational negation types have more salient negative
words as compared to truth-functional denial. Yet, as some of the percentages are based
on utterance sets of sizes < 10 we refrain from any definite assertion in this regard.
Truth-functional denial The type of negation which we may naturally expect to
occur in a teaching scenario is truth-functional denial : it seems likely that utterances of
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this kind would be produced whenever the pupil, in our case a robot, produces the wrong
answer. It seems, so to say, part of the teaching game to correct the pupil when he gets it
wrong. If, for example, the robot says “star” upon having been asked what the presented
object is being called, and when the presented object is indeed a triangle, it would not
surprise us to hear the participant qua teacher saying “No, it’s not a star” or “No, it’s
a triangle”, both cases of truth-functional denial. And indeed, as we can see from table
5.40, this kind of of utterance is produced many times by our participants within the
rejection experiment, up to 72 times by participant P07 during the 5 times 5 minutes of
all sessions. Only one single participant, P10, never produced truth-functional denial, the
9 other participants did. What is rather surprising in this context is that this utterance
type was not produced more often by the participants of Saunders’ experiment (cf. section
5.1.6) as both experiments were, as far as participants knew, about teaching the robot
object names, and additionally, in Saunders’ experiment, object colours and sizes.
Negative intent interpretations and Negative motivational questions As we
know from the evaluation of the taxonomy (cf. section 5.3.5) negative intent interpreta-
tions and negative motivational questions were frequently confused amongst coders and are
distinguished from each other only in terms of the former being judged to be an assertion
and the latter being judged to be a question. We observed frequently that participants
produced what the first coder judged to be negative motivational questions despite them
clearly seeing the emotional display of Deechee. Furthermore they frequently did not leave
the obligatory pause after asking these seeming questions, such that if was unclear to the
coder if these utterances, which had the intonational contour typically associated with
questions, were indeed that: proper questions. In such cases the two types are very easily
confused and it is questionable if it makes sense in these situations to distinguish asser-
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tions from questions. More important than the question of which of these two types these
Table 5.41: Percentage of negation types with salient negative word - Rejection ex-
periment. Listed are the percentages of utterances, classified by coder 1 as the stated negation
type, (one of) whose negation words were detected as being salient relative to the total number
of utterances of this type. All numbers are percentages relative to the total counts given in table
5.40. The last column lists the average percentage of salient negation words across participants
minus participant P04. For participant P04, one of the first participants, a different algorithm for
detecting salient words has been used. ‘?’ is not a negation type but indicates that the coder could
not decide on a type for a given utterance due to the utterance being incomplete. The total was
calculated by weighing each utterance identically which effectively gives more weight to the salience
rates of speakers who produced more utterances of the respective type.
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12 total total
w/o P04
neg. mot. question 0 8.3 56.7 63.6 70.8 48.8 30 22.2 12.5 50 49.3 54.3
neg. intent interpret. 0 4.3 69.4 51 42.9 44.4 48 0 36.8 33.3 44.2 48.6
truth-func. denial 44.4 0 0 0 66.7 0 55.6 0 48.9 15.4 28.3 29.1
neg. agreement 0 0 100 0 87.5 44.4 100 0 0 0 68.6 77.4
neg. tag question 0 0 80 28.6 50 0 42.9 0 100 0 48.4 51.7
neg. persp. assertion 0 0 0 100 100 50 33.3 0 100 33.3 46.2 54.5
neg. question 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 57.1 100
neg. imperative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 27.3 30
mot. dep. assertion 0 0 0 0 0 0 16.7 0 0 0 8.3 9.5
truth-func. question 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100
rejection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 100
neg. persp. question 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0
? 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 50 50
apostr. negation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 14.3 16.7
truth-func. negation 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 7.1 7.7
mot. dep. exclamation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
neg. promise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 40 3.9 65.9 50.7 58.4 46.4 36 20 39.1 29 41.8 47.6
utterances are instances of is that virtually all participants of the rejection experiment felt
compelled at least once to refer linguistically to the negative motivational state of the robot
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by producing one of these types without having been asked to do so39. Even more remark-
ably, 7 out of 10 participants, P04 to P10, produced these two types of negative utterances
considerably more frequently than they produced truth-functional denials such that these
negation types come to constitute the major source of negative words in the Rejection Cor-
pus (cf. section 5.2.1). When designing the robot’s behaviour, especially when designing
its motivational displays, we were hoping that these behaviours would elicit these kind of
utterances. Nonetheless we were surprised by the sheer abundance with which they were
produced by participants without them having been asked to do so. Furthermore there are
no indications that these utterances, at least on the surface, were linked to the teaching
task that participants were given.
Prohibition Experiment
Table 5.42 displays the frequencies of the various negation types produced by the partici-
pants of the prohibition experiment.
Most frequently produced negation types Within the prohibition experiment a
new negation type enters the top-ranking types, prohibition, thus leaving us with four
top-ranking types. The fact that this type is leading the total frequency count is even
more outstanding considering that the prohibition task was only in place during the first
3 sessions, i.e. nearly all of these linguistic prohibitions were produced during the first
three sessions. As opposed to the rejection experiment the frequency drop between the
top-ranking and the remaining types, i.e. the drop between the 4th- and the 5th-ranking
type is not as pronounced: here the frequency drops by only 35.6%, whereas within the
39This is not to say that participants did not refer to its positive motivational state, indeed they did.
Yet we only analysed negative utterances and these typically refer to the negative motivational state of
the robot. We did observe many positive intent interpretations but can’t give a numerical frequency due
to our focus on negation within this thesis.
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rejection experiment the observed drop is 79% between the 3rd and 4th-ranking type. The
circumstance that the type frequencies are slightly more evenly distributed within the pro-
hibition experiment can also be seen when looking at the percentages of utterances judged
to be of these top-ranking types in relation to the total number of negative utterances:
across participants on average 72.78% of all negative utterances fall into one of these four
categories. If we add the frequencies associated with disallowance to this count, which is
a type very similar to prohibition, the total coverage of these five types rises to 78.59%
which is still lower as compared to the 82.63% covered by negative motivational questions,
negative intent interpretations, and truth-functional denials of the rejection experiment.
Similar to the rejection experiment not much changes if we just consider the frequency
ranks for each participant as opposed to the absolute frequencies. This ensures that the
frequencies associated with the more talkative participants don’t overly skew the totals. For
three participants prohibition is the highest-ranking type, for two participants each negative
intent interpretations, negative motivational questions, and truth-functional denials are the
highest-ranking types, and disallowance is the top-ranking type for one participant. When
looking at the second-ranking types, negative intent interpretations lead the table with
being on this rank for 3 participants, followed by prohibition, truth-functional denial, and
negative tag questions ranking 2nd for 2 participants each. The distribution of the third
ranks is led by prohibition and negative intent interpretations with three participants each,
followed by negative tag questions with two participants, and negative agreement with one
participant.
We will thus focus in the following on the four top-ranking types plus disallowance as
they cover more than three quarters of all negative utterances produced by participants.
For the discussion of negative intent interpretations and negative motivational questions we
refer to their discussion in the previous subsection on the rejection experiment. Prohibition
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and disallowance will be discussed in the paragraph after next.
Table 5.42: Frequency of participants’ negation types - Prohibition experiment. Listed
are the counts for all negation types of all participants and all sessions within the prohibition
experiment. ‘?’ is not a negation type but indicates that the coder could not decide on a type for
a given utterance due to the utterance being incomplete.
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 total
prohibition 22 16 39 18 31 13 14 24 16 7 200
neg. intent interpret. 15 0 38 31 13 30 18 22 4 2 173
neg. mot. question 12 0 52 15 7 14 12 38 20 0 170
truth-func. denial 21 3 3 0 6 2 22 4 7 36 104
neg. tag question 1 0 14 30 0 16 1 2 0 3 67
disallowance 0 0 14 4 0 2 3 15 26 1 65
truth-func. negation 0 0 9 12 0 18 4 6 1 0 50
neg. agreement 0 0 15 3 10 0 7 3 5 0 43
mot. dep. assertion 0 0 3 12 1 1 0 5 1 0 23
neg. persp. assertion 1 1 0 4 0 5 1 2 0 1 15
negating self-prohibition 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 0 7
apostr. negation 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 6
neg. imperative 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 5
rejection 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 4
neg. question 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4
neg. promise 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4
neg. persp. question 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
? 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
mot. dep. exclamation 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
total 73 22 191 139 70 102 84 123 92 50 946
Salience rates of the most frequent negation types Table 5.43 displays the global
salience rates of the various negation types produced by participants within the prohibition
experiment. Similarly to the rejection experiment the total salience rates seem to indicate
that the motivational types, if we count prohibition as a motivational type, have higher
salience rates as compared to truth-functional denial. Also here the total for each type is
272
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human: Pragmatic Level
calculated based on each utterance being given the same weight such that the total rep-
resents the salience rates of more talkative participants more than the same rates of more
taciturn participants. If we adjust for this, by just averaging across the salience rates of all
participants, independent of their number of utterances of each type produced, the indi-
cated differences are less pronounced. If we consider the salience rates of all participants,
independent of the size of the basis, the total salience rates for prohibition, negative moti-
vational questions, negative intent interpretations, and truth-functional denial are 58.96%,
42.74%, 45.26%, and 19.93% respectively. If we perform the same calculation but restrict
it such that only the salience rates of those participants with a sufficiently large basis are
considered, in our case participants whose number of utterances associated with the respec-
tive type is > 5, the salience rates of prohibition, negative motivational questions, negative
intent interpretations, and truth-functional denial amount to 58.96%, 36.6%, 36.8%, and
29.2% respectively.
Thus the difference in salience between negative motivational questions and negative
intent interpretations on one hand and truth-functional denial on the other hand is, ac-
cording to the last method of calculation not as stark as the totals presented in table 5.43
seem to indicate, yet there still is a pronounced difference. The numerical basis for the
latter calculation is not large enough though in order to draw any definite conclusions.
However, no matter which method of calculation we choose, within prohibition negation
words reach the highest salience rate amongst all negation types. More than every second
negation word is prosodically salient there.
Prohibition and Disallowance Linguistic prohibition and disallowance might be some
of the least surprising negation types to be observed within this experiment. Within the
prohibition scenario participants were told to prevent the robot from touching certain
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Table 5.43: Percentage of negation types with salient negative word - Prohibition
experiment. Listed are the percentages of utterances, classified by coder 1 as the stated negation
type, (one of) whose negation words was detected as being salient. All numbers are percentages
relative to the total counts given in table 5.42. ‘?’ is not a negation type but indicates that the
coder could not decide on a type for a given utterance due to the utterance being incomplete.
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 total
prohibition 50 87.5 43.6 88.9 74.2 38.5 57.1 54.2 81.3 14.3 60.5
neg. mot. question 33.3 0 48.1 20 85.7 28.6 41.7 39.5 45 0 41.8
neg. intent interpret. 20 0 44.7 32.3 46.2 33.3 44.4 36.4 50 100 38.2
truth-func. denial 19 33.3 0 0 16.7 0 31.8 0 28.6 50 31.7
neg. tag question 0 0 35.7 53.3 0 56.3 100 50 0 33.3 49.3
disallowance 0 0 28.6 75 0 0 100 13.3 57.7 0 41.5
neg. agreement 0 0 46.7 33.3 60 0 71.4 66.7 80 0 58.1
truth-func. negation 0 0 11.1 41.7 0 27.8 25 0 0 0 24
mot. dep. assertion 0 0 33.3 41.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 26.1
neg. persp. assertion 0 100 0 8.3 0 0 100 50 0 0 17.4
rejection 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 66.7 0 75
neg. question 0 0 0 100 50 0 0 0 0 0 75
negating self-prohibition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 28.6
neg. imperative 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 40
apostr. negation 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 33.3 0 33.3
neg. persp. question 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33.3
? 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
neg. promise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 25
mot. dep. exclamation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
total 30.1 81.8 40.3 46.8 61.4 33.3 46.4 35 54.3 44 43.7
forbidden objects and they were taught how to achieve this in a physical manner, i.e. by
pushing its arm away. Participants were not explicitly told to use any form of linguistic
prohibition to achieve this feat, but intuitively we expected them to do precisely this.
It seems rather typical for humans from European cultures to accompany their physical
deeds, especially in the case of joint tasks, with fitting linguistic deeds, be it descriptions,
prescriptions, commands, questions, and the like. Furthermore it is hard to imagine, at
least within our European cultural circle, how one would go about prohibiting somebody
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else by the use of words without using any negatives. We can imagine stopping somebody
else from doing something, at least for a few seconds, by inarticulate, loud yelling. And
if this happens contingently when he or she engages in some action, he or she would at
some point understand that we try to do precisely this: stop them from doing something.
Yet there seem to be other cultural norms at play, that typically prevent us from doing
this, and language in such a situation is the typical tool of choice. For these reasons we
did expect participants to engage in linguistic prohibition without us experimenters having
told them to do so.
In English one would typically expect utterances such as “No!”, “Don’t!”, “Don’t do
that!”, “No, don’t!”, “No, not that!” or the like. We could also imagine a simple “Leave it
alone!”, or “Stop!”, which may or may not be ‘prefixed’ by a “No”. As we did not manually
analyse the non-negative utterances of the prohibition corpus we cannot say precisely how
many of these positively formulated prohibitions were uttered by participants, but we are
certain that there are very few of them. As we repeatedly looked through the list of all
words for lexical and pragmatic negatives before starting the pragmatic analysis we would
be rather surprised if we would have missed these expressions. We are certain that there
is no “leave it alone” in the corpus, and that there are only two “stop saying one” ’s, that
are not prefixed by a “no”. Yet these were not produced in the context of our specified
prohibition task and, therefore, do not fall into our prohibition category. Remember that
this category was specifically set up to capture those forms of linguistic prohibitions which
were used in the context of this task (cf. section B.8.5). Moreover, the above mentioned
“stop saying X” was only produced two times by a single participant and is therefore
exceptional.
Based on our corpus we can therefore state with sufficient certainty that linguistic
prohibition and disallowance have very high negation densities as they were produced by
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our participants, i.e. the probability that a prohibitive utterance or an utterance that
disallows the robot something contains a lexical negative is extremely high. With regard
to prohibitive utterances and disallowances that are performed in the context of our pro-
hibition task indeed every single instance contained at least one negative word. This is
considerably higher than the probability of an intent interpretation being negative or a mo-
tivational question being negative, where we have seen many positively formulated variants
or where the lexical negative is replaced by what we called pragmatic negatives. This, com-
bined with the circumstance that negative words have a comparatively high salience rate
within prohibitions means that prohibitions are principally an excellent source of negative
words for a word learner.
Comparison: Rejection vs. Prohibition Experiment
In order to attempt to answer our research question as to where the earliest forms of nega-
tion ultimately derive from, we compare in this section the two experiments with regards
to differences in the number of productions of the various negation types produced by our
participants. For this purpose we will analyse the first three sessions and the last two
sessions as separate blocks as the rejection and prohibition experiments only differ from
each other in the first three sessions (cf. chapter 4). We will focus on utterances which
were categorised as instances of one of the four most frequent negation types, negative
intent interpretations, negative motivational questions, truth-functional denials, and pro-
hibitions, plus disallowances. The remaining, less frequent negation types were produced
too infrequently in order to warrant a statistical analysis.
Table 5.44 lists the accumulated counts for the various types. The most conspicuous
difference between the two experiments is the presence of linguistic prohibition and dis-
allowance in the prohibition scenario and the absence of utterances of these types in the
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Table 5.44: Counts of 5 most frequent negation types grouped by session blocks. Listed
are the counts of negative utterances belonging to one of the 5 most frequent negation types and
grouped by sessions. As the rejection and prohibition experiments only differ during the first 3
sessions the type counts are summed across the first 3 session on one hand and across the last 2
session on the other for each respective experiment.
Rejection Experiment
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12 total
Sessions 1-3
neg. intent interpret. 2 17 30 25 35 10 18 1 19 9 166
neg. mot. question 0 15 19 6 38 27 16 3 6 4 134
truth-func. denial 7 14 0 1 2 0 0 0 28 16 68
Sessions 4+5
neg. intent interpret. 0 8 6 24 14 8 7 0 0 0 67
neg. mot. question 0 9 11 4 34 16 4 6 2 0 86
truth-func. denial 11 22 2 0 1 0 9 0 17 23 85
Prohibition Experiment
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22 total
Sessions 1-3
prohibition 22 16 39 18 31 13 14 24 16 7 200
neg. intent interpret. 12 0 23 13 9 25 13 14 1 2 112
neg. mot. question 6 0 25 7 3 12 7 19 9 0 88
truth-func. denial 20 2 0 0 5 1 21 3 3 26 81
disallowance 0 0 14 4 0 2 3 15 26 1 65
Sessions 4+5
neg. intent interpret. 3 0 15 18 4 5 5 8 3 0 61
neg. mot. question 6 0 27 8 4 2 5 19 11 0 82
truth-func. denial 1 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 4 10 23
rejection scenario. This is not surprising as argued in the previous subsection as non-
linguistic prohibition was part of the task in the prohibition scenario whereas it was not
part of the participants’ task in the rejection scenario.
When comparing the utterance counts of the negation types common to both exper-
iments, the differences between the two experiments are far less conspicuous. A manual
comparison of table 5.44, especially when comparing the totals, seems to indicate that
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both negative intent interpretations and negative motivational questions were produced
more frequently within the first three sessions of the rejection experiment as compared to
the same sessions of the prohibition experiment. It could be argued that because partic-
ipants engaged in linguistic prohibition and disallowance within the prohibition scenario
they simply had less opportunity to engage in the other motivation-related negation types.
Table 5.45 shows the results of the statistical analysis, a t-test based on the counts
displayed in table 5.44 comparing the respective types in both experiments against each
other. As the length of the corresponding sessions in the prohibition experiment are slightly
longer than the respective sessions in the rejection experiment, we performed the t-test on
the unmodified counts (2nd column) as well as on adjusted counts (3rd column). In the
latter case the corresponding counts from table 5.44 were divided by the factors by which
the respective sessions in the prohibition experiment were longer than in the rejection ex-
periment. The total duration of the sessions 1 to 3 of all participants within the rejection
experiment is 8600.1 seconds, and the total duration of the same sessions of all participants
within the prohibition experiment is 9361.3 seconds. Thus the adjustment factor by which
the respective counts of the prohibition experiment are divided is 9361.3/8600.1 = 1.089.
The adjustment factor for the sessions 4 and 5 is calculated accordingly with the total
length of all sessions in the rejection experiment being 5882.1 and the same length of the
prohibition experiment being 6252.6. As can be seen from the table there is a strong
tendency for lower means of production frequencies of (p < 0.1) for negative intent inter-
pretations in the prohibition experiment as compared to the rejection experiment if the
adjusted counts are considered as basis for comparison. In the case of negative motivational
questions and of the unadjusted counts of negative intent interpretations the difference in
means is also not statistically significant but there are still indications for this being the
case (p < 0.15 and p < 0.2 respectively).
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Table 5.45: Statistical comparison of most frequent negation types. Displayed are the
mean, standard deviation (sd) and t-values for the production frequencies of the displayed negation
types based on the counts in table 5.44. The third column displays the respective means for the
adjusted counts of the prohibition experiment. The adjustment factors are 1/1.089 for the first to
third session and 1/1.063 for the fourth and fifth session. ? = p < 0.05, ∗ = p < 0.1, † = p < 0.15,
‡ = p < 0.20
Rej. Exp. Pro. Exp. Pro. Exp. (adj)
negation type mean (sd) mean (sd) T mean (sd) T
Sessions 1 - 3
negative intent interpretation 16.6 (11.33) 11.2 (8.59) 1.201† 10.28 (7.89) 1.447∗
negative motivational question 13.4 (12.09) 8.8 (8.02) 1.002‡ 8.1 (10.05) 1.188†
truth-functional denial 6.8 (9.59) 8.1 (10.05) 0.296 7.44 (9.23) 0.152
Sessions 4 + 5
negative intent interpretation 6.7 (7.72) 6.1 (6.01) 0.194 5.74 (5.65) 0.318
negative motivational question 8.6 (10.25) 8.2 (8.72) 0.094 7.71 (8.2) 0.213
truth-functional denial 8.5 (9.35) 2.3 (2.95) 2.0? 2.16 (2.77) 2.055?
Furthermore there is a statistically significant difference in the means of production rate
of truth-functional denials in sessions 4 and 5 between the two experiments: participants
of the rejection experiment produce significantly more truth-functional denials (8.5) as
compared to participants of the prohibition experiment (2.3). In contrast there is no such
difference between the two experiments with regards to the motivation-dependent types.
We can only speculate why participants engaged in so many fewer truth-functional
denials in the prohibition experiment. It is possible that the presence of the prohibitive
task with the first 3 sessions pushed the word-learning task somewhat into the background
such that participants asked fewer questions about object labels and engaged more in non-
task-related talk. As truth-functional denial on the participants’ side typically occurs when
Deechee answers wrongly to object-related questions, fewer such questions would lead to
fewer occasions for Deechee to get it wrong and therefore fewer occasions for participants
to correct it via the use of truth-functional denial. Another possibility for fewer truth-
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functional denials on the participants’ side is the presence of self-prohibition on Deechee’s
side in the prohibition experiment. Sometimes Deechee answered a participant’s object-
directed question with a word previously used by participants in the prohibition task such
as can’t. In this case participants typically did not take this to be an object label, but
rather a case of self-prohibition. In such cases participants typically did not react with
truth-functional denial. They seemed to understand that what Deechee said could not
possibly be interpreted as object label and reacted by saying that it is ok for Deechee to
take this object, that it is not forbidden any more, or other utterances of this kind. In the
end only a complete analysis of all utterances could provide an answer to this question.
Our analytical focus on negative utterances here prevents us from answering this question
in a satisfactory manner.
Relating Negation Words to Negation Types
In this section we will look at the relationship between negation words and negation types.
The question of interest with regards to acquisition is if certain negation words occur more
frequently as part of certain negation types as compared to other negation types.
Within the word-level analysis (section 5.2) we showed that within both of our experi-
ments participants produced various negation words, no being the kingpin amongst them
both in terms of frequency and in terms of prosodic saliency. Furthermore we demon-
strated that this relatively high production frequency of negation words contrasted to the
way participants spoke in Saunders’ experiment where they hardly produced any negative
words. We subsequently assumed that it was the emotional displays and the motivationally
congruent behaviours of the robot that elicited the participants’ production of negation
words as opposed to some other minor differences between our and Saunders’ experiment
such as the duration of the sessions. A major analytical drawback of the word-level is the
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constraint to rather coarse-grained explanations that only refer to general differences be-
tween the two experiments. This level does not provide any explanation in terms of what
our participants actually did, i.e. what conversational functions they performed, when
producing these negation words. It is lacking any reference to the functional or pragmatic
level of the utterances produced by our participants.
To fill this explanatory gap the pragmatic analysis so far showed the high prevalence of
five of our 19 negation types in both experiments: negative intent interpretations, negative
motivational questions, truth-functional denials, and, in case of the prohibition scenario,
linguistic prohibition and disallowance. The high frequency of negative intent interpreta-
tions and negative motivational questions confirms the assumption from the word level: it is
indeed the emotional displays and emotionally congruent behaviours which led our partici-
pants to produce these kind of utterances. If the robot does not display any emotion, or if it
is not perceived to do so, participants evidently do not engage in linguistic interpretations
of these expressions nor do they pose questions about its motivational state. Why a lack
of emotional display simultaneously seems to suppress the production of truth-functional
denials, which at least on the surface don’t seem to be linked to emotional displays, is an
open question.
Despite our knowledge about the frequencies of certain negation words - word level -
and the frequencies of certain negation types - pragmatic level - up to this point we still
don’t know how precisely the two levels relate to each other. Of course we do know that
any instance of some negation type contains some negation word, this is precisely how we
constructed our negation types. However, we don’t know if instances of certain negation
types typically ‘come along’ with particular negation words. For this reason this section
analyses the frequencies of negation words within the stated negation types. We will see
that not all of the five highly-frequent negation types ‘produce’ the same amount of each
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kind of negation word.
Of particular interest is no - typically the first negation word to emerge in child language
development. If our data indicates that, firstly, certain frequently employed negation
types40 contain more no’s than others, and, secondly, that these no’s, when produced
within instances of these types, are produced with at least average salience rate, we can
conclude from which type of negation the majority of no’s in the robot’s embodied lexicon
ultimately originate.
Table 5.46 shows the total counts and percentages of negation words broken down by
their occurrence within the most frequently observed negation types across both experi-
ments. Furthermore, the table shows the salience rates of the selected negation words for
the 5 most frequent negation types.
We have already seen within the analysis on the word level (section 5.2) that from our
complete set of negation words produced by participants within our two experiments only
four were highly frequent: no, don’t, not, and, only within the prohibition scenario, can’t.
This observation can be seen replicated in table 5.46. Yet by means of grouping these
negation words by their associated negation types this table shows us something that was
not visible on the word level: the negation words produced by our participants are by no
means equally distributed across the various negation types.
We already know from the previous pragmatic analysis that can’t was exclusively
used by participants within utterances that were either instances of prohibitions or dis-
allowances. Yet, here we see that no was used nearly twice as often within prohibitive
utterances as compared to can’t. This comes as no surprise to the coders: no and can’t
40Correctly we would have to say “frequently employed instances/utterances of a certain negation type”.
As this is a rather unwieldy expression, we will in the following speak as if utterances were types (thereby
flattening the type-token distinction) as in “negation words produced as part of type xy”. In all of these
cases we really mean that negation words are produced as part of utterances which can be classified as
being instances of certain negation types, and we textually conflate these relationships just in order not to
discourage the reader with technically correct but overly bulky wordings.
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often occurred simultaneously in the same utterance such as “No, you can’t have that”, and
a singular no can work as a perfectly complete prohibition on its own. Importantly, as can
be read from subtable (b), no also has a higher saliency rate as compared to can’t within
prohibitions. Yet, it would be premature to conclude from this that no’s, when employed
within prohibitions, were, on average, prosodically more emphasized than can’ts41. The
reason for this is a second factor independent from prosodic emphasis which impacts on
our implementation of prosodic saliency: utterance length. In a single-word utterance the
one constitutive word will be extracted as the salient one no matter how weak the prosodic
emphasis is. It therefore may come as no surprise that no has a higher salience rate as
compared to can’t within prohibitions. The obvious explanation for this being the case
is that no is often produced on its own whereas can’t is typically embedded in a larger
utterance of length > 1. The only exception from this ‘rule’ would be if a speaker stops
before and after his or her production of can’t. This is possible, spoken language is often
grammatically incomplete, but not very likely. We will shed some light on the issue of
the explanatory tradeoff between utterance length and prosodic emphasis with regards to
prosodic saliency in the next section.
A fairer comparison in terms of the saliency rate of can’t is thus one that is performed
between equals, i.e. between words that in the vast majority of cases don’t come on their
own. Not is one of these words that can hardly be produced solitarily in most variants of
English42. And when comparing the different salience rates of not with the ones of can’t,
41We use here prosodically salient to mean, that the word was chosen by our salience detection algorithm
as the most salient word of the utterance. If an utterance consists of only one word it is therefore auto-
matically and trivially prosodically salient. Contrastingly we use prosodically emphasised to refer to the
acoustical properties of the production of the word. This means that the word was acoustically emphasized
by the speaker through either higher pitch, higher energy, or both.
42To the knowledge of the author there exist some dialects of English which elevate not in its production
frequency and grammatical role somewhat to the status of no such that it might be not uncommon to
produce it solitarily in these dialects. Yet, British, American, and Nigerian English, which were employed
by our participants do not form part of the dialects where this is the case.
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we can see that can’t fares rather well: its salience rate associated with prohibition (39.7%)
is higher than any salience rate of not.
With respect to no it is interesting to see that within our five most frequent types,
it typically has the highest share in terms of production of all negation words. The only
exception is its share within negative intent interpretations: there it is second to don’t.
Interestingly we find the highest absolute as well as relative number of productions of no
within utterances classified as truth-functional denials: Close to 70% of all negation words
produced within this type are no’s. This could lead us to believe that this negation type is
clearly the major source of no’s for the robot. However, if we take into account the salience
rate of no within this type we can see that this is not the case: due to a comparatively low
salience rate of no within productions of this type (34.6%), the absolute number of prosod-
ically salient no’s is far lower as compared to the number of its salient productions within
negative intent interpretations and negative motivational questions. There the salience rate
of no is up to twice as large (79.6% in the case of negative motivational questions). This
means that despite the overall larger number of productions of no within truth-functional
denials, the majority of no’s within the robot’s lexicons43 derive from the two frequent mo-
tivational types. Added up, these two types are responsible for 262 instances of no within
the robot’s lexicons, as opposed to 73 provided by truth-functional denials - less than a
third of the amount provided by the motivational types. The number of no’s provided
by prohibitions seems on the first glance comparatively low. But if we take into account
that prohibitions were only employed by participants during three out of the 5+5 sessions,
its share of no’s could be expected to be the highest of all when multiplying the absolute
43We shall remind the reader at this point that the given absolute numbers are accumulated, i.e. they
come about by lumping together the speech of all participants and all sessions. During runtime this is
never the case, i.e. the robot only ‘runs’ with one of the 20 lexicons - the one based on the speech of the
respective participant. Thus, in order to get a feel for the actual numbers of instances of words such as no
in the robot’s active lexicon, one has to divide the presented numbers for salient words by 20.
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numbers by the factor 5/3 in order to compensate for the ‘session-number disadvantage’.
The obvious danger in using accumulated measures such as the one used in table 5.46,
i.e. summing up the productions of all participants into single cross-participant numbers, is
that single very talkative participants could skew the measures such that the ensuing num-
bers do not represent the “average” participant any more. For this reason we statistically
verified the validity of these production and salience rates by calculating the production
rates for all words-type-participant combinations separately and subsequently employed
ANOVAs and, in a few cases, T-tests on this data. The results, i.e. the true means and
standard deviations on the one hand and an estimate of the statistical significance of the
apparent differences in both production and salience rates on the other hand are presented
in table 5.47.
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Table 5.46: Negation words within most frequent negation types. (Top) Listed are the
absolute frequencies of negation words grouped by negation types as produced by all participants in
all sessions within both experiments. The percentages in brackets give the share of the respective
word relative to all negative words produced within the respective type. (Bottom) Listed are the
number of salient words for each combination of negation word and type for the most frequently
produced types and words. The percentages in brackets give the share of salient productions relative
to the total number of productions of the respective word-type combination.
(a) All negation words by negation type: absolute and relative frequencies
Type neg. in-
tent inter-
pret.
neg. mot.
question
truth-
func.
denial
prohi-
bition
disallow-
ance
truth-
func.
negation
neg. tag
question
Word
no 174 (39.2%) 191 (46.2%) 212 (67.9%) 129 (52.9%) 39 (45.3%) 14 (21.2%) 1 (1%)
not 59 (13.3%) 47 (11.4%) 93 (29.8%) 40 (16.4%) 27 (31.4%) 30 (45.5%) 0
don’t 201 (45.3%) 164 (39.7%) 1 (0.3%) 2 (0.8%) 2 (2.3%) 2 (3%) 58 (58.6%)
isn’t 0 9 (2.2%) 4 (1.3%) 0 0 0 18 (18.2%)
can’t 0 0 0 68 (27.9%) 16 (18.6%) 1 (1.5%) 3 (3%)
haven’t 0 0 1 (0.3%) 0 0 7 (10.6%) 1 (1%)
wasn’t 0 0 1 (0.3%) 0 0 0 0
cannot 0 0 0 1 (0.4%) 1 (1.2%) 0 0
neither 0 0 0 0 1 (1.2%) 0 0
didn’t 7 (1.6%) 1 (0.2%) 0 0 0 5 (7.6%) 12 (12.1%)
doesn’t 1 (0.2%) 0 0 0 0 5 (7.6%) 3 (3%)
hasn’t 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1.5%) 2 (2%)
weren’t 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 (1%)
won’t 2 (0.5%) 1 (0.2%) 0 0 0 0 0
mustn’t 0 0 0 4 (1.6%) 0 1 (1.5%) 0
(b) Salient negation words: absolute frequencies and percentage relative to total num-
ber of respective word
Type neg. intent neg. mot. truth-func. prohibition disallowance
interpret. question denial
Word
no 110 (62.9%) 152 (79.6%) 73 (34.6%) 85 (65.9%) 12 (30.8%)
not 17 (28.8%) 8 (17.0%) 7 (7.5%) 7 (17.5%) 4 (14.8%)
don’t 39 (19.3%) 24 (14.7%) 0 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%)
can’t 0 0 0 27 (39.7%) 8 (50.0%)
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Table 5.47: Statistical analyses of relative frequencies of (salient) negation words
within most frequent negation types. Subtables (a) and (b): ANOVAs comparing relative
frequencies of the respective negation words across the stated negation types based on percentages
in table B.25. Percentages of word-type combinations with less than the given number of instances
were excluded from the analyses (cf. table B.25). Subtable (c): ANOVAs and T-tests comparing
salience rates of the respective negation words across negation types. T-Tests were employed instead
of ANOVAs where only 2 groups were left due to insufficient data (cf. table B.27). All numbers
are percentages. (brackets): standard deviation, ?: statistically significant with p < [p-value
table], †: T-test instead of ANOVA due to two comparative groups with sufficient data only
(a) ANOVAs of relative type-word frequencies under exclusion of measurements based on < 5 instances
Type neg. intent neg. mot. truth-func. prohibition disallowance F p
interpret. question denial
Word
no 42 (14.3) 41 (27.4) 71 (16.7) 49 (24.8) 34 (42.2) 3.481? 0.014
not 14 (9.9) 11 (10.4) 29 (16.7) 17 (17.8) 45 (34.6) 5.046? 0.002
don’t 45 (11.8) 48 (25.1) 0 (0) 0.9 (2.6) 1.7 (2.9) 28.54? 0.0001
can’t 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 33 (26.2) 20 (29.2) 14.75? 0.0001
(b) ANOVAs of relative word-type frequencies under exclusion of measurements based on < 20 instances
Type neg. intent neg. mot. truth-func. prohibition disallowance F p
interpret. question denial
Word
no 41 (13.5) 46 (20.6) 67 (20.6) 58 (19.9) n/a 3.086? 0.046
not 15 (10.0) 13 (6.0) 33 (20.6) 16 (17.1) n/a 3.112? 0.045
don’t 45 (11.4) 41 (16.7) 0 (0) 0 (0) n/a 30.57? 0.0001
can’t 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 25 (20.1) n/a 14.53? 0.0001
(c) ANOVAs/T-tests of salience rates under exclusion of measurements based on < 5 instances
Type neg. intent neg. mot. truth-func. prohibition disallowance F/T p
interpret. question denial
Word
no 63.6 (16.6) 87.4 (21.7) 36.7 (20.4) 68.7 (21.5) 43.4 (51.3) 9.044? 0.0001
not 24.3 (32.1) 17.4 (15.3) 4.1 (9.0) 34.6 (49.2) 25.6 (31.0) 1.356 0.27
don’t 15.4 (11.9) 13.7 (15.9) n/a n/a n/a 0.328† 0.255
can’t n/a n/a n/a 31.7 (26.4) 62.5 (53.0) 1.292† 0.228
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As can be seen in subtables (a) and (b), the differences in the means of production rates
are all statistically significant. When we compare the means of percentages given in these
two tables with the percentages based on the accumulated data in table 5.46 (accumulated
percentages) we can see that the latter are not too far off the actual means. As stated in
the captions of these subtables we excluded those percentages from the calculation of the
mean which were based on utterance counts less than the stated threshold: 5 in the case of
subtable (a) (criterion 1), and 20 in the case of subtable (b) (criterion 2). This was done
in order to prevent a distortion of the total mean by individual (per participant, type, and
word) percentages based on a very small number of utterances. To illustrate this problem,
an example shall be in order.
Participant P10 produced only a single utterance of the type negative intent inter-
pretation, which contained a no (cf. table B.24). Subsequently the share of no’s relative
to all negative words produced within this type by P10 is 100%. This percentage can
hardly be seen as representative for the share of a particular negation word relative to all
negation words produced within this type by this participant, as the percentage is based
on a single data point. For this reason this percentage was excluded from the calculation
of the means under both exclusion criterions (marked n/a in tables B.25 and B.26 in the
appendix). Thus, in order to be included in the calculation of the mean percentage, a
participant must have produced at least 5 resp. 20 utterances of this type. If his or her
productions fell short of these thresholds the counts for all negation words of this type for
this participant were excluded from the respective analysis.
The underlying data basis for the calculation of these percentages is displayed in the
appendix in the table B.24, the tables with the actual percentages and excluded values
(based on latter table) are appended as well (tables B.25 and B.26). For more explana-
tions on how the percentages were calculated, including exemplary calculations we refer to
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section B.6 in the appendix.
As can be seen from the two mentioned subtables, the differences between the (statis-
tically) calculated mean percentages or production rates and the accumulated percentages
are typically in the range of up to 4%. Notable exceptions are the percentage for don’t
within negative motivational questions (approx. +8% in statistical mean under criterion
1, but not under criterion 2), the percentage for no within prohibitions (approx. +5% in-
statistical mean under criterion 2, but not under criterion 1), and the percentage for can’t
within prohibitions (approx. +5% in statistical mean under criterion 1, but not under
criterion 2).
Yet, as can be seen from subtable (c), only the difference between the means of the
saliency rates for no are statistically significant. Our assertions that most no’s, that made
it into the robot’s active lexicon, originated to a large extent from productions of the
two motivational negation types, negative intent interpretations and negative motivational
questions, and, in case of the prohibition scenario, from productions of linguistic prohibition
remains valid.
Our assertion that can’t, when produced within prohibitions, had a higher salience
rate than all productions of not, is slightly relativised. The salience rate of not within
productions of disallowance is according to the ANOVA under exclusion criterion 1 34.6%,
yet the difference of the means of production rates of not across the various types is not
statistically significant. Therefore we cannot be sure how much we can trust the given
means. The data basis was too small to perform an ANOVA under exclusion criterion 2.
Nevertheless we may weaken our assertion to say that the mean salience rate of can’t is
higher than the mean salience rate of not for all negation types but one: the salience rate
of not within prohibitions. When produced within disallowances its salience rate is even
higher.
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Interim Summary
The pragmatic analysis of negative utterances produced within the rejection experiment
has shown that the vast majority of these utterances fall into one of three negation types:
negative intent interpretations, negative motivational questions, and truth-functional de-
nials. In which of these three types of negation a particular participant engaged most
varied across participants. We thus can conclude that our expectations were realized:
Firstly, participants of this experiment did engage in linguistic interpretations of the mo-
tivational or emotional state of the robot, and they posed questions with regard to these
states to the robot. Secondly, instances of both of these two negation types frequently
contain negative words as in “No, you don’t like that” - this utterance could fall into either
of these two categories depending on its intonational contour and conversational properties
such as the presence or non-presence of a subsequent pause.
Within the prohibition experiment a new negation type took over the top-rank for
the most frequently expressed: linguistic prohibition. A second new type emerged, disal-
lowance, albeit the latter was less frequently produced as compared to prohibitions, negative
intent interpretation, negative motivational questions, and truth-functional denial.
The analysis of saliency rates applied to the rejection experiment showed that negation
words when expressed within the two motivational types, negative intent interpretation
and negative motivational questions have an approximately 10% higher saliency rate as
compared to them being expressed within truth-functional denials. Applying the same
analysis to the prohibition experiment yielded a similar result, although the difference in
saliency rates between the two motivational types and truth-functional denial is less stark.
However, it appeared that negation words expressed within linguistic prohibitions reached
higher saliency rates than when expressed in any other negation type.
When comparing participants’ speech of both experimental experiments against each
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other the first, now obvious, difference is that participants within the prohibition exper-
iment engaged in linguistic prohibitions and disallowances whereas participants in the
rejection experiment did not.
Slightly less obvious, participants from the prohibition experiment showed a strong
tendency to engage less in negative intent interpretations as compared to their peers in the
rejection experiment within the first three sessions - these are the sessions during which
the prohibitive task was present or active. Furthermore there is a (less strong) tendency
for them to also engage less in negative motivational questions as compared to their peers
during the same first three sessions. Finally participants from the prohibition experiment
engage significantly less in truth-functional denials during the last two sessions as compared
to their ‘rejective’ peers during these sessions. We cannot explain on this analytical level
why this is the case.
Finally, when looking in more detail at the production rates of particular negation
words, no, don’t, not, and can’t, within the frequent negation types, we have shown that
they are not equally distributed across productions of these types. Albeit prohibitions and
disallowances were responsible for all the can’ts within the corpus, these types are also
responsible for nearly twice as many no’s. Due to these no’s having the second-highest
saliency rate when being expressed within prohibitions, this type is responsible for more
no’s in the PCS of the first three sessions than the other two motivational types, negative
intent interpretations and negative motivational questions, taken together.
Despite truth-functional denials containing overall the highest absolute production rate
of no’s, their saliency rate within productions of this type is only about half as big as com-
pared to their saliency rate within the motivational types. This allows for truth-functional
denials to contribute only ∼17% of all no’s to the total amount of no’s ‘generated’ by the
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5 most frequent types44. In contrast, negative intent interpretations, negative motivational
questions, and prohibition contribute ∼25%, ∼35%, and ∼20% to this set of no’s. Albeit
the said percentage of prohibitions (∼20%) might not strike the reader as considerably
larger than the one of truth-functional denials (∼17%), we would like to emphasise the
fact that prohibitions are only expressed during the first 3 sessions within the prohibition
scenario whereas instances of the other aforementioned types are expressed during all 5+5
sessions of both experiments45, thus rendering prohibitions much more effective in terms
of their contribution of no’s to the global corpus.
On Prosodic Saliency
An important notion, theoretically as well as in terms of our implementation, is the notion
of a word being prosodically salient. The operationalisation of prosodic saliency within
Saunders’ word extraction mechanism is such, that it is assumed that every utterance
contains at least one prosodically salient word. The extracted word subsequently becomes
part of the embodied lexicon of the robot. We have seen in the previous section that
the prosodic salience of various negation words varies between different negation types.
Especially interesting for our research question regarding the origins of negation is the
circumstance that no shows within motivational negation types a higher salience rate as
compared to it being expressed within truth-functional denials. We could take this as
an indication that no might be initially a primarily motivational entity for the language
learner precisely because it is prosodically emphasized when being used in emotional kinds
445 most frequent types: truth-functional denial, prohibition, motivation-dependent question, negative
intent interpretation, disallowance.
45This number is not entirely correct for truth-functional denials. That type is typically expressed by
participants as soon as the robot labels an object incorrectly. As the robot only speaks from the 2nd
session onwards, possibly all but certainly the majority of truth-functional denials are expressed within the
2nd to 5th session. Thus the number of sessions during which this type is most likely to be expressed is
4+4=8, which are still more than twice as many sessions as compared to those within which prohibitions
are ‘active’.
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of negation by the teacher.
In order to shed some more light on this issue we will look at the second, competing
factor with regards to prosodic salience: utterance length. Remember that our word
extraction algorithm always extracts the prosodically most salient word from any utterance.
If an utterance consists of only a single isolated word, as is the case in a simple “No!”, this
word will automatically, and trivially, be the prosodically most salient one. For these
cases we are not able to say, on the basis of our available data set, if this word was actually
prosodically emphasised or if it was salient by virtue of being the only word of the utterance.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show boxplots which visualize the distribution of utterance lengths
for all productions of the displayed word-type combinations where the stated negation
word is salient. These figures are contrasted with boxplots of the utterance length of all
productions of the same word-type combinations. Naturally the former are a subset of the
latter.
We can observe that all no’s, independent within which negation type they are pro-
duced, come frequently as self-containing utterances (utterance length (ul) = 1), whereas
this is only rarely the case for any of the other negation words. If we compare the general
length distribution of all utterances (red, leftmost boxes) with the various length distri-
butions of utterances containing no, we can see that the latter are generally lower with
one exception: the distribution of truth-functional denials. There, if all utterances of this
type and word are considered, the median ul equals 3 and 50% of all utterances have an
utterance length between 1 and 546. If we compare this to the length distribution of all
utterances, independent of type (red, left-most box) we can see that both distributions
look very similar. Yet, if we compare this to the length distribution of the subset of truth-
functional denials whose no is prosodically salient, the picture changes drastically: there
46We will abbreviate this in the following with the notation “median(ul) = 3 && 1 ≤ 50% ≤ 5”
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median(ul) = 1 and 50% of all utterances consist of single no’s47. This presents an inter-
esting contrast to salient productions of not within truth-functional denials as the latter
have a median ul of 4 and 50% of these utterances are between 4 and 5 words long. We
mentioned in the previous section that not hardly ever ‘comes along alone’ based on our
coding experience. Here we have the statistical confirmation of this very assertion.
When comparing the productions of no within truth-functional denials with its pro-
duction within the motivational types, it appears that the former are slightly longer than
the latter (truth-functional denials: median(ul) = 3 && 1 ≤ 50% ≤ 5, negative intent
interpretations: median(ul) = 1 && 1 ≤ 50% ≤ 4, negative motivational questions:
median(ul) = 1 && 1 ≤ 50% ≤ 2). When focusing on the subset of salient productions of
no across the same types (blue, dotted boxes), the difference in length distribution seems
to disappear (truth-functional denials (salient): median(ul) = 1 && 50% = 1, negative
intent interpretations (salient): median(ul) = 1 && 50% = 148, negative motivational
questions (salient): median(ul) = 1 && 50% = 149).
This indicates that the frequently salient no’s within the motivational negation types
as well as within truth-functional denial were not necessarily salient because they were
prosodically emphasised by the speakers, but rather because they were produced in isola-
tion. Naturally, by just looking at distributions of utterance lengths we can not definitively
say that these no’s, or even a majority of them, were not prosodically emphasised. But the
fact that most prosodically salient no’s were produced in isolation hints towards utterance
length being an important factor for them being salient. This is especially true for truth-
functional denials where the prosodically salient no’s are significantly more often found in
utterances of length 1 as opposed to all productions of no within utterances of this type.
47more precisely: ∼78% of all utterances have length 1 (taken from data as precise percentage is not
readable from boxplot).
48more precisely: ∼83% of all utterances have length 1.
49more precisely: ∼91% of all utterances have length 1
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When we finally focus on productions of no within prohibitions, we can discern a similar
trend. While the median utterance length of all, i.e. salient and non-salient, productions
of no is 2 and 50% of the utterances are between 1 and 5 words long, the median utterance
length of only salient productions is 1 and 50% of these productions are between 1 and 2
words long50.
Summary Based on the given analysis of utterance lengths we can now say with cer-
tainty that no’s, independent of the kind of negation within which they were expressed,
were part of relatively short utterances compared to the average utterance produced by
our participants. Many of these productions even consisted solely of these no’s and this
observation holds true for all frequently observed negation types. This may be seen in
contrast to other negation words, where this is not the case: utterances containing not,
don’t, can’t etc. are, on average, longer compared to utterances containing (or solely con-
sisting of) no. Furthermore we cannot conclude that the majority of prosodically salient
productions of no’s have been prosodically emphasised but they may have been frequently
salient by virtue of constituting single-word utterances. However, we can not exclude with
certainty the possibility that they may have been prosodically emphasized as we did not
analyse prosody directly. Only a direct prosodic comparison between these negation words
and non-negation words could yield any definite conclusion.
50more precisely: ∼72% of all utterances have length 1.
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Figure 5.7: Utterance lengths of utterances containing the most frequent negation
words, grouped by negation type (1). Displayed are box plots of the utterance lengths of the
most frequently produced negation words of the most frequent negation types, grouped by negation
type. For comparison the distribution of utterances lengths of all utterances is displayed as well
on the very left. The median is displayed as the bold bar in the middle of the box, the lower and
upper boundaries of the box are the 1. and 3. quartile respectively. The whiskers extend down-
and upwards up to 1.5*IQR (inter-quartile range). Black, solid boxplots: The underlying data is
based on all instances of the stated words. Blue, dotted boxplots: The underlying data is based on
only those instances of the stated words where this word was identified as being prosodically salient.
Red, dot-dashed boxplot: underlying data are utterances lengths of all utterances.
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Figure 5.8: Utterance lengths of utterances containing the most frequent negation
words, grouped by negation type [2]. Displayed are box plots of the utterance lengths of the
most frequently produced negation words of the most frequent negation types, grouped by negation
type. For comparison the distribution of utterances lengths of all utterances is displayed as well
on the very left. The median is displayed as the bold bar in the middle of the box, the lower and
upper boundaries of the box are the 1. and 3. quartile respectively. The whiskers extend down-
and upwards up to 1.5*IQR (inter-quartile range). Black, solid boxplots: The underlying data is
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5.4 Robot: Evaluation of Acquisition
In this section we will focus on the robot’s part of the human-robot dialogue and evaluate
its success in acquiring the ability to engage in negation. The analysis is based on the first
coder’s decision whether Deechee’s negative utterances were adequate or felicitous in the
respective situations. By doing so we treat the robot as a black box, i.e. we consciously
don’t pay attention to any of its internal workings, but rather make the judgment as an
external observer of the conversation without any formal criterion for felicity, similar to
the way that one may judge the linguistic capabilities of a child.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in section 5.3.5, the intercoder agreement on the felicity
of Deechee’s utterances was very low. The most frequent reason for this disagreement, after
exclusion of pragmatic negatives, turned out to be disagreement on Deechee’s intention. In
our particular context this means that the two coders did not agree if Deechee really did
or did not want a particular object. This will have an especially large impact with regards
to decisions on felicity of utterances, which would in a subsequent coding stage be classed
as instances of one of the motivational negation types.
Yet, as this is the only available measure for judging the robot’s performance similar
to how we may judge children’s linguistic performance, we will use it despite the low in-
tercoder agreement. The good news in this context is that there is no indication that the
first coder, whose decisions form the basis of this analysis, did judge the robot’s linguistic
performance more favourably as compared to the second coder. Table 5.48 lists the two
coders’ felicity rates on the full coding set and the three subsets where either P12 ’s utter-
ances, utterances containing pragmatic negatives, or both of the former are excluded. As
can be seen there, on 2 out of these 4 sets the 1st coder judged more of the robot’s negative
utterances as felicitous compared to the 2nd coder and on the other 2 the contrary holds.
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Table 5.48: Felicity rates of the two coders:
full: full coding set, no exclusions, -prag.: coding set
where utterances containing pragmatic negatives are
removed, -P12: coding set where P12’s utterances are
excluded, -P12 && -prag.: coding set where both P12’s
and pragmatic negatives are excluded.
coder full - prag. - P12 - P12 && -prag.
c1 53.91 46.94 54.88 48.57
c2 51.94 48.98 54.35 55.71
Pragmatic negatives were not consid-
ered for the following analysis due to
their detrimental effect upon the in-
tercoder agreement (cf. section 5.3.5).
For the coding set without utterances
containing pragmatic negatives the 1st
coder judged less utterances to be fe-
licitous (46.94%) as compared to the
2nd coder (48.98%). We expect for this
reason the percentages pertaining to the felicity of the robot’s utterances, presented in the
following, to be under- rather than overestimates.
Tables 5.49 and 5.50 give an overview of the negation types produced by Deechee within
the respective experiments as identified by the 1st coder. Within the rejection experiment
the robot did produce negation words in its conversation with 7 out of the 10 participants
but not with the participants P01, P06, and P10. Furthermore we can see that even
for those participants where Deechee did produce negative words, it did not necessarily
produce these within each session. In the conversation with P04, for example, Deechee
produced negative words during the third and fifth, but not during the second and fourth
session.
This can happen because Deechee’s productions depend entirely on the content of its
embodied lexicon. The latter is updated in between sessions, and the update consists of the
salient words which the respective participant produced in the session before. The words
prosodic saliency for their part depend on how and in which lexical context the participants
produced them in terms of utterance lengths and prosodic emphasis. Furthermore the
update also depends on whether what the participants said was uttered in a temporally
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congruent fashion. With temporally congruent we mean that an object is labeled while
it is being presented, not before or too long after the presentation. The same applies to
negative intent interpretations, negative motivational questions and prohibitions: from an
algorithmic perspective and in case of the two motivational types they should be produced
while Deechee was in the respective motivational state, not before it entered that state
and not long after it left that state. Similarly from the viewpoint of the architectural
design we expected participants to express linguistic prohibition while they were physically
prohibiting the robot, not before or too long after that.
Albeit our acquisition architecture has certain time buffers and other ‘coping mecha-
nisms’ in place to handle slight delays in a participant’s production relative to the physical
state of affairs, all of these mechanisms are very limited. The principal assumption backing
the design of the acquisition algorithm is that linguistic production happens roughly simul-
taneously to the state of affairs that is referred to within the ‘content’ of the production.
Overly severe violations of this constraint will have a detrimental impact on the robot’s
learning success. In such cases bad exemplars enter the lexicon where the respective word
is associated with non-fitting sensorimotor-motivational data. Subsequently it can happen
that what in a previous session seemed to be a ‘well-understood’ word, becomes dissoci-
ated from the correct referent due to the presence of ‘bad’, non-fitting exemplars. The
respective word might then not be expressed any more in the following session or it might
be expressed in the wrong sensorimotor-motivational context.
As compared to the rejection experiment we don’t find any single participant-robot
dyad within the prohibition experiment where Deechee did not produce any negation word
in the course of all five sessions. Yet we do find participants where the robot hardly engaged
in negation. With participant P13 Deechee only uttered four negative words during session
4, and another single one during session 5. With P14 Deechee did not use any negation in
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the second and third session during which the prohibition task was in place, whereas with
P18 the opposite was the case: Deechee used three types of negation five times during the
second session just to abandon any negative linguistic activity in all of the remaining three
sessions.
Table 5.51 sums up all sessions displayed in the previous two tables in a more compact
format for the purpose of comparing both experiments directly. We may call the absolute
total stated in the bottom-right corner an accumulated measure. With respect to this
measure every utterance has the same impact on the resulting felicity. As discussed in
previous sections such measures are skewed towards sessions where the robot was more
talkative, or more precisely, such sessions where the robot produced more negations. For
this reason we complement this analysis with a statistical one where every robot-participant
dyad is given the same weight within the total measure.
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In order to pitch our two research hypotheses on the origins of negation against each other,
hypothesis 1, the hypothesis that negation may originate in the linguistic interpretation
of a child’s motivational state by the caregiver (intent interpretations), was taken to be
the baseline for both experiments. Hypothesis 2, the hypothesis that a toddler’s use of
negation is rooted in parental prohibition, on the other hand was modeled as optional
treatment in the form of the prohibition task, present during the first three sessions of the
prohibition experiment. We thus compared the sessions 4 and 5 of the two experiments for
the respective rates of felicity of their respective utterances in order to evaluate the effect
of the treatment. The result of this comparison is displayed in table 5.52.
Ostensibly the felicity rate of all negative utterances across all participants during
these two last sessions is considerably lower within the prohibition experiment (30.15%) as
compared to the rejection experiment (67.86%): less than every third negative utterance
within the prohibition experiment was deemed felicitous, whereas this was the case for
more than every second negative utterance within the rejection experiment. On the face of
it these numbers indicate that the “prohibitive treatment” had a rather detrimental effect
upon the robot’s performance of negative linguistic acts. This result took us somewhat by
surprise as the observations that we made during the execution of the experiment seemed
to indicate that participants would quite reliably engage in linguistic prohibition, and,
furthermore, that this negation type was a very reliable source for negation words. In
order to somewhat alleviate this surprise we therefore conducted a separate analysis of
some assumptions of our experimental design, which will be presented in the following
section 5.5.
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As mentioned in previous sections, basing our analysis on absolute numbers has the disad-
vantage that the total represents those human-robot dyads more, where Deechee was more
(negatively) talkative, than those, where Deechee was rather taciturn with regard to the
expression of negatives.
In order to remedy this concern, a t-test was performed on the two sets of felicity
values of the participants in each experiment, independent of the negation type (bot-
tom row “all” in table 5.52). Two t-tests were performed, firstly, on the unpruned data
Table 5.53: Statistical comparison of felicity rates
between both experiments: Given are the mean and
standard deviation for the felicities of the robot’s production
of negation during the sessions 4 and 5 under two criteria:
Crit. 1: data basis = felicity values of all participants but
P01, P06, P10, and P18. Crit. 2: data basis as in crit. 1
plus additional exclusion of P04, P09, P13, P19, and P22.
? : p < 0.01, † : p < 0.02.
criterion experiment mean % felicity (std) T
crit. 1
R 74.4 (23.8)
3.0?
P 32.57 (30.31)
crit. 2
R 64.16 (19.8)
3.2†
P 28.02 (17.08)
set51 (criterion 1), and secondly,
on those felicity values that are
based on at least 10 utterances or
more in order to delimit the im-
pact of extreme outliers caused by
an insufficient data basis (crite-
rion 2).
The results of the t-test,
shown in table 5.53, confirm the
result of the accumulated mea-
sure: In terms of felicity (or ad-
equacy) of its negative utterances
Deechee performed considerably worse within the last two sessions of the prohibition ex-
periment as compared to the last two sessions of the rejection experiment. The difference
in means is in both cases statistically significant.
51Naturally even here human-robot dyads where the robot did not produce any negation whatsoever,
i.e. with participants P01,P06, P10, and P18, were disregarded (value n/a).
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5.5 Human + Robot: Temporal Relationships
The result of the pragmatic analysis, i.e. the comparatively bad linguistic performance of
Deechee in terms of felicity within the prohibition experiment came as a surprise to the
author and seemed to run counter to our (unquantified) observations during the execution
of the experiments. While we observed that negative intent interpretations were performed
at times without the use of negation, for example by saying “oh, you look sad” instead of “no,
you don’t like it”, we did not observe a single participant engaging in linguistic prohibition
that would not involve some negation word.
For this reason we suspected that one of our algorithmic constraints had been violated
overly much, the constraint that the ‘referent’, in our case the application of a corporal
constraint (called push in the following), and linguistic production occur roughly simulta-
neously. We will refer to the latter in the following as simultaneity constraint.
5.5.1 Temporal relations between prohibitive action and linguistic pro-
hibition
In order to specify more precisely which temporal relations between pushes and linguis-
tic prohibitions and disallowances manifested during the prohibition scenario, we recon-
structed the precise timings of utterances of both of the aforementioned types, subsequently
termed prohibition+, based on timed transcriptions, pragmatic codes, and the timings
of the participant’s corporal restraint of the robot. The latter were extracted from the
readings of the robot’s arm-pressure sensor from its log-files. We subsequently fused the
different time-lines of these two sources into one consistent time line and plotted the tem-
poral profile of prohibition/disallowance, the state of the pressure sensor, and the robot’s
motivational state against each other. An example of the result of this reconstruction is
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displayed in figure 5.9. On the top blue line we can see the timing of four instances of
prohibition+. During the second of the displayed utterances the participant starts to re-
strain the robot’s arm movement (1st peak middle red line), which lead to a transition of
the robot’s motivational state from positive to negative (bottom green line).
Figure 5.9: Excerpt of reconstructed temporal profile of human-robot interaction: the
given excerpt, taken from the reconstructed profile of P14’s 3rd session, displays the temporal
relation between prohibitive utterances and utterances of disallowance (top blue line), the robot’s
sensing of pressure being applied to its arm (middle red line), and the robot’s internal motivation
(bottom green line).
During the manual analysis of these temporal profiles we observed the temporal relations
depicted in figure 5.10. Additionally we observed the relations between pushes, and during
several pushes. Between pushes can be decomposed into:
between_pushes⇔ after_push(i) ∧ before_push(j) with j > i
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Figure 5.10: Basic temporal relations between corporal constraints and prohibition+:
The depicted temporal relations between prohibition+ and corporal constraints (“push”) were ob-
served within the prohibition scenario. Additionally two complex relations were observed which can
be decomposed in the depicted ones (see text).
and where the indices in brackets refer to the temporal order of push actions. During
several pushes can be decomposed into:
overlap_after(i) ∧ overlap_before(j) with j > i.
Important in this context are temporal constraints that apply to the prohibition+-push
relations. Assuming that a participant did execute at least two pushes during a particular
session and assuming further that the same participant produced at least one prohibition+
in between the two pushes, this prohibition+ will be naturally “between pushes”, no matter
how large the two gaps between the utterance and the two pushes are. We thus have to
impose temporal constraints on the gap between corporal and linguistic action in order
to render these relations meaningful. By looking at the various temporal profiles and
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revisiting the video recordings we determined a temporal limit of 4 seconds as maximum
gap size. If the gap between a push and a prohibition+ (and vice versa) exceeds this limit
the two actions are not considered to stand in any of our specified temporal relations. As a
last addition we added a no push (non-)relation to our set of temporal relations in order to
account for cases where participants produced prohibitions+ without touching the robot
at all.
5.5.2 Evaluation of temporal relations
After establishing which temporal relations prevailed between push actions on the one hand
and prohibitions+ on the other, a script was written to automatically extract and count
these relations based on the files resulting from the pragmatic coding and the robot’s log
files of the first three sessions of our 10 participants within the prohibition experiment52.
The relation counts based on the 30 file tuples are displayed in table 5.54.
As becomes evident from this table, our participants violated the simultaneity con-
straint quite dramatically. If we rank the totals displayed in the bottom row by frequency,
the first two ranks are distributed as follows: for 6 participants no push was the most
frequent (non-)relation, followed by 3 participants which most often uttered prohibitions
and disallowances while restraining the robot (during push). On place 3 of the top-rank is
before push for 2 participants.
52Remember that the prohibition task was only present during the first three sessions of this experiment.
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Table 5.54: Count of temporal relationships between physical constraints and pro-
hibitive utterances. Given are the counts of observed temporal relationships. Both prohibitions
as well as disallowances were taken into consideration in the given count. Counts are given for all
participants and sessions in the prohibition scenario in which participants were told to physically
restrain the robot in case of it approaching a forbidden object. Furthermore a total count per par-
ticipants is given in the last section of the table. A missing relationship type in a session indicates
that all counts were 0. Temporal relationships of the listed types set in bold are very likely to be
detrimental for an association of the salient word with negative affect. Relationships of a type set
in italic are less likely to be detrimental for said association depending on the length of the gap
between push(es) and utterance and the hypothesized duration of the motivational state triggered
by physical restraint.
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
s1
no_push 0 0 15 14 1 4 6 0 1 4
before_push 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 5 0
overlap_before 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
overlap_before_and_after 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
after_push 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 3 0
overlap_after 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
between_pushes 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0
during_push 4 0 1 0 2 0 1 4 3 0
s2
no_push 0 3 5 10 0 0 0 3 30 2
before_push 3 4 1 0 0 2 0 3 0 0
overlap_before 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
overlap_before_and_after 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
after_push 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
overlap_after 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
between_pushes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
during_several_pushes 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
during_push 5 0 2 0 4 2 0 2 0 0
s3
no_push 0 2 1 3 0 1 0 3 30 5
before_push 0 3 2 0 0 1 3 2 0 0
overlap_before 1 1 6 3 3 0 1 2 0 0
overlap_before_and_after 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
after_push 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
overlap_after 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
between_pushes 0 0 5 1 4 0 0 0 0 0
during_several_pushes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
during_push 2 0 8 1 8 0 2 5 0 0
total
no_push 0 5 21 27 1 5 6 6 61 11
before_push 4 7 3 0 0 4 6 7 5 0
overlap_before 4 1 7 3 5 1 1 3 1 0
overlap_before_and_after 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 0 0
after_push 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 0
overlap_after 2 0 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 0
between_pushes 0 0 5 1 5 0 0 3 1 0
during_several_pushes 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
during_push 11 0 11 1 14 2 3 11 3 0
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The second rank is distributed as follows: For 4 participants before push is the second-
most frequent relation, followed by overlap before (3 participants) and during push (2
participants).
How temporal relations of prohibitive action impact on the acquisition of nega-
tion
In order to understand why this frequent constraint violation is detrimental for the acqui-
sition of negation, we will discuss this with some examples after a short recapitulation of
architectural design targets and features which are important to understand the acquisition
dynamics.
Let us assume no as default negative word for the current exposition and let us further
assume that no is the salient word of the prohibitions+ produced by the participant.
The hypothetical assumption that drove the design of both our architecture as well as
our experiments is that the robot’s internal negative motivational state can be associated
with negative words similar to the association of object labels with perceptual features
in other symbol-grounding architectures. In memory-based learners such an association
comes to be merely by virtue of having a majority of exemplars in the memory where
this association is established. For our purposes this means that, all other things, i.e.
sensorimotor-states, being equal, such an association is established as soon as the majority
of no’s are attached to sensorimotor-motivational data with a negative motivational entry.
This means for the following exposition that any temporal relation which leads to a no
with negative motivational value attached being added to the lexicon is beneficial for our
learning target (good). By contrast any temporal relation which leads to a no with positive
motivational value being added is detrimental to this purpose (bad).
Our version of symbol grounding is implemented such that the salient word is associated
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with all variants of the sensorimotor-motivational (smm) vector that co-occurred during
the time when the utterance was produced. During short time frames of a few seconds,
the typical length of an utterance, in most cases nothing in this vector changes: The
robot’s behaviour does not change, the presented object stays the same, and, importantly,
the object is recognized by the object detection to be the same. If this is the case while
participants produce an utterance, the outcome will be one additional exemplar or lexical
entry that is added to the robot’s embodied lexicon. Yet, if one smm change occurs during
this production, two lexical entries for the same word will be created, one for each variant
of the smm vector. Changes in the smm data are caused through changes of the robot’s
behaviour, which for their part are caused by either timeouts or changes in the object
recognition. Also changes in the object id itself are forms of sensorimotor changes and so
is the change of the robot’s motivational state. We will in the following assume that the
object recognition works perfectly53.
The robot’s behaviour was implemented such that it would only grasp for objects that
it likes, i.e. objects that cause its motivational state to be positive. Subsequently, in the
vast majority of cases within the prohibitive setup, the robot’s motivational state will be
positive before the participant restrains its arm movement (push action)54. Restraints
of the robot’s agency lead immediately to Deechee becoming ‘grumpy’, i.e. a negative
motivational state.
For no push relations the following happens: No is uttered while the robot is and
continues to be in a ‘positive mood’, for its agency is not impeded. Instead of restraining
the robot’s arm, as they were taught to do, participants often just held the object out of
53Nothing could be further from the truth ...
54We say ‘in the majority of cases’ here, because it is possible due to a suboptimal object detection that
a presented object is misrecognised as a non-desirable one just before the application of restraint. This
would normally lead to the robot stopping to grasp. Yet if the misrecognition ‘kicks in’ just before the
participant starts to push the robot’s arm and therefore before the robot retracts its arm, its motivational
state could be other than positive.
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the robot’s reach, which has no impact on its motivational state. Such interaction will lead
to at least one exemplar of no in the robot’s lexicon which is associated to a smm vector
which has a positive motivational entry. This is bad.
In contrast, Deechee will already be ‘in a negative mood’ in case of participants starting
to restrain its arm before uttering a prohibition+ (during push). In this case one embodied
word will enter the lexicon: no associated with a smm vector containing a negative moti-
vational value. This is how we imagined the interaction to proceed from an architectural
standpoint motivated by assumptions of simultaneity in ostensive theories of meaning.
This is good.
In case of a participant starting to produce an utterance and subsequently constraining
the robot’s arm movement during that production (overlap before), two lexical entries will
be created: a no, associated with a smm vector with a positive motivational entry, and
additionally a no, which is associated with an otherwise identical smm vector but with a
negative motivational entry. This is in-between.
If the onset of utterance production happens during a push but extends to after the
end of the push (overlap after), the result will be one additional no in Deechee’s lexicon
associated to a smm vector with negative motivational entry as long as the utterance is not
overly long. The robot’s motivational system is implemented such, that its motivational
state has a certain time lag. The only exception to this rule are restrictions of Deechee’s
freedom of movement which will make it grumpy immediately. This is most probably
good.
These examples should give the reader an idea, how these different temporal relations
affect the robot’s lexicon.
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Quantification of the robot’s motivational state during prohibition+
In order to verify the just given explanations and quantify more precisely which moti-
vational states prevailed within the robot while participants engaged in prohibition+ we
counted the motivational states for each temporal relation and participant. The results are
displayed in table 5.55. The tabulation largely corroborates our explanations and further
shows that not many unpredictable recognition or other noise distorted the data. If we add
up for each participant the positive and negative motivational states prevailing during the
production of prohibitions+ it becomes clear that our expectations did not materialise. In
the interaction of 7 out of 10 participants the robot was more often in a positive motiva-
tional state when being prohibited as compared to it being in a negative state. Only for
three participants, P13, P17, and P20, the opposite holds true, and for P20 the margin of
the robot being in a negative over being in a positive motivational state is rather small.
We suspect this lacking simultaneity between the robot’s negative motivational state
and the participant’s production of prohibition+ to be the reason, probably the major rea-
son, for the acquisition of negation to be less successful within the prohibition experiment
as compared to the rejection experiment.
316
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human + Robot: Elicitation
T
ab
le
5.
55
:
M
ot
iv
at
io
n
al
st
at
es
du
ri
n
g
ut
te
ra
n
ce
s
of
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n
an
d
di
sa
ll
ow
an
ce
.
G
iv
en
ar
e
th
e
co
un
ts
of
th
e
ro
bo
t’
s
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
ls
ta
te
s
fo
r
ea
ch
te
m
po
ra
lr
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
be
tw
ee
n
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n/
di
sa
llo
w
an
ce
an
d
ph
ys
ic
al
re
st
ra
in
t.
T
he
co
un
ts
ar
e
lis
te
d
pe
r
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
w
it
hi
n
th
e
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t
(s
ee
ta
bl
e
5.
54
fo
r
th
e
fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
of
th
es
e
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
s)
.
T
he
co
un
ts
ar
e
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
ov
er
th
e
fir
st
th
re
e
se
ss
io
ns
,
i.e
.
th
e
se
ss
io
ns
in
w
hi
ch
ph
ys
ic
al
re
st
ra
in
t
co
ul
d
po
ss
ib
ly
oc
cu
r.
N
ot
e
th
at
on
e
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
of
su
ch
a
te
m
po
ra
l
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
ca
n
yi
el
d
m
or
e
th
an
1
to
th
e
co
un
t
(s
ee
se
ct
io
n
5.
5.
2
fo
r
de
ta
ils
).
T
he
en
tr
ie
s
fo
r
P
13
fo
r
ov
er
la
p_
be
fo
re
_
an
d_
af
te
r
is
so
bi
g
du
e
to
a
gl
it
ch
in
th
e
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
la
nd
/o
r
be
ha
vi
ou
ra
ls
ys
te
m
.
Sy
m
bo
ls
us
ed
:
-:
ne
ga
ti
ve
m
ot
iv
at
io
n,
+
:
po
si
ti
ve
m
ot
iv
at
io
n,
O
:
ne
ut
ra
lm
ot
iv
at
io
n
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
no
_
pu
sh
0
0
0
0
0
5
4
4
17
0
1
14
0
0
1
be
fo
re
_
pu
sh
0
1
4
0
0
7
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
ov
er
la
p_
be
fo
re
4
0
4
1
0
1
6
0
6
3
0
3
5
0
3
ov
er
la
p_
be
fo
re
_
an
d_
af
te
r
11
12
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
2
af
te
r_
pu
sh
0
0
0
2
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
ov
er
la
p_
af
te
r
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
1
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
be
tw
ee
n_
pu
sh
es
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
3
1
1
1
4
0
2
du
ri
ng
_
se
ve
ra
l_
pu
sh
es
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
du
ri
ng
_
pu
sh
11
0
0
0
0
0
11
0
0
1
0
0
14
0
0
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
-
O
+
no
_
pu
sh
0
0
5
0
2
4
2
4
1
3
14
16
0
1
7
be
fo
re
_
pu
sh
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
7
0
0
5
0
0
0
ov
er
la
p_
be
fo
re
1
0
1
1
0
1
3
0
3
1
0
1
0
0
0
ov
er
la
p_
be
fo
re
_
an
d_
af
te
r
1
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
af
te
r_
pu
sh
1
0
0
1
0
1
3
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
ov
er
la
p_
af
te
r
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
be
tw
ee
n_
pu
sh
es
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
du
ri
ng
_
se
ve
ra
l_
pu
sh
es
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
du
ri
ng
_
pu
sh
2
0
0
3
0
0
11
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
317
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human + Robot: Elicitation
If we further take our participants’ behaviour in terms of the temporal relationship between
corporal and linguistic action as indicative of how parents interact with their children when
prohibiting them from doing something, these observations have far reaching implications
for the fundamental design of symbol grounding systems. We will discuss these implications
later in the discussion chapter 6.
Quantification of the robot’s motivational state during other frequently pro-
duced forms of negation
After realising how often participants violated the simultaneity constraint in the context of
prohibition+, we are forced to ask ourselves if this constraint is heeded by our participants
when engaging in any of the other frequent negation types. To this purpose we performed
the same reconstructive temporal alignment between the robot’s motivational states and
the second group of major sources of negation words: negative intent interpretations and
negative motivational questions.
The tables 5.56 and 5.57 display the numbers and kinds of motivational states of the
robot during all of the participants’ productions of negative intent interpretations and
negative motivational questions. A manual inspection of these tables shows that in only 7
out of 100 sessions the number of positive motivational states outnumbered the negative
ones.
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Statistical comparison of prevailing motivational states during the production
of negation In this paragraph we seek to verify the impression that negative intent
interpretations and negative motivational questions were indeed expressed considerably
more often while the robot was in a negative motivational state as was the case during
the production of prohibitions or disagreements. To this purpose we compare the relative
frequencies of all three motivational states of the robot as measured for each participant
and type accumulated over all sessions. In other words, we computed for each participant
and type the relative frequencies (percentages) of each motivational state (cf. table B.30).
In order to statistically compare the relative frequencies of motivational states between the
three negation types, the relative frequencies pertaining to a particular motivational type,
negative, neutral, positive, and pertaining to a particular negation type for all participants
were pooled into one set. The ensuing nine sets, one set per motivational state and negation
type, were subsequently compared separately for each motivational state, resulting in 3
separate ANOVAs55.
In order to illustrate the comparison, an example shall be in order: For finding out if it
is indeed the case that participants produced negative intent interpretations significantly
more often while the robot was in a negative motivational state as compared to them having
produced prohibitions while the robot was in a negative motivational state, we compared
the relative frequencies of negative motivational states of all participants between the three
types applying an ANOVA to these sets. I.e. we compared the relative frequencies stated
in the 1st column (not counting the column of participant ids) of table B.30, with the
entries of the 5th and 9th column.
The ANOVAs were performed under two different conditions. In condition 1 none of
55As the relative frequencies of the motivational states for one particular type are mutually dependent,
one ANOVA would have presumably sufficed. But due to our shallow statistical knowledge, we wanted to
be sure to cover all eventualities.
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Table 5.58: Statistical comparison of relative frequencies of motivational states be-
tween negation types. Displayed are the mean and standard deviation of the relative frequencies
of motivational states in percent grouped by negation type. Furthermore the F-values resulting from
the ANOVA comparing the relative frequencies across types is presented. Condition 1: no exclusion
of data, condition 2: exclusion of relative frequencies based on less than 10 utterances. Abbrev.:
-: neg. mot. states, O: neut. mot. states, +: pos. mot states. ? : p < 0.0001, † : p < 0.01,
‡ : p < 0.02
Condition 1 Condition 2
NII NMQ P F NII NMQ P F
- 64.34 (24.65) 54.99 (19.94) 36.70 (23.38) 4.84‡ 65.94 (15.2) 56.44 (20.3) 40.78 (20.7) 5.17‡
O 25.45 (15.5) 34.79 (16.8) 10.35 (10.5) 8.25† 26.68 (12.9) 32.04 (14.2) 10.11 (11.1) 8.05‡
+ 10.22 (13.8) 10.22 (8.9) 52.96 (24.2) 30.78? 7.39 (8.46) 11.52 (8.9) 49.12 (22.2) 32.13?
the frequencies were excluded from the data sets apart for those cases where the respec-
tive participant never produced the respective negation type such as participant P14 for
negative intent interpretations (cf. table B.29). In condition 2 we excluded all relative
frequencies which are based on less than 10 utterances.
The results of the statistical comparisons are presented in table 5.5856.
As can be seen there, all differences in the mean relative frequencies are statistically sig-
nificant. Whereas under both conditions participants on average produced negative intent
interpretations (NIIs) and negative motivational questions (NMQs) about 10% of the time
when the robot is in a positive motivational state, they produced prohibitions+ while
the robot is in that state at least 49% of the time. In contrast, most often participants
produce NIIs with the robot being in a negative motivational state (∼64% vs. ∼66%
under crit. 1 and 2 resp.57), i.e. most often their negative linguistic productions of this
56The given table is based on the data of all participants. We performed the same test for participants
of the prohibitive experiment only. The resulting means were very similar and the differences of the
relative frequencies between types were equally significant. We further tested for differences in the means
of relative motivational frequencies of the same type across experiments, i.e. differences between NIIs
produced within the rejection experiment and those produced within the prohibition experiment, using
t-tests. None of the differences that were found were statistically significant. The same holds true for a
cross-experiment comparison of relative motivational frequencies of NMQs.
57We will keep this order of percentages, the mean percentage under criterion 1 first followed by the
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type are performed simultaneously with the robot’s physical display. The same, although
somewhat weaker, holds true for NMQs (∼55% vs. ∼56%), but not for the production of
prohibition+ (∼37% vs. ∼41%).
Another noteworthy observation is the statistically significant higher levels of produc-
tions of both NIIs (∼25% vs. ∼27%) and NMQs (∼35% vs. ∼32%) while the robot is in a
neutral state compared to the production of prohibitions+, which rarely takes place during
a neutral motivational state (∼10% under both criteria). The explanation for this differ-
ence is straightforward: as explained earlier, the robot’s typical motivations in the context
of prohibition+ are either positive or negative because participants typically engage in this
type as soon as the robot approaches a forbidden object and the robot only does this when
being in a “positive mood”. As soon as participants push the robot’s arm, its motivational
state flips immediately to negative, skipping the neutral state. We assume the on average
10% of utterances, which were produced while the robot was in a neutral state, to be
mainly instances of disallowance. The latter were also produced in less strict temporal
alignment with prohibitive situations. The comparatively high percentage of instances of
NMQ that were uttered while the robot was in a neutral state might be explained by some
of the participants’ interpretation of this state as Deechee being undecided. In such cases
negative motivational questions might be meant as proper questions, as the robot indeed
does not indicate his inclination towards an object in any direction.
mean percentage under criterion 2, in the following without saying so explicitly.
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5.6 Summary
Utterance level
We started the analysis of our participants’ speech on the utterance level (section 5.1).
Three measures in particular were considered: the mean length of utterance (MLU ), the
number of distinct words (#dw), and the number of utterances per minute (u/min).
In-group analysis First we determined whether any vertical changes could be ob-
served, i.e. potential adaptations of participants in their way of speaking to the robot across
the five experimental sessions. For the rejection experiment we found such adaptations for
both MLU as well as #dw. In the case of MLU these changes were only statistically signif-
icant when we compared the very first with the very last session. 3 out of 10 participants
changed their MLUs in a statistically significant manner and 2 further participants showed
tendencies to do so. These changes were such that those participants with initially high
MLUs shortened their utterances across the sessions and, conversely, those participants
with low MLUs increased their utterance lengths. For the number of distinct words we
observed a statistically significant drop by approximately 25, from approx. 117 to approx.
92, between the first two sessions after we excluded 2 participants as outliers. The two
outliers on the other hand, both of which started out with extremely low #dw (6 and 21)
increased this value between the first two sessions.
Within the prohibition experiment we observed a significant drop from approx. 4.5 to
2.3 words in the number of distinct negative words between the third and fourth session,
i.e. at the transition point when the prohibitive task (the treatment) ceased to be.
Cross-group analysis When comparing the two negation experiments in terms of
the abovementioned measures, we found statistically conspicuous differences in two of
324
Making Sense of Negative Utterances Human + Robot: Elicitation
them.
Participants of the rejection experiment appeared to generally use slightly shorter ut-
terances (MLU : 3.13) than their peers from the prohibition experiment (MLU : 3.4). Yet
this difference shows only a statistical tendency in the fourth session.
Considerably more substantial in statistical terms is the difference in the utterances per
minute between the two experiments. Albeit participants of the rejection and prohibition
experiment start out on average on approximately the same level (23.34 vs. 22.66 u/min
in session 1), the ‘rejective’ participants talk less and less from session to session, whereas
their ‘prohibitive’ peers do the opposite and appear to become more and more talkative
as the experiment proceeds. The difference in talkativeness thus increases from session to
session. Both groups finish the experiment with 21.58 u/min and 30.08 u/min respectively,
rendering this difference statistically significant.
There appears to be a similar trend during the first three sessions in the subset of
negative utterances only, yet the difference in the number of negative utterances does not
reach a significant level. Upon cessation of the prohibitive task in session 4, participants
decrease the number of negative utterances per minute such that the difference in this
measure between the two groups becomes increasingly smaller.
Comparison to speech from Saunders’ experiment When looking at the num-
ber of utterances per minute, we find a statistically increasing trend, as the experiment
progresses, that participants of Saunders’ experiment are located approximately in be-
tween the participants of the rejection and prohibition experiment.
A stark, and statistically significant difference from the very start is observable in
the number of negative utterances per minute (#nu/min). On average participants from
the rejection experiment produce more than 4 times as many negative utterances (3.2
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#nu/min) compared to the participants of Saunders’ experiment (0.74 #nu/min). This
difference is even more pronounced when the latter group is compared to participants of
the prohibition experiment (3.63 #nu/min). Here we see a first sign of the impact of the
robot’s display of emotion or volition upon the way people speak to the robot.
Word level
On the word level we established a ranking of word frequencies for each of the two word
corpora that result from conceiving of the recorded speech of all participants from each
experiment as one corpus - PC and RC for the rejective and prohibitive group respectively.
Indicators of personal involvement such as the vocative are on high ranks in both the PC
and RC. Moreover the vocative has a saliency rate well above average and would rank
amongst the 10 most frequent salient words in the RC, had we transcribed it with one
phonetic variant. We furthermore find very high frequencies of words such as like and no
that are probably indicative of participants ascribing intentionality to the robot. In the
RC no takes the 6th rank, thereby covering 2.39% of all words in the corpus compared
to a coverage of 0.56% in the British National Corpus of spoken British English (BNCS ).
When considering only the subset of prosodically salient words (RCS ), no moves up to the
second rank and covers 4.64% of latter corpus. Similar findings for no apply to the PC(S).
When looking at the saliency rates of different word groups we found for the RC(S) that
emotion words such as sad, happy, or smile, have the second-highest saliency rate (71.28%)
after the group of object labels (73.81%). This indicates that participants emphasised
these words prosodically, which in turn indicates an inclination of participants to ascribe
these motivational states to the robot. Within the PCS this group ranks on place 5 and
has a saliency rate of 55%.
In terms of negation words, we found no, don’t, and not to be the major players within
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the RC, with no being both the top-ranking and the most salient word of this group. In the
PC(S) this group is joined by can’t, ranking slightly below not in the PC but overtaking
the latter in terms of rank in the subset of salient words due to its comparatively high
saliency rate (39.8%).
When comparing these findings to the corpus derived from speech in Saunders’ exper-
iment (SC ), we found that participants there used you considerably less as compared to
both the RC and PC (10th rank in SC, 1st rank in both RC and PC ). Equally their
usages of like (approx. −75%) and the vocative (approx. −50%) are considerably lower,
which indicates a lower degree of involvement with the robot.
In terms of negation words the difference between the two negation corpora and Saun-
ders’ corpus is most dramatic. What are highly frequent words within both RC and PC,
no, not, don’t, and can’t (PC only), are hardly existent within the SC. Moreover, the few
occurrences of no that we find within the SC are considerably less salient (35.71% (SC ) vs.
58.03% (RC ), 59% (PC )). The lower production rate of negative utterances in Saunders’
experiment on the utterance level is thus mirrored in far lower ranks of negation words on
the word level. The lower salience rate of the already much fewer productions of negation
words then means, that these words hardly ever make it into the robot’s active vocabulary.
An interesting contrast in this context is the circumstance that the salience rate of
emotion words (essentially smile) within the SCS (60%) is located in between its respective
salience rate of the RC (71.28%) and PC (54.9%). Smile is in terms of its relative frequency
produced more often within Saunders’ experiment (coverage: 0.35%) as compared to the
RC (coverage: 0.07%) and PC (coverage: 0.08%). Happy and sad on the other hand, very
frequently occurring emotion words within the negation corpora (happy : 38 (RC ), 22 (PC ),
sad : 35 (RC ), 8 (PC )), were not or hardly produced within Saunders’ experiment (happy :
1, sad : 0).
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Pragmatic level
First, we presented the two negation taxonomies whose construction was guided by Pea’s
taxonomy of early child language negation but which are otherwise based on the forms of
negation which we encountered in the conversations between participants and robot.
Evaluation of the taxonomies Subsequently we presented the evaluation of the
taxonomies, which, for the lack of a pragmatic gold standard, is based on the agreement
between two coders (intercoder agreement) that applied this taxonomy to a subset of the
collected negative utterances. This evaluation yielded a good agreement for the human
negation taxonomy (κ = 0.74), but only poor agreement for the taxonomy of negative
robot utterances (κ = 0.46). Apart from letting the coders classify both the participants’
as the robots’ negative utterances for negation types, they also judged each of the robot’s
utterances as to whether they are felicitous or adequate in the respective situations. The
agreement for these judgments turned out to be even lower (κ = 0.41) than the agreement
with regard to the type. This value is at the lowest end of the boundary for moderate
agreement of the most forgiving of the three scales considered.
In an attempt to improve the robot negation taxonomy we developed and applied two
complementing methods. First we developed an automatic optimization algorithm for the
taxonomy that is guided by the idea that a reduction of negation types by virtue of merging
distinct types into hybrid types would necessarily lead to an improvement of agreement.
With the second method, a structured interview of the 2nd coder, we determined the
reasons for the coders’ disagreement. The confusion matrix that resulted from the dual
coding indicated that the major source of disagreement between coders pertained to the
coders’ choice between the types truth-functional denial and rejection. Also the automatic
optimization suggested to fuse precisely these two types into a hybrid-type. As this fusion
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would render the ensuing taxonomy virtually incomparable to established taxonomies for
early child negation, we rejected this suggestion. Instead, we have to accept that the
robot’s physical and linguistic behaviour as it was executed during the experiments, is
not sufficient for external coders to judge the robot’s negative utterances sufficiently well
according to type or adequacy.
Rather than artificially boosting the agreement by reducing the taxonomy in the sug-
gested, and what we consider nonsensical, way, we decided instead to focus on the reasons
why a higher agreement might not be reached with the given architecture, assuming the
same taxonomy. The major reasons identified for the coders’ disagreement was, firstly, a
lack of turn-taking skills.
In particular the fact that the robot is deaf in real-time while interacting with partici-
pants and its lacking real-time sensitivity for other social signals such as gaze or prosody,
renders it incapable to engage in conversational moves in a timely manner. Yet an im-
portant distinguishing criterion within our taxonomy is the linguistic and behavioural ad-
jacency of utterances to preceding conversational turns. Thus, as the robot produced his
turns under ignorance of preceding human turns, and as the temporal placement of conver-
sational turns is an important criterion to identify the type of a negative utterance, coders
had considerable problems in making decisions with regards to type as well as felicity.
Secondly, and especially important for judgments on felicity, the two coders often dis-
agreed with regards to the robot’s intentions. This was typically caused through a sub-
optimal inverse-kinematics module, which, at times, prevented the robot from reaching
out for an object, or which lead to it twisting its arm in humanly impossible ways. In
these cases, the first coder and architect, knew about the actual internal state of the robot
as indicated by its (reliable) facial expressions, its ‘real intention’ to grasp, whereas the
second coder often identified this behaviour as unwillingness to grasp. One could express
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this insight alternatively as: When it comes to negation, the success of what one does
(the speech act), depends on what one was intending to do. Conversely: If two persons
have different opinions with regards to the goal of an actor, they judge the success of his
moves under different criteria and therefore potentially differently. Taken out of context
this insight sounds astonishingly trivial, yet, as we will show here in very concrete ways,
it has far-reaching implications for the design of symbol-grounding architectures.
The only positive aspect when looking at the coders’ judgments of felicity is that both
coders yielded close to the same numbers of negative utterances which they considered fe-
licitous. Thus, there is no indication that the first coder, whose judgment was subsequently
used to determine the success of acquisition within the respective experiments, judged the
robot’s performance in an unduly positive way.
Pragmatic analysis The application of the human robot taxonomy to the utterances
produced by participants within the rejection experiment showed that the three negation
types, that participants from this experiment engaged in most, were negative intent in-
terpretations (NII ), negative motivational questions (NMQ), and truth-functional denial
(TFD). The finding, that most negative utterances were instances of the aforementioned
two motivational types (NII, and NMQ) corroborates the judgment, that we made on the
utterance level: the participants’ production of negative words was indeed linked to the
robot’s motivation-related behaviour.
We furthermore found that negation words which were produced within instances of
these two motivational types had considerably higher salience rates as compared to those
negation words which were produced within instances of truth-functional denial (rej. exp.:
NII : 48.6%, NMQ : 54.3%, TFD : 29.1%). The combination of these two facts, high overall
production rate and high salience rate of negation words, means that the majority of
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negation words, above all no, which entered the robot’s lexicon originated from human
utterances of the two motivational types.
Within the prohibition experiment the top rank of the most frequently produced nega-
tion type was taken over by linguistic prohibition while productions of the aforementioned
types still remained highly frequent. Prohibitions (P) were found to have the highest
salience rate with regard to negative utterances (pro. exp.: P : 60.5%, NII : 38.2%, NMQ :
41.8%, TFD : 31.7%). Moreover we could not find a single prohibitive utterance within
our corpus, that did not contain a negation word. This contrasts with the fact that intent
interpretations were not necessarily all negative: we did observe formulations such as “Oh,
you look sad” which appeared to have been uttered by some participants in exactly those
situations where other participants resorted to negative variants such as “No, don’t like
it”58. The latter observation in combination with the fact that negative words have a very
high salience rate with prohibitions renders prohibitions, at least in numerical terms, the
best source of negative words.
Linking word- and pragmatic level In order to determine more precisely, where
the negation words that entered the robot’s lexicon originated, we correlated the most
frequent negation words with the most frequent negation types. This correlative analysis
showed that within those sessions, where the prohibitive task was present, linguistic pro-
hibitions were the primary source of no, followed by instances of the other three frequent
types (P : 129 (85 )59, NII : 78 (48 ), NMQ : 64 (57 ), TFD : 74 (29 )), due to the combination
of high frequency and high salience rate (∼ 56−69%). Albeit instances of truth-functional
denials had within the rejection experiment the highest absolute frequency of no’s, the
58Due to our exclusive focus on negation and negative utterances, we don’t know how positive and
negative variants numerically relate to each other. This further means that the positive variants did not
enter our statistics.
59Format: absolute count (salient count)
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salience rate of this word within instances of this type in general (∼ 35− 37%) is consider-
ably lower than the salience rate of no’s produced within instances of the two motivational
types (NII : 63 − 64%, NMQ : 80 − 87%). Within the rejection experiment it is therefore
the two motivational types that constitute the major source of no’s which end up in the
robot’s lexicon despite the higher absolute frequency of this word within truth-functional
denials (NII : 97 (62 ), NMQ : 127 (95 ), TFD : 137 (44 )).
Sources of salience After having determined the varying degrees of saliencies of
negation words, with no typically having the highest rates amongst all negation types, we
attempted to isolate the reason for this salience. We determined that no as opposed to
other negation words, is typically part of shorter utterances many of which are one-word
utterances. This circumstance contributes or may even be the major factor for no to be
prosodically salient under the given operationalisation of prosodic saliency.
Assessment of the robot’s performance
The robot’s performance within the two negation experiments was assessed by comparing
the percentages of felicitous negative utterances of the last two sessions of both experiments.
The felicity (or adequacy) of Deechee’s utterances was significantly worse in the prohibition
experiment (∼ 28− 33%) compared to the rejection experiment (∼ 64− 74%). This result
did surprise us, especially considering the fact that linguistic prohibitions appeared to be
an excellent source of negation.
Temporal relationship between corporal and linguistic prohibition
In order to explain the mismatch between our intuition about prohibitions as good sources
of negation and the worse performance of the robot within the prohibition experiment,
we focused on one constraint of the acquisition algorithm, which we termed simultaneity
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constraint: the simple assumption that ‘referent’ and word occur roughly simultaneously.
As our analysis showed, most participants in the prohibition experiment did indeed violate
this constraint. 6 out of 10 participants most often acted against the instructions and
did not restrain the robot’s movement at all. Another frequently, and for our algorithm
detrimental, observed temporal ordering between linguistic and physical prohibition, was
the execution of the linguistic act before physical restraint was applied. Only 3 participants
followed our instruction in the majority of cases. A subsequent analysis of the temporal
alignment between the robot’s motivational state and prohibitive utterances showed that
the robot was on average more often in a positive (49−53%) than in a negative motivational
state (37− 41%) while participants uttered prohibitions.
By contrast we found that negative intent interpretations were produced in 64 − 66%
of the cases while the robot was in a negative motivational state as opposed to 7 − 10%
of the cases in which it was in a positive state. Similarly negative motivational questions
were 55− 56% of the time produced while the robot was in a negative motivational state
and only in 10− 12% of the time while it was in a positive state.
The fact that the majority of prohibitions are uttered while the robot is in a posi-
tive state fundamentally prevents any associative algorithm whose functioning depends on
approximate temporal simultaneity of symbol and referent to establish the correct associ-
ation. Yet before prematurely abandoning prohibitions as hypothetical early sources for
the child’s negation, we will pick up this point in the discussion chapter (chapter 6) as this
might give us important clues about principal shortcomings of the current generation of
symbol-grounding algorithms.
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P12 ((holds out crescent box towards D))
(1.5)
D ((starts to frown))
(1.8)
D crescent
P12 yea::h crescent well done
P12 ((puts down crescent box quickly))
D no ((P12 picks up circle box))
(.9)
P12 <stop saying no> ((laughs))
—Participant 12 and Deechee, session 5
Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 What did we learn?
6.1.1 Does the robot now really know how to say ‘no’?
A very simple sounding question that one may pose to us at this point is whether the robot
now knows how to negate. The answer to this question, lamentably, is far less simple. We
have seen in the previous chapter that the felicity rates of the robot’s negative utterances
were between 64% and 74% in the case of the rejection experiment, but only between 28%
and 33% in the prohibition experiment. Superficially one could now claim that in the
former experiment the robot by and large has evidently learned how to negate, as far as
an external oberver can tell, whereas it did not in the latter experiment.
The first issue here is that we have no naturalistic numbers to compare our results to.
None of the authors of our negation taxonomies have provided us with felicity rates for the
utterances of the children under observation. Even if they had given us felicity rates, we
presumably would not know how reliable they would be, as these authors did not employ
any second coders to evaluate the reliability of their judgements. This then means, that
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we really don’t know how good 30% or 70% are.
A plea towards the psycholinguists Thus, from our perspective, the first task for
modern psycholinguists is to repeat these experiments and observations and employ modern
methodology: multiple coders, and quantitative results with regards to negation type as
well as to felicity. What is also needed is more detailed and quantitative characterisation
of the source of error, in case of low intercoder agreement and/or low felicity rates.
At least one attempt has been made to evaluate the coder reliability for communicative
functions of very young children. We would like to remind the reader that we explained
our comparatively low intercoder reliabilty with the circumstance that the robot was ‘deaf
in real-time’. As it did not ‘know’ whether it was addressed or not, its utterances were
often ‘off’ with regards to the timing. For this reason the coders often could not agree
as to whether some utterance was ‘really’ an answer to a question, e.g. a case of truth-
functional denial, or if it was to be taken as a non-adjacent negation type, e.g. motivation-
dependent exclamation. This uncertainty subsequently impacts on decisions on felicity
because the various negation types have differing felicity criteria. The same holds true
for judgements on communicative intent, because communicative intent hinges, at least
partially, on adjacency: a question ‘has’ or embodies a different intent than does a response.
Accordingly, if we are to undertake a comparison between robot and human child, we
have to be fair and compare the robot with deaf children. Nicholas et al. (1999) performed
a comparison of inter-coder reliabilities between coders that coded for communicative func-
tion and intentionality of deaf children of various ages and coders that coded for the same
features of normally-hearing children. Their ‘taxonomy’ for communicative functions con-
tained 10 different types such as statement, directive, question, response, etc., but also
no clear function. Interestingly their coder agreement for intentionality for deaf children
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at the age of 12 and 18 months was slightly above and slightly below 50% respectively,
whereas it was slightly below 50% but nearly 75% for normally-hearing children of the
same two age groups. Their coder agreement for the communicative function assignment
for deaf children was first around 75% for 12 month old deaf children but then dropped
to just over 50% for 18 month old deafs and appeared to stay that way until they were 54
months of age - the maximum age considered in the experiment. The coder agreement for
the assignment of communicative function for normally-hearing children on the other hand
started out just above the 50% mark for 12 month old children, but subsequently increased
steadily towards the 75% mark at about 54 months of age. This is a very interesting result
as the intercoder reliability, though measured here as relative agreement, is not far away
from the one we measured for the robot’s utterances.
According to Nicholas et al. (1999) their results indicated that “even for those acts which
coders agreed were intentional, another 30-40% were ambiguous when coders attempted to
discern communicative function. This degree of ambiguity is greater for hearing-impaired
children, who presumably are less skilled communicators” (Nicholas et al. 1999, p. 128).
The good news then is, that our intercoder reliability for negative utterances is not that
much worse as compared to the one yielded when coding for the speech act type of 12 to
18 month old deaf children. The bad news is that we have to be extremely careful with any
judgement of a single author qua coder with regards to the frequency of communicative
functions at early ages. Thus, had the authors of our negation taxonomies produced quan-
titative judgements about the type frequency and adequacy of their childrens’ production
of early negation, we would now have to be extremely critical about them.
This emphasises the need for a repetition of the observations with modern methods
in order to verify the ‘old’ results, but also in order to quantify type frequency as well
as adequacy or felicity. Only then we will get an impression of how good children are in
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‘bringing the message across’, and only then we will be able to answer the question in the
heading: did the robot really learn how to say ‘no’?
6.1.2 Is hypothesis 2 now disqualified?
The short answer is: no. The reason for its non-disqualification due to the comparatively
low felicity values in the prohibition experiment is that there might be another explana-
tion, that does not apply to parent-child interactions. As we have seen in section 5.5,
our participants often did not ‘properly’ push the robot’s arm, i.e. they did not push it
simultaneously to uttering the prohibition.
An innocent explanation An innocent reason for their frequent non-compliance with
our instructions could be that they were either afraid or hesitant because they were not
used to or felt uncomfortable touching the robot. In this case the ‘misfit’ of the timing
between physical restraint and oral production of the prohibition may not apply to adult-
child interactions. In other words, the synthetic model does not ‘fit’ its natural counterpart.
In this case hypothesis 2 remains untouched and there are also no consequences for the
symbol grounding system.
A less innocent explanation Far more problematic, not for hypothesis 2, but for
our operationalisation of symbol grounding would be the following observation: what we
have seen in the experiments is not dissimilar to what parents do with their children.
What we have seen, was the frequent sole production of linguistic prohibition without
the execution of the prescribed corporal restraint, or the temporally earlier production of
linguistic prohibition before the application of corporal restraint. The high frequency of
both of these ‘events’ lead to an ‘incorrect’ association between positive motivational state
and negative word because the robot was still happy when the prohibition was uttered.
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The reason for the robot still being happy was its deafness.
If parents often happen to shout before they touch, or if they happen to shout without
touching at all, when uttering prohibitions, the timing becomes extremely important if
a simple associative mechanism is assumed. It is easy to imagine, especially if we take
speech act theory seriously, that shouting or the harsh pronunciation of an utterance is
unpleasant for the child, i.e. causes negative emotions. In this case it could be that the
phonetic decoding of the word takes the same amount of ‘brain time’ as it takes time for the
‘emotional valence’ of the utterance to unfold its impact. In this case a simple association
mechanism still stands a chance. If the emotional impact is delayed as compared to the
‘decoding’ of the word, the word would be associated with a positive valence. If this is
true and if hypothesis 2 holds, the learning algorithm is not one of simple association.
One could for example imagine that word as well as emotional valence are held for a
few seconds in some memory, upon which the grounding qua association process operates.
In this case the precise timing loses its importance. Many more cognitively more complex
operations are imaginable in this context. The only way, it seems, to shed more light
on the precise nature of the process, is with far more detailed observational data than is
currently available. What is needed are detailed and long-term video recordings of parent-
child interaction, not just in play settings, but rather in everyday settings where parental
prohibition is likely to occur.
6.2 Summary of contributions
Within the work presented in this thesis we have tested two hypotheses pertaining to
the origins of linguistic negation using a synthetic or constructive approach. The first
step in approaches of this kind is to construct a robotic architecture that, at least to
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a certain degree, mirrors and implements crucial aspects of the research question in the
target field. In our case the target field is developmental psychology and psycholinguistics
and the relevant research question, how children came to acquire the skill to engage in
linguistic negation, e.g. how they acquire the skill to use “no” in order to reject things
in appropriate situations and in the appropriate way. For this purpose we implemented
minimal cognitive and affective pre-requisites as they were formulated by pragmatic and
psycholinguistic theories more than 30 years ago. The humanoid was given a motivation
or affect system that was connnected to its symbol grounding system. Its output, a simple
trinary value, was treated in terms of symbol grounding in precisely the same manner as if it
was yet another sensorial input. The motivation system further triggered the humanoid’s
facial expression and its bodily behaviour such that the latter was congruent with its
motivational state and its facial expression. Equally important, we did not implement any
type of logical inference mechanism and neither did we implement any event detection that
would operate on temporally extended data.
The construction of this system thus constitutes our first contribution. The system
proved to be very successful in the elicitation of negation words in particular, and of intent
interpretations, positive or negative, in general. The recorded human-robot interactions
show that an approximately natural, linguistically mediated, human-robot interaction is
feasible and that this interaction can be effectively exploited in order to contribute to
answering long-standing psycholinguistic research questions. The architecture and the
constitutive software are available as open source and thus can freely be used by other
researchers in order to conduct similar experiments or in order to develop a modified set
of behaviours.
Upon construction of the architecture we executed two long-term experiments in order
to test two not mutually exclusive hypotheses that address the above mentioned research
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question on the origin of negation in language development.
The first hypothesis postulates that it are negative intent interpretations uttered by a
caretaker or other adults that constitute the major source of negation words for the child.
It is further assumed, equal to the usually tacit assumption of ostensive theories of word
acquisition, that these intent interpretations happen simulteously to the child being in the
respective emotional or motivational state. A second assumption of this hypothesis is that
there is a very high likelihood of negative intent interpretations containing lexical negation
words such as “no”.
The second hypothesis postulates that it is parental prohibition, i.e. the application
of bodily constraints to the child in conjunction with linguistic prohibition that forms the
developmental basis of negation. Further assumptions in the context of this hypothesis are
(a) that the bodily constraint and the linguistic prohibition are produced simultaneously,
(b) that the bodily constraint will lead directly to a negative motivational state on the
part of the child, and (c) that it is highly likely that the linguistic prohibitions will contain
lexical negation words such as “no”, “can’t”, or “don’t”.
Based on these two hypotheses and utilizing the developed architecture two blind exper-
iments with naïve participants were conducted. The participants engaged in a linguistically
unconstrained conversation with the robot in their stipulated function as language teachers.
The participants were not aware of the true purpose of the experiment, but nevertheless
produced in both experiments a very high number of negation words compared to the av-
erage frequency of negation words in spoken British English as well as compared to a very
similar experiment, that utilized the identical humanoid, close to identical experimental
instructions, but no motivation system. As a result of the two experiments, none of the
two hypotheses could be excluded.
Our second contribution is thus to have produced synthetic, quantitative, and consid-
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erably more detailed support for two developmental hypotheses that so far had mainly
been descriptive in nature. We have demonstrated in a very concrete and technical way,
that both of these potential ‘sources of meaning’ can act as such, and might constitute
alternatives to ostensive theories of meaning.
A third contribution is the advancement of symbol grounding. We have shown that it is
principally possible to ground symbols not only in sensorimotor data, but also in emotional
or motivational data.
A fourth contribution is the development of negation taxonomies for both negative
robot utterances and negative human utterances.
6.3 Discussion of impact
This thesis constitutes the first successful attempt to extend symbol grounding beyond
sensorimotor data to include emotional or motivational data. This opens a new avenue of
research, in that new kinds of words may be grounded and may be made meaningful for the
machine that have so far been out of the reach of robotic language acquisition. The reason
that the grounding of these words has not been tackled earlier may have been the, in our
opinion doubtful, conviction that they were considered too ‘abstract’, or only indirectly
groundable via other ‘more concrete’ words. We are thus convinced that negation words
are only one group of words that are amenable to such treatment, with emotion words
being an obvious second candidate group.
Albeit the idea of grounding symbols or words in anything else than sensorimotor
data may seem exotic at first glance, its plausibility is indicated by recent research in
experimental psychology that took place in parallel to the work reported in this thesis and
unbeknownst to the author (cf. Kousta et al. 2011).
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This extension of symbol grounding has allowed us to exploit the apparently natural
tendency of humans to engage in intent interpretations when faced with a comparatively
incompetent conversation partner, in order to extract and ground words directly from the
interaction without the need for third objects or shared attention, but with a heavy reliance
on simultaneity. Apart from constituting a novel approach to symbol grounding, this
interlacing of natural human-robot interaction with a language-centered machine learning
approach has the potential to build a bridge between two scientific fields, which so far
existed by and large in isolation from each other: affective computing and developmental
robotics.
6.4 Future work
As we have indicated earlier, we have gathered more data within the reported experiments
than we had opportunity to analyse. First, every participant filled out a Ten Item Per-
sonality Measure (TIPI) form (Gosling et al. 2003), which would give us an idea of certain
personality features of the participants. As the talkativeness but also the style of speech
varied considerably between participants, an obvious question is whether or not speech
behaviour is somehow correlated with personality features.
Albeit we conducted extensive quantitative and pragmatic analyses on our data, one
important analysis is still missing: a full-fledged conversation analysis. Like Fischer et al.
(2012) we retrieved some indicators that could automatically be lifted from the data, such
as supposed indicators of the speaker’s high degree of involvement with the robot. Nonethe-
less we do consider this method only a shortcut to a proper conversation analysis. We do
know as a matter of fact that at least some participants sometimes made their interpre-
tation of the robot’s behaviour ‘hearable’ and therefore observable during the interaction.
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Yet so far our examples of such interpretations are of a merely anecdotal kind. We expect
to gain far deeper insight into the ‘conversational minds’ of our participants via a full-fleged
conversation analysis (CA). Given that the total duration of all 100 sessions amounts to
between 8 and 9 hours of video recordings, a full-fledged CA amounts to a considerable
effort. Yet we don’t see any alternative, if we want to gain a deeper understanding of the
precise dynamics of the interaction.
A third avenue of future research is a deeper analysis of the dynamics between the
memory-based learner, the robot’s utterances, and the participant’s linguistic (re-)actions.
One could for example envision ‘tagging’ particular words in the lexicon from the time when
they enter the lexicon to the time that ‘they’ are uttered, similar to the use of radioactive
markers in medicine. This most probably requires a modification of the implementation of
TiMBL as we are not aware that it would allow such markings. Yet, in order to understand
the language acquisition process, one cannot ignore the dynamics between the core learning
mechanism and the interactive factors.
Finally, we expect to reach very quickly the limits of what can be done with a purely
associative learning mechanism. It would be interesting to take speech act theory even
more seriously and couple the grounding mechanism, and/or the motivation module with
a goal-evaluation mechanism and possibly switch to some kind of reinforcement learning.
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Related Publications
The majority of the work reported within this thesis has not been published yet. Two
conference publications explain the theoretical background.
Frank Förster, Chrystopher L. Nehaniv, Joe Saunders, (2011), Robots That Say
‘No’. Published in: In George Kampis, István, Eörs Szathmáry, Advances in Artificial Life
- Darwin Meets von Neumann, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer. A summary
of the negation taxonomies of Bloom, Pea, and Choi and a additional derivation of cogni-
tive requirements for the symbol grounding of negation.
Frank Förster, Chrystopher L. Nehaniv, (2010), Semiotics as Theoretical Under-
pinning for Language Acquisition in Developmental Robotics. In Klaus Mainzer (ed.),
ECAP ’10, Proceedings of the VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy,
TU München, Oct 4-6, 2010. Verlag Dr. Hut. Explains why the speaker cannot be re-
moved from symbol grounding and language acquisition systems and promotes the idea
that semiotics, in this context, is a better suited framework than truth-functional seman-
tics.
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Additional Tables and Coding
Scheme
B.1 Overview of the mapping of lexical negation words to
their phonetic counterparts
Table B.1 shows the mapping of lexical negation words to their phonetic counterparts. For
those lexical negation words with more than one phonetic counterpart, table B.2 gives an
overview of how these different phonetic forms are distributed across participants.
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Table B.1: List of mappings between lexical negation words and their phonetic coun-
terparts
lexical phonetic lexical phonetic lexical phonetic
no NOW doesn’t DAHZAXNT mustn’t MAASAXNT
don’t DOWNT DAHZNT MAHSAXNTDUHNT isn’t IHZAXNT weren’t WERNT
not NOHT haven’t HHAEVAXNT won’t WOWNT
can’t KAANT hasn’t HHAEZAXNT wasn’t WOHZAXNTKAENT couldn’t KUHDAXNT wouldn’t WUHDAXNT
didn’t DIHDAXNT neither NAYDHAX nono NOHNOHDIHDNT cannot KAENAXT
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Table B.2: Distribution of phonetic variants for negation words with more than one
phonetic variant
(a) Rejection Experiment
P01 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P11 P12
DOWNT 1 26 25 40 45 17 28 2 12 2
DUHNT 1 0 0 0 19 15 17 0 8 6
KAANT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
KAENT 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
DIHDAXNT 0 5 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 0
DIHDNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 6 0
DAHZAXNT 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
DAHZNT 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
IHZAXNT 0 0 6 0 2 0 2 0 1 0
IHZNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAASAXNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAHSAXNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) Prohibition Experiment
P13 P14 P15 P16 P17 P18 P19 P20 P21 P22
DOWNT 20 1 49 57 4 27 16 29 21 2
DUHNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KAANT 12 6 19 17 3 13 18 7 0 2
KAENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DIHDAXNT 0 0 4 6 0 1 0 7 0 0
DIHDNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DAHZAXNT 0 0 1 1 1 5 1 0 0 0
DAHZNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IHZAXNT 5 0 0 3 0 7 1 1 0 3
IHZNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAASAXNT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAHSAXNT 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
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B.2 Per session utterance-level measures for speech from Saun-
ders’ participants
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Table B.3: Utterance-level measures for participants speech from Saunders et al.
(2012). Any given number refers to the participant with participant id noted on top the cor-
responding column and the session number in the corresponding first column. Abbreviations: sX:
session nr. X, # w/# u: total number of words/utterances uttered by participant, # dw: number
of distinct words, MLU: mean length of utterance, w/min / u/min: average number of words /
utterances per minute, n/a: data for corresponding session was not available.
M02 F05 M03 F01 F02 M01 F03 F06 F04
s1
d (s) 172.7 185.5 170.1 107.1 115.2 167.9 n/a 177.3 120.2
# w 156 268 120 130 267 210 n/a 371 290
# u 51 80 41 34 55 62 n/a 99 75
# dw 29 70 34 42 74 58 n/a 103 85
MLU 3.1 3.4 2.9 3.8 4.9 3.4 n/a 3.7 3.9
w/min 54.2 86.7 42.3 72.8 139.1 75.1 n/a 125.5 144.8
u/min 17.7 25.9 14.5 19 28.6 22.2 n/a 33.5 37.5
s2
d (s) 102.4 130.6 118.9 117.9 125.5 136.9 130.7 138.7 119.7
# w 105 205 142 145 249 219 214 264 178
# u 34 48 45 35 55 63 61 77 60
# dw 24 77 37 37 65 44 56 83 41
MLU 3.1 4.3 3.2 4.1 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3
w/min 61.5 94.2 71.7 73.8 119 95.9 98.3 114.2 89.2
u/min 19.9 22.1 22.7 17.8 26.3 27.6 28 33.3 30.1
s3
d (s) 119.3 129.7 115.5 114 122.7 129 123.3 133.7 128.4
# w 99 215 97 123 236 162 200 278 220
# u 31 57 36 34 52 42 64 73 69
# dw 21 57 39 27 57 36 67 79 61
MLU 3.2 3.8 2.7 3.6 4.5 3.9 3.1 3.8 3.2
w/min 49.8 99.4 50.4 64.8 115.4 75.3 97.3 124.7 102.8
u/min 15.6 26.4 18.7 17.9 25.4 19.5 31.1 32.8 32.2
s4
d (s) 125.9 118.3 116.4 115.8 122.5 126.8 116.7 128.5 126.5
# w 90 174 82 107 172 127 200 273 192
# u 35 40 31 28 39 38 61 70 60
# dw 18 44 29 29 43 25 66 86 52
MLU 2.6 4.3 2.6 3.8 4.4 3.3 3.3 3.9 3.2
w/min 42.9 88.2 42.3 55.4 84.3 60.1 102.8 127.5 91
u/min 16.7 20.3 16 14.5 19.1 18 31.4 32.7 28.4
s5
d (s) 205.7 107.4 125.2 113.8 117.7 102.5 130.7 128.6 126.5
# w 160 182 99 122 200 93 233 234 155
# u 53 47 35 28 43 32 76 67 59
# dw 24 48 37 29 45 23 57 83 46
MLU 3 3.9 2.8 4.4 4.7 2.9 3.1 3.5 2.6
w/min 46.7 101.6 47.4 64.3 102 54.5 106.9 109.2 73.5
u/min 15.5 26.2 16.8 14.8 21.9 18.7 34.9 31.3 28
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Table B.4: Utterance-level measures for negative utterances of participants speech
from Saunders et al. (2012). Any given number refers to the participant with participant id
noted on top the corresponding column and the session number in the corresponding first column.
Abbreviations: sX: session nr. X, # nw/# nu: total number of negative words/utterances uttered by
participant, # dnw: number of distinct negative words, MLU: mean length of negative utterances,
nw/min / nu/min: average number of neg. words / neg. utterances per minute, n/a: data for
corresponding session was not available.
M02 F05 M03 F01 F02 M01 F03 F06 F04
s1
d (s) 172.7 185.5 170.1 107.1 115.2 167.9 n/a 177.3 120.2
# nw 0 0 2 0 0 0 n/a 11 2
# nu 0 0 1 0 0 0 n/a 10 2
# dnw 0 0 2 0 0 0 n/a 5 1
MLU 0 0 19 0 0 0 n/a 6.4 10
nw/min 0 0 0.7 0 0 0 n/a 3.7 1
nu/min 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 n/a 3.4 1
s2
d (s) 102.4 130.6 118.9 117.9 125.5 136.9 130.7 138.7 119.7
# nw 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 14 1
# nu 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 13 1
# dnw 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 6 1
MLU 0 0 3 5.8 0 0 0 5.6 6
nw/min 0 0 0.5 2.5 0 0 0 6.1 0.5
nu/min 0 0 0.5 2 0 0 0 5.6 0.5
s3
d (s) 119.3 129.7 115.5 114 122.7 129 123.3 133.7 128.4
# nw 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 14 3
# nu 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 13 2
# dnw 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 5 1
MLU 0 8 3.7 5 0 0 0 3 2
nw/min 0 0.5 1.6 1.1 0 0 0 6.3 1.4
nu/min 0 0.5 1.6 1.1 0 0 0 5.8 0.9
s4
d (s) 125.9 118.3 116.4 115.8 122.5 126.8 116.7 128.5 126.5
# nw 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 14 0
# nu 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 12 0
# dnw 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 0
MLU 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 6.6 0
nw/min 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6.5 0
nu/min 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5.6 0
s5
d (s) 205.7 107.4 125.2 113.8 117.7 102.5 130.7 128.6 126.5
# nw 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 7 0
# nu 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 6 0
# dnw 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 0
MLU 0 0 4 4 0 0 5 6.5 0
nw/min 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 3.3 0
nu/min 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5 2.8 0
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B.3 Complete listings of word frequencies
Table B.5: Complete word-frequencies of all words in rejection experiment. Listed
are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the
experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) yuw 1245 7.13 (28) diyjhiy 127 0.73 (58) rihmehmbax 40 0.23
(2) dhax 983 5.63 (29) dhaets 124 0.71 (58) hhaxlow 40 0.23
(3) layk 579 3.31 (30) uhkey 120 0.69 (59) sheyp 39 0.22
(4) ax 475 2.72 (31) noht 118 0.68 (60) aem 38 0.22
(5) dhihs 471 2.7 (32) hhia 116 0.66 (60) hhaepih 38 0.22
(6) now 417 2.39 (33) wayt 113 0.65 (60) nays 38 0.22
(7) wahn 396 2.27 (34) aol 110 0.63 (61) feyvaxriht 37 0.21
(8) skwea 337 1.93 (34) bohks 110 0.63 (62) taagiht 36 0.21
(8) duw 337 1.93 (35) diychiy 103 0.59 (63) puht 35 0.2
(9) tuw 311 1.78 (36) tray 101 0.58 (63) uwm 35 0.2
(9) iht 311 1.78 (37) yea 99 0.57 (63) uhey 35 0.2
(10) dhaet 302 1.73 (37) trayaenggaxlz 99 0.57 (63) ihf 35 0.2
(11) muwn 283 1.62 (38) hhaev 98 0.56 (64) shael 32 0.18
(12) hhaat 279 1.6 (38) ihn 98 0.56 (64) fao 32 0.18
(13) ihz 256 1.47 (39) vehrih 95 0.54 (65) dhehn 31 0.18
(14) trayaenggaxl 254 1.45 (40) luhk 91 0.52 (66) hhaats 30 0.17
(15) serkaxl 231 1.32 (41) wihdh 90 0.52 (66) dawn 30 0.17
(16) ihts 213 1.22 (42) gow 88 0.5 (66) yua 30 0.17
(17) downt 200 1.15 (43) aet 78 0.45 (66) ihm 30 0.17
(18) siy 195 1.12 (44) yao 77 0.44 (66) meyk 30 0.17
(18) aend 194 1.11 (45) ohv 75 0.43 (67) wuhd 29 0.17
(18) wiy 194 1.11 (46) dhehm 73 0.42 (67) dhowz 29 0.17
(19) wehl 193 1.1 (47) duhnt 69 0.4 (67) sehntax 29 0.17
(20) serkaxlz 190 1.09 (47) goht 69 0.4 (68) smaol 28 0.16
(21) ow 187 1.07 (48) sey 66 0.38 (68) yey 28 0.16
(22) skweaz 180 1.03 (49) lehts 63 0.36 (69) sahm 27 0.15
(23) yehs 179 1.02 (50) sow 59 0.34 (69) ahrtiyn 27 0.15
(24) wohnt 172 0.98 (51) krehsaxnt 58 0.33 (70) ao 26 0.15
(25) aa 164 0.94 (51) ohn 58 0.33 (71) aez 25 0.14
(26) dhea 159 0.91 (52) waots 55 0.31 (72) feys 24 0.14
(27) dahn 155 0.89 (53) gowihng 52 0.3 (73) er 23 0.13
(28) woht 153 0.88 (53) dia 52 0.3 (73) thriy 23 0.13
(28) rayt 153 0.88 (52) thihngk 50 0.29 (73) mao 23 0.13
(27) guhd 152 0.87 (52) hhaw 50 0.29 (72) shao 22 0.13
(27) axbawt 152 0.87 (53) baht 47 0.27 (71) wahnz 20 0.11
(26) ay 150 0.86 (54) axnahdhax 45 0.26 (71) dhey 20 0.11
(26) kaen 150 0.86 (55) naw 44 0.25 (72) jhahst 19 0.11
(25) blaek 145 0.83 (56) saed 43 0.25 (72) show 19 0.11
(26) hhowld 135 0.77 (57) wohts 42 0.24 (73) miy 18 0.1
(27) axgehn 133 0.76 (58) baek 40 0.23 (73) know 18 0.1
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Table B.5 – Continued from previous page
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(74) taxdey 17 0.1 (81) biy 10 0.06 (85) kyuwb 6 0.03
(74) laykt 17 0.1 (81) prihtih 10 0.06 (85) baed 6 0.03
(74) klehvax 17 0.1 (81) fayn 10 0.06 (85) thaot 6 0.03
(74) dhiyz 17 0.1 (81) lohts 10 0.06 (86) naastih 5 0.03
(75) sheyps 16 0.09 (81) bihg 10 0.06 (86) poynts 5 0.03
(75) hhaez 16 0.09 (82) laast 9 0.05 (86) fayv 5 0.03
(75) wohnax 16 0.09 (82) geht 9 0.05 (86) hhaend 5 0.03
(75) ahp 16 0.09 (82) sohrih 9 0.05 (86) yuwaxd 5 0.03
(75) ihnsayd 16 0.09 (82) wihl 9 0.05 (86) nehvax 5 0.03
(75) taym 16 0.09 (82) boy 9 0.05 (86) trayihng 5 0.03
(75) dihd 16 0.09 (82) pihraxmihd 9 0.05 (86) aolsow 5 0.03
(75) pley 16 0.09 (82) axwey 9 0.05 (86) ehnih 5 0.03
(75) rialih 16 0.09 (83) ehls 8 0.05 (86) smayliy 5 0.03
(75) sayd 16 0.09 (83) wiyv 8 0.05 (86) uhps 5 0.03
(75) ahdhax 16 0.09 (83) dhow 8 0.05 (86) stohp 5 0.03
(76) meybiy 15 0.09 (83) bawt 8 0.05 (86) ehs 5 0.03
(76) mihdaxl 15 0.09 (83) aydhax 8 0.05 (86) nehkst 5 0.03
(76) dahz 15 0.09 (83) uw 8 0.05 (86) aolweyz 5 0.03
(77) thaengk 14 0.08 (83) teyk 8 0.05 (86) loht 5 0.03
(77) gihv 14 0.08 (83) owvax 8 0.05 (86) aant 5 0.03
(78) mehnih 13 0.07 (83) wer 8 0.05 (86) hhohraxbaxl 5 0.03
(78) yuwv 13 0.07 (84) lahvlih 7 0.04 (86) rahnihng 5 0.03
(78) smayl 13 0.07 (84) rohng 7 0.04 (86) may 5 0.03
(78) bohksihz 13 0.07 (84) hhaa 7 0.04 (86) blohks 5 0.03
(79) seyihng 12 0.07 (84) dheaz 7 0.04 (87) tayaxd 4 0.02
(79) wohz 12 0.07 (84) muwnz 7 0.04 (87) owld 4 0.02
(79) yuwax 12 0.07 (84) lahv 7 0.04 (87) aen 4 0.02
(79) hhm 12 0.07 (84) saydz 7 0.04 (87) mihlihmiytax 4 0.02
(79) wihch 12 0.07 (84) wey 7 0.04 (87) rehktaenggaxl 4 0.02
(79) mahch 12 0.07 (84) awt 7 0.04 (87) nayt 4 0.02
(79) biht 12 0.07 (84) bihkohz 7 0.04 (87) wiyl 4 0.02
(79) rehktaenggaxlz 12 0.07 (84) kwayt 7 0.04 (87) hhaxm 4 0.02
(79) meyks 12 0.07 (84) kiyp 7 0.04 (87) lahvz 4 0.02
(80) aym 11 0.06 (84) werd 7 0.04 (87) liyv 4 0.02
(80) ihzaxnt 11 0.06 (84) skay 7 0.04 (87) ferst 4 0.02
(80) wia 11 0.06 (84) wahrih 7 0.04 (87) gohn 4 0.02
(80) hhiaz 11 0.06 (84) wehn 7 0.04 (87) piypaxl 4 0.02
(80) iych 11 0.06 (84) awax 7 0.04 (87) rawnd 4 0.02
(80) gohnax 11 0.06 (84) owkey 7 0.04 (87) sahmthihng 4 0.02
(80) ihl 11 0.06 (84) kaold 7 0.04 (87) ehvrihbohdih 4 0.02
(80) stihl 11 0.06 (84) siym 7 0.04 (87) tohp 4 0.02
(80) way 11 0.06 (84) sehd 7 0.04 (87) tiy 4 0.02
(80) dihdaxnt 11 0.06 (85) tehl 6 0.03 (87) ahdhaxz 4 0.02
(81) dihdnt 10 0.06 (85) sihks 6 0.03 (87) yuwzhaxlih 4 0.02
(81) ayl 10 0.06 (85) aekchualih 6 0.03 (87) smaolax 4 0.02
(81) hhaaf 10 0.06 (85) luhks 6 0.03 (87) poyntiy 4 0.02
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(87) feyvaxrihts 4 0.02 (88) seym 3 0.02 (89) mahdaxld 2 0.01
(87) mayt 4 0.02 (88) mawdh 3 0.02 (89) thihngz 2 0.01
(87) iyvaxn 4 0.02 (88) hhaatih 3 0.02 (89) prohbaxblih 2 0.01
(87) dihfraxnt 4 0.02 (88) bay 3 0.02 (89) ihndihfraxnt 2 0.01
(87) luhkihng 4 0.02 (88) liyst 3 0.02 (89) sheypt 2 0.01
(87) behtax 4 0.02 (88) baekgrawnd 3 0.02 (89) saend 2 0.01
(87) hhaed 4 0.02 (88) kiyn 3 0.02 (89) sahmtaymz 2 0.01
(87) axrawnd 4 0.02 (88) grahmpih 3 0.02 (89) blohk 2 0.01
(87) maysehlf 4 0.02 (88) ayv 3 0.02 (89) fyuw 2 0.01
(87) pleyihng 4 0.02 (88) miyn 3 0.02 (89) jhohb 2 0.01
(87) hhowldihng 4 0.02 (88) kaoz 3 0.02 (89) wohntihd 2 0.01
(87) hheyt 4 0.02 (88) hhey 3 0.02 (89) saxrawndihd 2 0.01
(87) ihnahf 4 0.02 (88) maynd 3 0.02 (89) pliyz 2 0.01
(87) ahpsayd 4 0.02 (88) kaol 3 0.02 (89) lernihng 2 0.01
(87) weyk 4 0.02 (88) ahnyuwzhaxl 3 0.02 (89) leht 2 0.01
(87) dyuh 4 0.02 (88) sheykihng 3 0.02 (89) tern 2 0.01
(87) smaylihng 4 0.02 (88) yuwd 3 0.02 (89) faen 2 0.01
(87) faynd 4 0.02 (88) hhehd 3 0.02 (89) kaxnsehntrihk 2 0.01
(87) yeht 4 0.02 (89) gehtihng 2 0.01 (89) fahn 2 0.01
(87) laajh 4 0.02 (89) yuwst 2 0.01 (89) faekt 2 0.01
(87) uh 4 0.02 (89) kaos 2 0.01 (89) streytaxwey 2 0.01
(87) mowst 4 0.02 (89) ehvrih 2 0.01 (89) th 2 0.01
(87) hhaevaxnt 4 0.02 (89) ehnihwahn 2 0.01 (89) kaynd 2 0.01
(88) kaent 3 0.02 (89) rihd 2 0.01 (89) wuhm 2 0.01
(88) throwihng 3 0.02 (89) axpihnianz 2 0.01 (89) yuwl 2 0.01
(88) behst 3 0.02 (89) prohmihs 2 0.01 (89) axweyk 2 0.01
(88) ayf 3 0.02 (89) layn 2 0.01 (89) throw 2 0.01
(88) kaxrehkt 3 0.02 (89) lowdz 2 0.01 (89) dhaen 2 0.01
(88) byuwtaxfuhl 3 0.02 (89) ehnihwey 2 0.01 (89) gowz 2 0.01
(88) lihtaxl 3 0.02 (89) paetaxnz 2 0.01 (89) paat 2 0.01
(88) dehfihnaxtlih 3 0.02 (89) kaech 2 0.01 (89) siyn 2 0.01
(88) waw 3 0.02 (89) fahnih 2 0.01 (89) liy 2 0.01
(88) ayz 3 0.02 (89) biyn 2 0.01 (89) aaftax 2 0.01
(88) ahndaxstaend 3 0.02 (89) staat 2 0.01 (89) sawnd 2 0.01
(88) niyd 3 0.02 (89) aebsaxluwtlih 2 0.01 (89) kahlax 2 0.01
(88) axgehnst 3 0.02 (89) ownlih 2 0.01 (89) axpaeraxntlih 2 0.01
(88) ruwmz 3 0.02 (89) ihntraxstihd 2 0.01 (89) nayslih 2 0.01
(88) wownt 3 0.02 (89) toyz 2 0.01 (89) klows 2 0.01
(88) ehksaxlaxnt 3 0.02 (89) maetax 2 0.01 (89) yaoz 2 0.01
(88) tihlt 3 0.02 (89) kohs 2 0.01 (89) tahch 2 0.01
(88) wihdhihn 3 0.02 (89) prihferd 2 0.01 (89) frohm 2 0.01
(88) kahmz 3 0.02 (89) hhayd 2 0.01 (89) baorihng 2 0.01
(88) pihraxmihdz 3 0.02 (89) behdtaym 2 0.01 (89) drohp 2 0.01
(88) naa 3 0.02 (89) siymz 2 0.01 (89) dahzaxnt 2 0.01
(88) lern 3 0.02 (89) kuhd 2 0.01 (89) dahznt 2 0.01
(88) pihk 3 0.02 (89) puhtihng 2 0.01 (89) drohpt 2 0.01
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(89) ehm 2 0.01 (90) meyd 1 0.01 (90) yuwzhaxl 1 0.01
(89) wiyk 2 0.01 (90) baelaxnsihng 1 0.01 (90) dey 1 0.01
(89) ohbviaslih 2 0.01 (90) sehvraxl 1 0.01 (90) taymz 1 0.01
(89) aaskihng 2 0.01 (90) dihslayk 1 0.01 (90) kuwl 1 0.01
(89) wiyd 2 0.01 (90) wihndowz 1 0.01 (90) aam 1 0.01
(89) sihlih 2 0.01 (90) saot 1 0.01 (90) sawndihng 1 0.01
(89) staek 2 0.01 (90) kaolihng 1 0.01 (90) bihld 1 0.01
(89) siarias 2 0.01 (90) axm 1 0.01 (90) md 1 0.01
(90) sihlvax 1 0.01 (90) kwihk 1 0.01 (90) muwd 1 0.01
(90) trayd 1 0.01 (90) wea 1 0.01 (90) saakaezaxm 1 0.01
(90) ahpseht 1 0.01 (90) kaot 1 0.01 (90) taagihts 1 0.01
(90) poyntiyah 1 0.01 (90) werkt 1 0.01 (90) aansax 1 0.01
(90) shuhd 1 0.01 (90) ohpshaxnz 1 0.01 (90) paast 1 0.01
(90) kihdz 1 0.01 (90) dhaw 1 0.01 (90) sahch 1 0.01
(90) praektihs 1 0.01 (90) kahlaxz 1 0.01 (90) siyihng 1 0.01
(90) aembihvaxlaxnt 1 0.01 (90) frawniy 1 0.01 (90) miynz 1 0.01
(90) ihntraxst 1 0.01 (90) ihksehl 1 0.01 (90) ihksprehs 1 0.01
(90) ternihng 1 0.01 (90) hhaendz 1 0.01 (90) growihng 1 0.01
(90) ihntraxstihng 1 0.01 (90) faynaxlih 1 0.01 (90) braek 1 0.01
(90) fayax 1 0.01 (90) hhay 1 0.01 (90) werk 1 0.01
(90) aagyuhmehntaxtihv 1 0.01 (90) ey 1 0.01 (90) aolrehdih 1 0.01
(90) taok 1 0.01 (90) aagyuw 1 0.01 (90) maaksmaxn 1 0.01
(90) taa 1 0.01 (90) stey 1 0.01 (90) neymz 1 0.01
(90) tehraxblih 1 0.01 (90) waa 1 0.01 (90) kayndax 1 0.01
(90) tayp 1 0.01 (90) wuhdaxnt 1 0.01 (90) chuwz 1 0.01
(90) ihfehkts 1 0.01 (90) taynih 1 0.01 (90) kawnt 1 0.01
(90) z 1 0.01 (90) gehst 1 0.01 (90) lahvd 1 0.01
(90) mkey 1 0.01 (90) aydia 1 0.01 (90) thaengks 1 0.01
(90) sao 1 0.01 (90) kaxnehktihd 1 0.01 (90) ehnihthihng 1 0.01
(90) pehn 1 0.01 (90) hhiy 1 0.01 (90) ihmaejhihn 1 0.01
(90) hhaevihng 1 0.01 (90) hhowp 1 0.01 (90) baekwaxdz 1 0.01
(90) poynt 1 0.01 (90) dihprehst 1 0.01 (90) hhaws 1 0.01
(90) luhkt 1 0.01 (90) axlawd 1 0.01 (90) cheynjh 1 0.01
(90) kervz 1 0.01 (90) kuhdaxnt 1 0.01 (90) ohf 1 0.01
(90) vaelaxntaynz 1 0.01 (90) bluw 1 0.01 (90) duwihng 1 0.01
(90) mowmaxnt 1 0.01 (90) bow 1 0.01 (90) brihng 1 0.01
(90) bohtaxm 1 0.01 (90) meykihng 1 0.01 (90) yeyy 1 0.01
(90) ehl 1 0.01 (90) wihndow 1 0.01 (90) slow 1 0.01
(90) puhshihng 1 0.01 (90) saxprayzd 1 0.01 (90) ihnsaydz 1 0.01
(90) breyk 1 0.01 (90) suwn 1 0.01 (90) tehraxbaxl 1 0.01
(90) striyt 1 0.01 (90) raadhax 1 0.01 (90) sohft 1 0.01
(90) sliyp 1 0.01 (90) guhdnaxs 1 0.01 (90) prihfer 1 0.01
(90) wowkaxn 1 0.01 (90) vehrihg 1 0.01 (90) lernihd 1 0.01
(90) sihmbaxlz 1 0.01 (90) spowk 1 0.01 (90) faos 1 0.01
(90) bihfao 1 0.01 (90) shehl 1 0.01 (90) hhah 1 0.01
(90) fohnd 1 0.01 (90) fyuwchax 1 0.01 (90) fea 1 0.01
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(90) ehniymao 1 0.01 (90) raytuh 1 0.01 (90) doht 1 0.01
(90) neym 1 0.01 (90) ahhhah 1 0.01 (90) low 1 0.01
(90) kriypih 1 0.01 (90) niychiy 1 0.01 (90) paetaxn 1 0.01
(90) rehktaenggyuhlax 1 0.01 (90) axnoyd 1 0.01 (90) kahm 1 0.01
(90) layf 1 0.01 (90) iychiy 1 0.01 (90) deyz 1 0.01
(90) wohzaxnt 1 0.01 (90) ihnstehd 1 0.01 (90) dihsaysihv 1 0.01
(90) flao 1 0.01 (90) gehs 1 0.01 (90) daansihng 1 0.01
(90) ihksehpt 1 0.01 (90) sihmbaxl 1 0.01 (90) naomaxlih 1 0.01
(90) rihmaxm 1 0.01 (90) spoht 1 0.01 (90) ohlrayt 1 0.01
(90) ehkspert 1 0.01 (90) bihhhaynd 1 0.01 (90) yuws 1 0.01
(90) ihgnao 1 0.01 (90) ihnkohmpihtaxnt 1 0.01 (90) paxtihkyuhlaxlih 1 0.01
(90) uhd 1 0.01 (90) rihaektihng 1 0.01 (90) mhhm 1 0.01
(90) shown 1 0.01 (90) ahnhhaepih 1 0.01 (90) mihstriytihng 1 0.01
(90) ael 1 0.01 (90) piypaxlz 1 0.01 (90) kaxrehktihd 1 0.01
(90) wearaez 1 0.01 (90) wayts 1 0.01 (90) sayn 1 0.01
(90) eywihs 1 0.01 (90) wahns 1 0.01 (90) mehnt 1 0.01
(90) dheyv 1 0.01 (90) ihnkraed 1 0.01 (90) nyuw 1 0.01
(90) fihnihsht 1 0.01 (90) fiylihng 1 0.01 (90) kaant 1 0.01
(90) laykihng 1 0.01 (90) ihmpaotaxnt 1 0.01 (90) yuwaxl 1 0.01
(90) rowlihng 1 0.01 (90) ehsey 1 0.01 (90) hheytihd 1 0.01
(90) hhow 1 0.01 (90) wihsh 1 0.01 (90) hhehld 1 0.01
(90) sax 1 0.01 (90) laots 1 0.01 (90) gohtax 1 0.01
(90) ihgzaektlih 1 0.01 (90) frawn 1 0.01 (90) wernt 1 0.01
(90) mihzaxraxbaxl 1 0.01 (90) paenihkihng 1 0.01 (90) ihnkrehdaxbaxl 1 0.01
(90) gerl 1 0.01 (90) aolmowst 1 0.01 (90) stahk 1 0.01
(90) ihntax 1 0.01
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Table B.6: Complete word-frequencies of salient words in rejection experiment. Listed
are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the
experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) skwea 259 4.97 (35) dhehm 25 0.48 (47) thihngk 11 0.21
(2) now 242 4.64 (35) ahrtiyn 25 0.48 (47) hhaxlow 11 0.21
(3) trayaenggaxl 206 3.95 (35) wohnt 25 0.48 (48) sayd 10 0.19
(4) hhaat 198 3.8 (35) vehrih 25 0.48 (48) hhm 10 0.19
(5) muwn 184 3.53 (36) tray 24 0.46 (49) wahnz 9 0.17
(5) serkaxl 184 3.53 (36) noht 24 0.46 (49) dhowz 9 0.17
(6) layk 167 3.2 (37) hhaats 22 0.42 (49) mihdaxl 9 0.17
(7) serkaxlz 140 2.69 (37) sehntax 22 0.42 (50) sey 8 0.15
(8) skweaz 126 2.42 (38) dia 20 0.38 (50) miy 8 0.15
(9) iht 123 2.36 (38) lehts 20 0.38 (50) ohn 8 0.15
(10) yehs 119 2.28 (38) tuw 20 0.38 (50) taym 8 0.15
(11) wahn 111 2.13 (38) hhaepih 20 0.38 (50) pihraxmihd 8 0.15
(12) rayt 98 1.88 (39) hhia 19 0.36 (51) ay 7 0.13
(13) dhihs 95 1.82 (39) waots 19 0.36 (51) baek 7 0.13
(14) uhkey 90 1.73 (39) dawn 19 0.36 (51) hhaw 7 0.13
(15) axgehn 88 1.69 (39) luhk 19 0.36 (51) fao 7 0.13
(16) ow 82 1.57 (39) sheyp 19 0.36 (51) klehvax 7 0.13
(17) guhd 81 1.55 (39) nays 19 0.36 (51) pley 7 0.13
(18) diyjhiy 76 1.46 (40) uhey 18 0.35 (51) fayn 7 0.13
(19) diychiy 68 1.3 (41) ihts 17 0.33 (52) yao 6 0.12
(20) dahn 63 1.21 (41) dhax 17 0.33 (52) thaengk 6 0.12
(21) dhaet 62 1.19 (42) axnahdhax 16 0.31 (52) aydhax 6 0.12
(21) trayaenggaxlz 62 1.19 (42) dhaets 16 0.31 (52) thriy 6 0.12
(22) gow 58 1.11 (43) shao 15 0.29 (52) baht 6 0.12
(23) yuw 53 1.02 (43) sow 15 0.29 (52) prihtih 6 0.12
(23) axbawt 53 1.02 (44) ihz 14 0.27 (52) wiy 6 0.12
(24) downt 52 1 (44) naw 14 0.27 (52) rialih 6 0.12
(25) siy 47 0.9 (45) sheyps 13 0.25 (52) wohts 6 0.12
(25) hhowld 47 0.9 (45) woht 13 0.25 (53) skay 5 0.1
(26) wayt 46 0.88 (45) hhaev 13 0.25 (53) wahrih 5 0.1
(27) yea 45 0.86 (45) rihmehmbax 13 0.25 (53) ihzaxnt 5 0.1
(27) bohks 45 0.86 (46) smayl 12 0.23 (53) ahp 5 0.1
(28) wehl 41 0.79 (46) aol 12 0.23 (53) mahch 5 0.1
(29) krehsaxnt 39 0.75 (46) yey 12 0.23 (53) ahdhax 5 0.1
(30) dhea 37 0.71 (46) duhnt 12 0.23 (53) laast 5 0.1
(31) aa 36 0.69 (46) smaol 12 0.23 (53) owkey 5 0.1
(31) blaek 36 0.69 (46) duw 12 0.23 (53) meyk 5 0.1
(32) aend 35 0.67 (47) bohksihz 11 0.21 (53) smayliy 5 0.1
(32) saed 35 0.67 (47) goht 11 0.21 (53) dhehn 5 0.1
(33) taagiht 31 0.59 (47) er 11 0.21 (54) feyvaxrihts 4 0.08
(33) uwm 31 0.59 (47) rehktaenggaxlz 11 0.21 (54) rehktaenggaxl 4 0.08
(34) feyvaxriht 27 0.52 (47) ax 11 0.21 (54) hhaxm 4 0.08
(34) aem 27 0.52 (47) taxdey 11 0.21 (54) sohrih 4 0.08
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(54) wihch 4 0.08 (55) blohks 3 0.06 (56) ehnih 2 0.04
(54) stihl 4 0.08 (56) poyntiy 2 0.04 (56) meybiy 2 0.04
(54) biht 4 0.08 (56) lernihng 2 0.04 (56) drohpt 2 0.04
(54) uw 4 0.08 (56) kaxnsehntrihk 2 0.04 (56) uh 2 0.04
(54) dhow 4 0.08 (56) geht 2 0.04 (56) gihv 2 0.04
(54) baed 4 0.08 (56) ehnihwahn 2 0.04 (56) maynd 2 0.04
(54) saydz 4 0.08 (56) tihlt 2 0.04 (56) ahnyuwzhaxl 2 0.04
(54) teyk 4 0.08 (56) streytaxwey 2 0.04 (56) saend 2 0.04
(54) show 4 0.08 (56) kaent 2 0.04 (56) wiyk 2 0.04
(54) aekchualih 4 0.08 (56) th 2 0.04 (56) kwayt 2 0.04
(54) feys 4 0.08 (56) naastih 2 0.04 (56) yuwzhaxlih 2 0.04
(54) bihkohz 4 0.08 (56) ehls 2 0.04 (56) ohbviaslih 2 0.04
(54) mao 4 0.08 (56) rohng 2 0.04 (56) ruwmz 2 0.04
(54) wihdh 4 0.08 (56) kyuwb 2 0.04 (56) jhohb 2 0.04
(54) ahdhaxz 4 0.08 (56) wuhm 2 0.04 (56) siarias 2 0.04
(54) laykt 4 0.08 (56) ehnihwey 2 0.04 (56) wownt 2 0.04
(54) uhps 4 0.08 (56) axweyk 2 0.04 (57) pliyz 1 0.02
(54) lohts 4 0.08 (56) aym 2 0.04 (57) sihlvax 1 0.02
(55) tayaxd 3 0.06 (56) paetaxnz 2 0.04 (57) neymz 1 0.02
(55) ehksaxlaxnt 3 0.06 (56) wohnax 2 0.04 (57) kaos 1 0.02
(55) gowihng 3 0.06 (56) puht 2 0.04 (57) trayd 1 0.02
(55) lahvlih 3 0.06 (56) poynts 2 0.04 (57) faen 1 0.02
(55) throwihng 3 0.06 (56) ferst 2 0.04 (57) ahpseht 1 0.02
(55) dihfraxnt 3 0.06 (56) staat 2 0.04 (57) wuhd 1 0.02
(55) luhkihng 3 0.06 (56) aebsaxluwtlih 2 0.04 (57) dihdnt 1 0.02
(55) pihraxmihdz 3 0.06 (56) aet 2 0.04 (57) praektihs 1 0.02
(55) seyihng 3 0.06 (56) ayz 2 0.04 (57) kayndax 1 0.02
(55) byuwtaxfuhl 3 0.06 (56) maetax 2 0.04 (57) aembihvaxlaxnt 1 0.02
(55) shael 3 0.06 (56) boy 2 0.04 (57) kawnt 1 0.02
(55) sihks 3 0.06 (56) kaold 2 0.04 (57) ihntraxstihng 1 0.02
(55) hhaaf 3 0.06 (56) bay 2 0.04 (57) lahvd 1 0.02
(55) jhahst 3 0.06 (56) loht 2 0.04 (57) ihmaejhihn 1 0.02
(55) dhey 3 0.06 (56) klows 2 0.04 (57) faekt 1 0.02
(55) ihnsayd 3 0.06 (56) piypaxl 2 0.04 (57) baekwaxdz 1 0.02
(55) mawdh 3 0.06 (56) baekgrawnd 2 0.04 (57) axpihnianz 1 0.02
(55) dhiyz 3 0.06 (56) ahndaxstaend 2 0.04 (57) wihdhihn 1 0.02
(55) waw 3 0.06 (56) grahmpih 2 0.04 (57) cheynjh 1 0.02
(55) muwnz 3 0.06 (56) yeht 2 0.04 (57) ohf 1 0.02
(55) hhaatih 3 0.06 (56) rawnd 2 0.04 (57) mayt 1 0.02
(55) ahpsayd 3 0.06 (56) trayihng 2 0.04 (57) tehraxblih 1 0.02
(55) smaylihng 3 0.06 (56) baorihng 2 0.04 (57) luhks 1 0.02
(55) aant 3 0.06 (56) ihn 2 0.04 (57) ihfehkts 1 0.02
(55) hhohraxbaxl 3 0.06 (56) prohbaxblih 2 0.04 (57) ayf 1 0.02
(55) smaolax 3 0.06 (56) hhey 2 0.04 (57) yeyy 1 0.02
(55) sahm 3 0.06 (56) ehvrihbohdih 2 0.04 (57) ihl 1 0.02
(55) axwey 3 0.06 (56) sehd 2 0.04 (57) kaxrehkt 1 0.02
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(57) mkey 1 0.02 (57) nehkst 1 0.02 (57) hhayd 1 0.02
(57) ihnsaydz 1 0.02 (57) ohpshaxnz 1 0.02 (57) faynd 1 0.02
(57) tehraxbaxl 1 0.02 (57) maysehlf 1 0.02 (57) kuhdaxnt 1 0.02
(57) behtax 1 0.02 (57) shown 1 0.02 (57) ihmpaotaxnt 1 0.02
(57) layn 1 0.02 (57) ihf 1 0.02 (57) bluw 1 0.02
(57) nayt 1 0.02 (57) awax 1 0.02 (57) behdtaym 1 0.02
(57) pehn 1 0.02 (57) pleyihng 1 0.02 (57) bow 1 0.02
(57) luhkt 1 0.02 (57) ihntraxstihd 1 0.02 (57) tahch 1 0.02
(57) kervz 1 0.02 (57) fayv 1 0.02 (57) wihsh 1 0.02
(57) hhaa 1 0.02 (57) kahlaxz 1 0.02 (57) wey 1 0.02
(57) vaelaxntaynz 1 0.02 (57) hheyt 1 0.02 (57) rahnihng 1 0.02
(57) mowmaxnt 1 0.02 (57) fihnihsht 1 0.02 (57) laots 1 0.02
(57) bohtaxm 1 0.02 (57) rowlihng 1 0.02 (57) frawn 1 0.02
(57) ohv 1 0.02 (57) toyz 1 0.02 (57) paenihkihng 1 0.02
(57) ehl 1 0.02 (57) ihnahf 1 0.02 (57) aolmowst 1 0.02
(57) faos 1 0.02 (57) ao 1 0.02 (57) kuhd 1 0.02
(57) stohp 1 0.02 (57) hhow 1 0.02 (57) doht 1 0.02
(57) naa 1 0.02 (57) faynaxlih 1 0.02 (57) hhiaz 1 0.02
(57) hhaez 1 0.02 (57) mihzaxraxbaxl 1 0.02 (57) saxprayzd 1 0.02
(57) hhah 1 0.02 (57) ihgzaektlih 1 0.02 (57) paetaxn 1 0.02
(57) hhaed 1 0.02 (57) hhaend 1 0.02 (57) puhtihng 1 0.02
(57) ayl 1 0.02 (57) hhay 1 0.02 (57) suwn 1 0.02
(57) wowkaxn 1 0.02 (57) ey 1 0.02 (57) raadhax 1 0.02
(57) sihmbaxlz 1 0.02 (57) aolweyz 1 0.02 (57) ayv 1 0.02
(57) neym 1 0.02 (57) weyk 1 0.02 (57) aolsow 1 0.02
(57) wehn 1 0.02 (57) raytuh 1 0.02 (57) deyz 1 0.02
(57) kriypih 1 0.02 (57) ahhhah 1 0.02 (57) guhdnaxs 1 0.02
(57) kaech 1 0.02 (57) niychiy 1 0.02 (57) sahmthihng 1 0.02
(57) bihg 1 0.02 (57) kahlax 1 0.02 (57) ihndihfraxnt 1 0.02
(57) rehktaenggyuhlax 1 0.02 (57) axnoyd 1 0.02 (57) laajh 1 0.02
(57) baelaxnsihng 1 0.02 (57) lahv 1 0.02 (57) owvax 1 0.02
(57) axrawnd 1 0.02 (57) kohs 1 0.02 (57) tohp 1 0.02
(57) ehs 1 0.02 (57) gehst 1 0.02 (57) daansihng 1 0.02
(57) sehvraxl 1 0.02 (57) aydia 1 0.02 (57) dahzaxnt 1 0.02
(57) fahnih 1 0.02 (57) nayslih 1 0.02 (57) taymz 1 0.02
(57) dihslayk 1 0.02 (57) ihnstehd 1 0.02 (57) dihdaxnt 1 0.02
(57) layf 1 0.02 (57) sihmbaxl 1 0.02 (57) kuwl 1 0.02
(57) wihndowz 1 0.02 (57) gehs 1 0.02 (57) ohlrayt 1 0.02
(57) ihksehpt 1 0.02 (57) kaxnehktihd 1 0.02 (57) bihld 1 0.02
(57) flao 1 0.02 (57) bihhhaynd 1 0.02 (57) meyks 1 0.02
(57) siyn 1 0.02 (57) yaoz 1 0.02 (57) axgehnst 1 0.02
(57) dahz 1 0.02 (57) prihferd 1 0.02 (57) saakaezaxm 1 0.02
(57) ehkspert 1 0.02 (57) ihnkohmpihtaxnt 1 0.02 (57) taagihts 1 0.02
(57) kaot 1 0.02 (57) rihaektihng 1 0.02 (57) aansax 1 0.02
(57) werkt 1 0.02 (57) ahnhhaepih 1 0.02 (57) paast 1 0.02
(57) dehfihnaxtlih 1 0.02 (57) wayts 1 0.02 (57) mhhm 1 0.02
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(57) sheykihng 1 0.02 (57) hhehd 1 0.02 (57) sihlih 1 0.02
(57) sahmtaymz 1 0.02 (57) hhaevaxnt 1 0.02 (57) staek 1 0.02
(57) sahch 1 0.02 (57) growihng 1 0.02 (57) ihnkrehdaxbaxl 1 0.02
(57) mihstriytihng 1 0.02 (57) aaskihng 1 0.02 (57) wer 1 0.02
(57) ihksprehs 1 0.02 (57) hhehld 1 0.02 (57) werk 1 0.02
(57) mowst 1 0.02 (57) saxrawndihd 1 0.02 (57) kiyp 1 0.02
Table B.7: Complete word-frequencies of all words in prohibition experiment. Listed
are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in the
experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) yuw 1591 6.18 (30) aa 199 0.77 (60) goht 91 0.35
(2) dhax 1416 5.5 (31) noht 198 0.77 (61) naw 89 0.35
(3) ax 962 3.74 (32) krehsaxnt 184 0.71 (62) rialih 87 0.34
(4) dhihs 956 3.71 (32) axgehn 184 0.71 (63) skweaz 86 0.33
(5) wahn 722 2.8 (33) serkaxlz 168 0.65 (64) wohnax 82 0.32
(6) ihz 632 2.46 (34) ay 167 0.65 (65) ow 80 0.31
(7) layk 527 2.05 (35) woht 165 0.64 (66) hhaats 79 0.31
(8) tuw 471 1.83 (36) wehl 162 0.63 (67) axnahdhax 78 0.3
(9) now 461 1.79 (37) wohnt 159 0.62 (68) hhaw 74 0.29
(10) ihts 428 1.66 (38) axbawt 157 0.61 (69) trayaenggaxlz 72 0.28
(11) hhaat 411 1.6 (39) siy 148 0.57 (70) kaold 71 0.28
(12) aend 389 1.51 (40) lehts 143 0.56 (71) yea 68 0.26
(12) skwea 389 1.51 (41) rawnd 140 0.54 (72) ihf 66 0.26
(13) trayaenggaxl 377 1.46 (42) gow 133 0.52 (72) tahch 66 0.26
(14) dhaet 366 1.42 (43) diychiy 132 0.51 (73) puht 65 0.25
(14) iht 366 1.42 (44) baht 130 0.51 (74) yao 62 0.24
(15) duw 360 1.4 (45) dhea 125 0.49 (75) aol 59 0.23
(16) muwn 356 1.38 (45) rihmehmbax 125 0.49 (76) nays 59 0.23
(17) serkaxl 332 1.29 (46) rayt 124 0.48 (77) dawn 57 0.22
(18) dhaets 329 1.28 (47) bohks 123 0.48 (77) shael 57 0.22
(19) sheyp 310 1.2 (48) yua 121 0.47 (77) axlawd 57 0.22
(20) luhk 286 1.11 (49) sow 116 0.45 (78) dhey 56 0.22
(20) aet 286 1.11 (50) uhey 115 0.45 (79) sheyps 55 0.21
(21) wiy 281 1.09 (51) hhia 113 0.44 (80) thihngk 54 0.21
(22) wihdh 269 1.04 (51) ohn 113 0.44 (81) ihn 53 0.21
(23) kaen 266 1.03 (52) hhowld 111 0.43 (82) wia 51 0.2
(24) vehrih 263 1.02 (53) fao 110 0.43 (82) saydz 51 0.2
(25) guhd 258 1 (54) dahn 106 0.41 (82) dhehn 51 0.2
(26) pley 229 0.89 (55) ohv 104 0.4 (82) know 51 0.2
(26) downt 229 0.89 (56) diyjhiy 103 0.4 (83) sey 49 0.19
(27) yehs 227 0.88 (57) baek 99 0.38 (83) gowihng 49 0.19
(28) uhkey 220 0.85 (58) kaant 98 0.38 (83) miy 49 0.19
(29) hhaev 207 0.8 (59) taxdey 94 0.37 (84) tray 48 0.19
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(84) thriy 48 0.19 (103) thaengk 22 0.09 (112) er 13 0.05
(85) aym 44 0.17 (103) ahdhax 22 0.09 (112) pleyihng 13 0.05
(85) wihch 44 0.17 (103) wihl 22 0.09 (112) blohks 13 0.05
(86) taym 42 0.16 (103) baorihng 22 0.09 (113) prehzaxnt 12 0.05
(87) wuhd 40 0.16 (104) miynz 21 0.08 (113) hhaaf 12 0.05
(87) hhaxlow 40 0.16 (104) smayl 21 0.08 (113) hhaend 12 0.05
(88) aez 39 0.15 (105) ihzaxnt 20 0.08 (113) waonihng 12 0.05
(88) ehksaxlaxnt 39 0.15 (105) aolsow 20 0.08 (113) tohp 12 0.05
(88) may 39 0.15 (105) luhkihng 20 0.08 (113) gowz 12 0.05
(89) sohrih 37 0.14 (105) show 20 0.08 (113) klehvax 12 0.05
(90) uwm 35 0.14 (106) lahvlih 19 0.07 (113) shaap 12 0.05
(90) kwayt 35 0.14 (106) lohts 19 0.07 (113) loht 12 0.05
(90) nehkst 35 0.14 (106) luhks 19 0.07 (113) siym 12 0.05
(90) dhiyz 35 0.14 (106) kyuwb 19 0.07 (113) aant 12 0.05
(91) dhehm 34 0.13 (106) dihdaxnt 19 0.07 (113) sehd 12 0.05
(91) feyvaxriht 34 0.13 (107) kuhd 18 0.07 (114) bihfao 11 0.04
(91) gohnax 34 0.13 (107) awax 18 0.07 (114) ihntraxstihd 11 0.04
(92) blaek 33 0.13 (107) biht 18 0.07 (114) aekchualih 11 0.04
(93) teyk 32 0.12 (108) biy 17 0.07 (114) awt 11 0.04
(94) lahv 31 0.12 (108) axrawnd 17 0.07 (114) skay 11 0.04
(94) jhahst 31 0.12 (108) mahch 17 0.07 (114) bihldihng 11 0.04
(95) wiyl 30 0.12 (108) mao 17 0.07 (114) bihg 11 0.04
(95) hhaez 30 0.12 (109) piypaxl 16 0.06 (114) ehs 11 0.04
(95) wehn 30 0.12 (109) smaol 16 0.06 (114) ayv 11 0.04
(96) ao 29 0.11 (109) seym 16 0.06 (115) aen 10 0.04
(96) baol 29 0.11 (109) way 16 0.06 (115) serkyuhlax 10 0.04
(97) feys 28 0.11 (109) gihv 16 0.06 (115) nayt 10 0.04
(97) wahnz 28 0.11 (110) hhiaz 15 0.06 (115) ayl 10 0.04
(97) dihfraxnt 28 0.11 (110) sheypt 15 0.06 (115) lihtaxl 10 0.04
(98) saynz 27 0.1 (110) bihkohz 15 0.06 (115) meybiy 10 0.04
(98) wohz 27 0.1 (110) bohksihz 15 0.06 (115) smayliy 10 0.04
(98) kahm 27 0.1 (110) kaonaxz 15 0.06 (116) fiyl 9 0.03
(99) sahm 26 0.1 (110) rihpiyt 15 0.06 (116) taok 9 0.03
(99) wohts 26 0.1 (111) shuhd 14 0.05 (116) hhaa 9 0.03
(100) ihnsayd 25 0.1 (111) tehl 14 0.05 (116) wea 9 0.03
(100) laast 25 0.1 (111) thihngz 14 0.05 (116) hhaendz 9 0.03
(100) prihtih 25 0.1 (111) duwihng 14 0.05 (116) yuwv 9 0.03
(101) ahp 24 0.09 (111) sayn 14 0.05 (116) dihd 9 0.03
(101) yey 24 0.09 (112) shao 13 0.05 (116) dhowz 9 0.03
(101) rowd 24 0.09 (112) ferst 13 0.05 (116) wihndow 9 0.03
(102) aem 23 0.09 (112) rowl 13 0.05 (116) dey 9 0.03
(102) wiyv 23 0.09 (112) dhow 13 0.05 (116) mihdaxl 9 0.03
(102) geht 23 0.09 (112) sahn 13 0.05 (116) mawntihn 9 0.03
(102) wayt 23 0.09 (112) nehvax 13 0.05 (116) leht 9 0.03
(103) staat 22 0.09 (112) laykt 13 0.05 (116) iyvaxn 9 0.03
(103) hhaepih 22 0.09 (112) yaa 13 0.05 (116) behtax 9 0.03
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(116) iykwaxl 9 0.03 (119) owvax 6 0.02 (121) tehlihng 4 0.02
(116) stihl 9 0.03 (119) meyks 6 0.02 (121) iykwihlaetaxraxl 4 0.02
(116) dahzaxnt 9 0.03 (119) hhaevaxnt 6 0.02 (121) kohs 4 0.02
(116) uh 9 0.03 (120) yuwst 5 0.02 (121) nialih 4 0.02
(117) hhay 8 0.03 (120) mahsaxnt 5 0.02 (121) bihgihnihng 4 0.02
(117) niyd 8 0.03 (120) hhaevihng 5 0.02 (121) awtsayd 4 0.02
(117) sahmthihng 8 0.03 (120) taokt 5 0.02 (121) ihnstruhmaxnt 4 0.02
(117) bohdihz 8 0.03 (120) mowmaxnt 5 0.02 (121) streyt 4 0.02
(117) blohk 8 0.03 (120) shaynz 5 0.02 (121) ehnih 4 0.02
(117) klaym 8 0.03 (120) taxgehdhax 5 0.02 (121) thruw 4 0.02
(117) hhaed 8 0.03 (120) hhihl 5 0.02 (121) faom 4 0.02
(117) saed 8 0.03 (120) waw 5 0.02 (121) wownt 4 0.02
(117) hhowldihng 8 0.03 (120) ehvrihwea 5 0.02 (121) aahhaa 4 0.02
(117) chohkaxlaxt 8 0.03 (120) flaeg 5 0.02 (121) stiyp 4 0.02
(118) aodaxz 7 0.03 (120) wey 5 0.02 (121) geymz 4 0.02
(118) luhkt 7 0.03 (120) ehjhihz 5 0.02 (121) stohp 4 0.02
(118) saot 7 0.03 (120) sahmtaymz 5 0.02 (121) pleys 4 0.02
(118) dheaz 7 0.03 (120) iych 5 0.02 (121) neym 4 0.02
(118) bihld 7 0.03 (120) klea 5 0.02 (121) paat 4 0.02
(118) rowboht 7 0.03 (120) kahmz 5 0.02 (121) biyts 4 0.02
(118) wohntihd 7 0.03 (120) dia 5 0.02 (121) ihgzaektlih 4 0.02
(118) kiyp 7 0.03 (120) lernihd 5 0.02 (121) aaftax 4 0.02
(118) pliyz 7 0.03 (120) sayd 5 0.02 (121) boy 4 0.02
(118) wihdhihn 7 0.03 (120) pahmps 5 0.02 (121) owkey 4 0.02
(118) mayt 7 0.03 (120) ehniymao 5 0.02 (121) yaoz 4 0.02
(118) wahndax 7 0.03 (120) staend 5 0.02 (121) sahnih 4 0.02
(118) hhm 7 0.03 (120) kiyps 5 0.02 (121) beysihk 4 0.02
(118) laynz 7 0.03 (120) mawdh 5 0.02 (121) towld 4 0.02
(118) kiyn 7 0.03 (120) aolweyz 5 0.02 (121) maynd 4 0.02
(118) axwey 7 0.03 (120) bay 5 0.02 (121) ohlrayt 4 0.02
(119) ihntraxstihng 6 0.02 (120) sihmbaxl 5 0.02 (121) tohblaxrown 4 0.02
(119) baod 6 0.02 (120) triy 5 0.02 (121) axlohng 4 0.02
(119) bohtaxm 6 0.02 (120) faynd 5 0.02 (122) ehvrih 3 0.01
(119) meyd 6 0.02 (120) mahst 5 0.02 (122) kwaotaxz 3 0.01
(119) pleyd 6 0.02 (120) frohm 5 0.02 (122) aaaa 3 0.01
(119) flaegz 6 0.02 (120) yuwd 5 0.02 (122) ehls 3 0.01
(119) showz 6 0.02 (120) bawns 5 0.02 (122) pihlowz 3 0.01
(119) pahmp 6 0.02 (120) trayaenggyuhlax 5 0.02 (122) taagiht 3 0.01
(119) lernihng 6 0.02 (120) aolrayt 5 0.02 (122) kahlaxd 3 0.01
(119) ahnfaochuhnaxtlih 6 0.02 (120) wer 5 0.02 (122) poynts 3 0.01
(119) aydhax 6 0.02 (121) gihvihng 4 0.02 (122) fahnih 3 0.01
(119) dahz 6 0.02 (121) poynt 4 0.02 (122) frehnd 3 0.01
(119) taokihng 6 0.02 (121) bihgax 4 0.02 (122) klaymihng 3 0.01
(119) smaylihng 6 0.02 (121) axkrohs 4 0.02 (122) aebsaxluwtlih 3 0.01
(119) ihmpaotaxnt 6 0.02 (121) blahd 4 0.02 (122) hhyuwmaxn 3 0.01
(119) meyk 6 0.02 (121) ehnd 4 0.02 (122) ownlih 3 0.01
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(122) axlayv 3 0.01 (123) seyihng 2 0.01 (123) iyt 2 0.01
(122) bawnsihng 3 0.01 (123) ts 2 0.01 (123) shaedowz 2 0.01
(122) kyuwbz 3 0.01 (123) sertaxnlih 2 0.01 (123) bihhheyv 2 0.01
(122) smaolax 3 0.01 (123) leytax 2 0.01 (123) ehnihthihng 2 0.01
(122) fyuw 3 0.01 (123) rehkaxgnayz 2 0.01 (123) ohf 2 0.01
(122) aolrehdih 3 0.01 (123) kwaotax 2 0.01 (123) ea 2 0.01
(122) rihmehmbaxrihng 3 0.01 (123) axgow 2 0.01 (123) kahmihng 2 0.01
(122) klawd 3 0.01 (123) liyv 2 0.01 (123) showihng 2 0.01
(122) werd 3 0.01 (123) sihks 2 0.01 (123) prehzaxnts 2 0.01
(122) hhaezaxnt 3 0.01 (123) hhawehvax 2 0.01 (123) pihraxmihdz 2 0.01
(122) fahn 3 0.01 (123) krehsaxnts 2 0.01 (123) dhaen 2 0.01
(122) ihnjhoyd 3 0.01 (123) kaech 2 0.01 (123) pleyst 2 0.01
(122) glahm 3 0.01 (123) fihnggax 2 0.01 (123) fuhl 2 0.01
(122) throw 3 0.01 (123) faynaxl 2 0.01 (123) frahnt 2 0.01
(122) skuwl 3 0.01 (123) muwv 2 0.01 (123) rihmehmbaxd 2 0.01
(122) wehlehntayns 3 0.01 (123) tayps 2 0.01 (123) slaytlih 2 0.01
(122) sehkaxnd 3 0.01 (123) mahndih 2 0.01 (123) pihk 2 0.01
(122) siyn 3 0.01 (123) mehnih 2 0.01 (123) wearaez 2 0.01
(122) hhert 3 0.01 (123) toyz 2 0.01 (123) laajhax 2 0.01
(122) rihmm 3 0.01 (123) rihvayz 2 0.01 (123) fihnihsht 2 0.01
(122) fuhtbaol 3 0.01 (123) kuhshaxn 2 0.01 (123) kahvaxd 2 0.01
(122) smuwdh 3 0.01 (123) geyv 2 0.01 (123) ohhh 2 0.01
(122) dihng 3 0.01 (123) geym 2 0.01 (123) ahhhah 2 0.01
(122) ihnjhoy 3 0.01 (123) waonihngz 2 0.01 (123) kahlax 2 0.01
(122) miyn 3 0.01 (123) pehnsaxl 2 0.01 (123) axfreyd 2 0.01
(122) hhey 3 0.01 (123) iy 2 0.01 (123) baolz 2 0.01
(122) drohpt 3 0.01 (123) grawnd 2 0.01 (123) faastax 2 0.01
(122) yuws 3 0.01 (123) kahpaxl 2 0.01 (123) ihnstehd 2 0.01
(122) kaol 3 0.01 (123) kerv 2 0.01 (123) klows 2 0.01
(122) thertih 3 0.01 (123) sehshaxnz 2 0.01 (123) faol 2 0.01
(122) maethaxmaetihks 3 0.01 (123) daats 2 0.01 (123) wahns 2 0.01
(122) mowst 3 0.01 (123) meykihng 2 0.01 (123) spiyd 2 0.01
(122) uwps 3 0.01 (123) hhmax 2 0.01 (123) erlia 2 0.01
(122) pihkchax 3 0.01 (123) kaenaxt 2 0.01 (123) laajh 2 0.01
(123) gehtihng 2 0.01 (123) biyihng 2 0.01 (123) kaoz 2 0.01
(123) paxhhaeps 2 0.01 (123) taymz 2 0.01 (123) drohp 2 0.01
(123) trayd 2 0.01 (123) kihk 2 0.01 (123) deynjhax 2 0.01
(123) ehndihng 2 0.01 (123) siyihng 2 0.01 (123) ehm 2 0.01
(123) drohpihng 2 0.01 (123) yuwzhaxlih 2 0.01 (123) wiyk 2 0.01
(123) keafuhl 2 0.01 (123) uhps 2 0.01 (123) thihng 2 0.01
(123) faxrehvax 2 0.01 (123) jhoyn 2 0.01 (123) nyuw 2 0.01
(123) siymd 2 0.01 (123) jhohb 2 0.01 (123) chehst 2 0.01
(123) throwihng 2 0.01 (123) fihftih 2 0.01 (123) sahmwahn 2 0.01
(123) rohng 2 0.01 (123) werk 2 0.01 (124) mihniht 1 0
(123) showd 2 0.01 (123) brihliant 2 0.01 (124) nahthihng 1 0
(123) eyay 2 0.01 (123) kea 2 0.01 (124) sh 1 0
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(124) riych 1 0 (124) ehndlihs 1 0 (124) prohbaxblih 1 0
(124) kwihklih 1 0 (124) sheyk 1 0 (124) paxtihkyuhlax 1 0
(124) cheynjhd 1 0 (124) aestraxnaot 1 0 (124) ehvrihbohdih 1 0
(124) bihkahmz 1 0 (124) buwlzay 1 0 (124) bowth 1 0
(124) dhearax 1 0 (124) bayt 1 0 (124) hhahnggrih 1 0
(124) kaxnfyuwzd 1 0 (124) kaot 1 0 (124) aeksihdaxnt 1 0
(124) krohp 1 0 (124) mohrnihn 1 0 (124) aam 1 0
(124) hhhh 1 0 (124) lay 1 0 (124) tiy 1 0
(124) klawdz 1 0 (124) sertaxn 1 0 (124) meyz 1 0
(124) ehf 1 0 (124) shaynihng 1 0 (124) priy 1 0
(124) hhuwps 1 0 (124) wow 1 0 (124) ahdhaxz 1 0
(124) weyv 1 0 (124) gohn 1 0 (124) pehtaxlz 1 0
(124) shuhdaxnt 1 0 (124) ehvrihthihng 1 0 (124) ehks 1 0
(124) berthdey 1 0 (124) sk 1 0 (124) prohpax 1 0
(124) wohtehvax 1 0 (124) grihp 1 0 (124) klowsax 1 0
(124) priht 1 0 (124) maonihng 1 0 (124) rehd 1 0
(124) flaet 1 0 (124) s 1 0 (124) prohblaxm 1 0
(124) behst 1 0 (124) layts 1 0 (124) sahch 1 0
(124) seh 1 0 (124) row 1 0 (124) wuht 1 0
(124) mey 1 0 (124) hheyts 1 0 (124) yiaz 1 0
(124) muwns 1 0 (124) seynt 1 0 (124) riychihng 1 0
(124) kaxrehkt 1 0 (124) piy 1 0 (124) perfihkt 1 0
(124) kertaxnz 1 0 (124) faynaxlih 1 0 (124) mayn 1 0
(124) gerlfrehnd 1 0 (124) ohntax 1 0 (124) spiykihng 1 0
(124) axl 1 0 (124) staendihng 1 0 (124) ruwmz 1 0
(124) sao 1 0 (124) staa 1 0 (124) fawnd 1 0
(124) saytlih 1 0 (124) aaskt 1 0 (124) ohps 1 0
(124) mihsduw 1 0 (124) puhsh 1 0 (124) ruwm 1 0
(124) miytihng 1 0 (124) wuhdaxnt 1 0 (124) sehntax 1 0
(124) hhaxm 1 0 (124) ihmehmbax 1 0 (124) yiy 1 0
(124) thahm 1 0 (124) trayaeng 1 0 (124) axhhehd 1 0
(124) shuwt 1 0 (124) truw 1 0 (124) lehs 1 0
(124) nohnoh 1 0 (124) wayl 1 0 (124) kaxmpliytlih 1 0
(124) hhuw 1 0 (124) yaosehlf 1 0 (124) poyntiy 1 0
(124) breyk 1 0 (124) fihnihsh 1 0 (124) neymz 1 0
(124) rihmayndz 1 0 (124) ehndz 1 0 (124) feyvaxrihts 1 0
(124) sheh 1 0 (124) sehmih 1 0 (124) skayz 1 0
(124) striyt 1 0 (124) ahndaxstaend 1 0 (124) maxstaash 1 0
(124) kaadz 1 0 (124) fayn 1 0 (124) trax 1 0
(124) sihmbaxlz 1 0 (124) lohlihpohp 1 0 (124) feysihz 1 0
(124) maechihz 1 0 (124) hhaad 1 0 (124) baejhihz 1 0
(124) owldax 1 0 (124) hhawzihz 1 0 (124) nowtihst 1 0
(124) diy 1 0 (124) axntihl 1 0 (124) strohng 1 0
(124) slowp 1 0 (124) trayihng 1 0 (124) mehzhax 1 0
(124) kehpt 1 0 (124) guhdnaxs 1 0 (124) rowbohts 1 0
(124) frehndlih 1 0 (124) riycht 1 0 (124) lahvd 1 0
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(124) noyz 1 0 (124) iyjhihpt 1 0 (124) lax 1 0
(124) kr 1 0 (124) faoth 1 0 (124) meynlih 1 0
(124) ayd 1 0 (124) sihmehtrihkaxl 1 0 (124) fiylihng 1 0
(124) dhih 1 0 (124) dihfraxns 1 0 (124) iyzih 1 0
(124) luhkawt 1 0 (124) flao 1 0 (124) hhohraxbaxl 1 0
(124) streytaxwey 1 0 (124) daak 1 0 (124) ohfaxn 1 0
(124) perfihktlih 1 0 (124) sihmbohlayzihz 1 0 (124) yuwzihng 1 0
(124) ae 1 0 (124) staatihd 1 0 (124) aess 1 0
(124) hhohldihn 1 0 (124) weyz 1 0 (124) yeht 1 0
(124) faa 1 0 (124) jhoynd 1 0 (124) ihnax 1 0
(124) sahmtaym 1 0 (124) shaht 1 0 (124) faolihng 1 0
(124) axtehnshaxn 1 0 (124) eynshaxnt 1 0 (124) pihraxmihd 1 0
(124) drao 1 0 (124) daw 1 0 (124) low 1 0
(124) duwihn 1 0 (124) ahs 1 0 (124) tehmptihng 1 0
(124) kowld 1 0 (124) poyntihd 1 0 (124) biytihng 1 0
(124) kahvaxz 1 0 (124) miyt 1 0 (124) flawaxz 1 0
(124) aerowz 1 0 (124) ael 1 0 (124) hhaadlih 1 0
(124) sihtihng 1 0 (124) naydhax 1 0 (124) tawax 1 0
(124) mihrax 1 0 (124) bihts 1 0 (124) teybaxl 1 0
(124) ehvax 1 0 (124) sihmaxlax 1 0 (124) fihnggaxz 1 0
(124) tehnihs 1 0 (124) buwmaxraeng 1 0 (124) naomaxlih 1 0
(124) saxk 1 0 (124) klowslih 1 0 (124) aachaxrih 1 0
(124) saht 1 0 (124) mow 1 0 (124) fraengk 1 0
(124) hhae 1 0 (124) gerl 1 0 (124) awtax 1 0
(124) staendihn 1 0 (124) taxnayt 1 0 (124) sheykihng 1 0
(124) faast 1 0 (124) lihsaxn 1 0 (124) krehs 1 0
(124) shahflihng 1 0 (124) baed 1 0 (124) wehdhax 1 0
(124) sih 1 0 (124) axdmiht 1 0 (124) key 1 0
(124) rihng 1 0 (124) ihntax 1 0 (124) earia 1 0
(124) spehshaxl 1 0 (124) hhahzbaxnd 1 0 (124) hhehd 1 0
(124) saxpowz 1 0 (124) luwkihn 1 0 (124) dhahs 1 0
(124) lern 1 0 (124) greyt 1 0 (124) ihtsehlf 1 0
(124) serk 1 0 (124) faolz 1 0 (124) gohtax 1 0
(124) hhehdseht 1 0 (124) yuwr 1 0 (124) klowzd 1 0
(124) st 1 0 (124) brayt 1 0 (124) ihmprehst 1 0
(124) wayf 1 0 (124) miynihng 1 0 (124) wernt 1 0
(124) axfehkshaxn 1 0 (124) nayslih 1 0 (124) bahmp 1 0
(124) saots 1 0 (124) liyst 1 0 (124) fiyldz 1 0
(124) chohkaxlaxts 1 0 (124) trohnohmiy 1 0 (124) miytihngz 1 0
(124) kaxmpliyt 1 0 (124) baelaxnst 1 0 (124) stahk 1 0
(124) piysihz 1 0 (124) ohnihstlih 1 0
(124) faomihng 1 0 (124) thaot 1 0
(124) yax 1 0 (124) smayld 1 0
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Table B.8: Complete word-frequencies of salient words in prohibition experiment.
Listed are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total number of words in
the experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) skwea 327 4.4 (39) wehl 40 0.54 (58) lahv 16 0.22
(2) trayaenggaxl 302 4.06 (40) kaant 39 0.52 (58) blaek 16 0.22
(3) serkaxl 285 3.83 (41) gow 38 0.51 (59) kwayt 15 0.2
(4) now 272 3.66 (42) dhea 37 0.5 (59) smayl 15 0.2
(5) wahn 250 3.36 (42) naw 37 0.5 (59) tray 15 0.2
(6) hhaat 248 3.34 (43) ow 34 0.46 (59) ohn 15 0.2
(7) dhihs 230 3.09 (43) hhowld 34 0.46 (59) thriy 15 0.2
(8) muwn 208 2.8 (44) tahch 32 0.43 (60) puht 14 0.19
(9) uhkey 171 2.3 (45) dawn 31 0.42 (60) ihnsayd 14 0.19
(10) sheyp 159 2.14 (45) noht 31 0.42 (60) dhehn 14 0.19
(11) yehs 155 2.08 (46) dhaets 30 0.4 (60) nehkst 14 0.19
(12) krehsaxnt 149 2 (46) ehksaxlaxnt 30 0.4 (60) baorihng 14 0.19
(13) layk 134 1.8 (47) rialih 29 0.39 (61) prihtih 13 0.17
(14) serkaxlz 129 1.74 (47) duw 29 0.39 (61) woht 13 0.17
(15) axgehn 112 1.51 (48) saydz 28 0.38 (61) goht 13 0.17
(16) guhd 107 1.44 (48) sohrih 28 0.38 (61) hhaxlow 13 0.17
(17) iht 101 1.36 (49) feyvaxriht 27 0.36 (62) feys 12 0.16
(18) vehrih 93 1.25 (49) siy 27 0.36 (63) axlawd 11 0.15
(19) uhey 88 1.18 (50) aet 25 0.34 (63) ay 11 0.15
(20) diychiy 83 1.12 (51) lehts 23 0.31 (63) bohksihz 11 0.15
(21) yuw 79 1.06 (52) sow 22 0.3 (64) gowihng 10 0.13
(22) rawnd 76 1.02 (52) kaen 22 0.3 (64) sahn 10 0.13
(23) pley 75 1.01 (53) aem 21 0.28 (64) hhaepih 10 0.13
(24) bohks 72 0.97 (53) ax 21 0.28 (64) kyuwb 10 0.13
(25) diyjhiy 67 0.9 (54) tuw 20 0.27 (64) dihfraxnt 10 0.13
(26) dhaet 66 0.89 (54) kaold 20 0.27 (64) wayt 10 0.13
(26) rayt 66 0.89 (54) nays 20 0.27 (65) sey 9 0.12
(27) skweaz 62 0.83 (55) aend 19 0.26 (65) serkyuhlax 9 0.12
(27) ihz 62 0.83 (55) wohnt 19 0.26 (65) prehzaxnt 9 0.12
(28) dahn 60 0.81 (55) baht 19 0.26 (65) ihzaxnt 9 0.12
(29) rihmehmbax 59 0.79 (55) thihngk 19 0.26 (65) wihndow 9 0.12
(30) luhk 52 0.7 (55) baol 19 0.26 (65) smaol 9 0.12
(31) taxdey 51 0.69 (55) yey 19 0.26 (65) know 9 0.12
(32) trayaenggaxlz 50 0.67 (55) teyk 19 0.26 (66) lahvlih 8 0.11
(33) axbawt 49 0.66 (56) uwm 18 0.24 (66) staat 8 0.11
(34) aa 47 0.63 (56) hhaev 18 0.24 (66) ao 8 0.11
(35) dhax 45 0.61 (56) taym 18 0.24 (66) waonihng 8 0.11
(35) downt 45 0.61 (56) fao 18 0.24 (66) piypaxl 8 0.11
(35) yea 45 0.61 (57) baek 17 0.23 (66) nehvax 8 0.11
(36) axnahdhax 44 0.59 (57) ihts 17 0.23 (66) aolsow 8 0.11
(37) hhaats 43 0.58 (57) wiy 17 0.23 (66) seym 8 0.11
(38) hhia 41 0.55 (58) saynz 16 0.22 (66) biht 8 0.11
(39) sheyps 40 0.54 (58) aol 16 0.22 (66) way 8 0.11
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(67) aodaxz 7 0.09 (69) klaym 5 0.07 (71) ahp 3 0.04
(67) bihfao 7 0.09 (69) behtax 5 0.07 (71) wia 3 0.04
(67) rowl 7 0.09 (69) iykwaxl 5 0.07 (71) aebsaxluwtlih 3 0.04
(67) laast 7 0.09 (69) axrawnd 5 0.07 (71) hhay 3 0.04
(67) dey 7 0.09 (69) dhiyz 5 0.07 (71) hhaend 3 0.04
(67) wihdh 7 0.09 (69) smaylihng 5 0.07 (71) flaegz 3 0.04
(67) mihdaxl 7 0.09 (69) kahm 5 0.07 (71) nialih 3 0.04
(67) lohts 7 0.09 (69) sehd 5 0.07 (71) bihgihnihng 3 0.04
(67) geht 7 0.09 (69) mao 5 0.07 (71) wey 3 0.04
(67) luhks 7 0.09 (69) dihdaxnt 5 0.07 (71) bawnsihng 3 0.04
(67) bihldihng 7 0.09 (69) wohts 5 0.07 (71) pahmp 3 0.04
(67) hhm 7 0.09 (70) aolrayt 4 0.05 (71) ihnstruhmaxnt 3 0.04
(67) shaap 7 0.09 (70) fiyl 4 0.05 (71) streyt 3 0.04
(67) kaonaxz 7 0.09 (70) dhehm 4 0.05 (71) tohp 3 0.04
(67) sayn 7 0.09 (70) axkrohs 4 0.05 (71) blohk 3 0.04
(67) chohkaxlaxt 7 0.09 (70) wea 4 0.05 (71) lernihng 3 0.04
(68) nayt 6 0.08 (70) waw 4 0.05 (71) wihdhihn 3 0.04
(68) hhaa 6 0.08 (70) flaeg 4 0.05 (71) klea 3 0.04
(68) shao 6 0.08 (70) sahmtaymz 4 0.05 (71) aahhaa 3 0.04
(68) ferst 6 0.08 (70) mawntihn 4 0.05 (71) hhaw 3 0.04
(68) ihntraxstihd 6 0.08 (70) wohntihd 4 0.05 (71) lernihd 3 0.04
(68) aekchualih 6 0.08 (70) pliyz 4 0.05 (71) ohv 3 0.04
(68) meybiy 6 0.08 (70) miy 4 0.05 (71) stohp 3 0.04
(68) bohdihz 6 0.08 (70) wahndax 4 0.05 (71) skuwl 3 0.04
(68) smayliy 6 0.08 (70) klehvax 4 0.05 (71) ehniymao 3 0.04
(68) miynz 6 0.08 (70) ehs 4 0.05 (71) gowz 3 0.04
(68) yaa 6 0.08 (70) dhey 4 0.05 (71) neym 3 0.04
(68) wahnz 6 0.08 (70) ihf 4 0.05 (71) wehn 3 0.04
(68) thaengk 6 0.08 (70) stihl 4 0.05 (71) sehkaxnd 3 0.04
(68) skay 6 0.08 (70) ihgzaektlih 4 0.05 (71) bihg 3 0.04
(68) duwihng 6 0.08 (70) beysihk 4 0.05 (71) saed 3 0.04
(68) luhkihng 6 0.08 (70) kiyn 4 0.05 (71) ahdhax 3 0.04
(68) wihch 6 0.08 (70) ohlrayt 4 0.05 (71) hhert 3 0.04
(68) mahch 6 0.08 (71) thertih 3 0.04 (71) er 3 0.04
(68) loht 6 0.08 (71) kwaotaxz 3 0.04 (71) pleyihng 3 0.04
(68) laynz 6 0.08 (71) ihntraxstihng 3 0.04 (71) aolweyz 3 0.04
(68) uh 6 0.08 (71) aaaa 3 0.04 (71) owkey 3 0.04
(69) baod 5 0.07 (71) yao 3 0.04 (71) sihmbaxl 3 0.04
(69) hhaaf 5 0.07 (71) luhkt 3 0.04 (71) triy 3 0.04
(69) hhaendz 5 0.07 (71) bohtaxm 3 0.04 (71) aant 3 0.04
(69) dhow 5 0.07 (71) pihlowz 3 0.04 (71) ihmpaotaxnt 3 0.04
(69) showz 5 0.07 (71) tehl 3 0.04 (71) hhey 3 0.04
(69) laykt 5 0.07 (71) taagiht 3 0.04 (71) rowd 3 0.04
(69) rowboht 5 0.07 (71) wohnax 3 0.04 (71) rihpiyt 3 0.04
(69) ahnfaochuhnaxtlih 5 0.07 (71) poynts 3 0.04 (71) tohblaxrown 3 0.04
(69) blohks 5 0.07 (71) trayaenggyuhlax 3 0.04 (71) axwey 3 0.04
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(71) uwps 3 0.04 (72) sahmthihng 2 0.03 (72) erlia 2 0.03
(71) pihkchax 3 0.04 (72) sheypt 2 0.03 (72) laajh 2 0.03
(72) ayv 2 0.03 (72) bihkohz 2 0.03 (72) owvax 2 0.03
(72) thihngz 2 0.03 (72) hhmax 2 0.03 (72) dahzaxnt 2 0.03
(72) gehtihng 2 0.03 (72) kaenaxt 2 0.03 (72) drohpt 2 0.03
(72) paxhhaeps 2 0.03 (72) ehjhihz 2 0.03 (72) maethaxmaetihks 2 0.03
(72) wuhd 2 0.03 (72) uhps 2 0.03 (72) hhaevaxnt 2 0.03
(72) drohpihng 2 0.03 (72) sahm 2 0.03 (72) chehst 2 0.03
(72) keafuhl 2 0.03 (72) iych 2 0.03 (72) axlohng 2 0.03
(72) mahsaxnt 2 0.03 (72) fihftih 2 0.03 (73) kwihklih 1 0.01
(72) poynt 2 0.03 (72) brihliant 2 0.03 (73) ehvrih 1 0.01
(72) taokt 2 0.03 (72) rihmehmbaxrihng 2 0.03 (73) shuhd 1 0.01
(72) mowmaxnt 2 0.03 (72) shaedowz 2 0.03 (73) faxrehvax 1 0.01
(72) bihgax 2 0.03 (72) fahn 2 0.03 (73) siymd 1 0.01
(72) hhaez 2 0.03 (72) gohnax 2 0.03 (73) klawdz 1 0.01
(72) sertaxnlih 2 0.03 (72) bihhheyv 2 0.03 (73) hhuwps 1 0.01
(72) shaynz 2 0.03 (72) ihnjhoyd 2 0.03 (73) weyv 1 0.01
(72) leytax 2 0.03 (72) mayt 2 0.03 (73) berthdey 1 0.01
(72) rehkaxgnayz 2 0.03 (72) iyvaxn 2 0.03 (73) wohtehvax 1 0.01
(72) aym 2 0.03 (72) dia 2 0.03 (73) flaet 1 0.01
(72) kwaotax 2 0.03 (72) aydhax 2 0.03 (73) behst 1 0.01
(72) yua 2 0.03 (72) prehzaxnts 2 0.03 (73) kaxrehkt 1 0.01
(72) hhawehvax 2 0.03 (72) hhaed 2 0.03 (73) kertaxnz 1 0.01
(72) krehsaxnts 2 0.03 (72) throw 2 0.03 (73) gerlfrehnd 1 0.01
(72) wohz 2 0.03 (72) wehlehntayns 2 0.03 (73) axl 1 0.01
(72) faynaxl 2 0.03 (72) fuhl 2 0.03 (73) hhaevihng 1 0.01
(72) saot 2 0.03 (72) rihmehmbaxd 2 0.03 (73) saytlih 1 0.01
(72) blahd 2 0.03 (72) biyts 2 0.03 (73) mihsduw 1 0.01
(72) lihtaxl 2 0.03 (72) hhowldihng 2 0.03 (73) eyay 1 0.01
(72) mahndih 2 0.03 (72) rihmm 2 0.03 (73) miytihng 1 0.01
(72) toyz 2 0.03 (72) fuhtbaol 2 0.03 (73) hhaxm 1 0.01
(72) ehvrihwea 2 0.03 (72) axfreyd 2 0.03 (73) ts 1 0.01
(72) kuhshaxn 2 0.03 (72) kahlax 2 0.03 (73) thahm 1 0.01
(72) waonihngz 2 0.03 (72) baolz 2 0.03 (73) nohnoh 1 0.01
(72) pehnsaxl 2 0.03 (72) ihnstehd 2 0.03 (73) shael 1 0.01
(72) kerv 2 0.03 (72) yaoz 2 0.03 (73) wiyv 1 0.01
(72) sehshaxnz 2 0.03 (72) show 2 0.03 (73) striyt 1 0.01
(72) daats 2 0.03 (72) smuwdh 2 0.03 (73) kaadz 1 0.01
(72) niyd 2 0.03 (72) spiyd 2 0.03 (73) maechihz 1 0.01
(72) awtsayd 2 0.03 (72) towld 2 0.03 (73) sihks 1 0.01
(72) hhiaz 2 0.03 (72) ihnjhoy 2 0.03 (73) slowp 1 0.01
(73) kahlaxd 1 0.01 (73) lohlihpohp 1 0.01 (73) noyz 1 0.01
(73) kaech 1 0.01 (73) awt 1 0.01 (73) streytaxwey 1 0.01
(73) frehndlih 1 0.01 (73) hhawzihz 1 0.01 (73) perfihktlih 1 0.01
(73) taxgehdhax 1 0.01 (73) axntihl 1 0.01 (73) hhohldihn 1 0.01
(73) fihnggax 1 0.01 (73) guhdnaxs 1 0.01 (73) ea 1 0.01
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(73) ehndlihs 1 0.01 (73) paxtihkyuhlax 1 0.01 (73) sahmtaym 1 0.01
(73) aestraxnaot 1 0.01 (73) kyuwbz 1 0.01 (73) axtehnshaxn 1 0.01
(73) frehnd 1 0.01 (73) ehvrihbohdih 1 0.01 (73) duwihn 1 0.01
(73) klaymihng 1 0.01 (73) ehnih 1 0.01 (73) showihng 1 0.01
(73) buwlzay 1 0.01 (73) taymz 1 0.01 (73) stiyp 1 0.01
(73) ehnd 1 0.01 (73) aeksihdaxnt 1 0.01 (73) glahm 1 0.01
(73) pleyd 1 0.01 (73) meyz 1 0.01 (73) aerowz 1 0.01
(73) tehlihng 1 0.01 (73) bihld 1 0.01 (73) pihraxmihdz 1 0.01
(73) mohrnihn 1 0.01 (73) ahdhaxz 1 0.01 (73) geymz 1 0.01
(73) hhyuwmaxn 1 0.01 (73) pehtaxlz 1 0.01 (73) saht 1 0.01
(73) tayps 1 0.01 (73) klowsax 1 0.01 (73) pahmps 1 0.01
(73) sertaxn 1 0.01 (73) rehd 1 0.01 (73) faast 1 0.01
(73) shaynihng 1 0.01 (73) prohblaxm 1 0.01 (73) shahflihng 1 0.01
(73) hhihl 1 0.01 (73) yiaz 1 0.01 (73) rihng 1 0.01
(73) ehvrihthihng 1 0.01 (73) riychihng 1 0.01 (73) spehshaxl 1 0.01
(73) grihp 1 0.01 (73) yuwzhaxlih 1 0.01 (73) pleys 1 0.01
(73) dheaz 1 0.01 (73) fyuw 1 0.01 (73) serk 1 0.01
(73) maonihng 1 0.01 (73) ruwmz 1 0.01 (73) saxpowz 1 0.01
(73) layts 1 0.01 (73) faom 1 0.01 (73) hhehdseht 1 0.01
(73) hheyts 1 0.01 (73) ohps 1 0.01 (73) pleyst 1 0.01
(73) piy 1 0.01 (73) wownt 1 0.01 (73) wayf 1 0.01
(73) faynaxlih 1 0.01 (73) kiyp 1 0.01 (73) axfehkshaxn 1 0.01
(73) rihvayz 1 0.01 (73) kaxmpliytlih 1 0.01 (73) saots 1 0.01
(73) dihd 1 0.01 (73) kea 1 0.01 (73) chohkaxlaxts 1 0.01
(73) staendihng 1 0.01 (73) poyntiy 1 0.01 (73) frahnt 1 0.01
(73) geyv 1 0.01 (73) aolrehdih 1 0.01 (73) kaxmpliyt 1 0.01
(73) axlayv 1 0.01 (73) leht 1 0.01 (73) staend 1 0.01
(73) staa 1 0.01 (73) feyvaxrihts 1 0.01 (73) paat 1 0.01
(73) geym 1 0.01 (73) klawd 1 0.01 (73) kiyps 1 0.01
(73) iykwihlaetaxraxl 1 0.01 (73) skayz 1 0.01 (73) iyjhihpt 1 0.01
(73) truw 1 0.01 (73) hhaezaxnt 1 0.01 (73) sihmehtrihkaxl 1 0.01
(73) iy 1 0.01 (73) feysihz 1 0.01 (73) dihfraxns 1 0.01
(73) grawnd 1 0.01 (73) baejhihz 1 0.01 (73) dahz 1 0.01
(73) wayl 1 0.01 (73) nowtihst 1 0.01 (73) sihmbohlayzihz 1 0.01
(73) ahndaxstaend 1 0.01 (73) rowbohts 1 0.01 (73) staatihd 1 0.01
(73) fayn 1 0.01 (73) mehzhax 1 0.01 (73) jhoynd 1 0.01
(73) dhowz 1 0.01 (73) kr 1 0.01 (73) eynshaxnt 1 0.01
(73) slaytlih 1 0.01 (73) luwkihn 1 0.01 (73) biytihng 1 0.01
(73) poyntihd 1 0.01 (73) brayt 1 0.01 (73) flawaxz 1 0.01
(73) ael 1 0.01 (73) siym 1 0.01 (73) drohp 1 0.01
(73) naydhax 1 0.01 (73) trohnohmiy 1 0.01 (73) teybaxl 1 0.01
(73) awax 1 0.01 (73) klows 1 0.01 (73) deynjhax 1 0.01
(73) bihts 1 0.01 (73) baelaxnst 1 0.01 (73) yuws 1 0.01
(73) wearaez 1 0.01 (73) wahns 1 0.01 (73) aachaxrih 1 0.01
(73) laajhax 1 0.01 (73) faynd 1 0.01 (73) wiyk 1 0.01
(73) buwmaxraeng 1 0.01 (73) meynlih 1 0.01 (73) sheykihng 1 0.01
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(73) klowslih 1 0.01 (73) iyzih 1 0.01 (73) krehs 1 0.01
(73) gerl 1 0.01 (73) ohfaxn 1 0.01 (73) key 1 0.01
(73) taokihng 1 0.01 (73) yeht 1 0.01 (73) earia 1 0.01
(73) lihsaxn 1 0.01 (73) aess 1 0.01 (73) hhehd 1 0.01
(73) boy 1 0.01 (73) faolihng 1 0.01 (73) klowzd 1 0.01
(73) axdmiht 1 0.01 (73) pihraxmihd 1 0.01 (73) ihmprehst 1 0.01
(73) hhahzbaxnd 1 0.01 (73) may 1 0.01 (73) wernt 1 0.01
(73) ohhh 1 0.01 (73) tehmptihng 1 0.01 (73) fiyldz 1 0.01
Table B.9: Complete word-frequencies of all words in the experiment of Saunders
et al. (2012). Listed are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total
number of words in the experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) ax 702 8.71 (30) layk 65 0.81 (49) dhehn 29 0.36
(2) dhihs 367 4.55 (31) staa 61 0.76 (50) aen 28 0.35
(3) bluw 347 4.31 (32) woht 56 0.69 (50) waots 28 0.35
(4) ihz 322 4 (33) sahn 54 0.67 (50) smayl 28 0.35
(5) aend 314 3.9 (34) uhkey 50 0.62 (50) now 28 0.35
(6) rehd 302 3.75 (34) naw 50 0.62 (50) dhea 28 0.35
(7) griyn 286 3.55 (35) wihdh 48 0.6 (51) hhaez 26 0.32
(8) dhax 265 3.29 (36) sow 46 0.57 (52) sheyps 25 0.31
(9) dhaets 237 2.94 (37) yea 44 0.55 (52) kaen 25 0.31
(10) yuw 194 2.41 (38) bihgax 41 0.51 (53) ihm 24 0.3
(11) ihts 161 2 (38) wayt 41 0.51 (54) show 23 0.29
(12) hhaat 160 1.99 (39) laajh 40 0.5 (55) bihg 22 0.27
(13) serkaxl 149 1.85 (40) aet 39 0.48 (55) dahn 22 0.27
(14) aerow 148 1.84 (41) kahlax 37 0.46 (55) vehrih 22 0.27
(15) sayd 146 1.81 (42) aa 36 0.45 (56) downt 21 0.26
(16) krohs 120 1.49 (42) ihn 36 0.45 (56) er 20 0.25
(17) hhia 112 1.39 (43) siy 35 0.43 (57) poyntihng 19 0.24
(18) wiy 111 1.38 (43) baodax 35 0.43 (57) smaolax 19 0.24
(19) ohn 110 1.37 (43) baekgrawnd 35 0.43 (58) tray 17 0.21
(20) muwn 95 1.18 (43) tuw 35 0.43 (58) krehsaxnt 17 0.21
(21) wahn 94 1.17 (44) axbawt 34 0.42 (58) gow 17 0.21
(22) dhaet 89 1.1 (44) guhd 34 0.42 (58) hhaxlow 17 0.21
(23) sheyp 88 1.09 (45) diychiy 33 0.41 (59) hhaw 16 0.2
(24) rayt 87 1.08 (45) yehs 33 0.41 (59) ihf 16 0.2
(24) bohks 87 1.08 (46) luhk 32 0.4 (59) baht 16 0.2
(25) hhaev 80 0.99 (46) miydiam 32 0.4 (59) saydz 16 0.2
(26) goht 79 0.98 (47) sahm 31 0.38 (59) know 16 0.2
(27) smaol 76 0.94 (48) wehl 30 0.37 (60) brihliant 15 0.19
(28) iht 75 0.93 (48) duw 30 0.37 (60) showihng 15 0.19
(29) skwea 69 0.86 (49) ay 29 0.36 (60) kaxrehkt 15 0.19
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(60) uwm 15 0.19 (69) nays 6 0.07 (73) baek 2 0.02
(60) axgehn 15 0.19 (70) dhehm 5 0.06 (73) mayt 2 0.02
(60) ahpwaxdz 15 0.19 (70) kyuwb 5 0.06 (73) baod 2 0.02
(61) tern 14 0.17 (70) behtax 5 0.06 (73) ehls 2 0.02
(61) gowihng 14 0.17 (70) yp 5 0.06 (73) skay 2 0.02
(61) gohnax 14 0.17 (70) seyihng 5 0.06 (73) duwihng 2 0.02
(61) luhkihng 14 0.17 (70) fao 5 0.06 (73) ihl 2 0.02
(61) lehts 14 0.17 (70) bihfao 5 0.06 (73) dawn 2 0.02
(61) wiyv 14 0.17 (70) smaolihst 5 0.06 (73) sihtihng 2 0.02
(61) ahdhax 14 0.17 (70) laast 5 0.06 (73) dhaen 2 0.02
(61) noht 14 0.17 (70) showz 5 0.06 (73) ayl 2 0.02
(61) mihdaxl 14 0.17 (70) saxrawndihd 5 0.06 (73) sihks 2 0.02
(62) taxdey 13 0.16 (71) yao 4 0.05 (73) sohrih 2 0.02
(62) thihngk 13 0.16 (71) kaent 4 0.05 (73) wia 2 0.02
(63) shael 12 0.15 (71) jhahst 4 0.05 (73) ferst 2 0.02
(64) dihfraxnt 11 0.14 (71) wihch 4 0.05 (73) nehkst 2 0.02
(64) kahlaxz 11 0.14 (71) feysihng 4 0.05 (73) dihd 2 0.02
(64) rawnd 11 0.14 (71) dhiyz 4 0.05 (73) sahmthihng 2 0.02
(64) ihznt 11 0.14 (71) laajhax 4 0.05 (73) feys 2 0.02
(65) aym 10 0.12 (71) wihl 4 0.05 (73) mao 2 0.02
(65) axnahdhax 10 0.12 (71) sfia 4 0.05 (73) laykt 2 0.02
(66) aol 9 0.11 (71) owkey 4 0.05 (73) sahmtaymz 2 0.02
(66) wohnt 9 0.11 (71) faynd 4 0.05 (74) aolrehdih 1 0.01
(66) ao 9 0.11 (71) wey 4 0.05 (74) wohchihng 1 0.01
(66) aolsow 9 0.11 (71) owvax 4 0.05 (74) sey 1 0.01
(67) wahnz 8 0.1 (72) dihdnt 3 0.04 (74) shuhd 1 0.01
(67) bohksihz 8 0.1 (72) geht 3 0.04 (74) feysihz 1 0.01
(67) ohv 8 0.1 (72) ihgzaampaxl 3 0.04 (74) lahvlih 1 0.01
(67) ihnsayd 8 0.1 (72) feyvaxriht 3 0.04 (74) taok 1 0.01
(67) sayzd 8 0.1 (72) shao 3 0.04 (74) dhiy 1 0.01
(67) aez 8 0.1 (72) paetaxnz 3 0.04 (74) rohng 1 0.01
(68) ehksaxlaxnt 7 0.09 (72) bihgihst 3 0.04 (74) behst 1 0.01
(68) aem 7 0.09 (72) frahnt 3 0.04 (74) laajhihst 1 0.01
(68) lihtaxl 7 0.09 (72) wohz 3 0.04 (74) iyvaxn 1 0.01
(68) slaytlih 7 0.09 (72) biy 3 0.04 (74) showd 1 0.01
(68) ow 7 0.09 (72) stihl 3 0.04 (74) dhaxz 1 0.01
(68) dheaz 7 0.09 (72) seym 3 0.04 (74) mowmaxnt 1 0.01
(68) hhay 7 0.09 (72) maonihng 3 0.04 (74) hh 1 0.01
(68) blohk 7 0.09 (72) taym 3 0.04 (74) stohp 1 0.01
(68) sayz 7 0.09 (72) aant 3 0.04 (74) erm 1 0.01
(68) iych 7 0.09 (72) skweaz 3 0.04 (74) rihng 1 0.01
(69) luhks 6 0.07 (72) serkaxlz 3 0.04 (74) hhaed 1 0.01
(69) yua 6 0.07 (72) kwayt 3 0.04 (74) krohsihz 1 0.01
(69) dawnwaxdz 6 0.07 (73) gehtihng 2 0.02 (74) rehkaxgnayz 1 0.01
(69) bay 6 0.07 (73) wuhd 2 0.02 (74) kohpihihng 1 0.01
(69) rialih 6 0.07 (73) saynz 2 0.02 (74) tehl 1 0.01
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(74) trayaenggaxl 1 0.01 (74) aolweyz 1 0.01 (74) ehnih 1 0.01
(74) neym 1 0.01 (74) pihkchaxz 1 0.01 (74) hhowld 1 0.01
(74) hhaaf 1 0.01 (74) greyt 1 0.01 (74) gihv 1 0.01
(74) kahlaxd 1 0.01 (74) loht 1 0.01 (74) dihsayd 1 0.01
(74) sehkaxnd 1 0.01 (74) brayt 1 0.01 (74) kaol 1 0.01
(74) klehvax 1 0.01 (74) taynih 1 0.01 (74) gehsihng 1 0.01
(74) tiyzihng 1 0.01 (74) siym 1 0.01 (74) ihksaytihd 1 0.01
(74) hhiyz 1 0.01 (74) prihtih 1 0.01 (74) wohts 1 0.01
(74) ahp 1 0.01 (74) rihmehmbax 1 0.01 (74) krsaxnt 1 0.01
(74) axrawnd 1 0.01 (74) aekchualih 1 0.01 (74) sayn 1 0.01
(74) dahz 1 0.01 (74) hhiaz 1 0.01 (74) miynz 1 0.01
(74) hhowl 1 0.01 (74) may 1 0.01 (74) taokaxtihv 1 0.01
(74) cheynjhihng 1 0.01 (74) nehvax 1 0.01 (74) mihsihng 1 0.01
(74) dhey 1 0.01 (74) paetaxn 1 0.01 (74) blohks 1 0.01
(74) gohn 1 0.01 (74) thihngz 1 0.01 (74) chaetih 1 0.01
(74) biht 1 0.01 (74) miyn 1 0.01 (74) sehntax 1 0.01
(74) faynaxlih 1 0.01 (74) hhaepih 1 0.01 (74) fahsih 1 0.01
(74) krihstiyn 1 0.01 (74) kyuwbz 1 0.01 (74) wer 1 0.01
(74) taokihng 1 0.01 (74) dihskrayb 1 0.01
Table B.10: Complete word-frequencies of all words in the experiment of Saunders
et al. (2012). Listed are the rank, word count ( cnt) and the percentage relative to the total
number of words in the experiment across all participants and sessions.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) bluw 157 6.91 (17) sahn 28 1.23 (29) yehs 13 0.57
(2) rehd 126 5.54 (18) wahn 27 1.19 (29) smaolax 13 0.57
(3) serkaxl 117 5.15 (19) kahlax 24 1.06 (29) krehsaxnt 13 0.57
(4) hhaat 108 4.75 (20) guhd 22 0.97 (30) miydiam 12 0.53
(5) griyn 99 4.36 (20) bihgax 22 0.97 (31) kaxrehkt 11 0.48
(6) aerow 81 3.56 (21) ax 21 0.92 (31) layk 11 0.48
(7) krohs 79 3.48 (22) dhaets 20 0.88 (31) yea 11 0.48
(7) sayd 79 3.48 (23) diychiy 19 0.84 (32) brihliant 10 0.44
(8) bohks 64 2.82 (24) sheyps 18 0.79 (32) now 10 0.44
(9) sheyp 55 2.42 (24) iht 18 0.79 (32) ihts 10 0.44
(10) aend 48 2.11 (24) baekgrawnd 18 0.79 (32) naw 10 0.44
(10) muwn 48 2.11 (24) yuw 18 0.79 (32) dahn 10 0.44
(11) skwea 47 2.07 (25) smayl 17 0.75 (33) mihdaxl 9 0.4
(12) dhihs 46 2.02 (25) dhaet 17 0.75 (34) dhax 8 0.35
(13) staa 42 1.85 (25) baodax 17 0.75 (34) taxdey 8 0.35
(14) uhkey 40 1.76 (25) wayt 17 0.75 (34) aolsow 8 0.35
(14) ihz 40 1.76 (26) goht 16 0.7 (34) luhk 8 0.35
(15) smaol 35 1.54 (26) laajh 16 0.7 (34) ohn 8 0.35
(15) rayt 35 1.54 (27) axbawt 15 0.66 (34) hhaxlow 8 0.35
(16) hhia 29 1.28 (28) woht 14 0.62 (35) saydz 7 0.31
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(35) bohksihz 7 0.31 (39) smaolihst 3 0.13 (41) behst 1 0.04
(35) axgehn 7 0.31 (39) sahm 3 0.13 (41) rihmehmbax 1 0.04
(35) wehl 7 0.31 (39) nays 3 0.13 (41) show 1 0.04
(35) er 7 0.31 (39) slaytlih 3 0.13 (41) aekchualih 1 0.04
(36) waots 6 0.26 (39) aet 3 0.13 (41) hhaw 1 0.04
(36) dihfraxnt 6 0.26 (39) ow 3 0.13 (41) ihl 1 0.04
(36) downt 6 0.26 (39) seym 3 0.13 (41) faynd 1 0.04
(36) ahpwaxdz 6 0.26 (40) maonihng 2 0.09 (41) aant 1 0.04
(36) ihznt 6 0.26 (40) wahnz 2 0.09 (41) showd 1 0.04
(36) gow 6 0.26 (40) poyntihng 2 0.09 (41) showz 1 0.04
(36) siy 6 0.26 (40) ihgzaampaxl 2 0.09 (41) sihtihng 1 0.04
(36) bihg 6 0.26 (40) dawn 2 0.09 (41) kaen 1 0.04
(36) dhea 6 0.26 (40) wey 2 0.09 (41) hh 1 0.04
(37) ehksaxlaxnt 5 0.22 (40) yp 2 0.09 (41) ohv 1 0.04
(37) showihng 5 0.22 (40) skweaz 2 0.09 (41) aol 1 0.04
(37) tray 5 0.22 (40) bihgihst 2 0.09 (41) sahmthihng 1 0.04
(37) uwm 5 0.22 (40) sihks 2 0.09 (41) rihng 1 0.04
(37) kahlaxz 5 0.22 (40) bihfao 2 0.09 (41) krohsihz 1 0.04
(38) kyuwb 4 0.18 (40) kwayt 2 0.09 (41) dihskrayb 1 0.04
(38) luhkihng 4 0.18 (40) thihngk 2 0.09 (41) dhaen 1 0.04
(38) tuw 4 0.18 (40) sahmtaymz 2 0.09 (41) rehkaxgnayz 1 0.04
(38) rawnd 4 0.18 (40) dhehn 2 0.09 (41) hhaaf 1 0.04
(38) ihn 4 0.18 (40) ferst 2 0.09 (41) frahnt 1 0.04
(38) wihdh 4 0.18 (40) wohnt 2 0.09 (41) kahlaxd 1 0.04
(38) blohk 4 0.18 (40) ihnsayd 2 0.09 (41) sehkaxnd 1 0.04
(38) lihtaxl 4 0.18 (40) ihm 2 0.09 (41) gehsihng 1 0.04
(38) sow 4 0.18 (40) dawnwaxdz 2 0.09 (41) tiyzihng 1 0.04
(38) vehrih 4 0.18 (41) aolrehdih 1 0.04 (41) wohz 1 0.04
(39) hhaev 3 0.13 (41) ao 1 0.04 (41) ihksaytihd 1 0.04
(39) sfia 3 0.13 (41) tern 1 0.04 (41) ahp 1 0.04
(39) dihdnt 3 0.13 (41) faynaxlih 1 0.04 (41) axrawnd 1 0.04
(39) laast 3 0.13 (41) ay 1 0.04 (41) wohts 1 0.04
(39) noht 3 0.13 (41) wohchihng 1 0.04 (41) krsaxnt 1 0.04
(39) aa 3 0.13 (41) krihstiyn 1 0.04 (41) wihch 1 0.04
(39) baht 3 0.13 (41) aolweyz 1 0.04 (41) taokaxtihv 1 0.04
(39) luhks 3 0.13 (41) lahvlih 1 0.04 (41) cheynjhihng 1 0.04
(39) feyvaxriht 3 0.13 (41) geht 1 0.04 (41) sayz 1 0.04
(39) rialih 3 0.13 (41) owkey 1 0.04 (41) feysihng 1 0.04
(39) hhaez 3 0.13 (41) pihkchaxz 1 0.04 (41) nehkst 1 0.04
(39) serkaxlz 3 0.13 (41) bay 1 0.04 (41) saxrawndihd 1 0.04
(39) lehts 3 0.13 (41) greyt 1 0.04 (41) sehntax 1 0.04
(39) paetaxnz 3 0.13 (41) kaent 1 0.04 (41) dhiyz 1 0.04
(39) axnahdhax 3 0.13 (41) brayt 1 0.04 (41) laajhax 1 0.04
(39) sayzd 3 0.13 (41) skay 1 0.04
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B.4 Accumulated word frequencies for the first three sessions
Table B.11: Word-frequencies of all words of the first three sessions in rejection ex-
periment. Listed are the ten most frequent words within said experiment produced during the first
three sessions across all participants. Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage
relative to the total number of words in the experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the
same statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and words linked to the motivational
state of the robot.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) you 772 7.16 (34) yes 84 0.78 (81) didn’t (2) 10 0.09
(2) the 590 5.47 (36) Deechee 76 0.7 (84) didn’t 7 0.06
(3) like 374 3.47 (39) not 71 0.66 (85) isn’t 6 0.06
(4) a 346 3.21 (44) don’t 56 0.52 (85) moons 6 0.06
(5) one 287 2.66 (45) box 55 0.51 (85) rectangles 6 0.06
(6) this 281 2.6 (45) triangles 55 0.51 (87) pyramid 4 0.04
(7) no 235 2.18 (52) Deechee (2) 45 0.42 (88) smile 3 0.03
(9) square 210 1.95 (55) crescent 40 0.37 (88) pyramids 3 0.03
(10) do 206 1.91 (60) shape 32 0.3 (88) haven’t 3 0.03
(12) to 183 1.7 (62) nice 29 0.27 (88) smiling 3 0.03
(13) heart 177 1.64 (66) favourite 25 0.23 (88) won’t 3 0.03
(14) moon 174 1.61 (68) happy 23 0.21 (89) can’t 2 0.02
(16) triangle 152 1.41 (73) hearts 18 0.17 (89) doesn’t (2) 2 0.02
(18) circle 139 1.29 (74) target 17 0.16 (90) wouldn’t 1 0.01
(20) don’t 128 1.19 (76) sad 15 0.14 (90) doesn’t 1 0.01
(23) circles 116 1.08 (77) arteen 14 0.13 (90) weren’t 1 0.01
(25) squares 111 1.03 (80) know 11 0.1
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Table B.12: Word-frequencies of all words of the first three sessions in prohibition ex-
periment. Listed are the ten most frequent words within said experiment produced during the first
three sessions across all participants. Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and the percentage
relative to the total number of words in the experiment. Apart from the highest-ranking words the
same statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and words linked to the motivational
state of the robot.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) you 918 5.98 (28) don’t 129 0.84 (92) smile 7 0.05
(2) the 788 5.13 (29) play 119 0.77 (93) doesn’t 6 0.04
(3) a 659 4.29 (33) circles 102 0.66 (94) mustn’t 5 0.03
(4) this 572 3.73 (34) crescent 100 0.65 (94) sad 5 0.03
(5) one 459 2.99 (39) yes 91 0.59 (94) smiling 5 0.03
(6) no 352 2.29 (39) can’t (2) 91 0.59 (94) haven’t 5 0.03
(7) is 347 2.26 (46) box 74 0.48 (96) won’t 3 0.02
(8) like 298 1.94 (53) Deechee 59 0.38 (96) hasn’t 3 0.02
(9) it’s 282 1.84 (53) Deechee (2) 59 0.38 (97) cannot 2 0.01
(10) to 269 1.75 (62) squares 44 0.29 (98) moons 1 0.01
(11) heart 236 1.54 (66) nice 37 0.24 (98) nono 1 0.01
(13) square 224 1.46 (66) triangles 37 0.24 (98) target 1 0.01
(15) triangle 214 1.39 (69) hearts 34 0.22 (98) crescents 1 0.01
(16) moon 211 1.37 (78) know 22 0.14 (98) wouldn’t 1 0.01
(17) shape 201 1.31 (82) happy 17 0.11 (98) neither 1 0.01
(20) circle 180 1.17 (85) favourite 14 0.09 (98) shouldn’t 1 0.01
(21) do 175 1.14 (88) isn’t 11 0.07
(22) not 170 1.11 (90) didn’t 9 0.06
374
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
Table B.13: Word-frequencies of salient words of the first three sessions in rejection
experiment. Listed are the ten most frequent salient words within said experiment produced during
the first three sessions across all participants. Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and
the percentage relative to the total number of words in the experiment. Apart from the highest-
ranking words the same statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and words linked to
the motivational state of the robot.
rank word cnt % rank word cnt % rank word cnt %
(1) square 157 4.99 (23) don’t 32 1.02 (40) happy 11 0.35
(2) no 146 4.64 (26) Deechee (2) 27 0.86 (41) a 10 0.32
(3) triangle 127 4.04 (27) box 26 0.83 (45) do 6 0.19
(4) heart 122 3.88 (28) crescent 25 0.8 (46) rectangles 5 0.16
(5) circle 111 3.53 (31) are 20 0.64 (47) isn’t 4 0.13
(6) moon 110 3.5 (34) shape 17 0.54 (47) pyramid 4 0.13
(7) like 108 3.44 (35) favourite 16 0.51 (48) smile 3 0.1
(8) circles 88 2.8 (36) target 15 0.48 (48) pyramids 3 0.1
(9) one 84 2.67 (36) nice 15 0.48 (48) moons 3 0.1
(10) squares 75 2.39 (38) not 13 0.41 (49) smiling 2 0.06
(11) it 71 2.26 (39) hearts 12 0.38 (49) won’t 2 0.06
(13) yes 56 1.78 (39) arteen 12 0.38 (50) didn’t (2) 1 0.03
(16) Deechee 46 1.46 (39) sad 12 0.38 (50) can’t 1 0.03
(17) this 42 1.34 (40) the 11 0.35 (50) didn’t 1 0.03
(22) triangles 33 1.05 (40) don’t (2) 11 0.35
(23) you 32 1.02 (40) to 11 0.35
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Table B.14: Word-frequencies of salient words of the first three sessions in prohibition
experiment. Listed are the ten most frequent salient words within said experiment produced during
the first three sessions across all participants. Given are the rank, the word count ( cnt) and
the percentage relative to the total number of words in the experiment. Apart from the highest-
ranking words the same statistics are given for object labels, negation words, and words linked to
the motivational state of the robot.
rank word cnt % (rank) word cnt % (rank) word cnt %
(1) you 918 5.98 (28) don’t 129 0.84 (92) smile 7 0.05
(2) the 788 5.13 (29) play 119 0.77 (93) doesn’t 6 0.04
(3) a 659 4.29 (33) circles 102 0.66 (94) mustn’t 5 0.03
(4) this 572 3.73 (34) crescent 100 0.65 (94) sad 5 0.03
(5) one 459 2.99 (39) yes 91 0.59 (94) smiling 5 0.03
(6) no 352 2.29 (39) can’t (2) 91 0.59 (94) haven’t 5 0.03
(7) is 347 2.26 (46) box 74 0.48 (96) won’t 3 0.02
(8) like 298 1.94 (53) Deechee 59 0.38 (96) hasn’t 3 0.02
(9) it’s 282 1.84 (53) Deechee (2) 59 0.38 (97) cannot 2 0.01
(10) to 269 1.75 (62) squares 44 0.29 (98) moons 1 0.01
(11) heart 236 1.54 (66) nice 37 0.24 (98) nono 1 0.01
(13) square 224 1.46 (66) triangles 37 0.24 (98) target 1 0.01
(15) triangle 214 1.39 (69) hearts 34 0.22 (98) crescents 1 0.01
(16) moon 211 1.37 (78) know 22 0.14 (98) wouldn’t 1 0.01
(17) shape 201 1.31 (82) happy 17 0.11 (98) neither 1 0.01
(20) circle 180 1.17 (85) favourite 14 0.09 (98) shouldn’t 1 0.01
(21) do 175 1.14 (88) isn’t 11 0.07
(22) not 170 1.11 (90) didn’t 9 0.06
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B.5 Listings of In-group changes between sessions of utter-
ance level measures
B.5.1 Rejection Experiment
Table B.15: Percental changes of MLU between sessions of rejection scenario. Statistically
significant changes (p < .05) are in bold
(a) All Utterances, T: ∗=1.98, ∗∗=2.37, †=2.38,
‡=2.9
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P01 -4.55 14.29 4.17 4
P04 -10.64 0 0 -4.76
P05 3.57 3.45 -6.67 -7.14
P06 -2.63 5.41 -5.13 8.11
P07 12.5 −11.11∗ -9.38 6.9
P08 15.63 -8.11 2.94 -8.57
P09 -5.26 2.78 -5.41 -14.29
P10 18.75 5.26 25 -28
P11 −20∗∗ −21.88† 8 7.41
P12 −26.32‡ 0 -17.86 8.7
(b) Negative Utterances Only, T: 1:2.69, 2:2.43, 3:2.7,
4 : 4.4, 5:2.37, 6:2.27,7:2.15
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P01 35 25.93 −47.061 105.562
P04 11.36 8.16 -13.21 2.17
P05 66.673 −604 166.675 -9.38
P06 -5.41 31.43 -15.22 12.82
P07 28.13 -26.83 6.67 -15.63
P08 28.57 −48.896 39.13 21.88
P09 37.78 0 -17.74 −33.337
P10 inf 20 56.67 -57.45
P11 -25 4.76 -22.73 8.82
P12 -26.32 42.86 -35 26.92
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Table B.16: Percental changes of distinct words between sessions of rejection scenario; a sta-
tistical evaluation is not possible for the depicted values as each is based on singular values for each
session and participant
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P01 23.81 11.54 3.45 -23.33
P04 -23.76 38.96 -2.8 0
P05 -26.04 2.82 -8.22 20.9
P06 -14 12.79 -2.06 -6.32
P07 -23.57 -6.54 8 -2.78
P08 -38.62 7.87 -8.33 44.32
P09 3.76 12.32 -1.94 -23.68
P10 350 0 -14.81 -13.04
P11 -12.62 -37.78 3.57 27.59
P12 -33.33 -71.05 22.73 33.33
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Due to the small number of distinct nega-
tive words, percentual values were not cal-
culated for negative words only.
See table 5.10 for absolute values.
Table B.17: Percental changes of utterances per minute (u/min) between sessions of rejection
scenario. undef means that there were 0 utterances in session X, for X→Y.
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P01 26.36 -7.19 16.28 -20
P04 6.28 -11.81 -6.25 19.05
P05 -16.6 13.43 2.04 20.4
P06 -8.86 -0.63 7.26 -9.71
P07 2.26 -3.04 2.28 0
P08 -20.06 0 -19.31 13.4
P09 -4.4 16.74 2.51 -8.04
P10 114.29 -14.67 6.25 8.82
P11 -6.99 -9.86 -27.08 -0.71
P12 -14.67 -52.23 76 -18.18
(b) Negative Utterances Only
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P01 200 66.67 50 -60
P04 34.88 -20.69 -2.17 68.89
P05 -17.02 -38.46 41.67 5.88
P06 -26.47 28 -3.13 -25.81
P07 52.27 1.49 -30.88 61.7
P08 -9.3 -23.08 33.33 -50
P09 -2.78 14.29 -30 7.14
P10 undef 0 50 0
P11 38.1 -50 37.93 -72.5
P12 3.85 -40.74 75 -7.14
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B.5.2 Prohibition Experiment
Table B.18: Percental changes of MLU between sessions of prohibition scenario. Statistically
significant changes (p < .05) are typed bold
(a) All Utterances, T: 1=2.09, 2=2.53, 3=2.23, 4=2.49,
5=2.2
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P13 -7.5 −13.511 3.12 -9.09
P14 10 9.09 -8.33 3.03
P15 2.7 5.26 -2.5 -10.26
P16 13.89 −14.632 5.71 5.41
P17 -6.67 -7.14 19.23 -3.23
P18 0 -2.7 5.56 -5.26
P19 0 0 -5.56 -2.94
P20 18.923 4.55 −19.574 0
P21 -3.57 -14.81 21.745 -7.14
P22 -9.09 -3.33 0 0
(b) Negative Utterances Only, T: 1=2.95, 2=2.11,
3=2.15
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P13 -8.33 0.00 -13.64 39.47
P14 undef 25 -66.67 30
P15 15.56 -3.85 0 −441
P16 -14.29 4.17 10 -3.64
P17 -22.22 -9.52 0 -31.58
P18 6.82 4.26 4.08 -9.8
P19 15.79 6.82 0 -8.51
P20 46.152 -7.02 -18.87 4.65
P21 -13.89 -22.58 66.673 -37.5
P22 -35.42 -12.9 44.44 -28.21
Table B.19: Percental changes of distinct words between sessions of prohibition scenario
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P13 -9.09 -30 -1.43 -7.25
P14 -3.95 -4.11 -21.43 -5.45
P15 -5.97 20.63 -13.16 -0.76
P16 -4.1 9.63 -4.88 1.54
P17 -15.87 -1.89 -23.08 5.00
P18 10.59 -5.32 8.99 -9.28
P19 -34.27 11.11 -10 -6.84
P20 -3.51 -20.91 6.90 12.90
P21 1.35 9.33 -28.05 16.95
P22 -22.22 29.87 27 -16.54
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Due to the small number of distinct nega-
tive words, percentual values were not cal-
culated for negative words only.
See table 5.11 for absolute values.
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Table B.20: Percental changes of utterances per minute (u/min) between sessions of prohi-
bition scenario
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P13 23.68 -18.54 11.94 4.33
P14 5.17 -6.56 -2.34 -5.39
P15 16.98 -1.34 -4.09 1.42
P16 14 1.75 -10.34 -3.3
P17 16.15 -6.62 12.06 32.28
P18 3.25 -0.52 -0.53 4.77
P19 -15.13 12.94 -1.55 7.86
P20 -2.54 1.12 -3.31 18.25
P21 26.13 9.96 -14.13 5.06
P22 -9.44 45.97 25.65 -17.05
(b) Negative Utterances Only
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
P13 76.32 -79.1 -28.57 20
P14 undef -12.5 -85.71 150
P15 -26 24.32 -48.91 23.4
P16 40 -19.05 -7.84 8.51
P17 10.71 61.29 -70 -6.67
P18 -50 25 -40 -18.52
P19 23.68 0 -74.47 41.67
P20 26.09 1.72 -32.2 0
P21 36.36 4.44 -65.96 93.75
P22 262.5 17.24 -61.76 -15.38
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B.5.3 Saunders’ Experiment
Table B.21: Percental changes of MLU between sessions of Saunders’ experiment
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
M02 0 3.23 -18.75 15.38
F05 26.47 -11.63 13.16 -9.3
M03 10.34 -15.63 -3.7 7.69
F01 7.89 -12.2 5.56 15.79
F02 -8.16 0 -2.22 6.82
M01 2.94 11.43 -15.38 -12.12
F03 n/a -11.43 6.45 -6.06
F06 -8.11 11.76 2.63 -10.26
F04 -23.08 6.67 0 -18.75
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Due to the small number of or even absent
negative words, percentual values were not
calculated for negative words only.
See table B.4 for absolute values.
Table B.22: Percental changes in number of distinct words between sessions of Saunders’
experiment
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
M02 -17.24 -12.5 -14.29 33.33
F05 10 -25.97 -22.81 9.09
M03 8.82 5.41 -25.64 27.59
F01 -11.9 -27.03 7.41 0
F02 -12.16 -12.31 -24.56 4.65
M01 -24.14 -18.18 -30.56 -8
F03 19.64 -1.49 -13.64
F06 -19.42 -4.82 8.86 -3.49
F04 -51.76 48.78 -14.75 -11.54
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Due to the small number of or even absent
negative words, percentual values were not
calculated for negative words only.
See table B.4 for absolute values.
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Table B.23: Percental changes in utterances per minute (u/min) between sessions of Saun-
ders’ experiment
(a) All Utterances
s1→s2 s2→s3 s3→s4 s4→s5
M02 12.43 -21.61 7.05 -7.19
F05 -14.67 19.46 -23.11 29.06
M03 56.55 -17.62 -14.44 5
F01 -6.32 0.56 -18.99 2.07
F02 -8.04 -3.42 -24.8 14.66
M01 24.32 -29.35 -7.69 3.89
F03 n/a 11.07 0.96 11.15
F06 -0.6 -1.5 -0.3 -4.28
F04 -19.73 6.98 -11.8 -1.41
(b) Negative Utterances Only
Due to the small number of or even absent
negative words, percentual values were not
calculated for negative words only.
See table B.4 for absolute values.
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B.6 Negative Words vs. Negation Types
The following tables display the numerical basis based on which the statistical analyses
presented in section 5.3.9, subsection ‘Pragmatic Analysis of Participants’ (pp. 280), were
performed. Table B.24 presents the absolute counts of the four most frequent negation
words - no, don’t, not, and can’t - grouped by negation type, i.e. the frequencies with
which the respective negation words were produced within utterances that were classified
as instances of the stated negation types.
Tables B.25 and B.26 show the relative frequencies (percentages) of the respective
negation word relative to the total number of the displayed four negation words produced
within utterances categorised as instances of the displayed negation type. All displayed
percentages were rounded to two decimal places for purposes of display, yet the actual
computation was performed on the same numbers with four decimal places. Example:
Participant P04 produced 29 of the four most frequent negative words within utterances
which were categorized as being instances of negative intent interpretations. 13, that is
44.82%, of these words were no’s. If we subsequently assert that 44.82% of the negation
words associated with negative intent interpretations are no’s we commit a small error.
This error is due to us only considering the four most frequent negation words and dis-
regarding the less frequent types. On the other hand we know that our most frequent 4
negation words cover for 97.8% of all negation words that were produced by all participants
in utterances classified as being of this type (cf. table 5.46). Therefore the error in our
calculation is relatively small. Similarly high coverage rates apply for negative motivational
questions, prohibitions, disallowances, and truth-functional denials, with the lowest of these
rates being 97.3% in the case of negative motivational questions. Subsequently the error
caused by ignoring negation words other than the most frequent four ones is marginal. Yet
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we cannot interpret these percentages to mean “44.82% of utterances that are instances of
negative motivational questions contain a no” because there is no 1 : 1 relation between
negation words, negative utterances, and negation types: some of the utterances based
upon which these percentages were calculated contain more than one negation word, for
example “No, you don’t like the star”. Some of these utterances even contain the same
negation word several times such as “no no no no”.
Tables B.27 and B.28 show the salience rates in percent of the corresponding negation
words, grouped by type and participant. These rates were calculated relative to the ab-
solute counts given in table B.24 and under exclusion of the same counts as indicated in
the tables B.25 and B.26 (entry: n/a). Naturally there are neither salience rates stated
(n/a-entry) for those cases in which a particular participant never produced the respective
word in conjunction with the respective type. Example: The entry for participant P08,
the word not, and the negation type negative motivational questions is 0.2. This means
that 20% of the 5 productions (= 1 production) of not by P08 within utterances that
were classified as negative motivational questions were such that not was extracted as the
salient word of the utterance.
384
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
T
ab
le
B
.2
4:
A
bs
ol
ut
e
fr
eq
ue
n
ci
es
of
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
n
t
n
eg
at
io
n
w
or
ds
gr
ou
pe
d
n
eg
at
io
n
ty
pe
.
D
is
pl
ay
ed
is
th
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
gr
ou
pe
d
by
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
s
w
it
hi
n
in
st
an
ce
s
of
w
hi
ch
th
ey
w
er
e
pr
od
uc
ed
.
Fo
r
re
la
ti
ve
fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
es
)
se
e
ta
bl
e
B
.2
5.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:
n
W
or
d:
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d,
I:
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
te
nt
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s,
Q
:
ne
ga
ti
ve
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
lq
ue
st
io
ns
,
P
:
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n,
D
:
di
sa
llo
w
an
ce
,
T
:
tr
ut
h-
fu
nc
ti
on
al
de
ni
al
nW
or
d
ty
pe
P
01
P
04
P
05
P
06
P
07
P
08
P
09
P
10
P
11
P
12
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
I
0
13
18
16
17
9
5
1
11
7
3
0
28
12
7
9
7
11
1
0
Q
0
22
11
3
52
26
2
7
1
3
2
0
29
1
7
3
2
13
7
0
no
P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
12
24
11
29
1
3
15
21
3
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
2
33
0
T
14
24
2
1
2
0
7
0
46
41
11
2
1
0
6
1
14
0
6
33
I
0
1
7
7
4
0
5
0
1
1
3
0
1
8
2
11
5
2
0
1
Q
0
3
6
0
3
5
4
0
0
0
0
0
8
3
0
5
1
7
2
0
no
t
P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
17
1
1
3
1
8
3
5
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
1
0
2
0
13
5
0
T
4
24
0
0
2
0
3
0
12
7
13
1
2
0
2
1
14
4
1
3
I
2
15
14
27
31
9
16
0
10
3
11
0
14
14
4
11
7
10
3
1
Q
0
7
10
7
17
15
15
2
6
1
7
0
21
10
0
6
9
19
11
0
do
n’
t
P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
T
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Q
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ca
n’
t
P
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
6
10
11
3
9
11
5
0
1
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
2
0
1
3
1
0
1
T
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
385
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
T
ab
le
B
.2
5:
R
el
at
iv
e
fr
eq
ue
n
ci
es
of
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
n
t
n
eg
at
io
n
w
or
ds
in
re
la
ti
on
to
n
eg
at
io
n
ty
pe
s.
D
is
pl
ay
ed
is
th
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
w
hi
ch
w
er
e
pr
od
uc
ed
as
pa
rt
of
in
st
an
ce
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
of
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ty
pe
s.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
es
ov
er
w
ri
tt
en
w
it
h
n/
a
w
er
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
du
e
to
to
o
sm
al
lo
f
an
un
de
rl
yi
ng
nu
m
er
ic
al
ba
si
s
(#
in
st
an
ce
s
<
5
).
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:
n
W
or
d:
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d,
I:
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
te
nt
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s,
Q
:
ne
ga
ti
ve
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
l
qu
es
ti
on
s,
P
:
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n,
D
:
di
sa
llo
w
an
ce
,
T
:
tr
ut
h-
fu
nc
ti
on
al
de
ni
al
.
nW
or
d
ty
pe
P
01
P
04
P
05
P
06
P
07
P
08
P
09
P
10
P
11
P
12
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
I
n/
a
0.
44
0.
46
0.
32
0.
32
0.
5
0.
19
n/
a
0.
5
0.
63
0.
17
n/
a
0.
65
0.
35
0.
53
0.
29
0.
36
0.
47
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
68
0.
40
0.
3
0.
72
0.
56
0.
09
0.
77
0.
14
n/
a
0.
22
n/
a
0.
5
0.
07
1
0.
21
0.
17
0.
33
0.
35
n/
a
no
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
45
0.
63
0.
47
0.
48
0.
88
0.
08
0.
2
0.
54
0.
81
0.
33
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
07
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
13
0.
83
n/
a
T
0.
78
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
7
n/
a
0.
79
0.
85
0.
46
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
75
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
0.
86
0.
92
I
n/
a
0.
03
0.
18
0.
14
0.
08
0
0.
19
n/
a
0.
05
0.
09
0.
18
n/
a
0.
02
0.
24
0.
15
0.
35
0.
26
0.
09
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
09
0.
22
0
0.
04
0.
11
0.
19
0
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
0.
14
0.
21
0
0.
36
0.
08
0.
18
0.
1
n/
a
no
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0.
05
0.
33
0.
04
0.
03
0.
23
0.
07
0.
29
0.
12
0.
56
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
4
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
81
0.
13
n/
a
T
0.
22
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
3
n/
a
0.
21
0.
15
0.
54
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
25
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
0.
14
0.
08
I
n/
a
0.
52
0.
36
0.
54
0.
60
0.
5
0.
62
n/
a
0.
45
0.
27
0.
65
n/
a
0.
33
0.
41
0.
31
0.
35
0.
37
0.
43
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
22
0.
37
0.
7
0.
24
0.
33
0.
71
0.
22
0.
86
n/
a
0.
78
n/
a
0.
36
0.
71
0
0.
43
0.
75
0.
49
0.
55
n/
a
do
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.
08
0
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0.
05
n/
a
T
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
0
I
n/
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
n/
a
ca
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
55
0.
32
0.
20
0.
48
0.
09
0.
69
0.
73
0.
18
0
0.
11
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
53
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
06
0
n/
a
T
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
0
386
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
T
ab
le
B
.2
6:
R
el
at
iv
e
fr
eq
ue
n
ci
es
of
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
n
t
n
eg
at
io
n
w
or
ds
in
re
la
ti
on
to
n
eg
at
io
n
ty
pe
s.
D
is
pl
ay
ed
is
th
e
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
w
hi
ch
w
er
e
pr
od
uc
ed
as
pa
rt
of
in
st
an
ce
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
of
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ty
pe
s.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
es
ov
er
w
ri
tt
en
w
it
h
n/
a
w
er
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
du
e
to
to
o
sm
al
l
of
an
un
de
rl
yi
ng
nu
m
er
ic
al
ba
si
s
(#
in
st
an
ce
s
<
2
0
).
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:
n
W
or
d:
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d,
I:
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
te
nt
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s,
Q
:
ne
ga
ti
ve
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
l
qu
es
ti
on
s,
P
:
pr
oh
ib
it
io
n,
D
:
di
sa
llo
w
an
ce
,
T
:
tr
ut
h-
fu
nc
ti
on
al
de
ni
al
.
nW
or
d
ty
pe
P
01
P
04
P
05
P
06
P
07
P
08
P
09
P
10
P
11
P
12
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
I
n/
a
0.
45
0.
46
0.
32
0.
33
n/
a
0.
19
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
65
0.
35
0.
54
0.
29
n/
a
0.
48
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
69
0.
41
n/
a
0.
72
0.
57
0.
10
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
33
0.
35
n/
a
no
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
45
n/
a
0.
47
n/
a
0.
88
n/
a
n/
a
0.
54
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
83
n/
a
T
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
80
0.
85
0.
46
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
0.
92
I
n/
a
0.
03
0.
18
0.
14
0.
08
n/
a
0.
19
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
02
0.
24
0.
15
0.
35
n/
a
0.
09
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
09
0.
22
n/
a
0.
04
0.
11
0.
19
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
14
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
18
0.
1
n/
a
no
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0.
33
n/
a
0.
03
n/
a
n/
a
0.
29
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
13
n/
a
T
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
21
0.
15
0.
54
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
n/
a
0.
08
I
n/
a
0.
52
0.
36
0.
54
0.
60
n/
a
0.
62
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
33
0.
41
0.
31
0.
35
n/
a
0.
43
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
22
0.
37
n/
a
0.
24
0.
33
0.
71
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
36
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
49
0.
55
n/
a
do
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
05
n/
a
T
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
0
I
n/
a
0
0
0
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0
0
0
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0
n/
a
ca
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
55
n/
a
0.
20
n/
a
0.
09
n/
a
n/
a
0.
18
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
T
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
0
387
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
T
ab
le
B
.2
7:
S
al
ie
n
ce
ra
te
s
of
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
n
t
n
eg
at
io
n
w
or
ds
gr
ou
pe
d
by
n
eg
at
io
n
ty
pe
s.
D
is
pl
ay
ed
ar
e
th
e
sa
lie
nc
e
ra
te
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
pr
od
uc
ed
w
it
hi
n
in
st
an
ce
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
to
ta
l
nu
m
be
r
of
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
(c
f.
B
.2
4)
,
gr
ou
pe
d
pe
r
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
an
d
pe
r
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
es
ov
er
w
ri
tt
en
w
it
h
n/
a
w
er
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
du
e
to
ei
th
er
to
o
sm
al
l
of
an
un
de
rl
yi
ng
nu
m
er
ic
al
ba
si
s
of
al
l
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ty
pe
(#
in
st
an
ce
s
<
5
)
or
be
ca
us
e
no
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
of
a
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ty
pe
co
nt
ai
ne
d
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:
n
W
or
d:
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d,
I:
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
te
nt
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s,
Q
:n
eg
at
iv
e
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
lq
ue
st
io
ns
,P
:p
ro
hi
bi
ti
on
,D
:d
is
al
lo
w
an
ce
,
T
:
tr
ut
h-
fu
nc
ti
on
al
de
ni
al
.
nW
or
d
ty
pe
P
01
P
04
P
05
P
06
P
07
P
08
P
09
P
10
P
11
P
12
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
I
n/
a
0.
31
0.
94
0.
63
0.
76
0.
67
0.
6
n/
a
0.
55
0.
43
0.
67
n/
a
0.
5
0.
5
0.
86
0.
78
0.
71
0.
64
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
45
1
1
0.
87
0.
73
1
0.
29
1
n/
a
1
n/
a
0.
79
1
0.
86
1
1
1
1
n/
a
no
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
8
0.
83
0.
46
0.
73
0.
76
1
0.
67
0.
87
0.
43
0.
33
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
1
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0.
30
n/
a
T
0.
57
0.
13
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
71
n/
a
0.
46
0.
15
0.
36
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
17
n/
a
0.
21
n/
a
0.
33
0.
55
I
n/
a
0
0.
57
0.
43
0.
5
n/
a
0.
6
n/
a
0
0
0
n/
a
1
0.
13
0
0.
18
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0.
17
n/
a
0.
33
0.
2
0.
25
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
13
0
n/
a
0.
2
0
0.
14
0.
5
n/
a
no
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
1
0.
12
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
17
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
0.
6
n/
a
T
0
0.
04
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0.
08
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
0.
29
n/
a
0
0
I
n/
a
0
0.
29
0.
41
0.
19
0.
22
0.
25
n/
a
0.
1
0
0.
09
n/
a
0.
14
0.
14
0
0.
09
0.
29
0.
1
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0.
2
0.
57
0.
29
0.
07
0.
2
0
0
n/
a
0.
14
n/
a
0.
05
0.
2
0
0
0.
33
0.
05
0.
09
n/
a
do
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
0
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
T
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
I
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
ca
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
25
0.
67
0.
4
0.
55
0
0.
44
0.
55
0
n/
a
0
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
25
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
1
n/
a
n/
a
T
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
388
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
T
ab
le
B
.2
8:
S
al
ie
n
ce
ra
te
s
of
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
n
t
n
eg
at
io
n
w
or
ds
gr
ou
pe
d
by
n
eg
at
io
n
ty
pe
s.
D
is
pl
ay
ed
ar
e
th
e
sa
lie
nc
e
ra
te
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
ds
pr
od
uc
ed
w
it
hi
n
in
st
an
ce
s
of
th
e
m
os
t
fr
eq
ue
nt
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
s
in
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
r
of
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
(c
f.
B
.2
4)
,
gr
ou
pe
d
pe
r
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
t
an
d
pe
r
ne
ga
ti
on
ty
pe
.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
es
ov
er
w
ri
tt
en
w
it
h
n/
a
w
er
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
du
e
to
ei
th
er
to
o
sm
al
l
of
an
un
de
rl
yi
ng
nu
m
er
ic
al
ba
si
s
of
al
l
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ty
pe
(#
in
st
an
ce
s
<
2
0
)
or
be
ca
us
e
no
pr
od
uc
ti
on
s
of
a
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ty
pe
co
nt
ai
ne
d
th
e
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d.
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
ns
:
n
W
or
d:
ne
ga
ti
on
w
or
d,
I:
ne
ga
ti
ve
in
te
nt
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
s,
Q
:n
eg
at
iv
e
m
ot
iv
at
io
na
lq
ue
st
io
ns
,P
:p
ro
hi
bi
ti
on
,D
:d
is
al
lo
w
an
ce
,
T
:
tr
ut
h-
fu
nc
ti
on
al
de
ni
al
.
nW
or
d
ty
pe
P
01
P
04
P
05
P
06
P
07
P
08
P
09
P
10
P
11
P
12
P
13
P
14
P
15
P
16
P
17
P
18
P
19
P
20
P
21
P
22
I
n/
a
0.
30
0.
94
0.
63
0.
76
n/
a
0.
6
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
0.
5
0.
86
0.
78
n/
a
0.
64
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0.
45
1
n/
a
0.
87
0.
73
1
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
79
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
1
1
n/
a
no
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
8
n/
a
0.
46
n/
a
0.
76
n/
a
n/
a
0.
87
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
30
n/
a
T
n/
a
0.
13
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
46
0.
15
0.
36
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
21
n/
a
n/
a
0.
55
I
n/
a
0
0.
57
0.
43
0.
5
n/
a
0.
6
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
1
0.
13
0
0.
18
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0.
17
n/
a
0.
33
0.
2
0.
25
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
13
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
14
0.
5
n/
a
no
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
12
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
6
n/
a
T
n/
a
0.
04
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
08
0
0
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
29
n/
a
n/
a
0
I
n/
a
0
0.
29
0.
41
0.
19
n/
a
0.
25
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
14
0.
14
0
0.
09
n/
a
0.
1
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
0
0.
2
n/
a
0.
29
0.
07
0.
2
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
05
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
05
0.
09
n/
a
do
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
5
n/
a
T
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
I
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
Q
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
ca
n’
t
P
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
0.
25
n/
a
0.
4
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
0
n/
a
n/
a
D
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
T
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
n/
a
389
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
B.7 Alignment of negation types with motivational states:
Additional tables
This section contains the tables which summarize the tables 5.55, 5.56, and 5.57 and which
form the basis for the statistical analysis presented in section 5.5. The ANOVAs and t-tests
were performed based on the relative frequencies displayed in table B.30.
Table B.29: Distribution of motivational states across participants and types (ab-
solute counts). Displayed are the absolute counts of the motivational states the robot was in
during the participants’ expression of negative intent interpretations (NII), negative motivational
questions (NMQ), and prohibition + disallowance (P+D) (combined count) for all participants.
Abbreviations for motivational states: -: negative, O: neutral, +: positive
NII NMQ P+D
- O + total - O + total - O + total
P01 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P04 22 1 1 24 21 3 0 24 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P05 20 8 10 38 16 13 6 35 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P06 40 14 3 57 7 3 1 11 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P07 35 14 2 51 13 41 25 79 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P08 12 7 0 19 17 22 5 44 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P09 18 11 2 31 9 10 6 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P10 1 1 1 3 10 5 2 17 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P11 15 5 1 21 5 2 1 8 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P12 5 3 3 11 1 3 0 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a
P13 14 3 1 18 9 1 2 12 28 13 8 49
P14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 15 19
P15 26 13 2 41 24 25 9 58 29 5 30 64
P16 12 20 2 34 7 8 1 16 6 2 19 27
P17 11 3 0 14 4 3 0 7 29 0 8 37
P18 21 7 4 32 10 5 1 16 6 0 11 17
P19 17 2 0 19 12 2 0 14 5 2 12 19
P20 15 10 1 26 28 13 3 44 27 4 14 45
P21 4 0 0 4 15 5 1 21 10 14 23 47
P22 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 8
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B.8 Coding scheme for quantitative analysis of negation ex-
periments on a pragmatic level
This section constitutes the coding scheme employed for the 2-coder analysis of negation
types and their felicity. The leading theoretical part has been removed from inclusion in
this appendix in order not to duplicate the theoretical considerations already elaborated
upon in the sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. The parts of the coding scheme handed to the 2nd
coder as coding manual are marked as such. Note that some proposals brought forward in
the scheme such as the consideration of teaching episodes have not been implemented by
the time of writing of this thesis due to time constraints. We nevertheless left them in the
document as they might be useful for future research.
B.8.1 Construction of the Coding Scheme
The purpose of the coding scheme described below is a description of how to determine
the negation types for all negative utterances produced by the robot and the participants
recorded during the experiments and, furthermore, which productions can be regarded as
felicitous or adequate in the given situations.
Against the background of the limitations of speech act theory with regard to the
analysis of actual conversations (cf. sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) it might not be surprising
that these very limitations of SAT’s single-utterance approach became apparent right from
the start during the first round of coding. The first coding round was conducted by the
author who will also be refered to as 1st coder. The initial coding was conducted on the
full set of negative utterances taken from the experiments and the resulting types are based
on Pea’s taxonomy with eventual extension of Pea’s taxonomy wherever this was deemed
necessary.
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Despite the mentioned issues we still think that this mixed qualitative-quantitative
approach is useful in order to determine what kind of negation types qua speech acts were
produced in experiments of this type. Yet optimally, if the analyst has enough time to do
so a complete conversation analytic analysis would be preferable. The usefulness of this
mixed approach hinges on the conception of speech acts being extended in order to account
of basic conversational phenomena such as adjacency in a way similar to Pea’s approach.
Without this kind of extension many utterances could not be coded due to them being
2nd part-pairs of adjacency pairs whose theoretical status in Searle’s version of SAT is
unknown. Thus many of the negation types listed below are, similarily to Pea’s types,
“types of use” and not ‘pure’ speech act types à la Searle. They might be rather viewed
conversation analytical and speech act theoretical hybrids due to the top-level inclusion of
adjacency as defining property on one hand and due to the refusal to accept Searle’s short
list of possible communicative functions on the other hand. It is unclear if Pea himself
would have thought of his types in this way but the fact that his taxonomy uses adjacency
as defining criterion on the top-level and his refusal to have the elements of his scheme
be classfied as “types of early meaning” leads us to think that he indeed leaned towards
a conversation analytical approach with a further leaning to Wittgenstein’s “definition via
use”. In this context it is important to realise that at the time of Pea’s publication CA
was in its early days.
The underlying idea on how to decide on the felicity of a particular utterance (stage
1) is to let a competent English speaker decide if an utterance was felicitous or not with-
out taking into account the theoretical (and categorical) apparatus as proposed by Searle
but by relying instead on the judgemental process that any fluent speaker of a language
employs when engaging in conversation herself. As it turned out this ethnomethodological
approach has its own problems (see section B.8.3).
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The time stamps and durations in the table for each negative utterance were derived from
the recorded audio and video, and the robot’s log-files. Deechee’s utterances are in few
cases hardly audible or not audible at all when watching the video recordings as the audio
was recorded via the headset worn by the participants and which suppresses external noise.
Therefore, instead of relying solely on the audio recording, Deechee’s utterances were ex-
tracted from the log files of the knnlanguaging module - the module that determines during
any experimental session content and timing of Deechee’s utterances. Using this log data
ensured that no robot utterance was missed.
Future work In terms of notation it might be helpful to introduce the concept of a
teaching episode. Due to the way both experimental scenarios are set up, the interaction
and conversation of any session naturally divides into a sequence of teaching episodes.
Participants always present and explain one object after another with small transition times
in between object presentations. A teaching episode starts with the participant picking up
a particular object in order to present it to Deechee and ends when the object is either put
back on the table or if the object is dropped by Deechee. Such a segmentation leads to
some parts of the interaction and conversation being outside of any such episode. At the
moment the data is not segmented into such episodes, but we think of the introduction
of episode boundaries as advantageous for analytical purposes. We hypothesize that the
temporal location of episode boundaries have an impact upon how participants react to
Deechee’s utterances and bodily behaviour, which is encoded in the column P (re-)acts in
accordance with R’s behaviour or speech (see section B.8.4 below).
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B.8.2 Selection of sessions for the 2nd coder
On recommendation by one of the psychologists of the research group the percentage of
negative utterances to be coded by the 2nd coder was set to 20%. Initially we were
planning to select randomly 20% of the 100 experimental sessions. As the number of
negative utterances per session and/or time unit vary greatly in between parties for both
participants and robot, this method could lead to far less than 20% of the total number
of utterances being coded. This situation would occur if sufficient sessions from less-than-
average communicative participants were randomly selected. For this reason we decided to
select 20% of the negative utterances instead of selecting 20% of sessions. The considerable
variation of the number of negative utterances per session is true for both human and robot
utterances.
Random selection of sessions for negative robot utterances The following pro-
cedure is applied in order to determine which sessions are selected for dual-coder coding
of the robot utterances:
Let TNU be the total number of utterances across all sessions and participants. Split the
(super)set of all sessions into two sets, each of which contains all (sub)sets of a particular
condition, rejective condition vs. rejective-prohibitive condition. For each of these sets do:
1. Fill the big_bag_of_sessions (BBS) with all sessions of all participants in the selected
condition
2. Select randomly a session from BBS
3. Determine the number of negative utterances per session of either human or robot
4. Add this session to the small_bag_of_sessions (SBS) for dual-coding and remove it
from BBS
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5. If the total number of utterances in the bag equals or exceeds 20% of TNU stop,
otherwise go back to 1
Note that this procedure bears the following risk: Once a session of a very talkative par-
ticipant is chosen we could end up with very few session to be coded for the 2nd coder
as the chosen session might already constitute a considerable share of the 20% target.
Nevertheless the alternative of selecting arbitrary utterances from arbitrary sessions on an
utterance-by-utterance basis was abandoned due to the following practical reason: Coding
utterances, that are randomly distributed across the whole corpus, would lead to a much
higher effort for the 2nd coder as she would have to potentially open dozens of files and
skim through each video in order to locate any one particular utterance. In total there are
100 video recordings at 5 minutes each. Due to financial limitations with regard to the
payment of the 2nd coder as well as time constraints inherent to any PhD it was decided
against this principally favourable but practically very time-consuming method.
Random selection of sessions for negative human utterances In order to select the
20% of the participants’ negative utterances the same files were coded as the ones selected
by the procedure specified in the last paragraph. As there are more negative utterances
produced by the participants than there are produced by the robot, additional files had
to be selected to reach the 20% margin: For each scenario all files across all sessions were
numbered from 1 to 50. Subsequently a random generator was used to produce a new
number upon any new run. The corresponding file was added to the set of files to be
coded. This procedure was repeated until the 20% margin was reached.
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B.8.3 Coding process
As mentioned in section B.8.1 above, the author and first coder coded all entries for all
participants and all sessions during the initial stage when constructing the coding scheme
and determining the initial set of negation types to be used by the 2nd coder. The coding
process for the 2nd coder is separated into three stages for the two coders in order for the
two to be able to work partially in parallel: While the processing of the 1st and 2nd stage
by the 2nd coder was under way, the first coder seeked to reduce the number of negation
types for stage 3. At that stage there were 24 negation types on part of the participants
which was deemed too many. This number has subsequently been reduced to 19 types.
In a potential 4th stage a speech act type analysis could be performed in which the felicity
or adequacy of the robots negative utterances could be determined in terms of Searle-
style satisfaction conditions which can probably be mapped to the columns body behaviour
and ling. signaling. The column P (re-)acts .. could possibly give some insight into the
perlocutionary effect of each utterance - the consequences of a robot utterance onto the
participant.
Stage 1 Coding of robot utterances for felicity: The second coder codes the last
row (felicity) of the table below. Based on her knowledge of English and by virtue of
being a fluent speaker of the language she decides if a particular negative utterance is
felicitous/adequate, i.e., makes sense in the given situational and conversational context.
Observations: To decide intuitively if a given utterance is adequate in a given situation
is often easier said than done when one of the conversation partners has a low communica-
tive competence. One reason for this uncertainty is for example the choice of the coder
between looking at the dialogue from an outsider perspective or looking at the dialogue
from the perspective of any particular participant. We observed that different participants
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reacted very differently to the (linguistic) actions of the robot: some participants were very
sensitive to the robot’s behaviour and/or speech, others clearly weren’t. Therefore, and
this is roughly in accordance with satisfaction conditions of illocutionary acts in speech act
theory, the 1st coder advised the 2nd coder to primarily judge from an outsider perspective
and, if in doubt, to ‘side with the robot’. Also parents occasionally ignore what children
say, but that does not mean that the child’s utterance is conceived of as inadequate in a
given situation. The failure in such a situation is a failure on the interactional but not on
the speech act level. In other words, we decided in such cases that the blame is primarily
assigned to the side of the conversationally adept conversation partner, i.e. the participant,
and only secondary to the robot. Notice that in adult-adult conversation where the conver-
sational competence can be assumed to be roughly identical the blame-assignment problem
for the observer does not or only marginally occur, as both conversation partners are in
possession of the necessary tools for conversational repair. In a case of misunderstanding
these tools are put to use which renders the repair process and potential blame assignment
transparent to an external observer. In the case of our asymmetric conversation partners,
a non-reaction of the participant has no effect on the adequacy of an utterance. There
might be good reasons for the participant (or the parent) not to listen to the child or robot
but these reasons don’t taint the issue if any particular utterance is adequate or not. One
may take a different stance here if the history of the whole conversation as well as the
personality of the participant is taken into account. But taking the complete history of the
conversation into account, if done properly, equates to a full-blown conversation analysis,
which is precisely what we could not perform for the given data due to time constraints.
The author intends to perform such a full-blown analysis for selected participants. The
author also asked every participant to fill out a TIPI form. An analysis of these, yields
the possibility of detecting potential correlations between particular rows of the table and
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particular personalities. At the current stage of this quantitative-qualitiative analysis this
data is not yet available. Furthermore it is unclear to the author, even if this data was
available, how particular personality traits ought to influence the decision about the ade-
quacy of the robot’s utterances on a per-utterance basis. Taking the participants reaction
into account for the purpose of determing adequacy on a speech act level would mean to
move towards the realm of perlocutionary acts.
Despite these decisions we still encountered considerable uncertainty in terms of deciding
on the felicity of the robot’s negative utterances. The author caught himself often going
back through the codes and changing some of them after some particular utterance made
him change his mind about the ‘intuitive’ requirements for an utterance to be considered
“ok”/adequate. The 2nd coder reported similar problems. Based on this experience the 2nd
coder was instructed to write down in ambiguous cases why she decided in a particular way.
So even if the agreement of the two coders should turn out to be very low, we will be able
to determine why we disagreed on particular occasions by comparing our reasons. Such a
comparison might tell us if a 2-coder analysis makes sense at all for this kind of analysis
and touches upon some of the questionable foundations on which speech act theory stands
which were mentioned above: the very attempt to make a judgment about “felicity” on the
level of single utterances/speech acts without (properly) taking the conversational context
into account is problematic. The author also observed that the same ‘linguistic moves’ are
repeated by participants within one episode to increase the certainty about what the robot
wants. It seems very hard to tease a sequence of such moves apart in order to decide for
each separately if it is adequate or not. The principal idea behind separating the coding
in stage 1 from the coding in stage 2 is to separate the ‘intuitive decision’ from a more
SAT-style analysis. But as just mentioned this separation is not as clean as we hoped
it to be, as the advise to make one’s decision on “adequacy” independent of the partici-
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pants reaction hinges on the sometimes rather fuzzy boundary between illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts. We currently don’t see an alternative to this approach apart from
performing a complete conversation analysis.
Stage 2 Coding of negative robot utterances for the remaining columns: The
second coder codes the remaining columns listed in the table B.31. We expect all columns
except columns 7 and 8 (P (re-)acts in accordance .., negation_types) to be unproblematic
in terms of inter-coder variance. The set of candidates for each column is described in
section B.8.4.
Stage 3 Coding of human negative utterances: The second coder fills in all empty
columns listed in table B.32 for each negative utterance listed there, which are all negative
utterances produced by the corresponding participant in the session in question. The set
of candidates for these columns is described in section B.8.5.
(Stage 4 (future work) Speech Act Theoretic analysis:) If possible, we intend to
perform a speech act theoretic analysis. At the moment it is unclear, if this actually is
feasible for the speech recorded in our experiments. In the literature very few attempts have
ever been made to apply SAT to child and child-directed language. In any case we would
expect that some of the negation types listed in section B.8.4 would become obsolete. If
feasible, a separate SAT analysis would amount to a reassignment of the values for felicity
based on formal SAT satisfaction criteria instead of letting two coders decide intuitively on
this value. In the best case the SAT criteria would could be mapped to the observations
encoded in the columns body behaviour, ling. signaling, and P (re-)acts ... The value for
linguistic signaling could yield an indiction towards the uptake on the participants side, the
body behaviour column indicates the psychological state of the robot (sincerity condition
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in SAT) and P (re-)acts.. equates roughly to the perlocutionary effect of an utterance. As
already mentioned, for most speech act types the perlocutionary effects are not part of the
set of satisfaction conditions which determine felicity. Yet there are exceptions for some
types of speech acts such as making a bet or requesting which have to be conventionally
acknowledged by the conversation partner.
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B.8.4 Coding Table for Robot Utterances
Columns marked bold are given. They were derived from the log files of the module which
is responsible for Deechee’s speech. Columns for time stamps are omitted for space reasons.
Column negation_word is omitted as it’s not applicable for robot utterances.
Table B.31: Coding Table for Negative Robot Utterances
spea- utt. body ling. signaling P (re-)acts in negation type felici-
kera behaviour that utterance accordance with tous
was (mis-) R’s behaviour
understood or speech
no positive signals underst.b N/A: see text truth-func. denial yes
go rejective signals misun- AB: acts on no
R_utt don’t prohibited derst.(+word)c behaviour neg. agreement n/a
... undecided no signal AS: acts on mot. dep. denial
neutral speech mot. dep. exclam.
ASB: acts on neg. imperative
both persp. dep. denial
NoA: doesn’t rejection of offer
react self-prohibition
mot. dep. assertion
none
a fixed in advance by coder 1, based on speech log files and 1st round of video analysis
b Example: Deechee: No P: no, not a big fan?
c Example: Deechee: Go P: no? ok
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Explanation of the single columns
speaker Specifies the speaker: robot (R) in case of R_utt or participant/human (P) in
case of H_utt.
start_of_utt Time relative to the start of the video recording when the utterance
started. Note that this time might be inaccurate by around 1 sec.
utterance This field contains the negation word which the robot produced.
body behaviour This field contains a description of the robot’s bodily behaviour at the
time when it pronounced the given utterance. It is only applicable to robot utterances.
The following five different types, also listed in table B.31, are possible:
• positive: R is smiling and possibly reaching for an object
• rejective: R frowns and potentially looks away from object and participant
• neutral: the robot is neither smiling nor frowning and neither reaches nor avoids a
presented object
• undecided: the robot starts to smile and starts to hold its hand out but flinches back
again and stops smiling. This “approach and flinch back” move might be repeated in
this situation several times
• prohibited: the robot is actively prohibited by the participant, that is, the partici-
pant restrains the reaching movement of the robot.
linguistic signaling .. This field contains an evaluation that indicates if the participant
signaled in some way that he or she understood the robot’s utterance. It is only applicable
for robot utterances. There are three possible values for this field:
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• signals understanding: P somehow signals that she understood the word. Often
this happens by repetition of the word with an assertive intonational contour (→
neg. type: neg. agreement) or an intonation contour of doubt (→ neg. type: neg.
question). Sometimes utterances might be deemed signals of understanding that were
not mere repetitions of the robot’s word, especially if it was witnessed before that the
participant in question understood this very utterance. A necessary requirement is
that P says something in direct succession (∆t 1s) to R’s utterance, and that this
utterance is deemed by the coder to be an affirmative signal that serves to indicate
that the utterance was understood.
If the coder deems a signal to be such a “signal of understanding” (uptake) this does
not imply that this very signal can not serve other functions as well. Latter functions
are outside the scope of this analysis. For example a participant answering Deechee’s
no with a no? not only signals that she understood Deechee’s no but might also
signal, at the same time with the very same word by intonating it in a particular
way, that she’s not sure or convinced that Deechee really means what it just said.
The important point is, that the coder thinks that one of possibly many functions of
P’s utterance is to signal understanding w.r.t. what Deechee just said.
Example:
P offers Deechee the heart and Deechee starts to frown.
R: No
P: No? Why not? The last time you liked playing with the heart
• signals misunderstanding (+ word): P somehow signals that he or she misun-
derstood what the robot said. Upon R uttering a word, P says what she understood
in direct succession to R’s utterance. The intonational contours are typically identi-
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cal to the ones in in the last case: assertive or doubtful.
Example:
R: Go
H: No? Alright ..
Here P evidently mis-heard and took the go for a no. In this case please specify the
word for which the ‘real’ word was mistaken for in brackets after the type.
• no signal: participants don’t signal understanding or misunderstanding. This is
what is usually the case.
P (re-)acts in accordance .. The idea behind this column is to see if participants
(re-)act on bodily behaviour/gestures and/or speech. When both gestures and speech are
in accordance the decision is straight forward. The more interesting case is when gestures
and speech are incongruent and when the behaviour leaves ample room for interpretation
(typically neutral and undecided behaviour). Below the term teaching episode is used with
which the following is meant:
A teaching episode starts with the participant picking up a particular object in order
to present it to Deechee. The teaching episode ends when the object is either put back on
the table by the participant or Deechee or if the object is dropped by Deechee. Such a
segmentation leads to some parts of the interaction and conversation being outside of any
such episode, this is ok. There are five possible values:
• N/A (not applicable): at the time when the negative is uttered participants cannot
react to the robot at all or it is highly unlikely that they do so. The situations where
this is case are the following:
– R utters the negative word in between two teaching episodes, for example when
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P has just put down an object and is looking for the next object to present to
R.
– P is constraining R’s arm with one hand, as asked for by the instructions, and
holds the box with the other. In this situation P’s ‘freedom to act’ is diminished
as she follows the experimental instructions.
• AB (acts on behaviour): the participant (P) reacts in accordance with the robot’s
behaviour.
Example 1:
R exhibits positive behaviour and says no. P tries to put the box into the
robots hand (and effectively ignores the no)
Example 2:
R exhibits rejective behaviour, P starts to put the box down, the robot says
no
• AS (acts on speech): P reacts in accordance with the robot’s speech.
Example 1:
R exhibits neutral behaviour and P is offering the box to it.
R: No
P puts the box down, possibly confirming the robots utterance with
P: No? Alright
Note that a linguistic confirmation is not necessary but is a clear indicator
that P actually acts on what R just said.
Example 2:
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The same scenario as the latter but with the robot exhibiting an undecided
behaviour
• ASB (acts on both behaviour and speech): P reacts in accordance with both
the robot’s behaviour speech. This can only be the case if R’s behaviour and speech
are congruent.
Example:
R exhibits rejective behaviour and shortly after says don’t. P puts the
box down after hearing the don’t, but not before that.
• NoA (no (re-)action): The participant does not react to R’s behaviour nor to R’s
speech.
Example:
R exhibits rejective behaviour and says no. P ignores both and continues
to offer and speak about the box.
negation type Based on a first round of analysis the following negation types for the
robot’s utterances were derived from the recorded interactions. These types can be split
into two groups: adjacent types, and non-adjacent types. Adjacent means that the ut-
terance is a linguistic reaction to what the conversation partner said - at this stage of
coding the conversation partner is the participant. A response to an answer, for exam-
ple, is adjacent, adjacent to the answer, whereas answers themselves count in our tax-
onomy as non-adjacent. A rejection of an offer is non-adjacent, if the offer was per-
formed mainly non-linguistically. (The terminology was most probably coined by con-
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versation analysts, see also the very concise article on Wikipedia on adjacency pairs:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adjacency_pairs).
Adjacent negation types
• Truth-func. denial: Truth-functional denials are negative responses to truth-functional
assertions or questions. Truth-functional assertions are assertions about state of af-
fairs of the world which can be evaluated objectively. With objectively we mean here,
that the truth or falsity of the assertion does not depend on the motivational state
of the speaker or hearer nor on their perspective.
Example:
A: It’s raining outside
B: No (I don’t think so)
The truth or falsity of “It’s raining outside” is independent of A (or B) being happy,
grumpy, or sad. It is also independent of the circumstance if A or B can actually see
if it rains or not, that is, if any of the two is close to a window or if A is just coming
from outside or not. This is what is meant with independent of their perspective.
As A’s It’s raining outside is a truth-functional assertion, B’s No counts here as
truth-functional denial. Also note that the example is not a classic adjacency pair as
It’s raining outside is not a question. Also note, if A would have asked Is it raining
outside?, a No on part of B would qualify here as truth-func. denial as well.
• Persp. dep. denial: Perspective dependent denials are negative responses to per-
spectival (or perspective-dependent) assertions or questions. The truth or falsity of
a perspectival assertion depends on either the knowledge (epistemic), the ability, or
the physical perspective of an agent.
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Example 1 (epistemic):
A: You know this one here, don’t you?
B: No, never seen such a thing
Example 2 (ability):
A: A big sportsman like you surely can do 50 pushups or not?
B: No, not right after a match.
Example 3 (physical perspective):
A: Can you see that red bird there on Mr Burns fence?
B: No, I can’t see over the hedges. You forget that you’re quite a bit taller
than I am.
• Mot. dep. denial: Motivation-dependent denials are negative responses to motivation-
dependent questions or assertions. The answers to motivation-dependent questions
depend on the motivational state of the addressee. With motivational states things
like likes and dislikes, or wants (and not-wants) are meant.
Note, that also those questions or assertions are considered motivation-dependent
which assume or refer to motivational states without containing motivational or vo-
litional verbs such as like, want, fancy, feel like etc. (implicitly motivational).
Example 1 (‘straight-forward’ motivational):
A: Do you like dogs?
B: No, not really.
Example 2 (‘volitional’):
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A: Do you want to come along to the cinema tonight?
B: No, I don’t feeling like going to the movies today.
Example 3 (implicit)
A: Will you finally mow the lawn this afternoon?
B: No
Example 4 (implicit)
A: How about some ice cream?
B: No, I’m rather feeling like something savoury at the moment
Note that in the examples 3 and 4 there is no verb or adjective in A’s questions that
would qualify as motivational. Nonetheless the question involves the motivational
state of the addressee by implicitly, that is without lexically referring to said states,
asking if the addressee feels like, is up to, or willing to mow the lawn or if she wants
some ice cream. Example 3 furthermore gives a hint that the listener must have
responded negatively to the very same question in the past, but this is an issue out
of our scope.
• Neg. agreement: Negative agreement is given if the participant produces a neg-
ative utterance of some kind and R agrees with it by uttering a negative as well.
Often but not always the negative is a repetition of the negative expression used
by the participant. The participant’s utterance can have an ‘assertional’ intonation
contour or a question contour. In the latter case it must be a question which already
suggests or anticipates an answer as is the case in example 1. Without the question
suggesting an answer there would be nothing with which B could agree with.
Example 1:
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A: So you don’t like strawberries then?
B: No
Example 2:
A: No, evidently you’re not very keen on strawberries.
B: No.
Non-adjacent negation types
• Rejection of offer: Rejective utterances are very similar to motivation-dependent
denial, the main difference being that the latter is adjacent to another utterance of
the conversation partner. Rejections are always reactions to non-linguistic offers or
proposals of some kind.
Example:
A is holding out an apple towards B, effectively offering it to B but not
saying a word
B: No, thanks! I’m not very much into fruit.
It is important to emphasize that the timing of the robots utterances in relation to the
human utterances is important to distinguish rejection of an offer from motivation-
dependent denial. The crucial question is: Does the coder deem the utterance to be
an answer or another kind of linguistic reaction to a recent utterance of the partici-
pant? Only if the coder thinks that the utterance is independent of the participant’s
utterance(s), it can be a case of rejection.
• Self-prohibition: Self-prohibition can only occur in the prohibitive setup. It con-
411
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
sists of the repetition of a word which was previously used by the participant in a
prohibitive way and/or while physically prohibiting the robot. Often participants
counteract self-prohibition by saying things like No, you can have that.
Example:
P is holding out a box to the robot
R: Can’t
P: Yes, you can hold it
• Neg. imperative: Negative Imperatives are similar to rejection of offers but don’t
assume an offer on part of the conversation partner. For an utterance to count as
a negative imperative it is necessary though, that the person that is addressed with
the imperative is in the process of doing something or just about to do something
that is not wanted by the speaker.
Example:
A: And now we’re going to put the chicken into the microwave.
B: No! Are you crazy?
• Mot. dep. assertion: Motivation-dependent assertions are utterances other than
rejection of offers or neg. imperatives that are linked to the motivational state to any
of the conversation partners. They are in some way a residual class for non-adjacent
motivational utterances that are too ‘weak’, intonationally or also by the mere con-
text in which they are uttered, to count as neg. imperatives.
Example: (mot. dep. assertion in B’s 1st utterance)
A: I’m going to the cinema tonight! Can’t wait to see the new Star Wars!
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B: I’m still knackered from the weekend. So I guess, I’ll give that one a miss.
Negation types that can be both adjacent and non-adjacent
There is only one type of negation in our taxonomy that does not clearly fit into the
adjacent-non-adjacent dichotomy:
• Mot. dep. exclamation: Motivation-dependent exclamations can stand in terms
of adjacency in isolation. In this case they typically refer to a current event. But
they can as well be adjacent and refer to an utterance of the conversation partner to
signal disagreement.
In the non-adjacent case they might be most similar to mot. dep. assertions but are
typically less articulate and more spontaneous. As opposed to mot. dep. assertions
they must refer to some current event of some kind which is disagreed with or negative
in some other way.
In the adjacent case they are most similar to mot. dep. denials but are not responses
to questions or (linguistic) offers but rather express disagreement with an evaluation
or assertion of the conversation partner which was not explicitly asked for.
Example 1 (non-adjacent):
A accidentally drops a glass of wine onto the white carpet.
A (or B): Oh no! I’ll never get that stain out.
Example 2 (adjacent):
A and B are watching a football game together but side for opposite teams.
Team X scores the first goal of the game 10 minutes before the end of the
game and chances are that this will remain the only goal of the game.
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A: Finally! It was about time. That’s it then, I guess.
B: No way! This game is far from over.
Example 1 illustrates that the event which triggers the exclamation can be caused
be the speaker itself or another agent. This type does not distinguish by whom the
triggering event has been caused or if it was caused by any agent at all. Natural
events such as a thunderbolt which are not caused by any agent could trigger such
an exclamation.
Other types
• None: It can happen with those negation words which I qualified earlier as prag-
matic, such as go, down, or done, that they are sometimes used and/or perceived
as negatives, i.e. they may serve for example the function of rejection. This is not
always the case though. So if one of these pragmatic negatives in a particular situ-
ation is none, their type should be qualified as such: none. This is only applicable
to pragmatic negation words, not to regular lexical/ grammatical negatives such as
(no, don’t, can’t etc).
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B.8.5 Coding Table for Human Utterances
Columns marked bold are given. Each entry was extracted from the files coming out of
the prosody analysis. The time stamps were created by hand by the 1st coder when coding
each entry. As opposed to the robot utterances the human utterances are tagged with a
start and end time to roughly give an idea of where the automatic utterance boundary
detection put the boundary. The utterance delimited through these boundaries does not
necessarily coincide with what we intuitively think of as an utterance.
Note that there can be more than one negation word per utterance. If this is
the case please specify both, separated through a semicolon in the column negation word.
If you think that the two negation words belong to different negation types, also specify
both negation types, separated through semicolon, in the column negation type. If you
think that both negative words belong to the same negation type, it is ok to specify the
type only once in this column.
Explanation of the single columns
speaker Specifies the speaker: robot (R) in case of R_utt or participant/human (P) in
case of H_utt.
start_of_utt Time relative to the start of the video recording when the utterance
started. Note that this time might be inaccurate by around 1 sec.
end_of_utt Time relative to the start of the video recording when the utterance ended.
salient word This field contains the most salient word of the particular utterance as
determined by the prosodic analysis. The most salient word can or cannot be the negation
word. This is why this field might contain non-negative words.
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Table B.32: Coding Table for Negative Human Utterances; entries for columns in bold are given,
entries for the remaining columns have to be entered by the coder
speaker start_of_utt end_of_utt salient negation negation type
word word
1:17:59 1:19:20 okay no truth-func. denial
3:49:27 3:50:10 squares no neg. agreement
H_utt 1:01:49 1:03:40 don’t don’t neg. question
5:17:39 5:20:30 hearts no rejection_of_request
negating self-prohibition
truth-func. question
neg. persp. question
neg. mot. question
neg. persp. assertion
mot. dep. assertion
truth-func. negation
prohibition
disallowance
neg. promise
neg. tag question
neg. intent interpret.
quoted negation
mot. dep. exclamation
neg. imperative
negation word This field has to be filled with the negation word(s) in the utterance by
the coder. It might be the same word as in the field “salient word” above or it might differ
from it as not all negation words are salient.
negation type Based on a first round of analysis the negation types listed below for
participants’ utterances were derived from the recorded interactions. These types can be
split into two groups: adjacent types, and non-adjacent types. Adjacent means that the
utterance is a linguistic reaction to what the conversation partner said, in this stage of
coding the conversation partner is the robot. A response to an answer, for example, is
adjacent, adjacent to the answer, whereas answers themselves count in our taxonomy as
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non-adjacent. (The terminology was coined by conversation analysts, though we use the
notion of adjacency in a somewhat broader sense. See also the very concise article on
Wikipedia on adjacency pairs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adjacency_pairs).
In all examples below the negative words which form part of the respective type are un-
derlined like this.
If an example contains square brackets this indicates an overlap of the speech of the robot
and the participant, they pronounced the so marked words simultaneously. Square brack-
ets with a number in them indicate pauses, and the number corresponds to the duration
of the pause in seconds.
Adjacent negation types
• Truth-func. denial: Truth-functional denial is a reaction of the participant to a
truth-functional utterance. See also the explanation of the same type in the section
on robot utterances.
Example 1:
P: What’s this one?
R: Heart
P: No, it’s not a heart
Example 2:
P: Heart!
R: Circle
P: No, bad
Example 3:
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P: What about the circular one?
R: There
P: No, this one’s a circle
• Neg. agreement: See the explanation for the same type in the section on robot
utterances plus the following extension: If a participant implicitly assumes a negative
utterance, as in example 1 below, this also counts as negative agreement. The either
in example 1 indicates that the participant believes that Deechee doesn’t like the
object. For all that matters P acts as if Deechee would have explicitly said no
before.
Example 1:
P: It’s not my favourite either, I’ll get rid of it. (Deechee did not say no
before P uttered this)
Example 2:
P: You want to play
R: No
P: No, ok. Lets try a different one then.
Example 3:
P: You don’t like the heart? No? It’s turning away from me, you don’t like
the heart
R: No
P: No! No, ok.
• Neg. question: Negative questions are very similar to negative agreement : they are
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adjacent negatives in which the negative word of the conversation partner is repeated.
As opposed to negative agreements the intonation contour here is one of doubt or
surprise. As opposed to neg. perspective questions and neg. mot. questions (see be-
low) this question type is necessarily adjacent to the utterance of the conversation
partner.
Example 1:
P: Do you [like] squares
R: [No
P: No?
Example 2:
P: Got a circle here
R: circle
P: Well done, that’s right
R: No
P: No?
Example 3:
P: What about the moon? The crescent [there?
R: [No
P: No?
• Rejection_of_request: As the name indicates, a rejection of a request is given if
Deechee asks the participant for something (or the participants interpret Deechee’s
utterance in this way) and P rejects linguistically to comply with Deechee’s request.
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As opposed to rejection_of_offers (see section on the classification of robot utter-
ances), rejections of requests are adjacent to a linguistic request of the conversation
partner.
Example 1:
R: Moon
P: No, you’ve had the moon already
Example 2:
R: Square
P: You no.. no I’m not gonna show you the squares any more
Example 3:
R: Moon
P: No, we’ve had the moon already
• Negation of self-prohibition: Negations of self-prohibitions only occur in the pro-
hibitive scenario. Deechee utters a prohibitive negative, that is, a negative which
was previously used by the participant to prohibit Deechee from touching a box.
In this situation participants sometimes interpret Deechee’s utterance as a form of
self-prohibition and counteract using this type of negation.
Example 1:
P presents and speaks about the heart box. R goes for it, but flinches back.
R: No
P: No, you’re allowed to touch this, it’s ok
Example 2:
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P speaks about the hearts, R smiles and reaches for it and P hands the box
to R
R: No
P: No, you can hold it, I don’t mind
Example 3:
R is holding the moon box. P used never in previous sessions to explain
Deechee which boxes were forbidden.
R: Never
P: No, no, good. This is for you
Non-Adjacent Negation Types
• Truth-func. question: Truth-functional questions, as the name indicates, are ques-
tions that refer to or ask for some state of affairs being or not being the case. The
way they were typically used by participants in case of them being captured in the
coding table was to contain suggestions to possible answers. Open truth-functional
question, that is questions which do not already suggest an answer or a set of possible
answers, albeit being the norm within the experiments are typically not listed in our
table due to a lack of negative words.
Example 1:
P: Is that a square? Yeah, no?
Example 2:
P: Is that a heart? No?
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• Truth-func. negation: Truth-functional negation is supposed to capture all kinds of
truth-functional negation which are not truth-functional denials. Truth-func. nega-
tion is in this sense a residual class that captures all non-adjacent truth-functional
utterances, be they negative assertions, suggestions, speculations, or guesses about
state of affairs, which are in essence truth-functional. Also negative normative asser-
tions such as the one in example 2 below count as a member of this class. Normative
assertions are assertions about rules, laws or general practices in society such as
“Thou must not kill” (law), “When driving a car one must stop in front of a red traf-
fic lights” (rule), or referring to social practices in Italy, “When you greet somebody
it is common to give the person two kisses, one on each cheek” (social practice).
Example 1:
P: My heart beats. Have you got one? [1.5s] No robot heart maybe? Maybe
not.
Example 2:
In the context of explaining round traffic signs:
P: They will tell you 30, which means you mustn’t go any faster than 30.
Example 3:
P: Which one didn’t we look at? We didn’t look at the moon.
• Neg. persp. question: Negative perspective questions, together with positive per-
spective questions, are the counterpart to perspective dependent denial on the side
of the robot utterances. As is the case with the latter, they encompass questions,
where the truth of the answer depends on either the knowledge (epistemic), the abil-
ity, the physical perspective of the agent or any other state of affairs which can be
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only judged by the agent that is addressed. For example, in example 2 below only
the addressee can decide whether it is hungry or not. These questions either contain
a lexical negative such as no or a grammatical one such as don’t.
Example 1 (epistemic):
P: Do you remember the moon? Don’t you remember the moon?
Example 2 (physical perspective):
P: Can you see the squares? No? Ok
Example 3 (“biological perspective”):
P is speaking about lollipops
P: No? You’re not feeling very hungry today?
• Neg. persp. assertion: Negative perspective assertions, together with positive
perspective assertions, can be found as counterpart to perspective dependent denial
on the side of the robot utterances. All remarks on the dependencies of truth values
mentioned under neg. persp. questions apply here as well. Furthermore perspectival
assertions are captured here which are not about some perspectival aspect of the
addressee but about such an aspect of the speaker (see example 1). Sometimes
it’s very hard to distinguish neg. persp. assertions from neg. persp. questions as for
example in example 2.
Example 1 (epistemic, regarding the speaker herself):
P: Do you like the one with the squares? I can’t remember
Example 2 (epistemic, regarding the addressee)
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P: You don’t remember this one?
Example 3 (physical ability)
P tries to balance a box on Deechee’s hand
P: No, I don’t think you can hold it.
Example 4 (physical perspective)
P: Can you see it? You can’t? Or you’re looking ..
Example 5 (other ability)
P: Can you say moon? No
• Neg. mot. question: Negative motivational questions are questions that contain
a lexical or grammatical negative. In the extreme case they consist of nothing else
than this very negative, which has the intonational contour of a question. They
may refer to the motivational state of the addressee directly (example 2). But they
may also refer to stances or preferences (example 1) or intentional actions (example
3) that are indirectly linked to motivational states. In the direct case the question
contains motivational or volitional verbs or constructions such as want, like, feeling
like, being keen on etc. In the indirect case they do not contain such ‘motivational
markers’ but clearly refer to the preferences of the addressee or her willingness to
perform a certain action based on her current motivation. As it happens, example
3 contains the volitional word want, but a pragmatically equivalent question in the
given context might be “Are you going to hold it? No?” which does not contain any
such markers.
Example 1:
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P: They’re pretty. Don’t you think hearts are pr.. . I think hearts are very
pretty.
Example 2:
P: You wanna look at the circles again. Do you not like the heart?
Example 3:
P: Do you want to hold it? No?
• Neg. intent interpret.: Negative intent interpretations are assertions in which
the participant interprets Deechee’s intentional or motivational state utilizing lexical
and/or grammatical negatives. Typically the semantics of these expressions is neg-
ative as well, i.e. the participants expresses that she thinks that Deechee does “not
want” or “not like” either a particular object or does “not want” or “not like” to per-
form a particular action such as holding the box. Neg. intent interpret. are in some
way a sub-type of mot. dep. assertions (see below). Whereas mot. dep. assertions
can refer to present, past, or future motivational states of speaker or addressee, neg.
intent interpret. refer to the motivational states of the addressee only and only of his
or her states right here and now. They are thought to have a special importance in
early language acquisition in that toddlers might learn what we call here motivational
words and their meaning by way of caretakers interpreting the toddler’s emotional
states or intents linguistically.
At times it can be hard to distinguish between neg. mot. questions and neg. intent
interpretations as the main difference between the two types is the fact if the utter-
ance is a proper question or not.
Example 1:
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P: No you don’t like circles do you like triangles (no transcription error here,
the participant indeed merged two expected you’s into one)
Example 2:
P: You don’t want to hold the box. [1s] No
Example 3:
P: Do you like the circles box?
R: circles
[1.5s]
P: No? Ok
• Mot. dep. assertion: Motivation-dependent assertions are all assertions that refer
directly (example 1) or indirectly to the motivational states in the present (examples
3), past (example 1) or future of the speaker, or the addressee (example 2), which
are not negative intent interpretations. This type is in this regard another residual
class.
Example 2 is a borderline case as it is questionable how tightly a personal judgment
about a mishap (reading variant 1) is linked to motivational states. Another way of
interpreting this utterance (reading variant 2, socio-linguistic) is the following: The
purpose of the utterance is to soothe the potential fear of the conversation partner,
a fear that might be directed towards the socially dominant teacher, in case of the
teacher being angered by the child/robot. Teachers have, by virtue of their social
status, the power to hand out punishments. If one accepts this reading variant, there
are expected emotional states with both the speaker and the addressee: expected
fear on the part of the student (S) based on his expectation of anger on the part
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of the teacher (T). T expects S to (potentially) display fear because T expects S to
(potentially) expect T to become angry, because S dropped the box. Therefore T
counteracts the expected fear by issuing the utterance in order to convey to S that
T will not become angry because of what happened. As the term “motivational”
here also captures emotional states, a link to motivation would be given under this
reading.
Example 1:
P: And I think the square you didn’t like
Example 2:
P: Don’t worry, not serious (when R drops the box)
Example 3:
P: Squares [1.5s] I don’t like squares, I think they are boring.
• Prohibition: (Linguistic) prohibition only occurs in the rejective + prohibitive sce-
nario. It encompasses occurrences of negation whose function is to keep Deechee
from touching forbidden objects. Sometimes such an utterance taken in isolation
does not indicate that its function is prohibitive, as for example in example 2, which
looks rather like a truth-func. negation. But, in context, when looking at the video
recording, it becomes clear that the utterance is used as prohibition. The prohibitive
utterance can or cannot be accompanied by the participant physically restraining
Deechee’s arm movement.
Example 1:
P: No, no, you’re not allowed to touch (no physical restraint on the part
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of the participant)
Example 2:
P: No, you’re not holding it, but you can look at them (no physical
restraint)
Example 3:
P: No (P pushes Deechee’s arm away)
• Disallowance: Disallowance is similar to prohibition but rather captures those ut-
terances that express general (negative) rules. In this sense disallowance utterances
are more detached from the here and now of the interaction than prohibitive utter-
ances. Whereas prohibitive utterances are always triggered by a current action on
part of the robot, disallowances can or cannot accompany such an action. It can be
tricky to clearly distinguish the two types from each other and possibly there is no
clear-cut boundary. But there seems to be an important difference between stating a
(negative) rule on one hand and uttering a prohibition with the purpose of stopping
an agent’s actions at that very moment on the other. The question, that the coder
has to ask herself is: Is this utterance meant to act upon Deechee immediately or is
it rather the expression of a (general) rule. I observed that both can happen more
or less at the same time by uttering a prohibition followed by the statement of a
negative rule.
Example 1:
P: You can’t have this one (Deechee is neither being restrained when this
is uttered nor shortly afterwards)
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Example 2:
P: You can’t touch the moon (Deechee is not even trying to touch the
moon at the time of utterance)
Example 3:
P: You’re not allowed to touch the circles (This utterance was uttered
at times when P was restrain-
ing Deechee’s arm as well as
when not restraining it)
• Neg. promise: Negative promises are those negative utterances, in which partici-
pants commit themselves not to do certain things (any more) in the future. Often
said commitment is triggered by a negative reaction of Deechee. “Promise” is actu-
ally a slightly too strong term as our category is supposed to capture all kinds of
future commitments by the participants - also commitments whose force is weaker
than that of a promise. In the examples 1 and 2 what is actually said is the following:
“We won’t play with X any more”. As the participants are in our setup the ones who
decide what is played with, this utterance amounts to “In the future I won’t pick up
X any more”.
Example 1:
P: You don’t like the circles, no? Ok, we won’t play with the circles.
Example 2:
P: Alright, I’m not gonna force you.
Example 3:
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P: Ok, we won’t play with that one then.
• Neg. tag question: Negative tag questions are negative grammatical constructions
that are attached to the end of the utterance. They consist of the negated auxiliary
verb of the main clause, if there is one, plus a personal pronoun (see example 2: can
[main clause]→ can’t you [tag question]). As can be seen in the examples 1 and 3 the
main clause does not always contain the non-negated form of the negated auxiliary
verb in the tag question, but putting it there wouldn’t make a semantic difference
to the utterance (ex. 1: Oh you do like that, don’t you, ex. 2: But you did like
the circles box, didn’t you). Tag questions, negated or non-negated, are not proper
questions but are attached to assertions. The negation is purely grammatical and,
as far as we know, does not serve any of the functions that the other negatives in
our taxonomy serve. Yet as they are distinct grammatical constructs, they are very
easy to spot.
Example 1:
P: Oh you like that, don’t you?
Example 2:
P: You can say square for me, can’t you?
Example 3:
P: But you liked the circles box, didn’t you?
Negation types that can be both adjacent and non-adjacent
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• Quoted negation: In the case of quoted negation, the negative part of the utterance
belongs to a part of reported speech, which, if written down, could be quoted or would
constitute indirect speech. The speech reported can either stem from the participant
herself or from Deechee.
Example 1:
P: I said ‘no’. Not this (uttered in a prohibitive situation)
Example 2:
P: No, you don’t like it. You said you didn’t like the squares.
Example 3:
P: What you’re saying Deechee? No? Ok
• Mot. dep. exclamation: See explanation to the same type in the section on the
coding of robot utterances.
Example 1:
P: Clever boy, I didn’t even need to say the name!
Example 2:
P: Oh we go back to the crescent moon then I think you quite .. oh dear, oh
no!
• Neg. imperative: Negative imperatives are a residual class for all those impera-
tives which are neither prohibitions nor disallowances. The two latter types cover all
imperative negatives which are linked to the prohibition task, set out in the exper-
imental instruction, that is, that Deechee must never touch the forbidden objects.
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Example 2 below was not conceived of as a form of disallowance as it was judged to
be more general than utterances that are tightly linked to the prohibition task. In
the case of this example this judgment is supported by the fact that the participant
used different, and more specific prohibitive utterances, which refered specifically to
the particular situation at hand (the prohibition task), before uttering this negative.
Example 1:
P: Oh you’re holding that very nicely. Don’t throw it away
Example 2:
P: You can’t have it! (uttered while P is
P: It’s no good, it’s no good putting a face like that restraining Deechee)
Example 3:
P: No, don’t say ’done’
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B.8.6 Fused Negation Types
The following types were fused in order to reduce the total number of negation types
observed amongst the human utterances.
Neg. epistemic assert.
Neg. persp. assert.
Neg. persp. assert.
Neg. epistemic question
Neg. persp. question
Neg. persp. question
Apart from an overall reduction of the number of negation types the indicated types were
fused into the indicated types because the resulting type subsequently matches the type
persp. dep. denial on the robot’s side as first pair parts.
B.8.7 Super-/Sub-Types
The following types stand in a super-/sub-type relationship to each other, that is, the ones
listed at the end of an arrow are more specialized than their super-type. All utterances
that are instances of the sub-type are therefore also instances of the super-type.
neg. imperative
vv ))
prohibition disallowance
truth-func. negation

truth-func. denial
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mot. dep. assertions
tt **
mot. dep. denial neg. intent interpret.
For the sake of simplicity of the coding scheme one might argue that it would be advan-
tageous to eliminate these sub-types. Yet in order to keep the human negation types as
synchronised with the robot negation types as possible, we decided to maintain truth-func.
denial. Moreover this is also one of the negation types listed in Pea’s taxonomy. Another
argument for maintaining this type is the circumstance that it indicates a genuine interac-
tion between participant and robot, whereas the super-type truth-func. negation is more
detached from the actual interaction both in terms of adjacency and in terms of the topic.
The same argument can be made for the relationship between mot. dep. assertions, mot.
dep. denial, and neg. intent interpretations. Furthermore neg. intent interpretations are
linked to one of our hypotheses and are thought to play a central role in the acquisitions
of emotional/affective words.
With regards to the three types neg. imperative, prohibition, and disallowance, we de-
cided not to eliminate the two subtypes, as prohibition is tightly linked with the prohibitive
task and shows that actual linguistic prohibition took place, which in general cannot be
said about neg. imperatives.
B.8.8 Problematic Columns
P (re-)acts in accordance .. [Robot utt.] This column might be the most problematic
one in terms of inter-coder agreement. Initially we thought it might be beneficial to restrict
the situational context considered by the coders to a very tight time window around the
occurrence of the utterance in order to see the ‘differential effect’ of the negative word, i.e.
the change in the participants’ behaviour caused by the robot uttering the word.
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Consider the following example, where the coder has to decide if the participant is
reacting to R’s behaviour or not. The decision is one between “no (re-)action” (NoA) vs.
“acts on behaviour” (AB). Consider the situation where the participant holds a box in
front of the robot and expects it to take it. The presentation of the box typically lasts
a few seconds. Let’s say P starts at time x to offer the box to R. R exhibits for x + 5s
an undecided behaviour and switches afterwards to a positive behaviour. After x + 6s R
says no, that is, it produces a negative utterance which is incongruent with its positive
behaviour. P tries to put the box into R’s hand. If now a tight time window of 2s around
the utterance at x+ 6s is applied, P’s behaviour does not change within this window - P is
during all this time holding out the box and trying to get R to hold it. This would result in
an entry of NoA in this column, as P’s behaviour did not change within the time window
around the utterance. If we extended the time window to 6s though, the entry would
change to AB because P initiated the movement at the very beginning of the window.
For one single participant and one single session one might be able to find a good value
for the time window, but certainly it is close to impossible to find such a window for all
participants across all sessions. Some participants might be in a hurry in one session and
are therefore less patient with the robot. We observed that some participant react very
quickly to R’s gestures and speech (decision time  1s), whereas others spend ages with
‘negotiating’ (see next paragraph).
Another problem that a coder faces when deciding which entry to choose for this
column is caused by the fact that the willingness to react to the robots gestures and or
speech seems, at least partially, to depend upon the relative time from the start of the
teaching episode. If P just picked up an object she typically does not react immediately
upon initiating this action to the robot utterances and/or behaviour. What is ‘typical’ in
terms of the participants ‘reactivity’ has to be determined from earlier sessions and the
435
Elaborate Results and Tables Appendix
participant’s previous reaction within the same session.
Most participants spent some time with the same box to make sure that R means
what it displays/says. For these participants an immediate reaction after initiating the
presentation of the box is atypical. Yet there are some participants that display a very high
sensitivity to R’s behaviour and speech and will probably react to a no from Deechee pretty
much from the very beginning of the teaching episode. The majority of participants, even if
in principle sensitive to R’s speech and behaviour do not react immediately upon the start
of a teaching episode to R’s behaviour. This observation hints to another limit of a Searle-
type speech act theory and any other theory that rips utterances out of the conversational
context and treats them in isolation: Some pragmaticists take the stance that the meaning
of communicative acts is typically negotiated in a conversation (process view as opposed to
a ‘structure view’). Any negotiation process obviously takes a certain time. Our suspicion
is that this is what we have observed in the interactions. Conversational analysts would
argue that the relative position of an utterances within the conversation is crucial to
understand its overall function within the conversation. Yet our very coding here is not
purely based upon CA but rather a mixed quantivative-qualitative approach. And just by
the virtue of each negative utterances having a separate entry in the table as is needed
for a quantitative approach we treat them, at least tendentially, as independent from each
other. Even if the coders do not treat them independently from each other and try to
account for their interdependency, any subsequent statistic will effectively treat them as
independent.
For these reasons we decided to abandon the ‘tight time window’ and left the decision
to the coder which parts of the participant’s behaviours she would deem relevant for mak-
ing the decision no matter how long before the time of the utterance the behaviour was
initiated. If for example the robot is holding out the hand for 15s, the participants puts
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the box into it’s hand at x+8s, and R says “no” at x+10s, we would still code this as AB
despite the relevant action having been initiated long before the utterance.
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Conversation Analytical Transciption
Glossary
The following transcription symbols are used within this thesis and accord with common
conversational analytic standards as described in Hutchby and Wooffitt (1999) and ten
Have (2007).
Notice that all punctuation marks refer to prosodic speech characteristics, not to grammat-
ical units.
(0.5) or (.5) Length of a gap in seconds (before decimal point) and 10ths of
secods (after decimal point)
(.) Pause of less than 0.2 seconds
= ‘Latching’ between utterances: equal signs at end of one utter-
ances and at beginning of a subsequent utterance indicates no
’gap’ between the two (parts of) utterances
.hh Dot before ‘h’ indicates that speaker is breating in - the more ‘h’s,
the longer the drawing of breath
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hh Without dot the ‘h’ indicates that the speaker is breathing out
.pt indicates a ‘lip-smack’
[ ] An opening square bracket that circumbraces two subsequent lines
or two vertically aligned square brackets indicate the start of over-
lapping talk. The closing square bracket indicates the end of the
overlapping talk.
(( )) Double opening and closing brackets indicate non-verbal activity
or other comments of the transcriber
- the dash indicates the abrupt ending of a word or a sound, as it
for example happens in self-repair when changing the word
: The preceding sound or letter has been streched by the speaker if
it is followed by a colon. The more colons, the longer the prolon-
gation.
! The exclamation mark indicates prosodic emphasis at the end of
an utterance
. The period indicates a stopping fall in tone at the end of an ut-
terance, which does not necessarily coincide with the end of a
grammatical sentence
? Question marks indicate a utterance-final rising intonation as is
typical but not exclusive to the end of intonation contours of ques-
tions.
↑ ↓ Vertical arrows pointing upwards and downwards indicate a rising
or falling intonation contour and can be applied within an utter-
ance
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(utt) Transcriptions that occur in single opening and closing parenthe-
ses indicate uncertainty on part of the the transcriber, when an
utterance is barley audible or otherwise distorted.
( ) Content-less opening and closing single parentheses indicate that
the speaker did utter something which was unintelligible to the
transcriber.
CAPITALS Capitalized transcription were perceived as noticeably louder by
the transcriber as compared to the previous and following utter-
ances.
° ° Degree signs at the beginning and end of an utterance indicate that
this utterance is noticably quieter as compared to the surrounding
utterances.
> < An utterance that is bracketed by a More than and less than sign
was produced quicker (“sped up”) as compared to the speaker’s
average speed of talk.
440
Appendix D
Contents of the DVD
D.1 <DVD_ROOT>/data
The data directory contains all files related to the audio processing and symbol grounding.
The original audio files were compressed into the mp3-format in order to make the entirety
of them fit onto the DVD.
D.2 <DVD_ROOT>/forms
This directory contains the consent forms containing the written instructions that were
given to participants prior to the experiment proper.
D.3 <DVD_ROOT>/software
The software directory contains all software that was written related to the work presented
within this thesis. The subdirectory scripts_data_proc contains all the scripts, that were
used within the analysis of the data. The italk subdirectory contains a snapshot of the
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ITALK svn versioning system roughly at the time when the experiments ended. Notice
that the software is at the time of writing already out-of-date due to the fast development
cycle of iCub-related software. In order to run our modules on the iCub, they certainly
will have to be adapted to the particular version of the iCub. We also expect that most
time constants, that are extremely important if realistic behaviour as seen in the videos
shall be achieved, have to be fine-tuned again.
D.4 <DVD_ROOT>/videos
The videos subdirectory contains all the experimental video files for both experiments
and some demo videos that were made for presentations. The videos are arranged by
session. P01 to P12 are participants from the rejection experiment, and P13 to P22 are
participants from the prohibition experiment. All videos were reduced in image size and
compressed in order make them fit onto the DVD and are therefore of mediocre quality.
The accumulated size of the original HD video files exceeded 100 GB and can therefore
not be delivered with the thesis.
D.4.1 Selected scenes
In the following are pointers to selected scenes that show some of the robot’s behaviours
and noteworthy ‘highlights’ of the interaction, that we alluded to from within the main
section of the thesis.
Head shakes
Participants interpreting the object <DVD>/videos/session4/P15-280312.mp4 5:10
avoidance behaviour as head shakes
Drops - intentional or else
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iCub dropping/throwing away an object <DVD>/videos/session2/P05-011211.mp4 5:35
<DVD>/videos/session5/P06-151211.mp4 0:15
<DVD>/videos/session1/P07-191211.mp4 0:18
<DVD>/videos/session2/P08-040112.mp4 4:25
P07 soothing Deechee after <DVD>/videos/session2/P07-040112.mp4 4:53
accidental drop
P07 interpreting drop as intentional <DVD>/videos/session1/P07-191211.mp4 0:33
iCub holding an object for a while <DVD>/videos/session1/P07-191211.mp4 5:22
and finally, unintentionally dropping it
Giving back a box
iCub giving back a box <DVD>/videos/session3/P05-021211.mp4 0:58
iCub giving back a box <DVD>/videos/session4/P05-051211.mp4 3:27
<DVD>/videos/session4/P06-141211.mp4 0:28
Negative intent interpret.
<DVD>/videos/session4/P09-160112.mp4 5:04
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